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A Note on Country Designation
We are aware of the linguistic problems difficulties in demarcating differences
between countries. The categories of 'developed', 'developing' and 'least
developed' have been criticized for their Western-based normative assumptions
about what constitutes development. Similarly, designating countries as part
of the 'First', 'Second', Third' and 'Fourth Worlds' has been challenged as
hierarchical, and even the older divisions of 'North' and 'South', while still
encountered, are not geographically accurate. The World Bank now organizes
countries by per capita income levels ('high', 'upper middle', 'lower middle',
'low'). This usage is becoming increasingly common, but reduces differences
to a single economic metric. There is no universally accepted or acceptable
way of denoting country differences; therefore we adopt the usage most
frequently encountered in the documents we reviewed, i.e. that of 'developed',
'developing' and 'least developed' countries.
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Foreword
For most of the past century, the spread of mysterious, frightening diseases is
something that has occurred mostly in poorer parts of the planet. Now that it is
identified as primarily a Third World', especially African, condition, AIDS has
briefly managed to make it to the highest level of political agendas, including
the UN Security Council. But all in all, the G8 countries under scrutiny in this
book have for decades lived as though immune to at least two of the biblical
scourges -famine and pestilence.
Enter Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). As this book goes to press,
SARS has suddenly put Canada on the same plane - in the eyes of much of the
world - as rural China. SARS has brought home how completely we rely on
the uninterrupted rhythm of our interdependent society - from family and
cultural events, to transportation systems bringing us to work and tourists to
us, to the smooth workings of a complex economy that is highly dependent on
the goodwill and good commerce of other jurisdictions. And, of course, a public
health system with enough trained people, enough resources, and enough
built-in reserves to monitor, recognize, interpret and act on the blips on the
epidemiological radar screen that signal a potential epidemic.
But SARS is clearly not just a medical problem. What SARS also highlights
is the extent to which the health of the public -and, importantly, perceptions
and actions half a world away - influence the health of the polity and the
economy.
This is, then, an opportune time to reflect on some of the less obvious
pathways and effects of globalization, and this book is an important contribution
to such reflection. The authors pursue the logic of globalization in arguing
that if we truly live in an interdependent world, then we will often have to
look to policies and decisions in one place in order to understand effects in
another. They argue further that if the G8 is in many ways a new seat of global
governance, then the G8 should be assessed as a group. This book is, to our
knowledge, the first attempt to bring together an analysis of G8 policies,
commitments and actions related to the South in the major domains known to
influence health: macroeconornic policy and debt; health-care and health
systems; education; nutrition and agriculture; official development assistance;
trade; and the environment. It evaluates each area from the perspective of public
health, and presents data from each country as well as the G8 overall. In addition
to providing a rigorous and well-referenced evidence base for policy makers,
researchers and activists, it is also an innovative presentation of what is
effectively a textbook on policy for global health.
x
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But the book does not support a simple North-South division of labour,
responsibility and blame. The project that led to this book was an intensive
research collaboration between Canadian and South African scholars in the
months leading up to the June 2002 G8 summit at Kananaskis, Canada. It was
this South-North and South-South dialogue, focused on rigorous analysis and
collegial debate on timely and important issues, that inspired the International
Development Research Centre to support the study. The project sought to
engage Canadian and African researchers, policy makers and activists in a
discussion about G8 health commitments, as well as NEPAD, the New
Partnership for Africa's Development. NEPAD was to be presented at Kananaskis
as an African plan for Africa's development, but many African critics had pointed
out that the drafts had been much more widely circulated among G8 leaders
than among ordinary Africans. The sector strategies to implement NEPAD are
still being developed; the 'NEPAD report card' is consequently much more
preliminary than that on the G8. While NEPAD can be analyzed and monitored
relative to its internal propositions, it is important to recognize that it is also
'globalized' -the underlying assumptions, proposed strategies and the document
itself are very much a product of global discourses and dynamics. It is therefore
not accidental that an analysis of NEPAD is integrated into a book about G8
promises.
Sadly, the authors conclude that the currently dominant vision of how
economies and societies should function is not conducive to an early
improvement in the dismal health situation of most of the world's population.
Even on a simple count of 'promises kept versus promises broken,' G8 countries
have a long way to go simply to fulfill explicit commitments made in official
communiques. On the NEPAD front, the authors see promising signs of a
realistic and pro-poor health strategy under development. Whether the other
sections of NEPAD and, more importantly, the political and economic climate
in Africa and globally, are likely to allow its successful implementation is, in
the authors' view, more doubtful. The principal challenge remains: how to put
human health and well-being at the centre of development, rather than at the
margins. This book provides an invaluable foundation for addressing this
challenge. We hope that these researchers as well as other colleagues will continue
the work begun here, notably through analyzing the dynamics and processes
through which the documents under examination have been produced -and
democratizing these dynamics.
Christina Zarowsky, MD, PhD
International Development Research Centre
xi
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Introduction
Estimated amount spent globally in 2003 on increased security against
terrorism: US$551 billion (Equity International, 2003).1
For the US alone: US$57 billion (Equity International, 2003).
For Canada alone: US$7.5 billion (Equity International, 2003).2
Best estimate one-time cost of total debt relief required to meet
development goals for all developing countries: US$600 billion (Hanlon,
2000).
High-end estimate of annual costs to meet the first seven of the Millenium
Development Goals: US$70 billion (Devarajan et al., 2002).
Total G7 development assistance, 2001: US$38 billion (OECD, 2003).
Total G7 development assistance to basic health, 2001: US$950 million
(OECD, 2003).
In 1978, building on the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a United
Nations conference proposed the goal of health for all by the year 2000 (WHO,
1978). In 2003, only limited progress has been made toward that goal. Most
notably, for much of the world's population, the ability to lead a healthy life is
limited by the direct and indirect effects of poverty. Almost half the world's
people live on an income of US$2 per day or less (World Bank, 2001b: 36-68),
creating vulnerabilities that all too often magnify one another. Lack of access
to health care is just one of these vulnerabilities. Among many consequences
is the fact that communicable diseases continue to comprise a significant portion
of the burden of disease in the developing world. At the same time, many
people outside the industrialized world now face a double burden of disease, as
they are exposed not only to communicable diseases associated with poverty
and inadequate health-care infrastructure, but also to non-communicable diseases
such as diabetes, and to industrial pollution, associated with rapid transitions to
patterns of production and consumption more typical of the industrialized
world (WHO, 1999; Sen & Bonita, 2000; Yach, 2001).
Ill health not only results from poverty, but also can limit the ability of
individuals and entire societies to escape from poverty: '[G]iven limited assets,
for the poor their body is often their only asset, and when the body is weakened
through hunger, illness and accidents, an entire family can plunge into
destitution' (Narayan, 2001: 15; see generally Narayan et al., 2000). The
contribution that interventions to improve population health can make to
economic development was a central theme of the work of the World Health
Organization (WHO) Commission on Macroeconomics and Health (CMH)
xii
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(CMH, 2001). Improved health, for example, may have accounted for as much
as one third of the East Asian 'economic miracle' (Bloom & Williamson, 1998).
Conversely, the impacts of HIV/AIDS and malaria provide especially dramatic,
large-scale illustrations of the economic damage that can result from poor
health (Haacker, 2002; Sachs & Malaney, 2002). Malaria is estimated to be
slowing African economic growth by up to 1.3 per cent per year (Gallup &
Sachs, 2000), while HIV/AIDS is substantially slowing income growth in Africa
and could account for an annual loss equivalent to 2.6 per cent of gross domestic
product (GDP) in many sub-Saharan African countries (Bonnel, 2000). As th
CMH summarized, 'health status seems to explain an important part of the
difference in economic growth rates [between developed and least developed
countries] even after controlling for standard macroeconomic variables' (CMH
2001:24).
By way of the social disintegration and lost economic opportunities they
create, high rates of disease are also linked to a decline in state capacity, and in
extreme instances can lead to state failure, and national and regional conflict
(Cornia & Court, 2001; Price-Smith, 2002). High income inequality and
economic stagnation also underpin disease burden, state collapse and regional
conflict (Nafziger & Auvinen, 2002). Protecting health, partly by direct
intervention and partly by creating conditions in which it is possible to be
healthy, is now a security issue for the world community, as well as a
humanitarian or human rights issue and a key element of development policy.
Unfortunately, as attested to by the data cited at the beginning of this
Introduction, this is not currently how the world's wealthier governments
allocate their resources for security.
Policy choices made in the rich countries that dominate the world economic
and political order can affect the prospects for health half a world away. In
1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)
emphasized the two-way causal relations between poverty and environmental
destruction, as well as the opportunities for the industrialized world to intervene
positively -e.g. by resolving the debt crisis that was even then draining capital
from the poor of the world to the rich. In the same year, a UN Children's Fund
(UNICEF)-sponsored study indicated that a combination of global recession
and the 'adjustment' policies adopted by national governments, often as
preconditions for receiving assistance from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), had the effect of reducing such basic indicators of child
welfare as nutrition, immunization levels and education. The study pointed
out that such outcomes were neither universal nor inevitable, calling for
'adjustment with a human face', with a special focus on protecting the
vulnerable (Cornia et al, 1987; see also Stewart, 1991).3
Subsequently, 'globalization' became familiar as a way of describing a set of
xiii
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changes in the organization of production, trade policy and law, investment
flows, and the diffusion of cultural commodities exemplified by the emergence
of global brands. Globalization affects the determinants of health by changing
exposures to health risks and the characteristics of health systems, and by
affecting the structure of household, community and national economies. The
asymmetric nature of international trade and financial relations is such that
any change in performance in the industrialized countries is amplified in its
effects on the developing economies' (Cornia, 1987:16). As national economies
are more exposed to global financial flows, economic crises of the kind that
occurred in Mexico in 1994-95 and in South Asia in 1997-98 dramatically increase
the number of people living in poverty. Relocation of 'dirty' industries or
waste disposal operations to low-wage countries may increase exposure to
hazardous pollutants (Burns, 1988; Puckett etal, 2002). Privatization and cost
recovery initiatives demanded by the international financial institutions (IFIs),
primarily the World Bank and the IMF, as conditions of development assistance
may raise the cost of access to health care or access to safe drinking water. The
reorientation of national economies toward production for export in order to
service foreign debt, often another condition of IFI loans or grants, may lead to
diversion of agricultural resources from food production for domestic use to
production of commodity crops for export (Mediterranean Commission on
Sustainable Development, 2001; Costello et al., 1994; lannariello etal., 2000;
Murphy, 2000; Pinstrup-Andersen, 1987). It may also be another risk factor for
domestic conflict. An analysis of civil wars between 1965 and 1999 found that
countries in which a substantial share of national income was derived from
the export of primary commodities, including agricultural crops, were more
prone to conflict (Thorbecke & Charumilind, 2002:1486; see also Collier (2000);
and Collier and Hoeffler (2001) for detailed discussion of the primary studies
on which this conclusion is based).
Why a Focus on the G8?
The G7 (or Group of Seven Nations) was formed in 1975, after the so-called oil
crisis highlighted the increasing interconnectedness of the world's economies.
The six countries originally included were France, the United States, Britain,
Germany, Italy and Japan. Canada joined the 'summit seven' in 1976, and hosted
the G7 summit in 1981; the European Community (now the European Union,
or EU) joined in 1977, although the EU does not have the same status as national
governments. Russia achieved partial membership in the group in 1998, and
full membership as of 2003; thus the G7 have become the G8. The purpose of
the G8 and their summits is described as threefold: providing collective
management of the world economy; reconciling globalization tensions among
xiv
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G8 members; and generating global political leadership 'where heads of state
and government take cooperation further than their officials and ministers
can' (Bayne, 2001:23).
John Kirton, who heads the University of Toronto's research center on the
operations of the G8 process (the G8 Research Group), believes the G8 grouping
'is emerging as an effective centre, and is prospectively the effective centre, of
global governance' (Kirton, 1999:46). Certainly, the G7 economies are collectively
dominant in statistical terms, with their 11.5 per cent of the world's people
accounting for 44.7 per cent of global economic activity and 46.5 per cent of
its exports (IMF, 2002: Table A). Perhaps even more importantly, these countries
dominate World Bank and IMF decision-making and also wield considerable
power in the World Trade Organization (WTO), because the size of their markets
provides them with formidable bargaining advantages vis-a-vis the countries of
the developing world.
This claim to emergent global governance, backed by economic clout, has
brought the G8 and their summits under increased scrutiny in recent years.
Civil society groups concerned with the environmental and social costs of
globalization criticize G8 leaders for managing the world economy for their
own benefit, with police-protester interaction turning violent at the 2001 Genoa
summit. Fiscally conservative commentators wonder whether summits provide
value for money, especially given the extra security precautions now taken,
which were estimated to push the hosting costs of the 2002 Kananaskis summit
to between US$ 130 and US$200 million. Despite the G8's improving compliance
record, others question the adequacy of its commitments, particularly on the
environment (Bayne, 2001), and ask whether the neo-liberal economic policies
the G8 continue to defend can succeed in reducing global poverty or reaching
other International Development Goal (IDG) targets, which it endorses (Dallaire,
2001).
The Report Card Project
Against this background of increasing globalization and increased attention
directed toward the G8 by globalization's civil society critics, we set out to
prepare a 'report card' on how commitments made at the summits affect health
and the determinants of health, with particular reference to countries outside
the industrialized world that account for roughly five-sixths of the world's
population. Our research explores (a) the extent to which G8 countries have
lived up to summit commitments, and (b) the adequacy of those commitments
when measured against the large and growing literature on globalization and
health. A special sub-theme of our work is the effect of summit commitments
and subsequent (in)actions on health and the determinants of health in sub-
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Saharan Africa, one of the world's poorest regions and the current epicentre of
the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the lead-up to the 2002 summit, considerable
attention was paid to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
proposal as a solution to the long-standing crisis of development in sub-Saharan
Africa. The NEPAD document is a merger of two separately conceived plans,
the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP), developed by South Africa, and
the OMEGA plan, developed by the Senegalese Head of State. The OMEGA plan
largely focused on infrastructural improvements, while MAP focused on
economic policies aimed at sustainable development through stimulating
economic growth on the continent. NEPAD was 'welcomed' in one of the
documents emanating from the 2002 summit, the G8 Africa Action Plan.
Methodology
We confined our analysis to commitments made at the three summits that had
taken place when our research began: Cologne (1999), Okinawa (2000) and
Genoa (2001). In addition, we limited most of our analysis to the actions of the
G7 countries, given Russia's newer membership and transitional situation.
Indeed, despite Russia's geopolitical significance, recent deterioration in the
health status of its population and its demonstrated vulnerability to the same
conditionalities that affect 'developing countries' as conventionally defined
(Cohen, 2000; Field et al, 2000) suggest that Russia today may have as much in
common with them as with its new G8 partners.4
At the start of the study, we confronted a fundamental choice. We could
restrict our assessment of G8 performance to a few specific commitments,
ideally involving dichotomous endpoints. This would resemble the
methodological approach employed by the G8 Research Group at the University
of Toronto (http://www.g8.utoronto.ca).5 Alternatively, we could err on the
side of inclusiveness, starting from an inventory of commitments, many of
which are not readily amenable to quantitative assessment. We followed the
latter course, for three reasons. Firstly, it is more appropriate to the complexity
of the relations between social policy, economic policy and the determinants
of population health, which we describe in more detail in Chapter 1. Secondly,
fulfilling a commitment does not mean that the response is appropriate or
adequate to the need. Thirdly, for purposes of assessing impacts on health, we
are especially interested in the extent to which summit commitments are
driven by prior allegiances to a particular conception of the relations among
economic growth, poverty reduction and integration into the global economy,
without specific attention to the consequences for population health. Our results
constitute an interrogation of the way in which selected policy commitments
made at the highest levels of G8 governments have promoted or undermined
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population health on a global scale, and an agenda for future research on how
the leaders chosen by the world's economically most fortunate define and
fulfil their obligations to the rest of humanity.
We began our inquiry with key texts associated with the past three summits,
primarily the formal statements issued at the start of and during the summits.
These texts are not the results of brainstorming sessions during the summits;
rather, they are carefully crafted and negotiated by officials of participating
governments well in advance of the events themselves. Three individuals, each
familiar with population health determinants, read these texts and independently
identified statements with population health significance, using 13 subject matter
headings. Under these 13 headings, summit commitments were then classified
into one (or, sometimes, more) of three columns in a matrix:
1. Commitments that could be assessed in quantitative or dichotomous terms
(e.g. expenditure figures, actions taken or not); this most closely mirrors
the approach taken by the G8 Research Group.
2. Commitments about which data exist, but where assessment would be
primarily qualitative or narrative (e.g. commitments using language such
as 'improve' or 'increase').
3. Commitments reflecting a pre-existing position on appropriate social and
economic policies (e.g. the presumption that integrating developing
countries into the global economy represents the only appropriate
development strategy).
Inter-rater agreement, though not tested statistically, was high, and consensus
was reached on a matrix of commitments and categorizations (see Appendix
1). Many commitments spanned more than one column; some also related to
more than one subject matter heading. Potential indicators for compliance
with summit commitments were next identified, using secondary data sets
regarded as valid and reliable (from such sources as the World Bank, UN
agencies, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD)), as well as an extensive body of research by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs). We conclude each of our chapter analyses of these
commitments with a table in which the G8, as a group, is assessed on whether
it achieved its explicit or specific and implicit or generic commitments; and
on whether these commitments were adequate to the need. We include in
these tables brief comments summarizing the chapter's findings, noting
important individual country differences where they exist. While the G8
should be judged as a group, if its claim to global leadership is to be taken
seriously, there are important disagreements between and differences among
the individual member nations.
xvii
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NEPAD Report Card Project Methodology
Given the expected prominence of the New Partnership for Africa's Development
during the 2002 G8 summit, an analysis was undertaken of the NEPAD document
as presented in October 2001. The analysis mainly addresses health-systems
issues. To increase rigour, three different analysts/raters familiar with population
health determinants independently identified NEPAD statements with population
health significance (see the G8 matrix in Appendix 1 for categories used to code
the statements). The NEPAD project used the same system as the G8 project to
classify commitments - explicit commitments that could be assessed in
quantitative terms, implicit commitments that are primarily assessed
qualitatively, and normative positions on socio-economic relations and
conditions. The NEPAD matrix classified explicit, implicit and normative
commitments into three categories:




• Reproductive health services,
• Disease control: AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases,
• Affordable drugs,
• Medical: Doctors and traditional practitioners,
• Capacity building,
• Sustainable health-care systems,
• Health as a means to growth and development, and
• The poor as a priority health target.
2. Health-related commitments explicitly recognized: NEPAD commitments
that explicitly acknowledge the link with health:
• Poverty,
• Food and food production, and
• The environmental and energy initiative.
3. Health-related commitments not explicitly recognized: NEPAD
commitments that do not specifically mention a link to health (but which
address areas generally recognized as having an impact on health):
• Safe water and sanitation,
• People-centered development,
• Global partnership,
• African autonomy and Renaissance,
• GDP target for sustainable development,
• Debt reduction,
xviii
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• Official development assistance (ODA), concessional finance and
sustainable development,
• Structural adjustment policies, and
• Political domestic reforms.
Benchmark indicators for each of these commitments, primarily secondary
data regarded as valid and reliable (e.g. World Bank, UN agencies, OECD) were
then identified where possible. Apart from some of our own calculations using
these data, the accuracy of the data from any of our sources was not checked.
The choice of indicators and data is not definitive. Because the initial NEPAD
document was first presented in October 2001 to a meeting of African leaders
in Abuja, Nigeria, and has not yet been implemented, it is clearly not yet
possible to determine whether NEPAD commitments have been fulfilled. The
analysis presented here, then, should be seen as a first attempt to analyze
NEPAD's health strategy. Research will continue as more documentation
becomes available.
Outline of the Book
In the next chapter (Chapter 1), we provide a necessarily brief overview of the
key dimensions of contemporary globalization, and a framework for describing
and understanding the various causal linkages between globalization and human
health. Those linkages operate through globalization's effect on various social
and economic variables at the national, community and household levels. Our
analysis in the remaining chapters is based on what is known, from the
perspective of a variety of disciplines, about those linkages and the influence of
the variables in question on human health.
In Chapter 2, we begin our analysis of the effects of G8 commitments and
policies on human health with the topic of national macroeconomic policy.
This choice reflects the manifold ways in which poverty and economic insecurity
affect human health, both directly and through various intervening variables.
In an increasingly interconnected world, the policy commitments of the largest
economic players have unavoidable impacts half a world away. In the case of
the structural adjustment policies that are a focus of the chapter, this is by
design. Many of the policies of the G8, while moving in the right direction, are
doing so on the basis of insufficient financial commitments and an unwarranted
reliance on neo-liberal social and economic policy prescriptions. The absence
of more comprehensive debt relief is a special concern.
Chapter 3 focuses specifically on G8 commitments as they affect health
care and health systems. Although health care is far from being the only
contributor to the health status of individuals or populations, it is nevertheless
xix
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
important -especially in the developing world, where low-cost, low-technology
interventions can make major contributions to reducing the burden of disease.
In turn, improved health may contribute to economic growth that improves
the social determinants of health and makes more resources available to support
health systems. The G8 could be doing much more, and doing it better, to
improve health in the developing world.
Two of the most important social determinants of health are education and
nutrition: access to each is fundamentally impaired by poverty, and each can
in turn be supportive of poverty reduction, as well as directly contributing to
improved health. We therefore devote Chapters 4 and 5 to G8 commitments as
they affect these areas, using evidence supplied by leading international agencies
- as we do in other chapters - to suggest that the resources that the G8 have
committed to improving education and nutrition are, on the whole, not
commensurate with the size of the tasks at hand.
Official development assistance is the primary vehicle that governments in
the industrialized world use to transfer resources to the developing world. We
therefore devote Chapter 6 to assessing whether, and how, G8 ODA policies
support health-related development objectives and live up to commitments
made at the past three summits. Disturbingly, the long-term trend is one of
declining ODA from the G8 countries, and all are far from reaching the often
repeated target of devoting 0.7 per cent of their gross national product (GNP)
or income (GNI) to development assistance. The fact that some industrialized
countries have attained this goal shows that it is not implausible - and, if the
G8 had achieved it, an additional U$ 109 billion would have been made available
in 2001 for purposes including poverty reduction, support for education and
access to basic health care and improved nutrition. To put this figure in
perspective, it is roughly twice the value of all ODA from the industrialized
world.
Reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade is a key element of contemporary
globalization, and invariably a centerpiece of conventional economic policy
prescriptions for development. In Chapter 7, we examine the G8 record on
trade liberalization as it affects the products of the developing world, in particular
the least developed countries (LDCs). We identify a remarkable consensus
among observers as diverse as Oxfam, the World Bank and the IMF that improved
performance on the part of the industrialized world in opening its markets,
especially for agricultural products and textiles, would generate economic gains
comparable in value to several times today's levels of development assistance.
G8 rhetoric about commitment to open markets has, with some laudable
exceptions, so far not been matched by action in the areas that matter most to
developing economies - and therefore, at least potentially, to the health of
those populations.
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Environmental concerns are the topic of Chapter 8. Over the past few years,
the G8 summits have devoted surprisingly little attention to environmental
questions as they affect human health. A few areas of satisfactory performance
stand out, but G8 members have been slow to ratify key international
environmental agreements: Russian delay in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change and US repudiation of the protocol are especially reprehensible.
The Johannesburg summit on sustainable development ('Rio +10') marked the
decline of environment-development linkages as an element of the international
policy agenda -ironically, 15 years after the World Commission on Environment
and Development (the Brundtland Commission) emphasized the connections
between environment and development.
While African data and analysis are included in several earlier chapters, Chapter
9 synthesizes and extends the previous discussion. The focus of this chapter,
written by researchers based on that continent (D.S. and W.M.), is an analysis
of NEPAD in light of the deterioration in health status and health systems that
the continent has suffered in recent decades. NEPAD was created largely for G8
and other industrialized world audiences and, despite its 'made in Africa' branding,
critics argue that it exemplifies the problems of shaping development policy
around external expectations of how poorer nations should 'develop' within
an increasingly globalized market. NEPAD therefore reflects the tensions
between neo-liberal macroeconomic policy assumptions and health and human
development identified in earlier chapters.
Finally, in Chapter 10, we summarize our findings in light of intensifying
debates over the macroeconomic prescriptions presented in both G8 policy
statements and the NEPAD document. We also review a few key areas of G8
(in)action that we were unable to address in any detail in our study. These, and
a number of other issues arising from our earlier chapters, are brought forward
as topics requiring ongoing monitoring and research.
Limitations of the Analysis
Several limitations of our analysis should be noted. The choice of indicators
and data for our report card is far from definitive. We did not, for example,
check on the accuracy of the data from any of our sources, beyond the
identification of clear omissions and inconsistencies in the data as published.
The literature review for findings that would shed light on the effects of the
commitments on population health was not exhaustive, but rather drew on
previous research carried out by members of the project team.
Time and timeliness are both issues. Because commitments made in a given
year may take some time to implement, assessment of the extent to which G8
countries have lived up to summit commitments runs the risk of being
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premature. On the other hand, such commitments are normally decided upon
well in advance of the summits themselves; they are not spur-of-the moment
choices. In addition, the speed with which resources were mobilized and the
agenda of the 2002 summit transformed after the events of 11 September 2001
suggests that the G8 countries are capable, individually and collectively, of
rapid responses to issues that are regarded as high and urgent priorities.
As for timeliness, the bulk of our research was completed before the
Kananaskis summit in June 2002. We have provided some commentary on
post-Kananaskis actions by individual G8 countries, but we restrict any detailed
data analysis to information relating to events prior to June 2002. The time
lags associated with book publication mean that no published volume can keep
up with the continuous flow of new developments and announcements.
Finally, a bias may have been introduced by the relative ease of tracking
new announcements by Canada and, to a slightly lesser extent, the US and the
UK, from our vantage point in the English-speaking world. Although we have
made every effort to achieve accurate scholarship and balanced presentation,
our 'report card' should be read as a work in progress and an agenda for future
research.
Endnotes to the Introduction
1 Details of the assessment are not available; only the summary data have been made
public at this time, thus the estimate should be treated cautiously.
2 These data come from a news report based on Equity International's conference
presentation of their summary data (The Globe and Mail, 5 March 2003: A10). Again, the
estimate should be treated cautiously.
3 For a contemporary version of the prescription for adjustment with a human face,
unfortunately presented without systematic reference to supporting documentation, see
UNRISD (2000).
4 Despite this, and despite the fact that Russia was not a full participant in the 1999-2001
summits, we refer to the 'G8' throughout the book, rather than the clumsier G7/G8 designation,
except when the factual context clearly pertains to the G7.
5 The G8 Research Group finds that compliance rates, typically under 40 per cent, improved
dramatically with the Okinawa summit in 2000, which achieved an 80 per cent compliance
rate (Kirton et al., 2001). Compliance declined to 49.5 per cent post-Genoa, although with
considerable issue and country variance (Kirton & Kokotsis, 2002). Their determination of
compliance is based on new actions on specific commitments undertaken by G8 countries in





Unregulated or under-regulated by governments, corporations set the
terms of engagement themselves. In the Third World we see a race to
the bottom: multinationals pitting developing countries against each
other to provide the most advantageous conditions for investment, with
no regulation, no red tape, no unions, a blind eye turned to
environmental degradation. It's good for profit, but bad for workers
and local communities. As corporations go bottom fishing, host
governments are left with little alternative but to accept the pickings.
Globalisation may deliver liberty, but not fraternity or equality
(Hertz, 2001).
Introduction
G8 members' economic policies and their influence on the programs of the
inter-national financial institutions shape much of contemporary
globalization. To assess this influence, and how it pervasively affects health
and human development, we first need to define more carefully what we
mean by 'globalization.'
Over the past decade, globalization has become both a slogan and a useful
historical and analytical concept. To some, it is an inescapable and primarily
benign process of global economic integration, in which countries
increasingly drop border restrictions on the flow of capital, goods and services.
Acknowledged risks of more rapid spread of disease and pests accompany the
speedier and more massive movement of goods and people, but these are not
new. Risks can be managed and are more than offset by benefits in the
diffusion of new ideas, technologies and steady global economic growth. To
others, 'globalization' is shorthand for a technologically mediated coup by
economic elites and political conservatives to create a 'new world order'
based more on private corporate control than public democracy. Rich
countries have overwhelmed poor ones in defining the macroeconomic
policies that must be followed, which usually benefit the former at the expense
of the latter. New global rules entrench private economic rights - 'liberty'1 -
but at the expense of public goods and public governance - key instruments
1
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of 'equality' and 'fraternity.' Battle lines are drawn. Barricades separate the
political and economic elites negotiating the terms of contemporary globali-
zation from those who protest the very idea.
Globalization, defined at its simplest, describes a constellation of processes
by which nations, businesses and people are becoming more connected
and interdependent across the globe through increased economic integration
and communication exchange, cultural diffusion (especially of Western
culture) and travel. By emphasizing processes we draw attention to the means
by which this interdependence and connectivity is occurring. Globalization
is not a new phenomenon. One might actually call it a basic human drive.
Jared Diamond, in Guns, Germs and Steel (2000), recounts how the history
of humankind has been one of pushing against borders, exploring, trading,
expanding, conquering and assimilating. In ancient Western times, 'global'
simply meant the Middle East, once a Garden of Eden that, despoiled by
overuse, became an eroding desert that drove people further east to what is
now China, and west to the Mediterranean and continental Europe. In
Western Renaissance times, 'global' meant exploration, colonization and
exploitation of the 'New World.' As the remarkable Uruguayan journalist
Eduardo Galeano showed 30 years ago in Open Veins of Latin America (1973),
only the wealth of the exploited colonies - their resources, their peoples -
allowed Western capitalism to displace feudalism. And, as some economic
historians point out, this is not the first time in more recent history that
capital (and capitalists) have had more interest in foreign markets than in
those in their home countries: the percentage of global economic output
accounted for by trade has only now returned to the levels characteristic of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Cameron & Stein, 2000),
before growing income inequalities and a global economic recession helped
fuel renewed protectionism and, eventually, two 'world' wars (Nye, 2002).
Contemporary Globalization
Contemporary globalization is characterized by an accelerated pace of
interdependence and connectivity, aided by innovations in communications
technologies. Although it arguably continues a longer historical trajectory,
it also differs from previous eras in several ways:
1. The scale and speed of cross-border movement of goods, services and (parti-
cularly) finance capital: Over US$1.5 trillion (some estimate US$2 trillion)
worth of currency transactions occur daily, an amount equivalent to more
than twice the total foreign exchange reserves of all governments. Such
transactions reduce the ability of governments to intervene in foreign
exchange markets to stabilize their currencies, manage their economies
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and maintain fiscal autonomy (UNDP, 1999); they also increase the vulnerability
of national economies to short-term movements of capital in response to real
or perceived changes in the relative risk of investing in various jurisdictions.
2. The establishment of binding rules, primarily through the WTO: Trade
agreements are increasingly establishing a regime of obligations that can
be enforced on national governments through the implementation of
trade sanctions. Countries have also entered into dozens of other
multilateral conventions and agreements on human rights and
environmental protection, but few if any of these are accompanied by a
similar regime based on national self-interest. This asymmetry between
enforceable economic (market-based) rules and unenforceable social and
environmental obligations is arguably the biggest governance challenge
of the new millennium (Labonte, 1998; UNDP, 1999; Kickbusch, 2000)2.
3. The size of transnational corporations, several of which are economically
larger than many nations or whole regions, as measured by annual sales
and annual GDP, respectively. For example, General Motors' global sales
in 1997 exceeded in value the GDP of Thailand or Norway; Mitsubishi's
sales in that year exceeded the GDP of Poland or South Africa; and the
sales of Wal-Mart Stores exceeded the GDP of Malaysia, Israel or Colombia
(UNDP, 1999: 32), This comparison is admittedly simplistic, but is does
illustrate the relative scale of the institutions involved. More
fundamentally, the balance of power between transnational companies
and nation states is, according to many observers, shifting decisively in
favour of the former, even within the industrialized world (e.g. see Hertz,
2001; Schmidt, 1995). According to one estimate, 'around 60% of
international trade involves transactions between two related parts of
multinationals' (Bishop, 2000: 18). The ability of transnational corpo-
rations to organize production across national borders, sometimes by
using multiple tiers of sub-contractors, is an important contributor both
to the emergence of genuinely global labour markets (World Bank, 1995)
and to tax competition among jurisdictions, as intra-firm transfer pricing
enables corporations to shift profits to low-tax countries.
4. The apparent commitment of most countries to continue the project of global
economic integration through increased market liberalization: This commit-
ment is built upon two decades of neo-liberal economic assumptions,
reflected in the macroeconomic policies of most governments, the World
Bank and IMF, and most trade agreements. It is somewhat tempered by
the reluctance of many of the world's wealthiest nations to abide by these
assumptions if they are not to their benefit, exemplified by the continued
presence and even increase of trade-distorting domestic agricultural
subsidies in the EU, Japan and the US.
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5. Social, economic, environmental and health issues are becoming 'inherently
global', rather than purely national or domestic (Labonte & Spiegel, 2002):
Environmental impacts of human activities are planetary in scale and
scope; disease pandemics and economic stagnation partly underpin state
collapse and regional conflict (Price-Smith, 2002).
Globalization, Health and Development: Competing
Arguments, Conflicting Evidence
From a health and human development perspective, several compelling pro-
globalization arguments exist. The diffusion of new knowledge and
technology through trade and investment, for example, can aid in disease
surveillance, treatment and prevention. Information communication
technologies (ICTs) are frequently cited as an overwhelmingly positive aspect
of contemporary globalization: they enable more rapid scientific discovery,
create virtual communities of support, increase knowledge about human
rights, strengthen diasporic communities and create an international advocacy
movement pushing to create new global governance structures to balance
the predominance of market-driven initiatives. Broad consensus can also be
observed on the positive effects of globalization on gender rights and
empowerment (Chinkin, 2000; Harcourt, 2000), though with the caveat that
these rights are not simply an invention of the West but previously existed
(often more strongly in pre-Western colonization times) in many countries
that are presumably less emancipated today (Sen, 1999).
In macroeconomic terms, the pro-globalization argument posits that
increased trade and foreign investment through liberalization can increase
economic growth. Growth can be used to sustain investment in necessary
public goods, such as health care, education, women's empowerment
programs and so on (Dollar, 2001; Dollar & Kraay, 2000). Especially in poorer
countries, growth may also reduce poverty, leading to desirable change in
the determinants of health. Improved population health, particularly amongst
the world's poorest countries, is increasingly associated with improved
economic growth (Savedoff & Schultz, 2000; WHO, 2001), and so the circle
virtuously closes upon itself.
Critics of the pro-globalization thesis quickly respond that the virtuous
circle can have a vicious undertow. This includes the more rapid spread of
infectious diseases, some of which are becoming resistant to treatment, and
the increased adoption of unhealthy 'Western' lifestyles by larger numbers
of people (Lee, 2001). The more significant challenge is that integration into
the global economy does not always or inevitably lead to economic growth
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and that, when it does, the result is not necessarily the reduction of poverty
(Cornia, 2001; Weisbrot etal, 2001; UNDP, 2000). Much depends upon pre-
existing social, economic and environmental conditions within countries;
and upon specific national programs and policies that enhance the capacities
of citizens, such as health, education and social welfare programs (UNDP,
1999, 2000). China, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam, while
dramatically increasing their role as global traders, did so primarily as
exporters. They retained tariff and non-tariff barriers shielding important
sectors of their domestic economies from competitive imports, maintained
public ownership of large segments of banking and placed restrictions on
foreign capital flows.
This is precisely how wealthier European and North American economies
developed historically (Rodriguez & Rodrik, 2000; Rodrik, 1999), with the
important additional resources and markets - neglected in conventional
economic narratives - that were made available by colonialism (Milanovic,
2003). Trade agreements now largely prohibit poorer countries from doing
the same, with only modest provisions for 'special and differential treatment'
(see Box 7.2, Chapter 7) that are being actively opposed by many of the
world's richest countries. Weaker economies with fewer domestic protections,
largely removed through earlier World Bank and IMF 'structural adjustment'
loan policies, have fared poorly under trade and investment liberalization
(see Box 1.1, below). The net effect for many of these countries has been
suppressed domestic economic activity, depressed wages and tax revenues,
and a worsened balance of payments (International Institute for Sustainable
Development, 2001). Mexico, Uruguay, Zimbabwe, Kenya, India and the
Philippines, for example, all witnessed serious declines in income, and
corresponding increases in poverty and poor health, among their rural
populations following liberalization (Hilary, 2001).
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Box 1.1: Zambia's Textiles and Kerala's Public Policies
Countries with weak domestic economies can be overwhelmed by surging,
cheap imports, often from wealthier countries still subsidizing their domestic
producers or their exports. Zambia provides a compelling example, fn return
for World Bank anci IMF loans, Zambia opened its borders to cheap, often
second-hand textile imports. Its domestic manufacturing, inefficient by the
standards of wealthier industrialized nations, could not compete. Within
eight years, 30 000 jobs disappeared and 132 of 140 textile milts closed
operations, which the World Bank acknowledges as 'unintended and
regrettable consequences' of the adjustment process (Jeter, 2002). Overall,
40 per cent of manufacturing jobs disappeared in the past decade, and
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A Framework for Understanding Globalization's
Impacts on Health
Globalization may improve human health and development in some
circumstances but damage it in others, especially when liberalization has
been rapid and without government support to affected sectors and
populations (UNDP, 1999; Ben-David etal, 1999; Cornia, 2001). Liberalized
trade in agricultural products may provide short-term economic benefit to
less developed countries. This can improve human health, depending on
how equitably these benefits are allocated among all citizens. But food exports
in poorer countries can also increase fossil fuel-based transportation, creating
short and longer-term health- and environment-damaging effects; and
commodity-led export produces lower long-term economic growth than
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huge numbers of previously employed workers rely on precarious street
vending. In the early 1990s, user charges for schools, imposed partly because
of the loss of public revenues following the collapse of the textile sector,
led to increased dropout and illiteracy rates. The current government is
now seeking to undo many of these policies, including elimination of user
fees for education, lowering costs for public health care, reintroducing
agricultural subsidies and supporting domestic industries with a potential
for growth. But the task is harder than it might have been before the 'open
borders' had been imposed.
The Indian state of Kerala provides another example. Like Cuba, Costa
Rica, China and a handful of other countries, Kerala has high population
health status despite a low per capita GDP. This somewhat anomalous
relationship results from policies that, at least until recently, created relatively
equitable income distribution, as well as supporting social transfers to meet
basic needs, universal education, equitable access to public health and
primary health care, and adequate caloric intake (Werner 6t Sanders, 1997;
Thankappan, 2001). These pro-poor policies are now being eroded by trade
liberalization. In Kerala, a media-developed Western consumerist culture,
alongside tariff reductions, is rejecting locally produced goods for imported
luxuries. This is weakening the local entrepreneurial base, lowering
employment and reducing the level of state taxes available for social program
spending and income redistribution. Liberalization in coconut and rubber
products, required by WTO rules, has seen a drop in prices that 'will have
serious implications for the health of Keralites, especially that of farmers'
(Thankappan, 2001: 893). There is also some concern that WTO rules may
cause Kerala to end its food subsidy program, which until now has succeeded
in providing affordable and adequate nutrition to almost its entire population
(Hilary, 2001).
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manufactured ('value-added') export (Yong Kim, Millen et al., 2000).
Protectionist policies, including subsidies, may preserve rural life and
livelihoods - arguments frequently advanced by the EU and Japan (Labonte,
2000). This benefits the health and quality of life of rural people. But such
policies can also support ecologically unsustainable forms of production
and increase oligopolistic corporate control over global food production.
Trade openness might increase women's share of paid employment, which
is an important element of gender empowerment (UNDP, 1999: 80). Yet much
of women's employment remains low-paid, unhealthy and insecure in Export
Processing Zones that often prohibit any form of labour organization and
employ only single women. Public caring supports for young children have
been declining in many trade-opened countries, portending future health
inequalities. There is also evidence of a global 'hierarchy of care.' Women
from developing nations employed as domestic workers in wealthy countries
send valued hard currency back home to their families, some of whi ch is used
to employ poorer rural women in their home countries to look after the children
the expatriate women have left behind. These rural women, in turn, leave their
eldest daughters (often still quite young and ill-educated) to care for the family
they left behind in the village, depriving them of any opportunity for personal
development or social advancement (Hochschild, 2000).
Who gains and who loses? Tracing the impacts of globalization on health is
a daunting and complex task. Figure 1.1, below, based upon a more extensive
study (Labonte & Torgerson, 2002), provides a simplified framework for
understanding how contemporary globalization can affect health. The key
points conveyed by this figure, in descending order of scale, are as follows:
1. How contemporary globalization affects health depends on the historical
context of particular countries, specifically their political, social and economic
traditions (e.g. democratic, oligarchic, patriarchal, theocratic, dictatorial);
and their stock of pre-existing endowments (e.g. level of economic
development, environmental resources, human capital development).
2. Globally, the major vehicles or processes through which contemporary
globalization operates are imposed macroeconomic policies. One category
consists of the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) of the World Bank
and IMF, which were the precursors to and a key component of today's
'free trade' agenda, and the more recent Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSP) program of the World Bank and IMF, required for debt relief and,
increasingly, for development assistance. A second category consists of
enforceable trade agreements (notably those administered by the WTO)
and associated trans-border flows in goods, capital and services. Third,
official development assistance represents a form of wealth transfer for
public infrastructure development in poorer nations. Fourth, there are
7
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
'intermediary global public goods' - the numerous yet largely
unenforceable multilateral agreements we have on human rights,
environmental protection, women's rights, children's rights and so on.
3. These vehicles, in turn, have both positive and negative health effects on
domestic policy space, by increasing or decreasing public sector capacity
or resources and regulatory authority. Key domestic policies that condition
health outcomes include universal access to education and health care,
legislated human and labour rights, restrictions on health-damaging
products, such as tobacco, or exposure to hazardous waste and
environmental protection. Liberalization, whether through trade
agreements or through SAPs, lowers tariffs on imported goods. This has
been particularly hard on developing countries, which derive much of
their national tax revenue from tariffs and which lack the capacity to
institute alternative revenue-generating sources. This affects their abilities
to provide the public health, education and water/sanitation services
essential both to health and to economic development. Global and
regional trade agreements, in turn, are increasingly circumscribing the
social and environmental regulatory options of national governments.
4. National policies and resource transfers affect the abilities of regional or
local governments to regulate their immediate environments, provide
equitable access to health-promoting services, enhance generic
community capacities (community empowerment) or cope with
increased and usually increasingly rapid urbanization.
5. At the household level, all of the above determine in large measure family
income and distribution (under conditions of poverty, for example, when
women control household income, children's health tends to be better),
health behaviours and household expenditures (both in time and in
money) for health, education and social programs.
In addition, each level affects, and is affected by, environmental pathways.
Among the most important of these are resource depletion (water, land,
forests), biodiversity loss, pollution, and the loss of ecosystem services such
as the sequestration of carbon by forests.
Subsequent chapters in this book provide evidence on, and arguments
surrounding, many of the elements in Figure 1.1. Much remains to be
understood about how globalization's vehicles or processes (the 'global contexts'
identified by the framework in Figure 1.1) can be harnessed to improve global
health outcomes. But the experience of 20 years of increased market
integration is surely enough to permit a preliminary assessment of the
consequences for human health. In several chapters of the book, we present
an overview of the evidence, which should always be understood with the
caveat that more detailed, context-specific inquiry is needed.
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Figure 1.1: A Framework for Linking Globalization and Health
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Poverty and Income Inequality
Controversy persists over whether globalization will (or will not) succeed in
poverty reduction -recalling that poverty is one of the greatest threats to health.
Less dispute surrounds the finding that globalization is increasing economic
inequality, both within and among nations. Whether economic inequality per
se contributes to health inequality remains a matter of debate amongst
population health researchers (Deaton, 2001). Poverty, which is higher in
countries with high income inequality, may be the bigger problem. But the
greater the extent of income inequality, the harder it becomes for the economic
growth presumed to follow trade liberalization actually to lift people out of
poverty. Moreover, increasing inequalities are associated with declines in social
cohesion, social solidarity and support for strong redistributive income, health
and education policies that have been shown to buffer liberalization's
unequalizing effects, as well as increased mortality due to homicide and suicide
(Deaton, 2001; Global Social Policy Forum, 2001; Gough, 2001).
From a health and development perspective, what remains contentious is
where (or whether) a trade-off should be considered between economic
growth that reduces poverty, but which, in the absence of strong redistributive
policies, also increases income inequality (see Figure 1.2, below, and
Milanovic, 2003). We return to this question in Chapter 10. Further
complicating the issue, conventional policy prescriptions for growth through
integration into the international economy are usually antithetical to such
redistributive policies as the provision of basic health services independently
of ability to pay.
Figure 1.2: The Ratio of the Income of the Top 20% of the World's Population to
that of the Bottom 20%, 1820-1999.
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The Environment and Sustainable Development
Among the pathways linking globalization to human health via changes in
the natural environment are the liberalization-induced effects of growth on
resource depletion and pollution, and increased transportation-based fossil
fuel emissions. As noted in Chapter 8, the past decade has provided numerous
illustrations of how these pathways operate.
Potential indirect climate change effects are also associated with loosening
of restrictions on foreign investment. A recent example was provided by the
Brazilian currency crisis of 1998 (UNDP, 1999; De Paula & Alves, 2000). The
Brazilian government lacked sufficient foreign reserves to stabilize its currency
and was forced to borrow from the IMF. The rescue package was conditional
on drastic public spending cuts, which included a two-thirds reduction in
Brazil's environmental protection spending. This led to the collapse of a project
with international funding that would have begun satellite mapping of the
Amazonian rain forest as a first step in stemming its destruction. This
destruction, in turn, may have a profound effect on climate change, with long-
term and potentially severe health implications for much of the world's
populations (Labonte, 1999). Many empirically based projections on the
environmental impacts of trade liberalization show severe ecological damage
(Labonte & Torgerson, 2002). The only exceptions are trade agreement
requirements to reduce trade-distorting agricultural and fisheries production
subsidies. These subsidies go primarily to wealthier producers within wealthy
countries, wreak havoc on local production in poorer countries by flooding
the market with below-cost commodities, and severely damage the environment.
The Devil is in the Details
A special issue of the Bulletin of the World Health Organization in 2001 was
devoted to the theme of globalization and health. The journal's editor, Richard
Feachem - now director of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria (GFATM) - weighed in heavily on the pro-globalization side of the
debate: 'A globalized world with rapid transit of ideas, people and money
provides a setting for a new generation of successful investments in health
that benefit people of all nations' (Feachem, 2001: 804).
Interestingly, the articles in the special issue were more divided and less
sanguine on this prospect than was the editor-in-chief. 'Globalization is good
for you' bannered one article, while 'Globalization is bad for you' headlined
another. The devil, as always, lay in the details. Thus, liberalization in trade
in goods may, under the 'right' domestic policy circumstances and with a
good supply of human, social and environmental capital, yield health and
development benefits. But liberalization in capital accounts, which is urged
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to promote foreign direct investment (FDI), generally wreaks havoc for the
poor in poorer nations.
Research on the pathways between commercial, export-oriented agriculture
and child nutrition/health demonstrates the importance of attention to detail
and distributional effects (Von Braun et al., 1994). For the household unit
engaged in agriculture, the effects of liberalization-induced commercialization
involve changes in the prices, wages and risks for the farm. Low prices for
commodities may mean that more off-farm labour is needed to ensure the
sustainability of the household unit. Findings from case studies of several
low-income countries that had implemented various types of
commercialization/liberalization schemes - including Guatemala, the
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, India, Kenya, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi, Sierra
Leone and the Gambia - were mixed. In some countries, such as Rwanda and
Zambia, the shift from subsistence farming to agricultural commercialization
(e.g. a technological change in maize production) had favorable effects on
the health and nutrition of children under five, while in other countries,
such as the Philippines and Sierra Leone, the children of commercialized
farmers were worse off than the children of subsistence farmers. The essential
nutrition-improving component was not the level of income itself (the 'rising
tide' presumed to lift all boats), but who controlled the income. Rising female-
controlled, but not male-controlled, incomes were related to higher levels of
caloric intakes among children, as women are more likely than men to allocate
household resources towards food.
These findings underscore the importance of a gender analysis in any
research examining how globalization influences health at the household or
individual level. More importantly, they emphasize that sweeping claims about
globalization's benefits can safely be disregarded unless the claims clearly
identify the relevant processes, and describe the pathways through which these
processes are believed to affect the outcome of interest. This perspective
informs our analysis throughout the chapters that follow.
Endnotes to Chapter One
1 And even here, liberty only in a narrow economic sense, and certainly not as Amartya Sen
influentially defines freedom (liberty) as the capacity to live a life one has reason to value (Sen,
1999).
2 O'Brien (2002: 14) extends the list of 'rules-supervisory institutions' to include the World Bank
and IMF, creating a triumvirate of advocates for 'economic liberalism with little concern for
social policy', relegating social policy institutions (largely the UN agencies) to 'an advisory
category' relying solely upon 'argument' to see their measures adopted.
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Macroeconomic Policy, Structural
Adjustment and Debt Relief
Economic policies are not neutral. Contrary to received opinion, they
can even kill (George, 1988: 6).
Introduction
Because of the numerous causal pathways and feedback loops linking poverty
and economic insecurity with ill health, we have chosen to begin our
substantive discussion of how G8 commitments affect health in the
developing world with an examination of the influence of the G8, directly
and through international financial institutions, on domestic macroeconomic
and social policy. The channels of G8 influence must, in turn, be understood
with reference to 'debt crises' as they have unfolded over the last three decades,
and to the role of 'structural adjustment' as a response to these crises.
According to the World Bank (2001b: 36-8), some 1.2 billion people world-
wide were living on less than US$1 a day, and 2.8 billion, or close to half the
world's population, were living on less than US$2 per day, in 1998. Using a
somewhat different technique for estimating income levels, the UN
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has calculated that within
the 39 LDCs1 for which data are available, an estimated 81 per cent of the
population lived on less than US$2 per day during the period 1995-99
(UNCTAD, 2002b: 52) and the incidence of poverty -on either measure -has
actually increased in the LDCs over the last few decades. However, it should
not be inferred from these figures that the LDCs are the primary locus of
poverty as measured in this manner: in fact, the LDCs account for 495 million
people living on less than US$2 per day, or less than one-fifth of the World
Bank's estimated total. (Direct comparisons are not possible because of
differences in methodology, but the magnitudes in question are nevertheless
important.) It should also be noted that recent critiques have argued that the
World Bank's methodology and definitions actually result in a substantial
underestimate of the extent of global poverty (Reddy & Pogge, 2002), and
have suggested that the methodological choices in question may have political
motivations (Wilks & Lefranc,ois, 2002: 28-31). Since the US$2-per-day figure
implies an annual per capita income roughly equivalent to the cost of two
nights' deluxe hotel accommodation or a mid-priced business suit in one of
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the world's financial centres, the debate can safely be dismissed as one with
marginal relevance to the real world of health and development.
'Debt Crises' and Structural Adjustment
The term 'structural adjustment' entered the international development
lexicon in 1980, when the World Bank initiated structural adjustment loans
(SALs) to help developing countries address an accumulation of economic
woes. To oversimplify considerably, but not inaccurately, a combination of
recession in the industrialized countries, rising oil prices and rising interest
rates meant that numerous developing countries were no longer able to fulfil
their governments' and firms' financial obligations to the industrialized
world's banks and official development agencies. Structural adjustment
became far more important after 1982, when the government of Mexico
announced that it was prepared to default on billions of dollars in loans,
primarily made by major US banks. The result was the first of a series of 'debt
crises.'
Following the Mexican announcement, apprehensions about the stability
of major banks in the industrialized world in the event of co-ordinated default
- an eventuality that was admittedly unlikely, given the formidable capacity
for reprisal at the disposal of banks and governments (George, 1988) - led
industrialized country governments, bilaterally and through the IFIs, to
provide new money for debt rescheduling. However, it must be emphasized
that debt repayment was normally stretched out, rather than cancelled. One
of the consequences was that, 'despite repeated rescheduling of debt by
creditor countries, developing countries continue[d] to pay out more each
year in debt service than the actual amounts they receive [d] in official
development assistance' between 1986 and 1996 (Cheru, 1999: para. 10). The
net outflow of funds became even more significant in the years that followed,
as a result of the financial crisis in South Asia (UN, 2002a). Ironically, high
levels of borrowing were and are often accompanied by capital flight (see
Box 2.1, below), facilitated by the availability of 'offshore' financial
institutions, an issue we address near the end of this chapter.
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offshore financial centres are among the primary destinations of flight capital,
and historically have often been eagerly receptive (Naylor, 1987).
No simple or unambiguous way of defining or measuring capital flight
exists, but estimates for a number of countries and regions suggest the
magnitudes involved. Using official financial statistics and several alternative
formulae for calculating capital flight, Cumby & Levich (1987) estimated capital
flight from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines and Venezuela during
the period 1976-84 as between US$54.7 and US$131.8 billion. (The wide
variation indicates the differences that result from using alternative bases for
measurement.) During this period, those countries' debts increased by a total
of US$243.1 billion. These figures mask substantial intra-country variations.
For Mexico in the late 1970s and early 1980s, knowledgeable observers in the
financial services industry suggested a much closer correspondence between
the amounts of capital flight and external debt (George, 1988; Naylor, 1987).
Loungani & Mauro (2000) estimated capital flight from Russia at US$15-20
billion per year between 1994 and 2000. Ndikurnana & Boyce (2003) estimated
the value of capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa between 1970 and 1996 at
US$186.8 billion (in 1996 dollars), noting that during the period, 'roughly SO
cents on every dollar that flowed into the region from foreign loans flowed
back out as capital t\\$M in the same year, suggesting that the phenomenon of
debt-fuelled capital flight was widespread' (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2003: 122;
emphasis added). In economically beleaguered Argentina, it was estimated at
the end of 2001 that the value of assets held abroad by Argentine residents
equalled the total value of the country's foreign debt (CELS, 2003).
From one perspective, capital flight is unexceptionable: it is a mechanism
investors use to apply the 'discipline of the market' to national economic policies.
However, capital flight is often a vehicle for tax evasion, or a way for rulers and
their close associates to sequester the proceeds of corruption. In any event,
when governments are borrowing on external markets while private investors
are shifting assets abroad, the effect is to reduce domestic savings and foreign
exchange available for development; to increase inequalities in income and
wealth, as governments must cut back services or tax the population as a
whole to finance debt service charges; and to create downward pressure on
exchange rates that further reduces the purchasing power of those who do
not have the option of diversifying into foreign assets (Rodriguez, 1987). Ic
1987, economist and financial historian Thomas Naylor stated flatly that '[t] here
would be no "debt crisis" without large-scale capital flight' (Naylor, 1987:
419). As the propertied and connected were able to shift their assets abroad,
governments were left to work out the best deals they could with commercial
lenders and the IMF, on the basis of various forms of conditionality.
In the context of debt relief for developing countries, it has been argued
that lenders are not entitled, as a matter of ethics and perhaps as a matter of
international law, to demand repayment of some debts that had the effect of
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A key element of the provision of financing for debt rescheduling was
'conditionality': funds were made available only if the debtor country agreed
to a relatively standard package of macroeconomic policies that were designed
primarily to ensure that interest payments could be maintained. Although
the specifics of conditionality varied somewhat, the core elements were
remarkably constant:
1. Opening domestic markets to imports, in the interests of improved
efficiency, through tariff reductions and removal of import controls;
2. Integrating national economies into the global economy, with the specific
aim of increasing exports, by way of exchange rate devaluation that
favoured export industries and removal of controls on FDI, while;
3. Restricting domestic consumption by moving toward free market pricing.
Policy measures included not only reducing 'overvalued' exchange rates,
but also deregulation of food and energy prices and elimination of food
price subsidies;
4. Divesting state resources in favour of the private sector through
privatization and contracting out of services;
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financing capital flight. The clearest case is that of so-called odious debts
incurred by despotic ruiers who were looting the public treasury and moving
the assets abroad (Kremer & Jayachandran, 2002a, 2002b). Even when rulers
are not directly implicated, '[t]he use of foreign borrowing to finance the
accumulation of private external assets raises questions as to the legal and
moral legitimacy of the external debt-that is, its treatment as a public obligation
as opposed to a private liability' (Ndikumana & Boyce, 2003: 108),
In a more expansive approach, the Halifax Initiative, a Canadian NGO formed
at the time of the Halifax (Canada) C7 summit in 1995, called in May 2002 for
the establishment by the G8 of an international mechanism with the authority
to cancel 'illegitimate debts.' Its proposal did not single out capital flight, but
included 'odious debts incurred to strengthen despotic regimes, debts
contracted for fraudulent purposes, debts whose proceeds were stolen through
corruption, debts for failed projects and debts that became unpayable as a
result of a creditor unilaterally raising interest rates' (Halifax Initiative, 2002).
Thus, several arguments exist for considering the circumstances under which
a developing country's debt was incurred, as well as the hardships associated
with repayment, for purposes of debt relief. Opportunities for such inquiries at
the moment are few and far between: the international bankruptcy or insolvency
procedure that has been proposed by a number of NGOs (see Box 2.3, below)
might address this deficiency.
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5. Reducing state expenditure (with the exception of military expenditure)
through devolution of responsibilities to local communities and cost
recovery for formerly public services that were not actually privatized;
and
6. Reorientation of social and economic policy toward attracting private,
primarily foreign, investment (adapted from Milward, 2000).
By the end of the 1980s, 'cross-conditionality' involving both the World Bank
and the IMF had become routine (Walton etal., 1994: 19), further ensuring
the subordination of domestic policy goals to the imperative of generating
revenues sufficient to meet debt obligations, even if the economy's ability to
meet basic human needs (such as food or clean water) deteriorated. This
often happened as a result of mandated domestic austerity measures, which
also decreased access to services, including health care and education, as
public expenditures were cut and user charges introduced (e.g. see Cheru,
1999; Chossudovsky, 1997; Cornia et al, 1987, 1988; Creese & Kutzin, 1997;
Schoepf et al., 2000; Walton et al, 1994; Yong Kim, Shakow et al., 2000).
The impacts of SAPs have proved difficult to separate from the effects of
economic crises that preceded their imposition. Many countries experienced
severe economic recessions in the early 1980s that were already eroding their
capacities to provide programming to support the health and livelihoods of
vulnerable populations (Braveman & Tarimo, 2002). Only in a few countries
strongly committed to pro-child and pro-poor policies even in difficult times
(e.g. Cuba, South Korea) did 'broad trends towards improvement in child welfare
continue ... almost unaffected' (Jolly & Cornia, 1984). There is less ambiguity
about the generally negative effects these programs had on people's health. A
review of the health consequences of structural adjustment conducted for the
CMH (Breman & Shelton, 2001) found a preponderance of negative effects
among 76 studies identified. A more even distribution of positive and negative
findings existed among what the authors classified as 'empirical' studies, a
term that was never defined. This literature review was weakened, however, by
a selective and incomplete sampling of literature: the authors do not appear to
have read the country case studies from the original Adjustment with a Human
Face study (Cornia et al., 1987 & 1988), nor did they consider ethnographic
studies (e.g. Schoepf, 1998; Schoepf et al., 2000, on AIDS in Africa) and other
forms of field observation (e.g. Farmer, 1999). Although the point cannot be
explored here, these omissions suggest the importance of a much more general
issue: what counts as 'knowledge' in development policy discourse, and what
power relations determine the answer to this question (cf. Wilks & Lefran^ois,
2002). Nevertheless, Breman and Shelton (2001) found that most studies
identified negative health impacts from structural adjustment in Africa.
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The Need for Debt Relief and the HIPC Initiative
The urgency of debt relief as a precondition for achieving various social,
economic and environmental policy objectives was identified more than a
decade ago by the WCED (1987) and UNICEF (Cornia et al, 1987, 1988;
UNICEF, 1990). More recently, a review prepared for the Economic and Social
Council of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights documented
the destructive consequences of the debt crisis and the role of the
industrialized world in perpetuating it, and argued for a program of debt
cancellation as part of a broader package of initiatives combining sustainable
economic growth with social justice (Cheru, 1999). In the same year UNCTAD
(1999) argued that the 'debt overhang' of the LDCs continued to be the major
obstacle to their economic growth and development. It is also a major
impediment to their ability to invest in health, education, water, sanitation
and other essential human development infrastructures. For example,
scheduled debt service in Zambia and Tanzania exceeds 40 per cent of their
governments' budgetary resources (AFRODAD, 2002). African countries as a
whole are currently paying over US$15 billion annually in debt servicing
charges to rich country creditors, an amount that exceeds the total aid they
receive (OECD, 2002b: 258).
This background is essential to understanding the genesis and limitations
of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, announced by the
World Bank and IMF in 1996 as a way of providing more effective debt relief
to a limited number of countries (41, 33 of which are in Africa). HIPC, and
the subsequent 'enhanced' HIPC Initiative, have been the centerpiece of G8
debt relief efforts, even though the HIPC countries account for only ten per
cent of the developing world's debt (UNRISD, 2000: 22).
Debt relief -particularly the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative -is a valuable contribution to the fight against poverty
.... We are delighted twenty-three countries have qualified for an overall
amount of debt relief of over [US] $53 billion, out of an initial stock
of debt of [US] $74 billion. We must continue this progress' (Genoa
Communique, para. 7).
The Enhanced HIPC Initiative we launched in Cologne aims to
increase growth, reduce poverty and provide a lasting exit from
unsustainable debt, by reducing debt on the basis of strengthened
policy reforms.... This will significantly reduce their debt service, thus
freeing resources for social sector expenditure, in particular education
and health (Genoa Communique, para. 15).
A recent progress report on Enhanced HIPC notes that
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[a]s of March 2002, 25 countries [have] reached their decision point2
under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative
framework and are now receiving debt service relief under the Initiative
which will amount to about [US] $40 billion over time, or a reduction
of nearly [US] $24 billion in the net present value (NPV) of their
outstanding stock of debt. This is more than 70 percent of the total
relief projected to be delivered under the Initiative (World Bank,
2002b).
The same report calculated that African countries eligible for debt relief under
HIPC would be able to increase their social expenditures from 4.3 per cent
of GDP in 1999, to 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2002 (World Bank, 2002b: 6).
Adrian Lovett of Jubilee 2000, in an address to the pre-Genoa summit meeting
with NGOs (Florence, 1-3 April 2001) noted that, of the debt relief so far
granted, two-thirds of the budgetary savings were going to health and
education, and the rest to water, sanitation and HIV/AIDS programs. Later
that year, however, a controversy arose that serves to illuminate the tensions
between social expenditure priorities and the commercial interests of
countries that provide development assistance - a topic examined at greater
length in Chapter 6. Tanzania secured a loan to buy an expensive military air
traffic control system from British Aerospace, even though the cost - according
to Kevin Watkins of Oxfam -would 'wipe out about two thirds of the budget
savings Tanzania would make' from the HIPC Initiative (Watkins, 2001). The
purchase eventually went ahead, and indeed Tanzania was able to secure a
substantial additional aid package from the UK (see Box 6.3, Chapter 6).
The G8, in other words, have lived up to their debt relief commitments.
The key question involves the adequacy of those commitments. The statement
issued at the start of the 2001 Genoa summit, for example, reiterated their
1999 commitment to forgive any debts associated with the loan portions of
ODA to HIPC countries (Genoa Statement, para. 16). But this debt reduction
will be available only once HIPC countries have reached their 'decision point',
and will not be fully implemented until they achieve their 'completion point',
something only five HIPC countries had accomplished by the end of 2002
(World Bank, 2003b).
Eligibility for debt relief under HIPC is currently determined based on a
ratio of debt service costs to export revenues. However, a more appropriate
ratio involves debt service costs to government revenues (Pettifor etal, 2001:
8-10). Numerous studies have indicated that the level of debt relief provided
- roughly one third of all HIPC debt - is thoroughly inadequate, given the
economic challenges faced by the countries that qualify for debt relief under
the terms of the initiative. For example, a US General Accounting Office
analysis of seven recipient countries, published in 2000, warned that
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the decline in debt service for the seven countries [studied] will only
'free up' resources for additional poverty reduction if countries
continue to borrow at the same level and concessional terms as in the
years prior to their qualifying for debt relief. This occurs because
countries previously borrowed for several reasons including debt
payments, and they will need to continue borrowing after receiving
debt relief in order to meet their remaining debt payments and to
increase spending on poverty reduction (USGAO, 2000: 9).
Pettifor et al. (2001) examined a much larger number of countries and
considered both uncertainties surrounding commodity prices and the
economic consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. They reached the same
conclusion: 'Enhanced HIPC is debt rescheduling not debt reduction'
(Pettifor et al., 2001: 10). The current rate of debt stock reduction from
debt relief is approximately 65 per cent; US$40 billion in debt relief
ultimately eliminates only US$26 billion in original debt stock. The US$14
billion difference is the new debt that continues to accumulate over the
period of the initiative. If this rate persists over the whole period of the
HIPC program, the total debt stock eliminated will be approximately US$45
billion. But the initial debt stock for these countries in 1996 stood at over
US$74 billion, with compounding interest and additional lending
continually increasing it.
In other words, having received the full amount of debt relief for which
they are eligible, at the end of the HIPC Initiative, the heavily indebted poor
countries will remain heavily indebted poor countries. By the World Bank
and IMF's own estimates, at least ten of the 26 countries involved in the
HIPC program will exit it with unsustainable debt loads, and their criterion
for what constitutes a 'sustainable' debt (150 per cent of a country's export
earnings) has been widely critiqued (Denny, 2003a). This problem is
particularly severe for several sub-Saharan African countries, notably Rwanda,
Zambia, Chad, Burkina Faso, Malawi, the Gambia, Tanzania and Niger. The
Enhanced HIPC Initiative, for example, will provide debt reduction equivalent
to only about three years of multilateral loans to Burkina Faso, Mali,
Mozambique and Uganda (World Bank, 2002b). These countries in future
years will have debt repayment requirements that, with essential spending
requirements, will still exceed available revenues. They will have to continue
borrowing in the future to continue paying down what they borrowed in the
past, ad infinitum (Pettifor et al., 2001; EURODAD, 2001). They are also
continuing to pay debt servicing each year, amounting to US$73 million in
Ethiopia (currently facing one of its worst famines ever), and over US$250
million in Zambia, Mozambique and Malawi, all of which are also facing
famines (Denny, 2003a). Oxfam (2001 a: Figure 1) calculates that in 14 HIPC
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countries, annual debt servicing costs will exceed combined public spending
on health and primary education even after debt relief is obtained.
Hanlon (2000), working backward from estimates of the amount of
spending that would be required to meet a package of development goals
similar to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (see Box 2.2, below)
throughout the developing world, estimates that approximately US$600
billion (at current value) in debt reduction would be needed in order to
ensure that debt repayment did not occur at the expense of essential social
spending.3 This is roughly eight times the value of debt relief to be provided
under Enhanced HIPC. Hanlon's estimates consider not only the HIPC
countries, which he estimates will require debt relief worth US$180 billion if
essential social spending is not to be compromised, but also many others.
His calculations imply, for instance, debt relief of US$24 billion for Argentina,
US$116 billion for Indonesia and US$98 billion for India - countries that
cannot qualify for HIPC despite the prevalence of poverty and desperation
within their borders. It should further be noted that some development NGOs
have argued for even more extensive debt relief, invoking both the impossible
arithmetic of debt repayment given the small amounts of development
assistance available (Bond, 2001: 28, 140) and the extent to which the debt
burden of poor countries consists of 'odious debt' (see Box 2.1, above)
incurred by leaders in order to finance political repression or the accumulation
of private fortunes. Economist Jeffrey Sachs (2000: 2), in a scathing critique
of 'the world's minimalist approach to helping the poor', has called HIPC 'a
program so badly mangled by the international community that millions of
people around the world have protested the debt relief policies that the IMF
and World Bank call their finest moment.'
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Box 2.2: The International and the Millennium Development Goals
As will be seen in the next chapter, the G8 have committed to support both
the International Development Coals and the later Millennium Development
Goals. The iDGs and the first seven of the MDGs are virtually identical - not
surprisingly, since they arose from the same multilateral consultative process
(Devarajan etal., 2002) (see Table 2.1, betow). Trie full set of MDGs, as adopted
by the UN General Assembly in 2000 (Resolution A/RES/55/2, United Nations
Millennium Declaration), includes a considerably more expansive set of targets,
under the heading of an eighth goal; a global partnership for development
(see Devarajan et a!., 2002: 34-5). The targets specified under this goal relate,
inter alia, to debt relief, market access, access to affordable drugs and providing
productive youth employment- fn this book, discussion of the MDGs is
presumed to involve the first seven goals, unless otherwise specified, because
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
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of the convergence between the IDCs and the M DCs. This does not mean that
GoalS is any less important than the first seven: indeed, the thrust of this book
is that changes of the kind envisioned are especially necessary in order to
achieve longer-term global improvements in population health.
Table 2.1: International Development Goals and Millennium Development
Coals Compared
International Development Goals Millennium Development Coals
(Goals 1-7)
1. Reduce the proportion of people Coal 1: Eradicate extreme
living in extreme poverty (less poverty and hunger,
than US$1/day) by 2015. Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and
2015, the proportion of
people whose income is
less than USSVday.
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and
2015, the proportion of
people who suffer from
hunger.
2. Enrol all children in primary Goal 2: Achieve universal
school by 2015. primary education.
Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015,
children everywhere,
boys and girls alike, will
be able to complete a
full course of primary
education.
3. Eliminate gender disparities Goal 3: Promote gender equality
in primary and secondary and empower women,
education by 2005. Target 4: Eliminate gender
disparity in primary and
secondary education
preferably by 2005 and
to all levels of education
no later than 2015.
4. Reduce infant and child Goal 4: Reduce child mortality,
(under-ftve) mortality rates Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds,
by two-thirds between 1990 between 1990 and 2015,
and 2015. the under-five mortality
rate.
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Development NGOs are urging a different approach to debt relief. The African
Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), for example,
argues that, instead of conditional or tied ODA, donor countries should direct
all aid to write off all loans (total debt cancellation) for African countries - a
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5. Reduce maternal mortality Goal 5: Improve maternal health,
ratios by three-quarters Target 6: Reduce by three-
between 1990 and 2015. quarters, between 1990
and 2015, the maternal
mortality ratio.
t>. Provide access for all who need Coal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS,
reproductive health services by malaria and other
2015, diseases.
Target 7: Have halted by 2015, and
begun to reverse, the
spread of HIV/AIDS.
Target 8: Have halted by 2015, and
begun to reverse, the
incidence ol malaria and
other major disease.
7. Implement national strategies Coal 7: Ensure environmental
for sustainable development sustainability.
by 2005 so as to reverse the loss Target 9: Integrate the principles
of environmental resources of sustainable develop-
by 2015. ment into country
policies and programs
and reverse the loss of
environmental resources.
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the
proportion of people
without sustainable
access to safe drinking
water.
Target 11: By 2020, to have
achieved a significant
improvement in the lives
of at least 100 million
slum dwellers.
Source: IMF etat. (2000) for IDCs; Devarajan et al. (2002: 34-5) for MDCs
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zero debt, zero aid proposition that, with an overdue opening of Northern
markets to African goods, would provide African countries with the capital
and autonomy they need for both economic and human development
(AFRODAD, 2002: 32).4 We expand upon this argument in Chapter 7. The
Jubilee 2000 movement, an international NGO campaign, gathered 24 million
signatures on a petition urging G8 leaders to 'cancel the unpayable debts of
the poorest countries by the year 2000, under a fair and transparent process'
(http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/about/about.htm). The campaign's successor
organization, Jubilee Research, argues for increased debt relief and, more
importantly, a debt restructuring process that embodies principles similar to
those that govern domestic bankruptcy procedures (see Box 2.3, below). This
proposal is similar to one that emerged from NGO consultations preceding
the Genoa summit, which further urged a cancellation of all debts to the
World Bank and IMF owed by the LDCs (http://www.gnginitiative.net/
gngreport.htm).
Canada has been the only G8 nation even to approach this position on
debt cancellation/debt relief. Canada called for a total moratorium on debt
payments for all HIPCs at the G7 finance ministers' meeting in Prague in
2000. However, Germany was 'particularly dismissive, of the proposal' (Kirton,
2001: 157), as reportedly was the US (Globe and Mail, 7 June 2002: A16).
Former Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin strongly advocated an
international bankruptcy process that incorporates emergency standstills (an
argument now being taken on board by the IMF, in light of Argentina's 2002
currency crisis; see Elliott and Teather, 2002) and more generous debt
forgiveness (Martin, 2002). At the Prague meeting, Martin 'announced that
Canada would cancel 100% of debt owed by HIPC countries to the Canadian
Export Development Corporation (EDC) and the Canadian Wheat Board
(CWB). Sub-Saharan Africa makes up about [C]$1.5 billion of developing
country debt owed to Canada, of which [C]$l.l billion is owed to EDC and
CWB by HIPC countries' (CCIC Africa-Canada Forum, 2002: 1).
Martin's tenure as Canada's finance minister ended in early 2002. His
replacement reportedly failed to lobby forcefully for such an initiative at the
2002 Halifax G7 finance ministers meeting, where 'there [seems to be] no
political will among G7 countries, particularly the United States and Japan,
to consider deeper and complete cancellation of... unsustainable debts' (CCIC
Africa-Canada Forum, 2002:2), although the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Gordon Brown, reportedly lobbied for more generous debt relief for poor
countries vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations (Elliott, 2002). The
UK is also urging a '100% plus' approach, in which qualifying countries
reaching their 'decision point' are retroactively reimbursed for debt service
payments from the start of the initiative. The Halifax G7 finance ministers'
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meeting ultimately agreed to commit only US$1 billion in new HIPC funding,
to cover a shortfall in its Trust Fund, and to call for 100 per cent of future
World Bank loans for AIDS programs in HIPC countries to be non-repayable
grant resources (Zeitz & Bryden, 2002: 3).
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Box 2.3: Insolvency for Countries?
NGOs such as Jubilee Research and AFRODAD have put forward several
proposals to adapt the treatment of insolvent debtors within the borders of
industrialized countries to the situation of developing country debtors, jubilee
Research (Pettifor et a/., 2001; Pettifor, 2002) argues that such a procedure
should be modeled on provisions of US federal law that deal with the
bankruptcy of municipal governments. Key features of this proposal would be
the opportunity to petition for an immediate standstill on debt repayments; a
procedure for appointing an independent panel to mediate between creditors
and debtors, whose function would include providing opportunities for inquiry
into the legitimacy of the debts in question; continued access to capital on the
part of the debtor country; protections against capital flight; and protections
for human rights in the debtor country as part of the debt restructuring process.
(It is not clear how these last two objectives would be ensured.) The IMF
would assume the role of a 'gateway' to the process, but would not itself play
an active role, because its own status as a creditor would (and does, according
to critics) place it in a conflict of interest.
Since 1996, UNCTAD has been cautiously exploring the need for an
international insolvency procedure modeled on the better-known 'Chapter
11' provisions of U5 bankruptcy law: the provisions that allow for-profit
corporations to seek court protection from creditors while they restructure
their operations, rather than simply liquidating their assets (see UNCTAD, 2001:
68, 133-19). in a different vein, AFRODAD (2002) suggests that the UN take
the lead in efforts to establish an International Arbitration Court for Debt by
international treaty. Instead of US bankruptcy law, AFRODAD uses as a model
principles of international arbitration that are now widely incorporated into
commercial contracts, and supported by several international conventions that
provide for the inter-jurisdictional enforcement of arbitral awards. Such a court
would, of course, onfy bind those countries that were parties to the proposed
treaty.
Interestingly, the IMF itself has conceded the need for some form of
international insolvency mechanism, starting with a widely cited speech by
senior official Anne Krueger (2001). However, in their current form, the IMF's
proposals for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) have been
criticized for expanding the already powerful role of the IMF in setting the
terms and conditions under which new financing will be made (Pettifor &
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
HIPC Conditionality: Are PRSPs Just the
Reincarnation of Structural Adjustment?
Further problems arise because HIPC eligibility is contingent on the recipient
government's completion of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. PRSPs were
launched by the World Bank and IMF in December 1999, as 'a new approach
to the challenge of reducing poverty in low-income countries based on
country-owned poverty reduction strategies that would serve as a framework
for development assistance' (International Development Association/IMF
2002: 5). Indeed, PRSPs are becoming a central element of the G8 approach
to development policy:
We urge multilateral development organisations and financial
institutions to support developing countries' efforts to create a
favourable trade and investment climate, including through the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Integrated Framework (IF)
(Okinawa Communique, para. 17).
We welcome the efforts being made by HIPCs to develop
comprehensive and country-owned poverty reduction strategies
through a participatory process involving civil society. IFIs should,
along with other donors, help HIPCs prepare PRSPs and assist their
financial resource management by providing technical assistance
(Okinawa Communique, para. 24).
Placing poverty reduction at the centre of development strategy is clearly a
laudable policy direction. However, as suggested by the reference to 'creating]
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Raffer, 2003). These observations suggest a more general limitation of the
analogy with bankruptcy proceedings under national legislation - the idea
that bankruptcy genuinely provides a 'fresh start', except for large corporations
or ultra-weal thy households that can shelter many of their assets, is illusory. As
a rule, bankruptcy more closely resembles a form of indentured servitude to
creditors, with debtors expected (a) to liquidate saleable assets, and (b) to
assign priority to meeting their debt obligations. At the household level, the
health consequences can be substantial (Jacoby, 2002). In other words, the
asymmetrical power relations characteristic of routine household or business
bankruptcy rather closely resemble the conditionalities associated with
structural adjustment as they have historically been applied to developing
countries' economies. Taking the human consequences of developing country
debt seriously is likely to require a different vocabulary, and more radical
solutions f more radical, because they involve real large-scale resource transfers
from the rich world to the poor) that involve, inter alia, debt cancellation
rather than just new forms of rescheduling.
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a favourable trade and investment climate ... through the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers', the lenders who assess PRSPs operate on the presumption
that poverty reduction is best achieved through neo-liberal prescriptions for
privatization, deregulation and rapid integration into the global economy -
the same prescriptions that often exacerbated existing inequalities when they
were incorporated into structural adjustment regimes (SAPRIN, 2002). Indeed,
direct parallels exist between the PRSP process of qualifying for debt relief
and earlier forms of conditionality (Cheru, 2001; IMF, 2001: 50-2; UNCTAD,
2002a: 191).
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in its assessment
of the PRSP process, notes that advice on the requirement for a macroeconomic
framework identifying fiscal and financing policies for poverty reduction is
weak, contains many unexamined assumptions and does not adequately
emphasize distributional impacts of macroeconomic policies (UNDP, 2001b).
UNCTAD (2002b: 197) links the PRSP process with the inadequacy of overall
levels of debt relief, noting that in order to ensure that a PRSP is perceived as
'realistic', countries like Uganda and Tanzania are still investing far less than
the minimum amounts required for health and social programs. The WHO
goes further in analyzing serious gaps in existing PRSPs with respect to health.
Among its major criticisms: PRSPs deal with ill health as a consequence of
poverty, but not as a cause of poverty, particularly with respect to the effects
of cost recovery or user charges for health-care services on the poor. Similarly,
PRSPs address health as an outcome of development, rather than a means of
development. At least implicitly, then, investments in health are regarded as
secondary to investments in economic growth. Six of the ten PRSPs reviewed
by the WHO referred to the need to subsidize cost-recovery health services
for the poor, but failed to mention any of the well-known failures of such
fee-exemption programs, even though the failures were raised in the public
participatory documents associated with these PRSPs. PRSPs do not deal with
such important health system issues as governance (e.g. government doctors
also working privately) and expenditure levels well below the minimum
needed to provide basic primary health care; and there is no indication that
the PRSP process is leading to any increased commitments in health or
education (WHO, 2002a).
Several development NGOs have noted that the degree of public or civil
society participation in developing PRSPs has been minimal. Given the short
time since their inception, and that eight full and 41 interim country PRSPs
have been completed, the pace of their development perforce precludes wider
civil society engagement. A recent World Bank/IMF evaluation of the PRSP
process acknowledges this problem, although it also notes that public
participation is slowly increasing, government 'ownership' is strengthening
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and there is more transparent communication between governments and
their citizens as a result of the PRSP requirement (World Bank/IMF, 2002b:
6-7). Some G8 countries, such as Canada, are urging that PRSPs associated
with their development assistance include gender analyses of poverty-
reduction plans, an extremely important consideration for maternal/child
health and for HIV/AIDS prevention (Tomlinson, 2002). There is also some
evidence that countries engaged in the PRSP process are making education a
higher priority in national government policies and plans (UNESCO, 2002b:
131). But the PRSP process continues to be plagued by several development
assistance challenges, including lack of adequate public budget and accounting
structures in most affected countries, inadequate funding for the costs of
broader civil society participation, and a lack of mechanisms for ensuring
that programs actually do reach and benefit the poor primarily (World Bank/
IMF, 2000, 2002b).
The major concern remains that full PRSPs require integration into a
comprehensive macroeconomic framework that simultaneously incorporates
pro-poor and pro-growth strategies, and in fact attaches highest priority to
accelerated global economic integration (Craig & Porter, 2003). Yet the World
Bank and IMF acknowledge that 'the linkages between macroeconomic
policies and poverty reduction are complex' (World Bank/IMF, 2000: 11).
They also acknowledge that policy adjustments creating macroeconomic
stability can cause short-term fiscal shortfalls, which they 'hoped ... could
eventually lead to an increase in donor assistance to support larger fiscal
deficits in line with the targets identified in the PRSP.' In other words,
development assistance is expected to provide a safety net for the losers from
policies that were adopted in order to qualify for loans from the IFIs. We
note in Chapter 6 the uneven, and less than enviable, record of the G8 with
respect to providing such assistance.
A critique that echoes many earlier commentaries on the effects of structural
adjustment conditionality points out 'that the [PRSP] focus on short-term
economic stability often comes at the expense of long-term sustainable
development' (World Bank/IMF, 2000: 13). UNCTAD (2002a), in its review
of the PRSP initiative, cites a public statement by a World Bank official that
'the PRSP is a compulsory process wherein the people with the money tell
the people who want the money what they need to do to get the money', and
suggests that this can lead to governments 'second-guessing' what the World
Bank and IMF want to see, thus shaping their PRSPs as a response to earlier
World Bank and IMF lending conditionalities. Cheru (2001: 12), in his
assessment of PRSPs, quotes a finance minister from one of the HIPCs: 'We
do not want to second-guess the Fund. We prefer to pre-empt them by giving
them what they want before they start lecturing us about this and that. By so
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doing, we send a clear message that we know what we are doing, i.e., we
believe in structural adjustment.'
A special concern has been the incorporation of user fees for primary
health care and education in some PRSPs, despite even the World Bank's
acknowledgment that this increases the difficulty of access for the poor
(Naiman, 2001; Hilary, 2001). According to Naiman (2001), leaked World
Bank documents concerning the Tanzanian interim PRSP led to NGO protest
and, in the US, lobbying by certain legislators who pointed out that, under
October 2000 US legislation (itself a product of intense NGO and AFL-CIO
lobbying efforts), US representatives to the World Bank and IMF could not
support any primary health-care or education program that included user
fees. The Tanzanian interim PRSP indicated that the poor would be exempt
from such fees, but NGOs and others cited extensive evidence that such
exemption schemes have failed (Naiman, 2001; WHO, 2002a).
Many development NGOs insist that debt relief and ODA must be de-
linked from the PRSP process. If debt relief is to provide either a meaningful
general stimulus to development or the more specific fiscal flexibility
necessary for investments in health and education, it cannot be contingent
on the macroeconomic conditions historically imposed by lenders. Some of
the G8 are moving, cautiously, in this direction. France is reported to be
progressively removing conditionality on its bilateral aid (Canonne, 2002);
Italy is imposing very little (Rhi-Sausi & Zupi, 2002); Japan never agreed
with the emphasis of SAPs on market liberalization and privatization, believing
that governments had stronger roles to play (Takayanagi, 2002); and Germany's
concerns include respect for human rights, public participation in political
decision-making, a social market economy and a good legal system
(Dederichs-Bain, 2002). Canada, the UK and the US appear to be lining up
more firmly behind the PRSP process. To the extent that G8 nations increase
the multilateral portion of their ODA, the PRSP process will likely continue
to increase its influence on financial relations between the G8 and poor
countries.
Poverty Reduction and Foreign Direct Investment
A major goal of PRSPs (and before them SAPs) has been to create conditions
favourable to attracting foreign direct investment that, in turn, would
supposedly fuel new economic growth. This assumption is embedded in G8
summit statements, and is also to be found in NEPAD:
The New Partnership for Africa's Development seeks to increase private
capital flows to Africa, as an essential component of a sustainable
long-term approach to filling the resource gap.
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The first priority is to address investors' perception of Africa as a 'high
risk' continent, especially with regard to security of property rights,
regulatory framework and markets (NEPAD, paras. 153-4).
Even before urging the multilateral development organizations and financial
institutions to step up the pace of the PRSP process, the G8 'express[ed]
concern that certain regions remain marginalized as regards foreign direct
investment, and that the 48 LDCs attract less than 1% of total foreign direct
investment flows to the developing countries' (Okinawa Communique, para.
17).
Since most African countries have adopted SAPs as the price of assistance
from the IFIs and many are now following PRSPs, one would expect them to
have been rewarded with a greater flow of FDI. In absolute terms, that is so.
Between 1990 and 2000, FDI inflows to sub-Saharan Africa increased eight-
fold, from US$834 million to US$6.67 billion. It is also so in relative terms,
with sub-Saharan Africa's share of global FDI rising from 0.4 per cent to 0.5
per cent (World Bank, 2002d: 354), although the percentages are so low they
are almost meaningless in the global context of financial flows, and its share
of overall FDI inflows to developing countries remained stuck at four per
cent.
Governments are not necessarily responsible for where firms and investors
located within their borders choose to invest - although a case could be
made for social responsibility requirements in the case of large institutional
investors like public sector pension funds, which might include policies of
investing in the developing world when consistent with the institutions'
fiduciary obligations. But the evidence on FDI flows raises two questions.
Firstly, are the macroeconomic policies that are being demanded of HIPC
countries and other LDCs in Africa necessary to attract such investment?
Secondly, is the prescription for FDI-led growth - normally understood to
require major increases in exports -even appropriate for sub-Saharan Africa?
In a world of increasingly hypermobile capital, the answer to the first
question may very well be 'yes,' at least in situations where countries cannot
realistically expect to rely on domestic savings and development assistance
as sources of capital investment. However, the potentially destructive effects
of organizing economic policy around the competition for foreign investment
- a few of which we discuss briefly in the next chapter, as they relate to
health systems - should not be underestimated. The resulting dilemma is
succinctly captured by a recent study of FDI in the developing world as a
whole: '[Progressives often criticize FDI as a destructive force while at the
same time decrying the fact that many poor countries can't seem to attract
any. It may be that the only thing worse than engaging in this bidding war
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and getting FDI is engaging in it and not getting any' (Grotty et al, 1998:
121; see also Box 2.4, below). FDI has only been successful in creating
employment in developing countries when it has been forthcoming in very
large amounts (e.g. Singapore, Malaysia, the Mexican maquiladoras), and suc
FDI generally takes advantage of low labour costs rather than developing
new technological capacities in the host country, rendering the employment
and its associated economic growth very fragile (Third World Network/UNDP,
2001: 20). This is especially true for industries characterized by commodity
chains that cross multiple borders, with associated competition among
contract suppliers. Stated another way, '[competition among firms, including
international firms, in developing countries becomes competition among
labour located in different countries' (UNCTAD, 2002c: ix), creating
downward pressure on wages and disincentives to improve working
conditions. More fundamentally, Tandon (2000, original emphasis) has argued
that the prevailing orthodoxy that growth must be led by foreign investment
does not fit the historical facts, in Africa or elsewhere: '[T]he very assumption
thatFDIs are necessary for development of Africa (or for the developing countries
generally) was itself at best an untested theory, and at worst a plain inversion of
the truth ... it was growth that attracted FDIs, and notFDIs that brought growth.'
In any event, the social policy implications of organizing macroeconomic
policy around attracting foreign investment illustrate how and why research
on health and development needs to be broadly transdisciplinary, engaging
specialists in development policy and political economy (to name just two
fields), as well as those who normally contribute to research on international
health.
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Box 2.4: Capital Account Liberalization and Foreign Direct Investment
The 08, reflecting mainstream economic theory on the benefits of liberalization,
frequently claim the importance of trade and investment to economic growth
and poverty reduction, e.g. 'trade and investment are critical to promoting
sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty' (Okinawa Communique,
para.17). Given the low amount of savings in many developing, particularly
least developed, countries, investment is assumed to be primarily foreign. A
recent study of capital account liberalization, which is presumed to increase
the flows of presumably beneficial FOt, found that this was so principally for
developed'but not for developing countries (Cobham, 2002: 169). Moreover,
there are significant negative poverty impacts associated with increased FDI
in developing countries when it does occur, quite apart from the problems
associated with currency 'meltdowns' and conditions imposed upon the
bailouts. A structural difficulty is embedded in the need for governments to
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International Finance, Tax Competition and Offshore
Financial Centres
The complex issues associated with tax competition and the operations of
offshore financial centres deserve the attention of the international health
research and policy community for the following reasons. As we indicate in
Chapter 7, many developing and least developed countries rely on tariffs for
a far higher proportion of their overall tax revenues than do the industrialized
countries. This pattern replicates the situation in the industrialized countries
at a much earlier stage of their economic development, but trade liberalization
is rapidly reducing the significance of this source of revenue without - at
least over the short term -generating alternatives. When governments' fiscal
capacity is simultaneously eroded by reductions in tariff revenue and by
international pressures to maintain 'competitive' tax regimes in order to
attract direct and portfolio investment, the effect is to make taxation to finance
such policies as income support and investment in basic health and education
more problematic than in previous decades (Von Furstenberg & Kirton, 2001
248; CMH, 2001: 76). Indeed, capital flight has the potential seriously to
erode the fiscal capacity even of wealthy countries (Avi-Yonah, 2000; OECD,
2001 b), just as it has already compromised many developing countries (see
Box 2.1, above). The financial volatility that results from the hypermobility
of capital can result in economic crises, such as the collapse of the Mexican
peso in 1994-95, the so-called Asian meltdown in 1997-98 and the more recent
implosion of the Argentine economy, which plunged millions of people into
poverty, with attendant effects on the social determinants of health (e.g. see
Bello et al, 1998; GELS, 2001, 2002; DePalma, 1995; Kristof, 1998a, 1998b;
Myerson, 1995; Reveles & Teran, 2001; Santiso, 1999; Walton et al, 1994;
Weeks, 1995; Yong Kim, Shakow et al, 2000).5
A recent report from Oxfam Great Britain (2000) estimated that developing
countries might be losing as much as US$50 billion per year in tax revenues
- roughly equivalent to the annual amount of ODA they receive - as a
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prevent inflationary pressures brought on by increased FOI flows by selling
bonds in their domestic currency and purchasing bonds in foreign currencies.
Differences in the interest rates or fluctuations in exchange rates between these
two transactions represent a cost to the developing country government; and
so 'the effect of capital inflows is to seriously reduce the level of government
expenditure' (Cobham, 3002: 178). Private sector growth may occur, but
whether or not this translates into benefits for the poor is moot. This is not to
claim that FDI is inevitably disadvantageous, but rather that its advantages are
not without significant development costs.P
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consequence of tax avoidance and inter-jurisdictional tax competition. Even
these amounts pale in comparison to estimates of the total value of assets
held in offshore tax havens (Oxfam, 2000: 3-5). The line between 'legitimate'
diversification of household and corporate investments from tax avoidance
and tax evasion is not always clearly visible. It is clear, however, that the
general erosion of barriers to capital mobility - a trend to which the rise of
offshore finance clearly contributes (cf. Naylor, 1987) - offers abundant
opportunities for small, propertied minorities to protect assets against the
redistributive consequences of national and sub-national taxation. One recent
estimate is that an astounding one-quarter of the world's financial assets are
being managed from or through offshore financial centres (Levin, 2003);
another places the value at roughly US$8 trillion, which, if subjected to a
'freeloader levy' of just 3.5 per cent, would generate US$280 billion annually
(Gates, 2002: 21).
The G8 leaders have attempted to address these problems, although not
with specific reference either to capital flight or to the potential channels of
influence on population health. In 2000, a detailed set of commitments
addressed 'abuse of the global financial system' under the separate but related
headings of 'money laundering'; 'tax havens and other harmful tax practices';
'offshore financial centres'; and 'the role of IFIs' (Okinawa Statement, para.
26). More recently, in 2001, the G8 nations 'reaffirmed] [their] support for
the multilateral effort against abuses of the global financial system and
endorse[d] [their] Finance Ministers' recommendations to address this
challenge' (Genoa Statement, para. 14, citing Fighting the Abuses of the Global
Financial System, Report of G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors,
Rome, 7 July 2001).
Most of these activities endorsed at Okinawa were and are actually
undertaken by the OECD. The OECD's Financial Action Task Force against
money laundering (FATF), whose 'initial work' was 'welcomed' at Okinawa
(Okinawa Statement, para. 26), was established at the G7 summit in 1989; its
mandate specifically addresses national policies with respect to the proceeds
of serious crimes, including drug trafficking.6 In 2000, the FATF published its
first list of Non-Compliant Countries and Territories (NCCTs), defined with
reference to a set of 25 practices said to be conducive to money laundering
(FATF, 2000). By the FATF's own account, most countries it has identified as
NCCTs have responded with appropriate legislative and regulatory actions
(for updates, see http://wwwl.oecd.org/fatf/NCCT_en.html). These national
policy responses to FATF have probably improved financial reporting,
transparency and client identification, and thereby made certain forms of
tax avoidance more difficult. However, the FATF's mandate does not include
tax competition or international financial stability.
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In 1996, the OECD established a project on 'harmful tax competition/
whose initial report was published in 1998 (OECD, 1998). The OECD's activities
in this area were 'welcome[d]' and 'encourage[d]' by the G8 in 2000 (Okinawa
Statement, para. 26), despite the US refusal to participate in May 2001 talks
convened by the OECD to advance this project (Du Boff, 2002: 28). Since the
publication of the 1998 report, the OECD has continued to refine the criteria
for defining 'tax havens/ to the point that by April 2002, only seven countries
(Andorra, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Monaco, the Marshall Islands, Nauru and
Vanuatu) remained on the OECD's 'uncooperative' list (Kondo, 2002). The
shortness of this list, and the absence of specific attention to the destructive
social consequences of capital flight in the developing world, raises concerns
that harmful tax competition is being defined less broadly than would be
justified by the potentially destructive effects of the erosion of governments'
fiscal capacity. A further concern is that tax competition among the OECD
countries (including the G8 countries themselves) may be escaping scrutiny.
Only in January 2003, for example, did the EU agree to end banking practices
allowing non-residents to earn interest tax-free. Luxembourg, Austria and
Belgium would not have to share banking information but would be required
to impose a withholding tax on interest-earning investments; however, this
would not begin until 2004 or be fully phased in until 2010 (The Economist,
25 January 2003: 72). A deal is still to be reached with non-EU member
Switzerland, and it is not even clear that all EU members will ratify January's
agreement (Denny, 2003b: 14).
The report of the UN's high level panel on financing for development (the
Zedillo report), released in 2001 as background for the 2002 Monterrey
conference on Financing for Development, called for considering the
establishment of an International Tax Organization. The proposed
organization would have a variety of roles, ranging from providing technical
assistance to national governments (an activity the importance of which was
acknowledged at the Okinawa summit in 2000) to sharing tax information
in order to limit tax evasion on offshore investment income and actively
trying to limit the use of 'excessive' tax incentives to attract multinational
firms. The panel noted:
If an ITO succeeded in curbing tax evasion and tax competition, there
would be two beneficial consequences. One would be an increase in
the proportion of a given volume of taxes paid by (a) dishonest
taxpayers and (b) mobile factors of production (such as capital). Most
people would consider this an unambiguous gain. The second
consequence would be an increase in tax revenue at given tax rates
(UN, 2001: 27-8).
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In some of the most legally and financially sophisticated countries in the
world, concern is growing about erosion of the domestic tax base as a result
of offshore reincorporations motivated by tax advantages (Johnston, 2002;
Rosenbaum, 2002), the rise of private banking services (e.g. USGAO, 1999)
and, in the United Kingdom, the ability of the super-rich to opt for an offshore
domicile with a more advantageous tax regime while remaining physically
resident in Britain (Davies, 2002). For developing countries that may have
limited administrative capacity, and that are exhorted to attract private
investment as a central element of their growth and poverty-reduction
strategies, the challenges -and the potential health consequences -are vastly
greater.
Despite growing policy attention to the larger issue of financial mobility
(legal and illegal), the connections among capital flight, tax competition
and the social determinants of health are not yet well understood by either
academic researchers or policy makers. Further research in this area,
comprising both country-specific case studies and investigations of
international capital flows, will be extremely important (Cobham, 2002:182).
The research task is complicated by the extreme technical complexity of the
policy field, the obvious interest of users of offshore financial centres in
concealing details of their operations, and the normative difficulty in
distinguishing between harmful tax competition and the efforts to create
investor-friendly economic environments that are a central element of many
contemporary policy prescriptions.
Summary: Chapter Two
Two of the major vehicles by which G8 macroeconomic policy preferences
have been imposed globally are the SAPs and PRSPs of the World Bank and
the IMF, which are dominated by the G8 countries. (A third vehicle, trade
liberalization, is taken up in later chapters.) The effects of SAPs on health
care and health status have been studied for almost two decades, with largely
negative findings. While PRSPs emphasize country 'ownership' and civil
society participation, their requirements for a macroeconomic framework
with recommended elements almost identical to those of SAPs have raised
criticisms from civil society groups, international development organizations
and several UN agencies.
SAPs were unable to alleviate the severe debt problems of many developing
and most of the least developed countries. The G8's HIPC Initiative for debt
relief, while freeing up some national income for use in the health, education
and water/sanitation sectors, is widely criticized for being debt restructuring
rather than actual relief. Many HIPC countries will exit the initiative with
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unsustainable debt loads. Estimated costs of effective debt cancellation for
all developing countries are high, but represent only a small percentage of
the net wealth of OECD donor countries. It is unlikely that countries that
remain crippled by debt will ever be able to develop economically or make
any sustained progress towards the IDGs to which the G8 countries regularly
commit their support. Civil society groups, and even some G8 member
countries, have called for more radical approaches, including complete debt
cancellation, particularly of 'odious debts/ or 'bankruptcy' proceedings
structured to insulate poor and vulnerable groups while also allowing
appropriate forms of economic development.
A key assumption of G8 development policy preferences is that conven-
tional macroeconomic policies at the national level will attract the FDI that
is an indispensable prerequisite for economic growth. This assumption has
not been borne out empirically. When FDI materializes, it creates the risk of
'compradorization,' in which the economic development of the receiving
country becomes subject to the interests of foreign investors rather than its
own citizens.
Explicit or Specific Commitments: Macroeconomic Policy,
Structural Adjustment and Debt Relief
• Enhanced HIPC Initiative, 23 countries qualified for overall debt relief of
$53 billion, out of an initial stock of debt of $74 billion (Genoa).
Accomplished: Yes. As of March 2002, 25 countries received debt service
relief that will amount to about $40 billion over time.
Adequacy: Enhanced HIPC is debt rescheduling, not debt reduction.
Several countries will exit HIPC with unsustainable debt loads. Debt
reduction is not extended to many other developing countries with large
impoverished populations facing debt crises.
Comments: Canada is the only G8 country that has suggested total debt
cancellation for HIPC countries. Germany and the US have not supported
this proposal. The UK and Canada have both urged some form of
bankruptcy protection for heavily indebted countries, similar to
protections offered private companies. The UK is promoting retroactive
forgiveness of all debt service payments from the start of the HIPC
initiative once countries reach their 'decision point.'
• HIPC countries to be forgiven loan portions of ODA (Cologne, reiterated
at Genoa).
Accomplished/Adequacy/Comments: Slow rate of eligibility for this
forgiveness. At the end of 2002, only five HIPC countries had actually
reached their 'completion point/ where this provision will apply.
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• Urge multilateral development organizations and financial institutions
to support the PRSPs and the Integrated Framework (Okinawa).
Accomplished: Yes. The World Bank and IMF are promoting PRSPs.
Several G8 countries are increasingly linking their ODA to PRSPs.
Adequacy: The PRSP process, to date, has been plagued by lack of adequate
public budget and lack of civil society participation; actual programs are
not benefiting the poorest segments of society. PRSPs arguably represent
a new form of conditionality.
Comments: France is considering de-linking of aid (including debt relief)
from conditionality. Italy imposes very little conditionality. Japan has
never agreed that market liberalization is fundamental to economic
success. Germany has focused its conditionality on human rights, civil
society participation, social market economy and a strong legal system.
• Welcoming, supporting and encouraging of OECD efforts to improve
financial transparency (especially with respect to money laundering) and
reduce harmful tax competition (Okinawa).
Accomplished: Yes, although the language of the commitments makes
precise assessment difficult.
Adequacy: The problem is the narrowness of definitions of 'tax havens/
and uncertainty about the willingness of G8 governments to improve
compliance on the part of home country firms, investors and financial
institutions.
Implicit or Generic Commitments: Macroeconomic Policy,
Structural Adjustment and Debt Relief
• Debt relief will free up resources for social sector spending (Genoa).
Accomplished: Yes. African countries under debt relief for HIPC are
projected to increase social expenditure from 4.3% of GDP in 1999 to
5.5% of GDP in 2002.
Adequacy: Continuing unsustainable debt loads for many HIPC countries
will undermine their ability to provide health, education and essential
human development services. For all developing countries, far higher
levels of debt relief are required to ensure that debt repayment does not
occur at the expense of social spending.
• PRSPs require macroeconomic framework with pro-growth strategies
embodying several assumptions (cost-recovery, privatization, increased
liberalization) associated with SAPs.
Accomplished/adequacy: The UNDP and many NGOs believe that PRSP
focus on poverty reduction is extremely weak, and macroeconomic
assumptions are questionable. The WHO posits that there are serious
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gaps relating to health in existing PRSPs. International development
agencies point to the empirically demonstrated weaknesses of structural
adjustment programs in achieving poverty reduction or improved health
in the past.
Comments: Canada, the US and the UK appear committed to using PRSP
or other macroeconomic orientation to prioritize allocation of ODA.
Endnotes to Chapter Two
1 The UN Economic and Social Council classifies countries with fewer than 75 million people as
LDCs if they are characterized by low GDP (currently US$900 or less per capita), weak human
assets, and a high level of vulnerability. Forty-nine countries are now classified as LDCs (UNCTAD,
2002b). Note that the upper population threshold means the LDC category excludes countries
that may actually have larger numbers of people than the entire population of 'official' LDCs
living in comparable privation and insecurity.
2 The 'decision point' is reached when debt relief under enhanced HIPC is approved by the
Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank.
3 To put this apparently huge sum of US$600 billion into some perspective: it amounts to a little
more than one per cent of the OECD members' total financial assets of US$53 trillion, and
represents less global financial disruption than the financial meltdowns of recent years (Mexico,
Asia, Russia, Brazil, Argentina), and the losses in global stock market valuations. Debt relief of
this magnitude would be economically possible, if it were also deemed politically important by
wealthy creditor nations.
4 We caution that, assuming full market access and the most optimistic economic growth
projections, full debt cancellation for African countries would still be insufficient to generate the
public revenues required to develop the health, education and other infrastructures needed to
attain the MDGs. Direct financial transfers from rich to poor nations, through ODA or other
channels, would still be needed.
5 Unemployment and poverty rates generally rise, and rarely drop to pre-crisis levels; wage rates
often remain frozen while inflation rises, creating negative income effects for those still working;
and 'fire-sales' of profitable and well-performing public utilities, as a condition for loan 'bail-
outs,' have long-term implications for the poor (O'Brien, 2002: 174). O'Brien (2002: 172) points
out another major reason why currency collapses, partly induced by liberalized capital markets,
negatively affect the health and development of the poor: recapitalizing domestic banks costs
governments enormous sums - some US$50 billion in Korea, US$70 billion in Indonesia and
US$20 billion in Thailand. '[T]he average cost across 40 cases [of banking crises] was 12.8 percent
of GDP', an enormous sum when compared to the portion of GDP allocated to health and social
development budgets in many developing countries.
6 The irony of G8 indifference to the far more serious health consequences of the (usually) legal
activities of the tobacco industry is briefly discussed in Chapter 3.
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Health and Health Systems
Just think of the so-called war on terrorism, with scores of billions of
dollars hurled into the fray overnight to avenge the horrendous deaths
of three thousand people. So explain to me why we have to grovel to
extract a few billion dollars to prevent the deaths of over two million
people every year, year after year after year? Why is the war against
terrorism sacrosanct, and the war against AIDS equivocal? In the answer
to that question lies the challenge for NEPAD and the true test for the
G8 (Stephen Lewis, 2002, UN Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa).
Introduction
One of the basic axioms of population health is that health care is just one
of the determinants of health, and far from the most important one. For this
reason, the previous chapter focused on the health consequences of
macroeconomic policy. However, health care is far from irrelevant. This is
especially true in the developing world, where major improvements in health
could be achieved by way of relatively low cost, low technology interventions,
for instance, to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and reduce the toll
from diarrhoea and childbirth (Spinaci & Heymann, 2001). A central concept
in promoting these low-cost approaches has been a focus on the 'burden of
disease', identifying those diseases associated with the largest reductions in
healthy years of life.1 The burden of disease approach yields global estimates
that show sharply different disease distributions in the industrialized and
developing worlds (see Table 3.1, below). In developing countries in 1996,
for example, infectious and parasitic diseases accounted for 43 per cent of all
deaths, as against just 1.2 per cent in developed nations, including the
transition economies (WHO, 1997: 21).2
39
CHAPTER THREE
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health

































Source: WHO (1999) as cited in GFHR (2000)
Not only does the disease burden differ between rich and poor countries:
poorer nations shoulder a much higher burden (see Table 3.2, on the next
page). Only in depression, heart disease and motor vehicle accidents do high-
income countries face a greater burden than low-income countries.
Access to health care is limited, first and foremost, by lack of resources.
The world's LDCs spend an average of just US$11 per capita annually on
health, including both public and private expenditures, to cope with their
much greater burden of disease. For other low-income countries, average per
capita expenditure on health is US$25 (Global Forum on Health, 2002: 5). By
comparison, the CMH estimated the cost of a 'set of essential interventions,'
which would not need to be the same for each country, at US$34 per capita
per year. The report warned that '[i]f anything, we are on the low end of the
range of estimates of the cost of such essential interventions' (CMH, 2001:
11). As if to corroborate this observation, according to the former Director-
General of the WHO, '[i]t is becoming clear that health systems which spend
less than [US]$60 or so per capita are not able to even deliver a reasonable
minimum of services, even through extensive internal reform' (Brundtland,
2000). While the greatest predictors of population (average) health status in
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developing countries are income and education levels and gender equity,
lack of access to essential health services creates enormous human hardship,
particularly for the poor.
Table 3.2: Global Burden of Disease Distribution among Major Groups of Causes,






























































Source: Frenk and Murray (1999); WHO (1999)
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The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria
At the Okinawa summit in 2000, the G8 appeared to take up some important
aspects of the challenge of reducing the burden of disease in the developing
world. They committed themselves to an 'ambitious agenda' of 'deliverfing]
three critical UN targets': reducing the number of HIV/AIDS-infected young
people by 25 per cent by 2010; reducing TB deaths and prevalence of the
disease by 50 per cent by 2010; and reducing the burden of disease associated
with malaria by 50 per cent by 2010 (Okinawa Communique, para. 29). To
help accomplish this, in 2001 the G8 announced:
At Okinawa last year, we pledged to make a quantum leap in the fight
against infectious diseases and to break the vicious cycle between
disease and poverty. To meet that commitment and to respond to the
appeal of the UN General Assembly, we have launched with the UN
Secretary-General a new Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis. We are determined to make the Fund operational before
the end of the year. We have committed [US]$1.3 billion.... We welcome
the further commitments already made amounting to some [US]$500
million (Genoa Communique, para. 15).
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has now been
established, and has awarded its first grants, totalling US$616 million over
two years to 58 programmes in 40 countries (GFATM web site, accessed 16
January 2003). Pledges received from government and the private sector to
date amount to almost US$2.1 billion (see Table 3.3, below). Table 3.3 shows
that the G8 exceeded their Genoa commitment of US$1.3 billion, although
some countries gave proportionally more than others (Italy, the UK, France,
Canada and Russia) and many of the commitments are spread over several
years. Since only one round of GFATM grants has been announced, it is too
early to evaluate performance with respect to the G8 commitment that the
GFATM 'will promote an integrated approach emphasising prevention in a
continuum of treatment and care ... with a strong focus on outcomes' (Genoa
Communique, para. 16).
It is not too early, however, to identify the urgency of finding additional
resources for both treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria if the 'quantum leap' referred to in the Genoa Communique is to
happen. The GFATM was never intended to be the sole source of support for
interventions to address these three diseases. Nevertheless, the level of G8
commitment to the GFATM, relative to need, is both woefully inadequate
and comparatively cheap. On a per capita basis, the US contribution amounts
to US$1.78, or less than the cost of a Big Mac, and Italy's contribution -the
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highest among the G8 countries - to US$3.48. Using another comparison:
Canada's three-year pledge, equal to US$1.10 annually, is less than the cost
of a cup of coffee per Canadian per year. By contrast, contributions from
Sweden and the Netherlands - not members of the G8 - amount to US$6.18
and US$7.61 per capita respectively.
Richard Feachem, Executive Director of the GFATM, although guarded in
his comments, states, 'the current situation requires a substantial front-loaded
capital investment to scale up existing efforts' (quoted in Nolen, 2002b).
The first round funding of 58 projects committed US$1.6 billion over five
years; without immediate and dramatic new donor resources, there will be
little left for later funding rounds. Jeffrey Sachs, chair of the WHO CMH,
which urged the scaling up of the GFATM to about US$8 billion per year by
2007 and US$ 12 billion by 2015, speaks more harshly, stating that the GFATM
and its contributors 'are nowhere on track to actually achieving [the US$8.1
billion required over the next two years]... the fiscal [20]03 request from the
Bush administration was a shocking US$200 million for the Global Fund -
that's a derisory sum, telling the rest of the world that they're just going to
drop dead and it's too bad' (quoted in Nolen, 2002b).
The US$8.1 billion figure cited by these critics refers to the shortfall
between the current level of commitments to the GFATM, and the UN
Secretary-General's call for US$7-10 billion annually to combat the HIV/
AIDS pandemic alone. According to the GFATM's web site, this call 'is based
on an estimate of the total resources required annually to address the HIV/
AIDS epidemic in low- and middle-income countries.' Similarly, estimates
suggest that about US$2 billion is needed annually from all sources to address
TB and malaria.
Activist groups have called upon some form of contribution formula to
prompt more appropriate levels of contribution from the G8 countries. Using
G8 country share of the total UN budget, and an annual GFATM contribution
of US$10 billion, Lee (2002) calculated how much each G8 nation should be
contributing (see Table 3.4, below). By this measure, all G8 countries fall
well short of a 'fair share' and, while Canada and the UK appear to be doing
better than several of their fellow G8 members, their contributions are meted
out over three and five years respectively. Another formula, proposed by the
Washington-based Global AIDS Alliance, breaks down the GFATM's present
shortfall by GDP (Global AIDS Alliance, 2002). Based on estimated GFATM
requirements for 2003 and 2004, the alliance calculated what each G8 country
should have contributed, against what it actually contributed (see Table 3.5,
below). By this metric, all G8 countries fall short. Italy sets itself apart from
its G8 fellows, with Japan, Germany, the US and the UK lagging well behind.
Each set of calculations presents a reasonable criterion for tithing G8 country
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* Based on 1999 population figures from UNDP (2001 b: Table 5). Dollar figures
unadjusted for purchasing power parity. ** Source: Kirton etal. (2002)
Legend:
A = Contribution exceeds proportionate amount (country's share of G8
GDP x US$1.3 billion/total G8 commitment).
^ = Contribution below proportionate amount.
— = Contribution equal to proportionate amount.
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Source: Lee (2002: Table 1)
* Some figures in this column adjusted to correspond with latest data on GFATM
commitments.
annual contributions to the GFATM and, as such, is a benchmark against
which future G8 commitments might be adjudicated. However Stephen Lewis,
the UN Secretary-General's special envoy on HIV/AIDS in Africa, says that,
'[t]he Global Fund simply does not want to deal with a formula -they don't
want to nail the US' (quoted in Nolen, 2002b).
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Source: Global AIDS Alliance (2002: Table 2)
To put the GFATM's urgent need for an additional U$8.1 billion into global
perspective, this amount is roughly equivalent to what was spent annually
on cosmetics in the US, and roughly one-sixth of what was spent on cigarettes
in Europe, during the mid-1990s (UNDP, 1998: 37). It is easy to dismiss such
comparisons as polemical, but they serve a critically important purpose in
comparing the discretionary consumption of the few with the low cost of
reducing or preventing the desperation of the many. A more timely
comparison against which G8 commitments to the GFATM can be weighed
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is the 2002 Kananaskis summit commitment to raise up to US$20 billion
over the next ten years to support projects aimed at the 'destruction of
chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear
submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former
weapons scientists' (Statement by the G8 leaders, Kananaskis summit, 'The
G8 global partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass
destruction'). An important undertaking, this commitment, when annualized,
exceeds that made to the GFATM. As we noted in our Introduction, pandemic
diseases also pose grave national and global security threats, with immediate
humanitarian consequences. During his opening address to the 'G6Billion'
alternate summit in Calgary in June, 2002, Stephen Lewis argued that it would
be 'unconscionable' if the G8, which freed up over US$100 billion to avenge
the deaths of 3 000 people in the attacks on New York and Washington,
failed to free up the US$10^IO billion needed to prevent the deaths of millions
of people in Africa (Lewis, 2002a). 'Unconscionably,' they did fail at
Kananaskis.4
Essential Health Interventions as Global Public Goods
Public goods are economic amenities that are undersupplied by the market
and therefore require public provision and/or financing. In common use,
the concept of a public good is often associated with 'the common good,' or
with such value-based goals as social equity, social justice and environmental
sustainability. Its definition in economic theory is narrower, more precise,
and contrasted specifically with private goods. A private good is one whose
individual consumption is both excludable (my use of the good is not
dependent on other's use) and rivalrous (my use of the good could preclude
use by another) (Kaul et al., 1999). This characterizes most market-based
commercial exchanges of commodities, and many exchanges of services. A
public good is one that is non-excludable (which includes most common pool
resources, such as air,5 water, biodiversity, peace and even -the classic example
often used to illustrate a public good - the traffic order created by traffic
lights); and, in 'pure form,' also non-rivalrous. However, many common pool
resources do entail potential rivalry as supply diminishes, or efforts are made
legally to convert them into private goods.
In practice, the boundary between public and private goods is harder to
pin down, for several reasons. Many transactions have both private and public
effects. Access to nutritious meals, for example, primarily improves individual
health (a private good), but this improvement, in turn, contributes to better
population health (which many public good theorist economists define as a
public good). Education, as another example, improves individuals' earning
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capacity (a private good), but at the same time universal public education
has important benefits in the quality of civic life, benefits that would be
undersupplied if education were left up to individual consumer choices. Public
education's effects on earnings and on a society's ability to innovate also
have a public good dimension that would be foregone in a strictly laissez-
faire society. A variant of this argument is the principal economic justification
for public support of scientific research, even though such research also yields
extremely important private benefits. These examples suggest that many kinds
of goods can be provided in a variety of ways, and, '[wjhether - and to what
extent - a good is public or private is often not a given but a matter of policy
choice' (Kaul, 2001: 6).
When public goods are local (such as police and fire protection) or national
(such as public defence), local or national governments, respectively, are the
key providers. Global public goods (GPGs) are public goods that are
underprovided by local and national governments, since the benefits accrue
at least partly beyond a country's borders. Efforts to distinguish national or
regional public goods from global public goods are also problematic. Aid
efforts to alleviate poverty in sub-Saharan Africa will produce national or, at
best, regional public good effects. But such aid might also be considered a
global public good to the degree that reduced poverty rates allow for more
stability, peace and security in the region, and hence globally. Individual
poverty itself is not considered a public bad, but its contribution, inter alia,
to environmental degradation or to conflict through loss of social cohesion
creates a number of potential public bads, making poverty eradication, to
some extent at least, a public good. Similarly, malaria control efforts are not
GPGs in themselves, because the disease is regional, although with climate
change the affected regions are likely to expand (McMichael, 2001: 300-2).
Such control efforts might still be considered to have a public good element
because malaria creates a disincentive for investment and trade, and so may
reduce economic growth (Kaul, 2001; Kaul etal., 1999). As the final revisions
to this manuscript are made, the human and economic toll associated with
the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) underscores the truly
global dimensions of infection control as a public good. In the environmental
field, the carbon sequestration benefits provided by forests exemplify public
goods that may be important for health reasons, and are threatened by the
private appropriation of forests for purposes of timber sales.
Despite some disagreement, then, a consensus is emerging that the fight
against infectious diseases affecting poorer countries is both a GPG in itself,
and requires important investments in GPGs that are beyond the means or
incentives of any single government and beyond the capabilities of national-
level programs (CMH, 2001: 76). GPGs for health minimally include disease
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eradication, disease research, control of epidemics and disease surveillance
(CMH, 2001; Bradley, 2001). The category is often expanded to include air
and water pollution emissions control (Sandier & Arce, 2001) and prevention
of global warming (Sandier, 1999); and can be further enlarged to include
poverty reduction and disaster relief (Sandier & Arce, 2001), expertise in
development (Bradley, 2001) and technical assistance/training in health
(CMH, 2001), to the degree that these are necessary to achieve the 'purer'
GPGs of disease eradication and control of epidemics.6
Against this background, G8 commitments to health must be assessed with
reference to a need for investment in such public goods that goes far beyond
interventions to fight AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. This was indirectly
acknowledged in 2001:
We call on MDBs [multilateral development banks] to provide support
for global public goods, such as fighting infectious diseases, facilitating
trade, fostering financial stability and protecting the environment.
We support a meaningful replenishment of IDA7 and, in that context,
we will explore the increased use of grants for priority social
investments, such as education and health (Genoa Statement, para.
13).
Interestingly, the G8 leaders did not commit their own governments directly
to an increase in support for global public goods. Concern over lack of action
on the '10/90' gap, however, led the Canadian Coalition for Global Health
Research to lobby successfully for more explicit recognition of health research
as a GPG in the Kananaskis G8 Africa Action Plan, which commits members
to '[supporting health research on diseases prevalent in Africa, with a view
to narrowing the health research gap, including by expanding health research
networks to focus on African health issues, and by making more extensive
use of researchers based in Africa' (G8, 2002: para. 6.4).
Unfortunately, lack of specificity on how much more this support will
grow renders this statement more of an opportunity for global health
advocates than a commitment by G8 governments.
Health System Infrastructure
The final report of the CMH concluded that a major increase in donor
financing would be needed to support critical health interventions
throughout the developing world. It identified the need for 'an additional
[US]$22 billion per year by 2007 and [US]$31 billion per year by 2015' in
grant financing for country-specific interventions against infectious diseases
and nutritional deficiencies, which are important prerequisites for creation
of GPGs. The CMH further emphasized that these amounts should be
49
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
augmented by increased aid flows in other health-related areas, such as
education, sanitation and water supply. Above and beyond these country-
specific interventions, it called for additional grant funding of US$5 billion
in 2007 and US$7 billion in 2015 for research and development on diseases
of the poor and other GPGs, such as epidemiological surveillance, for a total
of US$27 billion in 2007, rising to US$38 billion in 2015 - as against current
ODA for health of around US$6 billion (CMH, 2001: II).8
The disparity between the commitments that would be needed even for a
minimal package of essential health interventions and current levels of
development assistance calls into serious question the likelihood of achieving
health-related development goals. For example, in 2001 the G8 committed
itself to 'work with developing countries to meet the International
Development Goals, by strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness of
our development assistance' (Genoa Communique, para. 14); and
recommitted itself to the updated MDGs at the 2002 Kananaskis summit
(G8, 2002, para. 8).9 The IDGs, jointly published in 2000 by the World Bank,
the IMF, the OECD and the UN, call for reducing infant and under-five child
mortality by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015 (IMF et al, 2000: 12-13).
The World Bank recently concluded, based on a scenario of 3.6 per cent
annual per capita income growth in the developing countries between 2005
and 2015, that South Asia was the only region likely to achieve the target
(World Bank, 2002a: 31).10
One of the reasons the IDG health targets are unlikely to be met is the
increasing collapse of health-care infrastructure in many countries,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. Although there are a number of
contributory factors, key has been reduced public expenditure on health in
at least 29 of the poorest African countries (UNDP, 2000), with all but six
countries falling below the US$60 per capita figure recently advocated by
the WHO Director-General (Brundtland, 2000). Some analysts argue that
public health systems have been undermined by a combination of structural
adjustment policies and health sector reform; their impact on sub-Saharan
Africa is reviewed in Chapter 9. Whatever the reason, public health spending
in developing countries, both per capita and as a percentage of GDP, remains
considerably lower than in G7 countries (see Figure 3.1, below).11 The
persistence in health budgets of disproportionately high spending on tertiary
and specialised services coexists with chronic underfunding of basic health
services, which in many cases are unable to meet their running costs.
Declining child vaccination coverage is just one indication of the deterioration
of health systems, albeit one with special significance in view of our earlier
discussion of GPGs. Although coverage declined in all developing continents
during the 1990s, the decline in Africa is particularly troubling (Sanders et
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al, 2002). Almost 50 per cent of African children are now not adequately
vaccinated (Social Watch, 2002; Simms etal, 2001; UNICEF, 2000: 89; WHO,
2002b). Perhaps the most serious reflection of the collapse of African health
systems lies in the situation regarding health personnel, a point we take up
later in this chapter.
It is fundamental to understand that the CMH's estimates of the minimum
necessary increase in donor spending on health interventions assume that
developing countries have well-functioning, well-staffed health systems
accessible to those in greatest need. Although developed countries generally
do better than developing countries in ensuring that the poor obtain access
to health care, health care in poorer countries still tends to favour the wealthy
over the poor, and hospital care over primary care. Gains from ensuring
health-care access for the poor in developing countries are much more
substantial than they are for the poor in wealthier nations (Wagstaff, 2001).
Figure 3.1: Average Annual Key Health Indicators and Health Expenditures in G7,
Low-Income Countries and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) Countries
Source: World Bank (2002d: Tables 2.15 & 2.20)
Note: Where no bars appear on the graph, the numbers are so low they do not register. See data
tables in Appendix 2 for actual numbers.
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Table 3.6, below, shows that, despite the economic, political and social
difficulties Africa has faced this past decade, many countries have attempted
to increase the portion of their GDP spent on public health care. This table is
a measure of effort, not of capacity, which would entail adjustments for
actual GDP trends for 1990-98, taking into account population changes,
improvements in health service delivery and management, and the emergence
of new health problems such as the AIDS pandemic.







































Source: Social Watch (2002: 52-A)
Legend:
 Significant progress (more than 1% change in public expenditure as % of
GDPorCNP).
 Some progress (less than 1% change in public expenditure as % of GDP or GNP).
 Stagnation.
 Some regression (less than 1% change in public expenditure as % of GDP
or GNP).
 Significant regression (more than 1% change in public expenditure as % of
GDP or GNP).
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The absence of an effective public health-care system in poorer countries
undermines the more technical disease interventions supported by the GFATM
and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI). Over 90 per
cent of the first round of grants from GAVI went to research on new vaccines
and injection equipment (Hardon, 2001). Although this is an important
investment, an initial assessment of GAVI in four African countries reported
that there are major inadequacies in health-system infrastructure, including
poor staffing levels, infrequent supervision, insufficient transport and fuel,
and poorly functioning refrigeration for vaccines (Brugha et al, 2002). Health
officials in these countries expressed concern that they would be unable to
sustain the cost of vaccines should GAVI funding stop after five years. There is
worry that the GAVI funding proportions (where the bulk goes to
Pharmaceuticals and laboratory research) will be replicated by the GFATM,
compounding a problem already identified in the fund's initial assessment:
The great burden of these three diseases [AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria] falls
on Africa, and most especially on children and young adults living in sub-
Saharan Africa. There, AIDS, and TB linked to AIDS, and malaria, are straining
an already frayed public health infrastructure' (WHO, 2002d: 6; emphasis added).
Access to sufficient and affordable quantities of anti-retroviral drugs
remains an issue, partly due to extended patent protection under the
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPS). As an indication
of the potential gains, Brazil's policy of free, publicly funded anti-retroviral
therapy - which relies as far as possible on locally manufactured drugs - is
credited with substantially reducing deaths from AIDS and the incidence of
opportunistic infections, while improving patient quality of life (Galvao,
2002). But without adequate resources to support the delivery of basic health
care, overcoming problems of treatment supply alone may do little to control
the AIDS pandemic in Africa (Attaran & Gillespie-White, 2001).
G8 Official Development Assistance to Health-
Systems Development
The G8 at their 2001 Genoa meeting stated that '[s]trong national health
systems will continue to play a key role in the delivery of effective prevention,
treatment and care arid in improving access to essential health services and
commodities without discrimination' (Genoa Communique, para. 17).
Given the desperate condition of public health systems in many developing
countries, and certainly in most sub-Saharan African nations, one might expect
that ODA targeted to basic health would constitute a major plank in the G8's
development assistance strategy. In the preceding chapter, we noted that the
acceptance in PRSPs of cost-recovery schemes results in reduced access to
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Figure 3.2: Trends in Aid to Health as % of Total ODA*
Source: OECD (2000: Table 2 (1990-92 and 1996-98 data)); OECD (2002b:
Tables 14 & 19 (2000 data)); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19 (2001 data))
Estimates of 1999, 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.13
* Total ODA includes bilateral aid (country to country) and multilateral aid
(contributions made by donor countries to the European Commission, the World
Bank and regional development banks).
Note: Averages for 1990-92 and 1996-98 are for bilateral aid only. Data on country-
specific contributions to multilateral health aid could not be obtained or calculated
(imputed).
health care for the poor, despite efforts to exempt the poor from such schemes.
The question here is more basic: How adequately have G7 countries assisted
developing countries in creating 'strong national health systems'? Figure
3.2, above, provides data on health aid over two periods (1990-92 and 1996-
98 averages, bilateral only) and the summit years that are the focus of our
research (1999, 2000 and 2001, both bilateral and multilateral). Only two of
the G7 show any progressive increases in health aid since 2000 (France and
Canada), both of which now exceed their 1990 levels. Italy and the UK showed
increases in 2000 over 1999, but both countries also recorded a surprisingly
sharp drop the next year. Italy's low level of total development assistance
also mutes its generosity: it gives a lot of very little to health. The precipitous
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drop in US aid to health in 2000, on the eve of a G8 declaration of the need
to increase such assistance, is particularly disturbing.12 G7 performance did
not improve much in the following year (2001). US contributions inched up,
as did Germany's. Japan's remained stagnant while Italy's and the UK's took
a surprisingly sharp drop. Only Canada and France recorded any notable
increases. Overall, the portion of ODA directed to health remained surprisingly
low. Since 1999,2000 and 2001 figures include multilateral aid, as well as bilateral
aid, the general downwards tend from earlier years is even more disturbing.
The data in Figure 3.2 are for total health aid, which includes medical
education, health policy and management, medical services such as
laboratories, and medical research. The amounts directed to basic health
(primary health care, infrastructure, nutrition, disease control and health
education) were even smaller (see Figure 3.3, below). Here, we see that in
2001, France gave the largest proportion of its aid to health, followed closely
by the UK, Italy, the US and Canada. The US, however, lead in the amount of
its health aid devoted to basic health, and was the only country to exceed the
G7 average. It was followed closely by Germany and Canada. France and
Japan did not fare well in basic health contributions, and the UK fared little
better. The UK showed a marked decline in both forms of health aid (total
and basic) from the previous year, as did Italy. For all of the G7 countries,
except the UK in 2000 but not in 2001, the percentage of their ODA that they
allocated to health care was lower than the percentage of their GDP that they
spent on the public portion of their own domestic health care (World Bank,
2002d, Table 2.15).
Total health spending, however, excludes the aid category described as
'population and reproductive health.' Not all aid analysts believe that this
category should be included, since it is program- rather than sector-specific
(OECD, 2000). Population and reproductive health programs, however, could
improve maternal/child health outcomes and so contribute substantially to
the IDGs. Figure 3.4, below, incorporates this category of aid. Here again, for
both years, the US rises well above the pack. In 2001, Canada and France
follow it, although Canada shows a decline in combined 'basic' and
'population health' aid from the previous year.
Because they represent percentages of ODA spending, the data in Figures
3.3 and 3.4 do not take into account the differing size of the economies of
the G7 countries and so do not present health aid relative to a country's
ability to pay. When total health aid is presented as a percentage of GNI (a
new measure roughly similar to GDP), a different pattern appears (see Figure
3.5). (We exclude population health spending from these calculations in
order to better present sectoral commitments.) The UK led the G7 for 2000,
but fell back to a tie with France in 2001. Both France and Canada showed
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significant increases in 2001. The rest of the G7, though showing some increase
in 2001, fell below the group average, particularly the US and Italy.
Figure 3.3: % of Total ODA* to Basic Health and Total Health, 2000-01 **
Source: OECD (2002b: Tables 14 & 19); German and Randel
(2002); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
* Estimates of multilateral contributions made by authors.
** Basic health spending is part of total health spending; the darker portion of the
bar represents non-basic health spending.
Countries target their development assistance to different priorities, including
population and reproductive health (notably the US), nutrition, water and
sanitation, education and other important determinants of health. Given the
urgency of dealing with infectious diseases, however, G8 development
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assistance to health systems lags as far behind need as does the group's current
level of contributions to the GFATM.
Figure 3.4: % of Total ODA* to Basic Health, Population Health and Total Health,
2000-01**
Source: OECD (2002b: Tables 14 & 19); German and Randel (2002);
OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
Estimates of multilateral contributions made by authors.
Basic health spending is part of total health spending. Population health is a
separate category. The right-hand portion of the bar represents health spending
that is neither 'basic health' nor 'population health.'
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Figure 3.5: Total Health ODA as % of GNI, 2000-01
Source: OECD (2002b: Tables 14 & 19); German and
Randel (2002); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
* Estimates of multilateral contributions made by authors.
* Includes both bilateral and multilateral contributions. Estimates of multilateral
contributions made by authors.
The Brain Drain
Another reason for the deterioration of health-care systems in developing
countries is the 'brain drain' of health professionals (Sanders et al., 2002).
This brain drain, which primarily benefits wealthier nations, such as the UK,
the US and Canada, calls into question G8 commitments to support
developing countries in reaching health targets of the International and
Millennium Development Goals.
The WHO target for the doctor-to-population ratio is one per 1 000. The
doctor-patient ratio is currently one per 500 in wealthy countries, and only
one per 25 000 in the 25 poorest countries (Frommel, 2002),14 a 50-fold
difference made all the more unacceptable when one considers the greater
health gain such care affords the poor in poorer countries (Wagstaff, 2001).
Current trends in the movement of health-care professionals from developing
countries to wealthy countries are quite discouraging; and the CMH
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specifically cites such movement as a negative aspect of contemporary
globalization (CMH, 2001: 74):
• Fifty-six per cent of all emigrating physicians move from developing to
developed countries; developing countries, in turn, receive only 11 per
cent of emigrating physicians, principally from other developing
countries. Rates are even higher for nurses (Chanda, 2001).
• Half of Pakistan's medical graduates in any year leave the country and go
to the West; very few return (Chanda, 2001: 23).
• Sixty per cent of Ghanaian doctors trained locally during the 1980s have
left the country; over 21 000 Nigerian doctors are practising in the US,
while there is an acute shortage of physicians in Nigeria; Zimbabwe lost
almost three-quarters of all of its doctors to emigration during the 1990s
(Chanda, 2001: 22).
• Over 35 per cent of trained health professionals from Africa's poorest 20
countries left for (and often were actively recruited by) countries in North
America and the EU (CMH, 2001: 76).
• Zambia has lost 75 per cent of its physicians in recent years, often to
South Africa as well as to developed countries (Globe and Mail, 5 January
2002).
• Fully one-third to a half of all graduating doctors in South Africa migrate
to the US, UK and Canada, at a huge annual cost to South Africa (lost
investment in education/training). Including all health personnel, the
losses for South Africa reach US$37 million annually (WHO, 2001b).
This exceeds the combined (multilateral and bilateral) estimated education
assistance for all purposes, not just health professional training, received
by South Africa in 2000 (US$35.5 million; calculations based on OECD,
2002b: Tables 13; 19 & 30).
15
Many of the G8 countries are the beneficiaries of these losses to developing
nations. Indeed, Canada, the US and the UK have actively recruited health
professionals from developing countries to make up for their own undersupply
in domestic production. (Italy is the only G8 country that produces a surplus
of physicians and nurses.) The provincial government of Alberta, Canada, as
one example, has done active recruitment of more than 40 physicians from
South Africa to fill the numerous vacancies in the rural communities (Bundred
& Levitt, 2000), and over half of the physicians in northern Saskatchewan,
another Canadian province, are South African. The South African government
in 2001 formally complained to the Canadian government about the number
of its physicians being allowed to take up practice in Canada, yet in 2002 the
number of South African-trained physicians in Canada increased by another
174, to total 1 738 (McClelland, 2002).
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Developing countries invest about US$500 million each year in training
health-care professionals, who are then recruited by or otherwise move to
developed countries (Frommel, 2002).16 This amount is equivalent to roughly
25 per cent of the total ODA that developing countries receive for health
(based on OECD, 2002b: Tables 1 & 19). Meanwhile the United States, with
its 130 000 foreign physicians, saved an estimated US$26 billion in training
costs for nationals (Dovlo, 2001), while estimates suggest that Africa spends
approximately US$4 billion annually on salaries of 100 000 foreign experts
(all sectors, not only health) to 'build capacity' and/or provide technical
assistance, and incurs a loss of US$ 184 000 per migrating African professional
(Pang etal, 2002; IRIN, 2002a).
The problem is not simply active recruitment by wealthier countries - a
result of their own poor health-care human resource planning - or even the
pull of higher earnings and greater opportunities available in such countries.
There is also the push in terms of low salaries, lack of positions and little
infrastructure for research or advanced training. These are problems rooted
in the underdevelopment of public health systems in poorer countries. The
NEPAD main document (October 2001) recognizes the brain drain problem
and calls for its reversal into a 'brain gain for Africa' (para. 122). Its solutions
to this problem lack detail, however, and are unconvincing (see Chapter 9).
Several specific proposals have been vetted by others, and include the
following:
• Wealthy countries accepting health professionals from developing
countries should compensate those countries' health and health training
systems for the costs of the training.
• Wealthy countries should not actively recruit health professionals from
developing countries, unless these countries are producing a surplus of
such professionals (such as Cuba and the Philippines).
With respect to recruitment behaviours, the UK recently adopted as guiding
principles for National Health Service (NHS) recruitment that 'developing
countries should not be targeted for recruitment' (Department of Health
Guidance on International Recruitment, 2001). It is difficult, however, to
know how well these principles are being implemented. Nurses and physicians,
for example, continue to leave South Africa in large numbers for positions in
the UK NHS. Indeed, some 2 114 South African nurses were registered in the
UK between March 2001 and March 2002, twice the number who were
registered in the previous year when the 'anti-poaching' policy went into
place. The US, in turn, is attempting to recruit one million nurses by 2010
from, amongst other countries, the UK and South Africa (Carvel, 2002a).
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The G8 has not dealt with this specific issue in any of its recent summits.
We believe it needs to, and that it should be leading the wealthy developed
nations to collaborate with developing countries to draft an enforceable
international protocol to stem the South-North brain drain, perhaps using
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control as a model.17
Access to Essential Medicines
High pharmaceutical costs associated with the harmonization of intellectual
property regimes under the TRIPS Agreement have emerged as one major barrier,
among many, to improving health-care access in poor countries (Medecins
sans Frontieres, 2001 b; 't Hoen, 1999). Another source of doubt about G8
commitments to assist developing countries in attaining the IDG targets arises
from the uncertain progress made in ensuring that patents do not create
economic impediments to access to essential medicines. The G8 committed
to '[ajddress ... the complex issue of access to medicines in developing countries,
and assess ... obstacles being faced by developing countries in that regard'
(Okinawa Communique, para. 30) and to 'work with the pharmaceutical
industry and with affected countries to facilitate the broadest possible provision
of drugs in an affordable and medically effective manner' (Genoa
Communique, para. 17). More importantly, the Genoa Communique continues:
We welcome ongoing discussion in the WTO on the use of relevant
provisions in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
agreement. We recognize the appropriateness of affected countries
using the flexibility afforded by that agreement to ensure that drugs
are available to their citizens who need them, particularly those who
are unable to afford basic medical care (Genoa Communique, para.
17).
It is unclear what verbs like 'welcome' and 'recognize' actually commit the
G8 to doing, but one can infer, at least, the position that TRIPS does not (or
should not) prevent access to essential medicines.
Developing countries proposed that the WTO ministerial meeting in Doha
in November 2001 adopt a declaration on intellectual property affirming
that nothing in the TRIPS Agreement prevents WTO members from taking
measures to protect public health, clearly asserting the right to issue
compulsory licensing and to use other means to decrease drug prices, such
as parallel importing. Canada, the US and Japan (as well as non-G8 countries
Switzerland and Australia) opposed this proposal, arguing that TRIPS already
provided these flexibilities; France supported it (Stern, 2003: 25). This
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position, however, did not acknowledge that developing countries attempting
to use these flexibilities were often faced with challenges by foreign
governments and pharmaceutical companies, and that the US was pursuing
bilateral TRIPS-plus' agreements that further limited these flexibilities. The
Doha meeting eventually adopted the position of the developing countries
in a Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health stating, in part,
that 'the TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent members from
taking measures to protect public health' (WTO, 2001 b). The Doha TRIPS
declaration further committed WTO members to recognizing a number of
'flexibilities' in interpreting TRIPS in the context of public health crises. It
also mandated the WTO TRIPS Council to find a solution before the end of
2002 to the problem of ensuring access to the compulsory licensing provision
in TRIPS by the majority of developing countries that lack any domestic
pharmaceutical production. The EU made the first proposal (5 March 2002),
focusing on two possible options. Firstly, the relevant article of the TRIPS
Agreement (31 f) could be amended so that the medicines can be produced
elsewhere and exported to the country in need. Secondly, the TRIPS agreement
could be interpreted in such a way as to allow medicines to be produced
elsewhere for export to the country in need (referred to in WTO-speak a
'parallel imports').
Developing countries gave cautious support to the EU proposal, but the
US opposed it and proposed, instead, a time-limited, conditional moratorium
on trade disputes related to intellectual property (IP) and drugs that would
apply only to the three diseases (HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis) named
as examples in the declaration. Canada supported the US position (Inside US
Trade, 2002). This position, however, contradicted the declaration's broader
view of public health emergencies, which may not be restricted to the 'big
three' of HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis, i.e. that '[e]ach member has
the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds
upon which such licences are granted' (WTO, 2001b: para. 5(b); emphasis
added).
By late 2002, the TRIPS Council had reached near consensus on a detailed
plan that would allow developing countries the right to declare what
constitutes a public health emergency within their borders, and to engage in
parallel importing of generic drugs from other developing countries with
pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities (WTO, 2002c). The US has been the
only country to reject the plan outright, reportedly on the specific direction
of Vice-President Dick Cheney to the US TRIPS negotiators (Elliott & Denny,
2002). This stance is consistent with the US government's earlier, aggressive
defence of the pharmaceutical industry's intellectual property rights against
efforts by the South African government to reduce the costs of HIV/AIDS
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treatment (Bond, 2001:154-76). Civil society groups, notably Medecins sans
Frontieres, also urge rejection of the plan, but for a different reason: the plan
refers to 'national emergencies/ rather than the broader language of 'measures
to protect public health.' Some African countries express the same concern
(BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 2003). The issue is far from resolved:
irrespective of how well its ultimate resolution reflects the spirit of the Doha
Declaration, some G8 behaviour in the TRIPS Council has not kept faith
with stated commitments.
The US is also seeking to write TRIPS-plus' restrictions into the intellectual
property rights chapter of the Free Trade Area of the Americas Agreement,
now in negotiation (Human Rights Watch, 2002). These TRIPS-plus'
restrictions are non-WTO agreements between two or more nations in which
members agree not to exercise some of their compulsory licensing rights
currently permitted by the TRIPS Agreement. The US is also entering into
trade talks with the Southern African Customs Union - Lesotho, Botswana,
South Africa, Namibia and Swaziland -that include discussion of intellectual
property rights, something NGO observers believe could be another TRIPS-
plus' effort (BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 2002g).
Concern about the US trade policy agenda in the area of intellectual
property and about the negative impact of the TRIPS Agreement on developing
country health is becoming widespread. No less an authority than Joseph
Stiglitz, the former chief economist of the World Bank and the winner of the
2001 Nobel Prize in economics, recently commented:
When I was on the Council of Economic Advisers in the Clinton
administration, we (as well as the Office of Science and Technology
Policy) worried that the US trade representative, who negotiates thes
agreements 'on behalf of the US, was pushing for intellectual propert
arrangements that could have harmful effects. The US was reflecting
the interest of the drug companies more than the perspectives, for
instance, of scholars or those concerned that the laws governing
intellectual property should maximize growth. The US trade
representative paid scant attention to our concerns -let alone those of
the developing world (Stiglitz, 2002a: 28).
The World Bank's 2002 Global Economic Prospects report notes as part of a
broader discussion of the distribution of the costs and benefits of strengthened
intellectual property protection under TRIPS that
[i]t is conceivable that patent protection will increase incentives for
R&D [research and development] into treatments for diseases of
particular concern to poor countries. However, because purchasing
power is so limited in the poorest countries, there is little reason to
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expect a significant boost in such R&D. Accordingly, many developing
countries see little potential benefit from introducing patents [since]
potential costs could be significant (World Bank, 2002a: 137; see also
Trebilcock & Howse, 1999: 310-12).
The authors of the UNDP Human Development Report 2000 took the problem
seriously enough to warn that the TRIPS Agreement may conflict with
international human rights agreements that recognize the right to share in
scientific progress, because it 'dramatically reduces the possibilities for local
companies to produce cheaper versions of important life-saving drugs' (UNDP,
2000: 84). NGO critiques of the TRIPS Agreement's policies as they apply
both to Pharmaceuticals and to living matter have been even more emphatic
about the adverse distributional consequences of the current IP regime (e.g.
Medecins sans Frontieres, 2001 b; Shand, 2001; Watkins, 2002a: 208-24).
Macroeconomic Policies and Health Care
Stiglitz's comment that the treatment of intellectual property rights in trade
agreements should take into account impacts on economic growth brings us
to a consideration of the broader impact of macroeconomic policies on health
care. Most countries, from the US in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
to Asian states in the twenty-first century, have grown economically by taking
technologies developed by other people in other nations and copying them,
often more cheaply. This opportunity is now being denied poorer countries,
by virtue of the harmonization of IP regimes under TRIPS.
Detailed studies of macroeconomic adjustment policies, largely predicated
on the neo-liberal tenets of globalization that continue to be endorsed by G7
(now G8) summits (Kirton & Von Furstenberg, 2001; Dallaire, 2001), find
that such policies generally result in 'high inequalities in access to and
utilization of health services, and the reinforcement of risks of exclusions
and barriers to access of the poorest by efficiency-oriented health sector
reforms' (Haddad & Mohindra, 2001: 20). Declining public expenditures on
health are closely linked to privatization of health services and the imposition
of user fees as part of structural adjustment packages (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2000;
Melgar, 1999; Schoepf et al., 2000; CMH, 2001: 121; Whitehead etal, 2001;
Yong Kim, Shakow et al., 2000). Since ill health, often itself related to low
income and economic insecurity, is one of the principal reasons that
households slip further into poverty (Narayan et al., 2000), the 'medical
poverty trap' (Whitehead et al., 2001) created by adjustment may undermine
the potential for achieving economic growth through improvements in health.
The contribution that interventions to improve population health can make
to economic development was a central theme of the work of the CMH (2001).
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Conversely, the impacts of HIV/AIDS and malaria provide especially dramatic,
large-scale illustrations of the economic damage that can result from poor
health (Haacker, 2002; Sachs & Malaney, 2002). With these considerations in
mind, we should briefly revisit some issues of macroeconomic policy.
Neo-liberal prescriptions for reorienting economies and societies in order
to attract FDI may have a variety of negative health effects. Many developing
countries did not allow FDI in health services until the 1990s, when it was
often required under SAPs (Chanda, 2001: 28). FDI in health services increased
the presence of parallel private health-care systems in many developing
countries, which eroded public health-care systems in several ways. Latin
America provides a compelling example of this. Between 1990 and 1995, the
share of private health expenditure rose in 15 of 22 Latin American countries
(Brugha & Zwi, 2002). The scope for private health care in Latin America is
considered so large that, in 1999, The Economist launched a new quarterly,
Healthcare Latin America. The same year, The Economist ran a feature on the
'shift toward private health care,' which quoted the President of the American
Association of Health Plans noting that, '450 million Latin Americans
constitute a health-care market of [US] $120 billion a year - of which only
15% is spent on private insurance' (Lewis, 1999). By inference, 85 per cent of
the market is ripe for privatization.19
Latin American governments are moving in this direction, often with World
Bank or IMF prodding.20 Peru, in 1998, committed itself to increased
privatization of public services, including concessions to private companies
taking over public services and increased foreign investment in health and
education. Bolivia, with World Bank, IMF and US Agency for International
Development (USAID) funding, is promoting a private, self-financed primary
health-care model (PROSALUD). 'Regardless of the type of intervention, most
[World Bank and International Development Bank] initiatives have favored
the private financing and provision of health care over the former public
financing and provision that predominated in most Latin American countries'
(Armada et al, 2001).
Evocative Latin American examples show how such privatization creates
inequalities in access. Between 1974 and 1989, total private health-care
expenditures in Chile rose substantially, while public health-care expenditures
declined (Collins & Lear, 1995). Large segments of the poor population were
left with underfunded, low-quality public health care. Although public health
expenditures since the return of democratic regimes in 1990 have been
increasing, growth in private health-care expenditure in Chile still outstrips
that for public health care (Leon, 2002), and foreign companies now provide
60 per cent of Chile's health insurance (Wasserman & Cornejo, 2002). In
Brazil, private health care provides 120 000 physicians and 370 000 hospital
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beds to the richest 25 per cent of the population, while the public system has
just 70 000 physicians and 565 000 hospital beds for the remaining 75 per
cent (Zarrilli, 2002a). Yong Kim, Shakow etal (2000) describe a similar pattern
of declining, and increasingly unequal, access to health care in Peru. A special
need exists for an authoritative literature review and synthesis on the effects
of cost recovery and privatization on access to health care in developing
countries. In this context, 'privatization' must be understood both in the
narrow sense of the substitution of private, for-profit health services for
publicly provided serves and the broader sense of 'a new division of
responsibility among the state, the family and the market for individual and
social welfare' (Fudge & Cossman, 2002: 18).
Privatization, Liberalization and GATS
Liberalization of trade in services is another element of conventional
development policy wisdom. The contribution of services to economic growth
and wealth has increased rapidly in comparison to the production of goods.
Their actual and potential contribution to trade has also grown (Sinclair,
2000). Countries differ in the degree to which they are introducing
commercial operating principles into their domestic public services, or
autonomously liberalizing trade in services with other nations. The WTO's
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is a 'framework agreement'
introduced at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATS essentially 'locks in' existing service
privatization and liberalization policies. It has not itself been a driver of either
privatization or liberalization, but has secured and entrenched pro-
competitive policies in areas that have been autonomously liberalized.
GATS was conceived, and continues to be defended, primarily as a vehicle
for the expansion of business opportunities for transnational service
corporations (Hilary, 2001). The key concern is that GATS will unavoidably
lead to increased privatization of such essential public services as health care,
education and water/sanitation. Corporations with a major stake in service
industries are exerting considerable pressure, especially in the US and EU, to
use GATS to open up government services for commercial and foreign
provision (Evenett & Hoekman 1999, in Sinclair, 2000). European negotiators
are urging greater service liberalization because they see China as a lucrative
market, as that country dismantles its previous state welfare infrastructure
(Pollock and Price, 2000; see note 19, in this chapter). Private US health-care
providers regard GATS as the main vehicle for overcoming obstacles to market
access in countries where public funding and provision currently predominate.
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The estimated annual value of the global health-care market is US$3.5 trillion
(Barlow, 2001).
GATS defines four different modes of liberalization of trade in services:
1. Cross-border delivery of services (such as shipment of laboratory samples
or provision of telehealth services);
2. Consumption of services abroad (so-called 'health or medical tourism'),
where people from one country are treated by health services in another,
and provision of professional (under- and post-graduate training at tertiary
institutions abroad);
3. Commercial presence (where foreign private investors provide private
hospitals, clinics, treatment centres or insurance, or have management
contracts for such facilities, whether they are public or private); and
4. The presence of natural persons (the temporary movement of health
professionals from one country to another).
As with globalization and trade liberalization generally, many arguments are
made for liberalizing trade in health services. For example, liberalized health
services can lead to new private resources to support the public system; can
introduce new techniques to health professionals in developing countries;
can provide such professionals with advanced training and credentials; and
can introduce new and more efficient management techniques (Zarrilli,
2002b).21 But there are powerful counter-arguments to each of these points.
Notably, private investments in health services, by definition, emphasize those
services for which a market exists. They are therefore likely to be concentrated
in services for the affluent (Lethbridge, 2002), undermining support for
universal, public provision of health services. We have already described the
global crisis associated with the movement of health professionals from
developing to developed countries. Trade in goods or services, generally, is
presumed to benefit health by increasing the income of providers and
decreasing the costs for consumers. In health, however, the goal is not
increased income but equitable access to quality services, including by those
who may not be able to purchase traded services. Most importantly, nothing
prevents countries from allowing foreign commercial presence in their
domestic services market, providing services to non-nationals or 'exporting'
service providers to other countries without making commitments under
GATS. The only effect of such GATS commitments is to make it extremely
difficult for countries to change these provisions in the future.
To date, 54 WTO members have made commitments to liberalize medical
and dental services, 44 for hospital services, 29 for nursing and midwifery
and 17 for 'other' health services (Adlung & Carzaniga, 2001, 2002). Many of
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these are developing countries, whose corresponding figures are 36, 29, 12
and 15. The number of health-liberalized countries grows to 78 if one includes
private health insurance. GATS has a built-in requirement for 'progressive
liberalization', meaning that countries are committed to ongoing negotiations
to apply the GATS rules to a wider range of services and government measures.
Once these rules apply to a service sector, any changes that reduce the level
of trade liberalization are subject to penalties in the form of trade
compensation (CCPA, 2002). Canada and Brazil, for example, have both
opened up private health insurance under GATS. Should either country ever
wish to extend its public system into areas that are now covered by private
insurance, and so reverse the current trend away from privatization, its GATS
commitments might expose it to penalties. The same would apply to any
developing country wishing to reverse its current commitments to health
services privatization.
Imagine a poorer country where many essential services are now privately
provided, partly in response to earlier conditionalities. Imagine further that
trade liberalization does eventually promote long-term economic growth,
and that the country is able to tax such growth so that it has sufficient revenue
to increase its public provision of health, education or sanitary services. If it
had committed itself to liberalized trade in any of these services under GATS,
it might have to provide compensation in the form of trade concessions
should its public programs reduce private foreign providers' share of the
domestic market.
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Box 3.1: GATS, Health Services, Africa and the G8:
Who's Committed to What
Negotiations on GATS are ongoing, with a major round under way in 2003.
Commitments under GATS can be for 'market access' {opening the market to
foreign providers) and 'national treatment' (treating foreign providers the same
as domestic providers). Governments tan commit to none or any combination
of the four modes. Their commitments can be:
• no limitations - or full liberalization, which they designate by claiming
'none';
• bound - which covers both existing and any future government measures;
and
• unbound -which applies only to current government measures.
Both bound and unbound commitments can have limitations placed on foreign
service provision in both national treatment and market access. Countries can
also stipulate 'horizontal commitments,' which are limitations that apply to a
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GATS does offer an exception from its liberalization requirements for 'a
[government] service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor
in competition with one or more service suppliers' (Article l:3b). This is
often cited as evidence that concern over privatization is misplaced. This
clause, however, may not adequately shield public health measures from a
trade challenge, since most countries allow some commercial or competitive
provision of virtually all public services (Pollock & Price, 2000; Price et al.,
1999; Sinclair, 2000).
Only one sub-Saharan African country has made any GATS commitments
involving specialized medical services, but over half a dozen have committed
to full liberalization of several modes of medical and dental services,
including provisions for private foreign investment. They have done so with
fewer limitations than those defined by the already well-developed EC 12
members. Sub-Saharan African countries appear more reluctant to open up
nursing, midwifery and other health services. It is important to recall that
liberalization in health services will benefit more affluent 'consumers' with
the ability to pay for them, at the expense of the poorest sectors of the
population reliant upon a public system likely to lose staff and funding as
the private system entrenches and expands. If domestic incomes and political
will should shift in such committed countries in the future, and if the shift
brings with it an improved prospect of implementing a more equitable and
efficient universal, risk-pooled health-care system, future governments may
find it financially impossible to pay the trade sanctions or monetized
settlements required by an expanded public system's displacement of the
foreign-invested private one. It is also important to recall that there is nothing
preventing present-day governments from allowing foreign commercial presence
or service providers in health (or any other) services without making GATS
commitments. These commitments simply make it difficult or impossible to
create a stronger public system of services in the future. There are also concerns
that wealthier nations, particularly the US and the EU, will be pressuring
developing countries to make more commitments to liberalize services in
the present GATS negotiations (2003), in return for increased market access
for their exports.
Health care is not like other commercial services. It is essential to the
creation and maintenance of public goods. Public systems for health-care
provision arose in most countries because private systems proved inadequate
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larger range of service sectors. There is pressure in current GATS negotiations
to make all commitments 'bound' and restrict the limitations placed on them,
i.e. to move towards the 'no limitations' or full liberalization option.
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and inequitable. Whatever forms of cross-border exchanges in health (or
education, or other essential public services) may be beneficial or desired,
trade treaties - which are intended to promote private economic interests -
are not the best place to negotiate them (CCPA, 2002). Other forms of
multilateral agreements freed from commercial economic goals, such as a
proposed global cultural diversity treaty supported by both Canada and
France, which would remove cultural products from the WTO ambit (Globe
and Mail, 29 November 2002: B5), are more in keeping with the OS's
commitment to the health targets of the IDGs (see Box 3.2).
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Box 3.2: Developing a New International
Agreement on Cultural Diversity
The Okinawa Communique described cultural diversity as a 'source of social
and economic dynamism which has the potential to enrich human life in the
21" century' and recognized 'the importance of diversity in linguistic and
creative expression' (para. 39).
As far back as February 1999, the Cultural Industries Sectoral Advisory Group
on International Trade (SACIT) in Canada drafted a report urging creation of
an independent international and rules-based agreement to 'manag[ej the
interface between cultural objectives and trade obligations' {SACIT, 2002: 1).
The intent was not a general exemption for culture from trade agreements,
but to agree upon the conditions under which governments would 'confidently
pursue their legitimate domestic cultural policy objectives without fear of trade
reprisals' (SAGIT, 2002: 8). Cultural goods and services are already covered
under several WTO agreements, including CATT (1994), GATS and TRIPS.
In proposing that a new instrument on cultural diversity be developed
outside the WTO, we recognize that the relationship between the instrument
and the WTO will need to be addressed. Once the instrument has been finalized,
it is envisaged that signatories to it would seek to have its principles recognized
by the WTO, although the agreement would continue to be a distinct stand-
alone agreement (SAGIT, 2002: 8).
The reason for a new instrument and monitoring/enforcement organization,
with its own dispute settlement body and procedures, separate from the WTO, is
that 'it is important that it be first and foremost a cultural instrument [and] the
WTO may not be in a position to take into account what is required to ensure the
preservation of cultural identities and cultural diversity' (SACIT, 2002: 8).
Indeed, the goal of the proposed new agreement would be 'to ensure that
the international trading system is compatible with the goal of preserving and
enhancing cultural diversity' (SAGIT, 2002: 4). In the absence of such an
agreement, governments must now ensure the reverse: that new cultural policies
are compatible with trade agreements.
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Tobacco Control: Deadly Silence from the G8
We shift here from emphasizing what the G8 said they would do, to an
inexplicable gap in what they failed to say at all. At all three of the summits
we investigated (1999, 2000 and 2001) and also the 2002 Kananaskis summit,
the G8 were totally silent on the issue of tobacco control, despite tobacco's
contribution to the global burden of disease. That contribution is expected
to increase in the future.
In the first year of the new millennium, it is estimated that tobacco will
kill approximately two million people in the developed nations and an equal
number in the developing nations. By the year 2030, however, estimates are
that three million per year will die from tobacco use in the developed nations
and more than seven million people per year will die from tobacco use in the
developing world.
In all nations of the world, nearly one in ten people - or more than 500
million human beings - who are now alive will die from a tobacco-related
disease (Bal etal, 2001: 247; see generally WHO, 1999: 65-79).
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The SACIT group has drafted a model text for '[a]n international agreement
on cultural diversity,' which states the intent even more clearly: 'Member states
have the right to take measures with respect to the creation, production,
distribution and exhibition of cultural content and to the activities of cultural
undertakings in order to support, promote and preserve diverse cultural
expression' (Article Vt, para. 1).
Foreign cultural content would be encouraged under the proposed agreement,
but trade sanctions would only apply if governments expropriated without
compensation existing cultural undertakings of non-nationals, or adopted policies
inconsistent with international treaties respecting IP rights (e.g. TRIPS).
The draft agreement is now being circulated internationally, with the
expectation that a negotiated international agreement with a sufficient number
of member nations can be signed in the near future. It is thought that support
from between 70 and 80 countries will be needed for discussions for adoption
of its principles at the WTO to be successful (Globe and Mail, 29 November
2002: 85).
The countries promoting this agreement recognize that it is an ambitious
undertaking, given its novelty in the current multilateral arena. Nonetheless, it
provides a usefully different mode! for managing international beneficial
exchanges in goods and services where the defining criterion is no longer
cross-border liberalization, but rather a public good.
If such an agreement can be undertaken for cultural diversity, it can also be
undertaken for essential public services like health care.
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The health consequences of tobacco use are of special concern to the
developing world for several reasons. Firstly, as noted, it is anticipated that
most of the growth in tobacco-related disease will occur outside the
industrialized world, where tobacco control initiatives have been at least partly
successful. The tobacco industry, in fact, has actively sought to expand its
markets in such developing regions as Latin America (PAHO, 2002b) and
Asia (Niu et al, 1998; O'Sullivan & Chapman, 2000), even as it attempts to
undermine tobacco control efforts both nationally and internationally (Carter,
2002; Committee of Experts, 2000; Glantz etal, 1996; Yach & Bettcher, 1999,
2000). The industry's marketing efforts directed at young people are of special
concern, since '[n]icotine addiction takes hold almost exclusively in children
and youth' and about half of teenagers in OECD countries who try smoking
'become life-long smokers, among whom one in two will die from smoking'
(WHO, 1999: 70).
Secondly, tobacco-growing in developing countries - like other forms of
the drug trade - may emerge as a competitor for scarce resources, such as
arable land and water, as tobacco consumers quite simply outbid subsistence
users. One observer relates that '[t]hroughout the two years that I lived and
worked in central Mozambique I saw trees collapse because of the drought...
and I never saw maize grow successfully. I did however see fields full of
healthy growing tobacco on a multinational-owned tobacco farm' (Lawlor,
2001). This is an area that clearly merits further research.
Thirdly, there are indications that trade liberalization may undermine
tobacco control efforts. Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1996) concluded that
liberalized trade agreements result in an overall increase in cigarette demand.
A joint World Bank/WHO study demonstrated the same results more broadly,
showing that the largest impact of reduced trade barriers with respect to
tobacco consumption occurred in low-income countries (Taylor etal., 2000).
The inclusion of tobacco marketers in Canada's most recent (February 2001)
trade delegation to China raised numerous complaints from health officials
in government, and from health practitioners and researchers.
It could be argued that specific G8 attention to tobacco control at annual
summits has not been necessary, since negotiations have been under way
since 1996, under the auspices of the WHO, toward the Framework Convention
on Tobacco Control (FCTC). Reportedly, developing countries took the lead
in many areas of the negotiations - notably in opposing the inclusion of a
trade supremacy clause that would have subordinated the public health goals
of the convention to international trade agreements (Bates, 2001). Germany,
the US and Japan, G8 countries with major tobacco industries, reportedly
made several attempts to 'water down crucial clauses,' and the FCTC 'falls
short of expectations by not banning duty-free sales and vending machines,
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and by failing to ban deceptive descriptors, such as "light" and "low-tar"'
(Framework Convention Alliance, 2003). A draft of the FCTC was released in
March 2003 for discussion at the World Health Assembly in May of that year
(Intergovernmental Negotiating Body, 2003). In fact, the case for decisive G8
action is now stronger than ever. Political commitment to signature and
ratification at the highest levels of the industrialized countries, in which the
global tobacco industry is based, will be essential if the FCTC is to succeed. If
past experience is any guide, restrictions on advertising and promotion are
likely to be especially contentious. Willingness to ratify the FCTC, to devote
the necessary resources to its domestic implementation, and to provide
assistance to developing countries for this purpose will be one of the clearest
tests of G8 leadership on global health issues in the coming years.
Summary: Chapter Three
The global pandemics of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases are
increasing, and with them a devastating and morally unacceptable toll of
human misery, economic loss, deepening poverty and regional and global
insecurity. LDCs are most affected. More funds for disease prevention are
urgently needed. Access to affordable drugs for treatment or management is
essential. Increased aid to build functioning public health systems to
administer both is critical. Retaining and supporting health professionals to
run these systems and their programs is basic. On almost of all these fronts,
the developing world, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is losing ground.
The G8, while fulfilling some of its past commitments, has failed in others,
and the promises it has kept come nowhere near matching the scale of the
problems they were meant to help remedy.
Explicit or Specific Commitments: Health and Health Systems
• Establish global fund on AIDS, TB and malaria and initially pledge $1.3
billion (Okinawa).
• Reduce the number of HIV/AIDS-infected young people by 25%; TB deaths
and prevalence by 50%; and the burden of disease associated with malaria
by 50%; all by 2010 (Okinawa).
Accomplished: Yes. GFATM was established by the time of the Genoa summit.
Adequacy: Annual contributions are below 10% of estimated
requirements. The Kananaskis summit failed to deliver any substantial
new commitments. With seven years to go, achieving the 2010 targets
seems remote, if not impossible.
Comments: Italy, the UK, France, Canada and Russia gave proportionally
more than other G8 countries. Every G8 country falls short of what it
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actually should be giving if allocations were based on estimated need. By
each metric, Italy has been the most generous G8 contributor, followed
by France and Canada. The recent pledge by US President Bush for
significant new annual funding for HIV/AIDS represents a unilateral,
rather than multilateral, approach, largely bypassing the GFATM.
• Work to meet IDGs by strengthening and enhancing effectiveness of
development assistance (Cologne, Okinawa and Genoa; reiterated as
MDGs at Kananaskis).
Accomplished: No. Key health IDGs are to reduce infant and under-five
mortality rates by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015, and to reduce
maternal mortality rates by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015. South
Asia, based on optimistic growth projections, is estimated to be the only
region to achieve just one target: infant and under-five mortality reduction.
Adequacy: The G7 ODA support given to health is substantially below
the estimated amounts needed to achieve targets.
Commit to address the complex issue of access to medicine in developing
countries (Okinawa).
Recognize some flexibility for developing nations regarding TRIPS (Genoa).
Accomplished: Mixed.
Adequacy: The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001)
emphasized that TRIPS should not impede the protection of public health,
and that countries had the right to determine when they could invoke
compulsory licensing provisions. However, implementation was impeded
by US intransigence. The problem of allowing poor countries to 'parallel
import' generic drugs was referred to the TRIPS Council for resolution
by 31 December 2002.
Comments: Canada, the US, and Japan initially opposed the Doha
Declaration, and referred the parallel import problem to the TRIPS
Council. The US remains opposed to any TRIPS amendments for parallel
importing except for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.
Implicit or Generic Commitments: Health and Health
Systems
• Strong national health systems will continue to play a key role in the
delivery of effective prevention, treatment and care and in improving
access to essential health services and commodities without
discrimination (Genoa).
Accomplished: No. Total ODA for health was only one-sixth the low-end
estimate of amounts required for essential health services related to major
infectious diseases in developing countries. Many developing countries
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are suffering severe 'brain drain/ dramatically weakening their national
health systems; the major beneficiaries are G8 countries. GATS
commitments by some African countries to liberalize trade in health
services could prevent the development of these national health systems.
Comments: Many G7 countries have shown sharp declines in ODA to
health since 1996/98. Only France, Italy and Japan showed any increases
in health aid between 1996/98 and 2000; as a percentage of gross national
income (GNI), the UK's contributions in 2000 were most generous. G7
ODA to health dropped further for 2001 in the UK and Italy, remained
the same in Japan, and rose slightly in Germany. Only Canada and France
showed any substantial increase. Canada is the only G7 country making
no new commitments to liberalize health services under GATS, and there
have been no requests for such liberalization by other countries.
Ask the multilateral development banks to provide support for global
public goods. The G8 will explore the possibility of increased grants for
social investments (Genoa Statement).
Accomplished: No. This commitment was not reiterated in the final
Genoa Communique.
Comments: See Box 6.2, Chapter 6.
Endnotes to Chapter Three
1 The units used for purposes of this determination, disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), have
been the topic of considerable controversy. DALYs were originally developed in an effort to
provide a single metric for combining lost years of life with reduced functioning, in order to
overcome the serious limitations of such crude indicators as life expectancy. Ethical critiques of
the use of DALYs focus on four issues (Arnesen & Nord, 1999; Rock, 2000). Extending the life of
a person with reduced functioning ('disability') counts for less than extending the life of someone
with full functioning. Disability weightings used for calculating DALYs were arrived at using
convenience samples of health professionals rather than community members, including people
living with disabilities. The age weighting that is used for calculating DALYs assigns a lower
value to a year of life lost by the very young or aged than to a year of life lost by a young adult.
Finally, discounting means that a year of life lost in the future is valued less than a year of life lost
today.
Defenders of DALYs note that both age and disability weightings are consistent with common
clinical intuitions and practices in the context of limited resources, and that failure to discount
future life years might lead to recommendations that all current treatment be deferred in favour
of expenditures on research that would lower the cost or improve the effectiveness of future
treatment (Murray & Acharya, 1997). They also point out that changing or removing the age
weighting and discounting does not substantially change the ranking of contributors to the
burden of disease. Thus, the DALY remains at best an imperfect indicator, while being widely
used and useful for comparing the burden of disease across populations or societies with very
different patterns of health and development. For illustrations of this point, see Cwatkin et al.
(1999) and Priiss et al. (2002). At the same time, serious ethical issues arise when burden of
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disease figures are used as the basis for comparing the cost-effectiveness of interventions or
combinations of interventions.
2 The term 'transition economies' refers to the group of 25 Central and Eastern European countries,
including Russia, which were once part of or affiliated with the USSR. China and Vietnam are
also sometimes considered in this category.
3 At the Okinawa summit, japan committed US$3 billion over five years to an Infectious Disease
Initiative. About US$700 million of this commitment has been 'implemented/ with another
US$200 million contributed to the CFATM (OECD, 2002b: 108).
4 As with many C7 commitments, evaluating compliance and adequacy is akin to chasing a
moving target. An example of this is the recent pledge by US President Bush to commit US$10
billion in new funding for HIV/AIDS over the next five years (Stolberg, 2003). This pledge is
subject to Congressional approval, so its future (at time of writing) is uncertain. The pledge was
generally welcomed by most organizations concerned with the global pandemic, but only US$1
billion of it would be channeled through the multilateral and independent GFATM (McDonald,
2003). The rest would be administered according to US bilateral aid priorities -bilateral aid, as
Chapter 6 notes, is often based more on geopolitical interests than development need. More
importantly, this decision calls into question US commitment to multilateral processes, including
the G8 itself.
5 Note that although air and water are common pool resources, air and water quality are impure
or ambiguous public goods. Households can purchase air quality by moving to leafy
neighbourhoods upwind from pollution sources or on hillsides above the metropolitan haze;
communities and societies can also purchase air quality by mandating emission reductions. Safe
drinking water can be provided as a public good through pollution regulations and public
investment in treatment facilities, or can be a private good purchased in a bottle.
6 The UN report on financing for development had its own list for GPCs, which included
'peacekeeping; prevention of contagious diseases; research into tropical medicines, vaccines
and agricultural crops; prevention of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions; limitation of carbon
emissions; and preservation of biodiversity' (UN, 2001: 19). No individual country, the report
continued, has an incentive to pay for these, hence international cooperation and collective
action is required. The report estimated the annual cost to meet these GPGs at about US$20
billion (UN, 2001: 20). The need for more research on tropical diseases is sometimes described
as closing the '10/90 Gap' (GFHR, 2000) - the fact that 90 per cent or more of all medical
research addresses the 10 per cent of the 'burden of disease' affecting the wealthiest sectors of
the global population. 'Apparently it is more profitable to develop and market Viagra than to
research a new drug to treat patients with visceral leishmaniasis, a fatal disease if left untreated.
Such a drug is more likely to be developed through veterinary research if it has economic potential
on the pet market' (Veeken & Pecoul, 2000; see also Medecins sans Frontieres, 2001 a; P£coul et
al., 1999; Reich, 2000).
7 The International Development Association (IDA) is that section of the World Bank that provides
funding for 79 countries with per capita incomes below US$885. Over 96 per cent of donor
country disbursements to the World Bank go to the IDA. Significantly, this commitment appears
in the pre-summit statement but not in the final summit communique. The issue of G7 ODA for
health, education and other development goals, both bilateral and multilateral, is taken up in
Chapter 6.
8 A higher cost-estimate range of US$40-52 billion per year in new health funding by 2015 is
provided in a summary of the report of the Working Group responsible for these estimates (Jha
eta/., 2002). Both estimates include a US$8 billion annual allocation to the GFATM.
9 Box 2.2 in the previous chapter presents these two sets of goals and describes their similarities
and differences.
10 The WHO Coordinates report (2002d), which provides the first assessment of progress toward
meeting the goals that motivated the establishment of the Global Fund, avoided any quantitative
assessment of this point.
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11 Per capita spending is so low in sub-Saharan Africa (averaging US$20/year) that it does not
even track on Figure 3.1; see Appendix 2 for detailed data forthis figure. Averages also overstate
health care available for the poor in sub-Saharan Africa, since they include both public and
private spending (World Bank, 2002d: 105).
12 Its equally precipitous increase between 1990-92 and 1996-98 may also be an artifact of
reporting. In 1995, the US began to report aid by strategic objectives rather than by individual
aid activities (OECD, 2000: 6). We thus urge caution in interpreting the trend data presented.
Average total ODA contributed for health by all Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
members (including non-G7 members and multilateral lending) has averaged about seven per
cent in recent years, up from four per cent in the mid-1970s and matching high levels reached in
the mid-1980s (OECD, 2000: 6).
13 The OECD DAC report (OECD, 2002b) provides country-specific data for bilateral aid, by key
sectors. It does not, however, provide multilateral aid by country for these same key sectors.
Comparing sector-specific aid trends without estimating countries' portions of 2000 aid
contributed through multilateral agencies would be egregious, to say the least. Instead, we
estimate total 2000 ODA (bilateral and multilateral) based on the following calculation: country-
specific percentage of total aid contributed through each of the three multilateral agencies
(Regional Development Banks, World Bank, European Commission) x the percentage of aid
provided to the specific sector by each of the multilateral agencies. The product of these
calculations is added to that country's sector-specific bilateral contribution. While reasonably
accurate, there may be small margins of error: the OECD report (OECD, 2002b) itself cautions
that figures for the European Commission are 'approximate.' Total 2001 ODA contributions are
based on the same calculations, using provisional data from the OECD (2003). An even greater
note of caution is expressed for 1999 multilateral estimates. We applied the same formula as for
2000 and 2001, but the percentage of EC aid contributions by sector is not available for 1999.
We used the percentages for 2000 as a rough approximation. For this reason, we do not include
1999 in calculating G7 averages, but rely on years for which data are more reliable (2000, 2001).
14 Similar inequalities in ratios for nurses also apply, but we did not locate precise figures. Much
of the easily accessible date on the 'brain drain' applies to physicians. In using this data, we are
not implying that nursing shortages are any less critical for effectively functioning health systems.
15 We were unable to locate sector-specific ODA receipts for South Africa. Applying the percentage
of ODA for education disbursed to all recipient countries and applying it to the net ODA receipts
for South Africa, we arrived at our estimate of educational ODA.
16 The scale of this South subsidy to the North is much larger when all trained professionals are
considered. Fully one-third of computer professionals in California's Silicon Valley, for example,
are from India, and India, despite remittances earned from its foreign-placed workers, is estimated
to lose around US$700 million annually in training costs (Desai, 2001, cited in Oxfam, 2002:
45).
17 This convention, intended to be a legally binding treaty on collective international action and
cooperation on tobacco control, is being negotiated under the auspices of the WHO, and is
described later in this chapter.
18 It is difficult to assess the UK's position on this, given its intent to lobby for its own, differing
plan at the 2003 G8 summit in France. This plan, closely resembling the US's position, would
have drug companies sell their patent-protected treatments at 'slightly above cost,' but only for
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, and only for sub-Saharan African and other least developed
countries (Boseley, 2002).
19 Globally, 'the growing income of developing countries is leading to increases in private care
expenditures that are faster than public health care expenditures' (Lethbridge, 2002: 350). The
result is an increasing number of rural poor and urban low- and even middle-income persons
losing access to effective public health care, as services lose practitioners to the better-paying
private system, lack basic equipment or supplies due to decreased public funding, charge user
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fees or implement other cost-recovery programs, or are simply privatized (Iriart et al., 2002;
Xing, 2002). China's 'great leap forward in economic growth ... and great leap backward in
social security' (Xing, 2002: 248) is one of the starkest examples. Since the late 1970s, as public
spending on health as a share of GDP dropped by 75 per cent, over 700 000 communal rural
health clinics have been turned into private, full-cost-recovery services, completely disenfranchising
almost 40 per cent of the rural population. While 80 per cent of China remains rural, 80 per cent
of physicians are in the urban centres that are home to its new middle- and upper-income classes
(Xing, 2002: 249-50).
20 The World Bank's International Finance Corporation (IFC), which makes loans to the private
sector, for example, is aggressively marketing growth in privatized health and other services
(Lethbridge, 2002; Tannenbaum, 2002). In its 'Private Sector Development Strategy,' adopted
by the World Bank in 2002, the IFC envisions a larger private market in health services, with
subsidy programs for the poor financed by the World Bank's IDA, which provides concessional
lending or grants to developing countries (Tannenbaum, 2002). Its priorities for private health
investment 'reflect a high-technology, high-income approach to health care provision' (Lethbridge,
2002: 352) and rest on 'the underlying belief that investing to meet middle-class health needs
through the private sector will eventually have a significant impact on poverty,' despite there
being 'no substantial evidence to support this' (Lethbridge, 2002: 352).
21 Several developing countries, such as Cuba and India, are liberalizing health services under
Modes 2 (health tourism) and 4 (export of health professionals), in order to earn valuable
foreign exchange. India, which is a major exporter of health professionals and sees economic
advantage in GATS Mode 4, nonetheless has a domestic deficit in the number of physicians,
ranking 119 of 184 countries for which there are data (WHO, 2002c).
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[N]o government seriously committed to achieving education for all
will be thwarted in this achievement by lack of resources (G8 Okinawa
Communique, para. 33).
Introduction
The connections between education and health are many, and operate both
directly and through the intervening variables of economic growth and gender
equity. Personal and household (family) income rises with education level.
In developed countries, higher education is associated with healthier living
conditions (e.g. better housing, exposure to less environmental pollution)
and healthier lifestyles. In developing countries, increased education is
associated with greater economic productivity, lower disease rates, better child
survival and increased political participation (Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2002). These gains are more dramatic as education levels for women
rise, and 'societies that limit girls' access to education pay a price in poorer
health, and thereby in poorer economic growth' (CMH, 2001: 75).* Education
levels are also associated with reduced HIV risk, particularly for girls and
women. Those countries showing the greatest lack of knowledge about HIV/
AIDS (primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and several of the former Soviet
republics) are also ones with very low and in some cases rapidly declining
rates of education spending and participation (CIDA, 2002b; World Bank,
2002c). As women's education rates and levels rise, fertility rates decline,
and life expectancies for both women and children rise (UNESCO, 2002b:
34-5). Universal primary education, UNESCO further argues, can be a
powerful social force in displacing unhealthy child labour (UNESCO, 2002b:
33).
Indeed, if ever a virtuous development circle existed, it is the link between
health and education. The healthier a child, the better able he or she is to
learn. The better educated a child becomes, the healthier he or she will grow.
The healthier and better educated people are, the more economically sufficient
and productive they will become. The more economically sufficient and
productive people become, the better able they are to reinvest their own savings
into continuing health and education that is universally accessible.
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Education for All and the Dakar Framework for Action
This virtuous circle has long been recognized, first in Article 26 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), more recently in the 1990
Declaration on Education for All (EFA) at the World Conference on Education
for All, and subsequently in a series of summits throughout the 1990s
(UNESCO, 2002a). The goal of education for all took on more operational
shape during multilateral meetings in Dakar in 2000, which produced the
Dakar Framework for Action (UNESCO, 2000). This framework identifies six
education goals (see Box 4.1).
At the Okinawa summit, which followed the Dakar meeting by only a few
months, the G8 expressed its support for several of these goals:
We reaffirm our commitment that no government seriously committed
to achieving education for all will be thwarted in this achievement by
lack of resources.
We therefore commit ourselves to strengthen efforts bilaterally and
together with international organisations and private sector donors to
achieve the goals of universal primary education by 2015 and gender
equality in schooling by 2005 (Okinawa Communique, paras. 33^1).
80
Box 4.1: The Six Dakar Goals
We hereby collectively commit ourselves to the attainment of the following
goals:
• expanding and improving comprehensive early childhood care and
education, especially for the most vulnerable and disadvarttaged children;
• ensuring that by 2015 all children, particularly girls, children in difficult
circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities, have access to
and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality;;
• ensuring that the learning needs of all young people and adults are met
through equitable access to appropriate learning and life skills programmes;
• achieving a 50 per cent improvement in levels of adult literacy by 2015,
especially for women, and equitable access to basic and continuing
education for all adults;
• eliminating gender disparities m primary and secondary education by 2005,
and achieving gender equality in education by 2015, with a focus on
ensuring girls' full and equal access to and achievement in basic education
of good quality;5 [and]
• improving all aspects of the quality of education and ensuring excellence
of all so that recognized and measurable learning outcomes are achieved
by all, especially in literacy, numeracy and essential life skills (UNESCO,
2002b: 13).
Education
This second commitment is a direct quotation from paragraph 10 of the Dakar
Declaration, identifying the two most important initial targets in education. These
two targets (enrolling all children in primary school by 2015 and eliminating gender
disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005) are also among the IDGs to
which the G8 have committed their support. The G8 reaffirmed support for the
Dakar Declaration at their next summit in Genoa (2001), including 'our commitment
to help countries meet the Dakar Framework for Action goal of universal primary
education by 2015' and that 'education, in particular universal primary education
and equal access to education at all levels for girls, must be given high priority
both in national poverty reduction strategies and in our development programmes'
(Genoa Communique, para. 18). They nonetheless failed to specify the resources
that would be devoted to the Dakar Framework goals.
In every region of the world, excepting the transition and Central/Eastern
European countries, substantial progress has been made in both universal
primary education (UPE) and gender equality since 1990 (UNESCO, 2002b:
69). UNESCO's 2001 Monitoring Report on progress toward the Dakar goals,
however, cautioned that
[a]t least 32 countries, of which 11 are experiencing conflict, are
unlikely to meet the target of UPE [Universal Primary Education] by
2015, unless a serious effort is made for these countries.
One region of particular concern is sub-Saharan Africa, where
enrolment would have to increase at almost three times the effort
undertaken during the period 1990-97 (UNESCO, 2001: 7).
One year later, the tally of countries unlikely to meet the UPE goal has
increased to 37, with another 20 countries noted as requiring 'renewed efforts'
(UNESCO, 2002b: 17). Only 21 countries remain on target. The majority of
countries unlikely to meet the UPE goal are in sub-Saharan Africa, where net
enrolment rates for primary education stand at only 57 per cent (UNESCO,
2002b: 45). For UPE alone, 21 countries (of which 14 are African) are further
away from the Dakar goal now than in 1990 (UNESCO, 2002b: 91).
Estimating progress toward the Dakar goals using school completion rates
rather than enrolment rates, the World Bank came up with an even more
pessimistic assessment: '[U]se of completion rates raises the number [unlikely
to meet the UPE goal] to 88 countries, out of the total 155 for which data
were established. Some 35 countries are unlikely to meet the goal of
eliminating gender disparities at the primary level by 2005, even when the
goal is simply universal primary education and not universal primary
completion' (World Bank, 2002f: 3).
There are further causes for concern. The 2003 Social Watch annual report
noted that of the 153 countries (including the industrialized countries) for
which information was available, 38 had regressed relative to their situation
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in 1990 (or, in some cases, in 2000) in the area of basic education, as
determined by primary school enrolment rates and the percentage of students
reaching Grade 5 (Social Watch, 2003: 73-6). The previous year's report noted
that out of 116 countries for which data were then available, 33 had actually
reduced the percentage of their GDP spent on education between 1990 and
1995-97 (Social Watch, 2002: 19).
Responsibility for the downward trend in some countries, and stagnation in
others, cannot be laid entirely at the door of the G8, but the data do indicate
the size of the challenge that lies ahead. That challenge is compounded by the
effects of the HIV epidemic, which, as the World Bank (2002c) points out,
threatens to undermine and reverse the modest progress that has been made
toward educational goals, even while education, as we have already noted, has
a particularly important role to play in combating the epidemic. Some 860
000 children in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, lost their teachers to HIV/
AIDS in 1999 (UNESCO, 2002b: 118). '[F]or a growing number of countries,
HIV/AIDS is not just an additional factor that needs to be accommodated in
educational planning and practice. It is now a fact of life that requires that
every policy, procedure and activity should be re-worked and rethought within
an AIDS-centred policy framework' (UNESCO, 2002b: 118).
This statement merely underscores the importance of the virtuous circle
linking health, education and development, and the dramatic inadequacy of
G8 support for the GFATM and health systems recounted in the previous chapter.
Once again, we confront the scale of the problem, and estimates of the
resources required to remedy it. UNESCO cites estimates of the additional
resources that would be needed to achieve the UPE goal ranging from US$8
billion to US$15 billion per year, with the higher estimate being UNESCO's
own (UNESCO, 2001: 38). To put this in some perspective, these amounts,
respectively, are six per cent to ten per cent of the value of US tax reductions
in 2001-02 (Oxfam, 2001b). The lower estimate is roughly equal to the average
annual value of tax cuts enacted in Canada between 1984 and 2000 (Yalnizyan,
2002). The World Bank, focusing on completion rather than just access rates,
estimates the additional funds needed to achieve the UPE goal at US$ 10-30
billion, depending on the basis used for estimating costs (Devarajan et al.,
2002). Another World Bank calculation (World Bank, 2002f) generated a
substantially lower set of cost estimates - lower, because it assumed gradual
phasing-in of increased expenditures and a more substantial contribution
from governments' own domestic budgets. Despite this latter assumption, 'a
regional breakdown of the estimate shows the importance of intensifying
support to sub-Saharan Africa: the region would require a seven-fold increase
from its present level of aid inflows for primary education in real terms'
(World Bank, 2002f: 4, original emphasis). Table 4.1, below, indicates that
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relying on the availability of additional funds from domestic sources is almost
certainly unrealistic, ait least in the case of sub-Saharan Africa. In 1998, public
expenditure on education by G7 countries averaged 5.3 per cent of GDP,
while for sub-Saharari African countries the comparable figure - excluding
foreign aid for education -was 3.6 per cent (World Bank, 2002d: 82-5). The
problem is that in poor countries, the available funds are simply inadequate
to the task. As we emphasized in Chapter 2, public expenditures on all forms
of social provision are often further constrained by the imperative of servicing
the external debt, and the limited scope of currently available debt relief.












































Source: Social Watch (2003: 79-81)
Legend:
Significant progress (more than 1% change in public expenditure as % of
GDPorCNP).
Some progress (less than 1% change in public expenditure as % of GDP or
GNP).
Stagnation.
Some regression (less than 1% change in public expenditure as % of GDP
or GNP).
Significant regression (more than 1% change in public expenditure as % of
GDP or GNP).
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Policy Challenges, G8 Responses
UNESCO (2001: 38) identified four major challenges for the international
community if the Dakar Framework's targets are to be achieved:
1. To drastically increase support for basic education within a context
of increased support for the education sector and for overall
international development assistance.
2. To ensure that increased financial flows, from the private sector as
well as ODA, act as a catalyst for national resource mobilization
and sustainable development, with due attention to the critical
role of basic education.
3. To strengthen policy coherence and co-ordination of EFA efforts
nationally and internationally.
4. To hold national governments and the international community to
their commitment for EFA through careful monitoring of the
progress towards the goals and targets of EFA (original emphases).
The UNESCO report observed that although the real value of ODA declined
during the 1990s, 'education seems to have suffered relatively less within
this overall declining ODA trend/ However, it also notes that 'education
continues to constitute a low proportion of individual countries' development
assistance' (UNESCO, 2001: 37-8).
Data from our three summit years (1999, 2000 and 2001) indicate that, as
with health, education aid forms a small part of total ODA for most G7
countries (see Figure 4.1, on the next page). Overall, G7 aid for education
increased slightly in 2001 from the previous year. Both France and Germany
have reasonably high total education expenditures and, with Italy, show a
marked upward increase since 1990. In the case of France, however,
'"education" encompasses areas as broad as higher education, research,
teaching of French and the promotion of the French-speaking world'
(Canonne, 2002: 194). Some caution in interpreting these trends is thus
warranted, the more so since the earlier two time periods (1990-92 and 1993-
96) reflect only bilateral aid, and calculations for total (multilateral and
bilateral) aid for France, Italy, Germany and the UK for 1999 rest on an
assumption we have had to make in the absence of available data (see
explanatory notes in Figure 4.1 on the next page). Education aid increased
marginally in 2001 from 2000 (the two years for which data are more reliable)
in the US, UK and Japan, and more substantially in Italy and France. It declined
in Canada and Germany, although Canada's basic education contribution
increased (see Figure 4.2, on page 86).
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Figure 4.1: Trends in Aid to Education as % of Total ODA*
Source: UNESCO (2002b: Table 5.2); OECD (2001c: Tables 13, 15 & 19);
OECD (2002b: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
Estimates of 1999, 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
* Total ODA includes bilateral aid (country to country) and multilateral aid
(contributions made by donor countries to the EC, the World Bank and Regional
Development Banks).
In 1999, the multilateral contributions for European C7 countries were approximated
using EC sector commitments in 2000, as data on EC sector commitments for 1999 are
not available.
Note: Averages for 1990-92 and 1993-96 are for bilateral aid only.
Basic education aid -that portion going to primary education, basic life skills
and early childhood education in developing countries - is surprisingly low
for all G7 countries, especially given their repeated commitments to the UPE
goal. (To avoid misleading comparisons, we restrict these data to the two
years - 2000 and 2001 - for which full and reliable data are available.) Japan
and the US showed very marginal increases in basic education aid in 2001;
only Canada and France showred a substantial rise. The other G7 countries
registered declines in basic education aid, causing the group as a whole to
rise only marginally above its 2000 level.
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Figure 4.2: % of Total ODA* to Basic Education and Non-basic Education,
2000-01**
Source: OECD (2002b: Table 19); OECD (2003: Table 19).
* Estimates of multilateral contributions made by authors.
** Basic education spending is part of total education spending; the dark portion of
the bar represents non-basic education spending.
The G8 further stated, 'we will develop incentives to increase school
enrolment' (Genoa Communique, para. 18). No further elaboration was
provided, but the G8 committed themselves to 'establish a task force of senior
G8 officials to advise us on how best to pursue the Dakar goals in co-operation
with developing countries, relevant international organisations and other
stakeholders/ with a report to be presented at the next summit (Genoa
Communique, para. 19). Although the report (G8 Education Task Force, 2002)
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was duly released, it contained no explicit proposals for commitments to
new solutions, and was disturbing in its emphasis on increased contributions
from developing countries' domestic resources.
Canada was the first G8 country to announce a specific monetary
commitment to the Dakar Framework, indicating a quadrupling of its basic
education assistance to a total of C$555 million over five years (2000-05)
(CIDA, 2002b), of which C$100 million is earmarked for Africa (CCIC, 2002:
5). By 2005, annual basic education contributions from Canada should reach
C$164 million (CCIC, 2002: 5). Since Dakar (April 2000), the UK has
committed £96 million to major new education initiatives in three African
countries: Malawi, South Africa and Rwanda (Kirton & Kokotsis, 2002) and
pledges 'significant' increases in new education aid (UNESCO, 2002b: 174).
The US in July 2002 pledged to increase basic education aid by 50 per cent
from 2001 to 2003, and to increase educational aid to Africa by 30 per cent
over the same period (UNESCO, 2002b: 174). In September 2002, Japan
pledged an additional US$2 billion in new educational aid over five years
(2002-07), but outside of the OS's Dakar EFA Action Plan (UNESCO, 2002b:
174). Japan's assistance, however, will be targeted to low-income countries,
including those in Africa, and appears dedicated to basic education (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 2002).
These are positive changes. They are, however, still grossly insufficient. UNESCO
(2002b: 75), complaining that the documentation from G8 bilateral aid agencies
makes it difficult to sum up their new education commitments, nonetheless
estimates these at about US$1 billion annually, of which US$0.3 billion will likely
go to basic education. This US$0.3 billion sum is less than ten per cent of UNESCO's
estimate of US$4.4 billion in new annual contributions to basic education if the
UPE and gender goals are to be met by 2015 (UNESCO, 2002b: 175).
UNESCO and the G8
In Genoa, the G8 also committed its members to 'support UNESCO in its
key role for universal education' (Genoa Communique, para. 18). It is not
possible to separate out G8 funding from total support to UNESCO, but it is
safe to presume that G8 countries, with the exception of the United States,
are among the major contributors.4 In that light, the concern expressed by
UNESCO's Director-General about the inadequacies of the post-Genoa summit
fiscal year are revealing:
[Tlhe Programme and Budget for 2002-2003 was drawn up - for the
third time in a row - on the basis of zero-nominal growth pegged at
some US$544 million for the two years. In reality, zero-nominal growth
represents a reduction in resources of 4.2% .... Clearly, the Organization
cannot afford to remain on such a path of continuous belt-tightening
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lest it be depleted of its vitality and ability to respond to new challenges
(UNESCO, 2002b).
In fairness, the G8 did not say they would increase support to UNESCO in its
work, but, without such an increase, their statement of support lacks any
meaning.
Education and NEPAD
Like recent G8 summit communiques, NEPAD commits participating African
nations to the IDGs, which include UPE by 2015, and to remove gender
disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005 (NEPAD, para. 68).
As Bond (2002: 121) points out, 'cost-recovery provisions and exceedingly
low state education budgets' are 'double disincentives' to achieving these
goals, and are not explicitly addressed by NEPAD. Cost-recovery programs
are particular barriers to women's participation. At the same time, progress
in UPE had been made in many African countries in recent years and has
only recently begun to regress. Gender parity in primary education in sub-
Saharan Africa rose from 0.79 in 1990 to 0.89 in 1999, bettering the world
average of 0.88 (affected primarily by low gender parity in South and West
Asian countries) (UNESCO, 2002b: 69). The adult illiteracy rate has also
decreased in all African countries for which data exist (N = 47) (Social Watch,
2002).
These positive trends, however, require perspective. As we noted earlier, 14
African countries are farther away from the UPE targets now than they were
in 1990, and nine have worse gender parity (World Bank, 2002d). Many African
countries still have a very high adult illiteracy rate. Twelve of the 47 reporting
countries have adult illiteracy rates of less than 23.9 per cent, the world average.
Almost half (N = 23) have illiteracy rates exceeding 40 per cent of the adult
population (Social Watch, 2002:42). Countries in West Africa (many of them
former French colonies), countries that have been or still are in conflict, and
countries with predominantly Muslim populations have particularly high
illiteracy rates.
Two of the Dakar goals reference the need for basic education beyond UPE
and gender parity. UNESCO has criticized NEPAD for ignoring these:
In basic education, NEPAD refers only to the ... [g]oal of UPE by 2015,
and to curriculum, quality and the use of ICTs. In view of the huge
EFA needs in Africa in the area of each of the six Dakar objectives,
planning for basic education needs special attention wherever the
NEPAD is used as a framework for planning specific initiatives or
allocating new funding (UNESCO, 2002a: 47).
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This is a criticism also made of the 'Fast Track Initiative' (FTI), a program
supported by the G8 Education Task Force (2002). The FTI emphasizes UPE
and gender parity to the exclusion of other Dakar goals, which makes the
initiative 'less satisfactory as a framework for medium- to long-term education
reform' (UNESCO, 2002b: 176). It is also linked with the PRSP program, which,
UNESCO cautions, renders 'the extent of national ownership of plans and
policies ... uncertain' (2002b: 177; see PRSP discussion in Chapter 2). NEPAD's
desire to reduce the global 'digital divide', which it shares with the G8 (see
Box 4.2, below), is not unwarranted, but without more specific planning for
basic education, it risks replicating within Africa the same global divide it is
keen to bridge.
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Box 4.2: Technology for Development
In 2000, the G8 leaders set up the Digital Opportunities Task Force (dot.force),
and in 2001 they stated; 'We endorse the report of the Digital Opportunity
Task Force (dot.force) and its Genoa Plan of Action that successfully fulfilled
the Okinawa mandate. ... We will continue to support the process and
encourage all stakeholders to demonstrate ownership, to mobilise expertise
and resources and to build on this successful co-operation' (Genoa
Communique, para. 22).
The dot.force report is to be welcomed as a recognition of the critical role
that access to information and communications technology (ICT) will play in
economic development (e.g. see Hewitt de Alcantara, 2001; OECD, 2001a)
and in contributing to the achievement of a variety of social goals, such as
those related to education and food security (International Food Policy Research
Institute, 2000). Although it is too early to assess the success of the C8 in
achieving the objectives outlined in the report, it is not too early to warn about
the importance of two critical sets of questions.
Firstly, a fundamental weakness of technology-based prescriptions in other
areas has been and continues to be the gap between market power and social
need. The Genoa Communique's vague references to 'ownership' and to
'mobilizing] expertise and resources' do not address the concrete problem of
limited purchasing power as it affects both access to the results of today's
scientific research and influence on the priorities of tomorrow's. It is useful to
know that OECD countries, per capita, have roughly ten times as many
telecommunications access paths and TOO times as many internet hosts as
non-OECD countries (OECD, 2001 a: 7-8), and it is not hard to imagine the
social and economic effects of this divide, given the indispensability of advanced
computing and telecommunication for many sectors of today's industrial and
commercial economy. It is harder to imagine how the situation can soon be
remedied, even in a world of dramatically falling ICT costs, without some
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Education, Child Labour and NEPAD
The Genoa summit, as part of its support for UPE and UNESCO, referenced
the importance of working 'with the International Labour Organization (ILO)
to support efforts to fight child labour' (Genoa Communique, para. 18). The
issue of child labor remains one of the contentious points in trade negotiations
between developed and developing countries, particularly with efforts by
EU countries and, in 1999, by the US, to link labor rights to WTO agreements.
Developing countries, with some justification, see this as a potential means
of 'back door protectionism', although much depends on how such a linkage
is operationalized and the extent of 'special and differential' phase-in periods
for countries lacking the financial resources or material infrastructures
allowing quick compliance (Labonte, 2002).
NEPAD does not mention children, apart from its reference to infant and
under-five mortality rates. It does not mention the Convention of the Rights
of the Child, nor the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention 1999. Of the 53
African countries, 32 have ratified the 1999 convention, while no African
country has denounced it. Child labor rates, while high, continue to decline
(see Table 4.2).
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financial support (Hewitt de Alcantara, 2001: 17-18). The UNDP Director of
ICT for Development has warned that today's disparity in information
infrastructure investment between the OECD and the rest of the world is unlikely
to lessen in the future, given the status quo, because of re venue-re I a ted limits on
'teiecoms operators' availability to support infrastructure build-out' {Gilhooly,
2001): even within the industrialized countries, internet access at the household
level tends to vary with income and education fOECD, 2001 a: 18).
A second set of questions is more complex, more disturbing, and can only
be touched upon here, because it requires analysis of a huge literature on
technology and development. Hewitt de Alcantara, in a sceptical survey of
claims about development and the knowledge economy, warns that developing
countries vary widely in their ability to adopt new ICTs and in the speed with
which they can do so, and argues that 'nothing in the current information
revolution seems to be changing the underlying dynamics of unequal
development at a global level' (Hewitt de Alcantara, 2001: 14), although
thoughtfully designed and implemented development assistance policies have
the potential to do so. Especially in the context of NEPAD's preoccupation
with ICT, it is worth asking what mechanisms will be developed to ensure
equitable and meaningful participation in the potential benefits from ICTs.





























Source: World Bank (2000a)
Key factors internationally in child labor decline are higher rates of spending
on public health (which induces parents to switch from a high-fertility, low-
survival, low-education strategy to a low-fertility, high-survival, high-
education one) and on education (via direct subsidies or indirectly through
tax-based income redistribution policies) (Cigno etal, 2002). Globalization,
in the form of increased trade, may worsen child labor in countries that start
out with an uneducated labor force, although the 'net effects are ...
ambiguous' (Cigno et al., 2002: 1587), and it reduces it in countries starting
with a larger educated (post-primary level) workforce. This makes intuitive
sense, since such countries would be able to import products made more
cheaply by child labor in other countries.
GATS and Education
Trade liberalization, under some conditions, may have a positive effect on
reducing child labour and increasing school enrolment and completion. The
impact of services liberalization is less well known, but with potentially
negative results. As with health-care services (Chapter 3), there is a growing
developed world market in private provision, or contracted private management,
of education services (Grieshaber-Otto & Sanger, 2002). Indeed, privatization
and commercialization in education in many developed countries are outpacing
their equivalents in health care; the global education market is estimated to be
worth US$2 trillion annually (Barlow, 2001). Policies and practices include
school management contracts with private companies, increased fund-raising
by parents and school committees to pay for basic services and supplies in public
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schools, direct corporate sponsorship for public school supplies and programs,
new or higher tuition costs (particularly for tertiary public education),
increased numbers of private schools (religious and non-denominational),
and tax deductions (indirect public subsidies) for private school fees.
Education in most countries has long been a mix of public and private
provision. Private education, in turn, has usually been the prerogative of
wealthier individuals and families with the income needed to afford it. As
Cigno et al (2002) argue for developing countries, public provision of health
and education are important factors in school enrolment. User charges or other
cost-recovery schemes for education, whether public or private, are associated
with declines in enrolment, especially by the poor (Hilary, 2001). If private
provision of education increases, an enlarged 'two-tiered' system will
disproportionately benefit the wealthy and penalize the poor. It can do so in a
number of ways paralleling threats to public health care: e.g. by eroding support
for tax-funded public systems among the elite ('tax revolt') or by attracting
teachers away from public schools to a private system with higher salaries or
benefits. Countries that liberalize trade in education services without restrictions
or horizontal limitations under 'national treatment' that exempt subsidies for
public education could be responsible for providing similar subsidies to foreign
private companies seeking to establish private schools. Even when they do
make such exemptions, trade challenges could arise, with the final outcome
uncertain - as it is in other areas where the disciplines of trade law could be
applied to social services (Grieshaber-Otto & Sanger, 2002: 110-13).
Few African or G7 countries have so far made GATS commitments related
to education. Exceptions are the fairly extensive commitments made by
Lesotho, and by the EC 12 nations to permit foreign provision of private
education. Nevertheless, critical questions arise about whether liberalization
of trade and investment in education services liberalization under GATS is
compatible with international instruments concerning the right to education.
Notably, Article 26, paragraph 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(1948) declares that 'education shall be free, at least in the elementary and
fundamental stage'; and Article 13, paragraph 9b of the International Covenant
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (1966) states that '[secondary education
in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education,
shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every means, and in




Education is one of the keys to improved population health and economic
development. The Dakar Framework for Action (Education for All or EFA)
was the first comprehensive, multilateral plan setting targets for education
across the lifespan. The framework has been endorsed by individual G8
nations, and by the G8 as a group at the Okinawa (2000), Genoa (2001) and
Kananaskis (2002) summits. In the group's own words, '[e]ducation is the
foundation for higher living standards and democratic societies. It is an
important long-term investment in peace and development. We reaffirm the
importance of literacy, numeracy, and learning, and our support for the EFA
initiative' (G8 Education Task Force, 2002).
The G8 have focused particularly on two of the Dakar goals, UPE and gender
equality, which UNESCO describes as a minimization of expectation, a
minimization that appears to have been copied by NEPAD. Despite the G8's
acceptance of the importance of the EFA goals, the number of countries
regressing on their UPE and gender equality goals increased since the Okinawa
summit. There are numerous reasons for this. One directly bearing on the G8
is the need for increased development assistance for basic education, which,
for sub-Saharan Africa, is estimated to require a seven-fold jump if the UPE
goal alone is to be met. Yet, with the exceptions of France (which gives a lot to
language education), Italy (which gives a lot of little) and the US (which gives
little of a lot), G8 countries' aid to education, including their multilateral
assistance, declined in 2001. Several countries since (Canada, Japan, the US,
the UK) have announced increased aid for basic education, much of it targeted
to Africa. This is partly a reflection of a Kananaskis summit commitment to
'significantly increase the support provided by our bilateral aid agencies to
basic education for countries with a strong policy and financial commitment
to the sector. Each G8 donor will make public the steps it will take to fulfill
this commitment' (G8 Education Task Force, 2002). The total amounts,
however, are still less than one-tenth of the annual increases which UNESCO
estimates are required to reach the UPE and gender equality goals alone.
Explicit or Specific Commitments: Education
• Affirmed commitment to education for all, including the goals of UPE
by 2015 and gender equality in schooling by 2005 (Okinawa, Genoa).
Accomplished: Will probably not be accomplished, particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Adequacy: Basic education aid for all G7 nations is very low. New G8
pledges for basic education assistance will be less than 10% of new donor
funding needed if UPE and gender equality goals to be met.
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Comments: Both France and Germany have relatively high total education
aid expenditures; this does not always translate into expenditure on
primary education. Canada was the only G7 nation to announce a
monetary commitment to the Dakar framework prior to the Kananaskis
summit. The UK, the US and Japan have made subsequent commitments
to increase education aid, targeting low-income countries (including
African ones) and basic education.
• Support UNESCO in its key role for universal education (Genoa).
Accomplished: Unknown; specific G8 contributions to UNESCO budget
are not available.
Adequacy: UNESCO budgets, mostly financed by the G8 nations
(excluding the US), have declined in real dollar terms over the past several
years.
Comments: Support is usually considered a non-explicit commitment
since it is not quantified. We regard it as explicit and requiring constant
if not rising financial contributions.
Implicit or Generic Commitments: Education
• Will work with the ILO to support efforts to fight child labour (Genoa).
Accomplished: Unknown.
Comments: Decreased child labour is associated with increased public
health and education spending/access, and possibly with trade
liberalization (market access). See Chapters 3 and 7.
• Will develop incentives to increase school enrolment (Genoa).
Accomplished: Unclear.
Comments: The G8 Education Task Force has commited itself to increased
development assistance to basic education (Kananaskis). The Kananaskis
Chair's Summary states, 'We agreed to increase significantly our bilateral
assistance for countries that have demonstrated a strong and credible policy
and financial commitment to these goals' (emphasis added). No other
initiatives were specifically identified.
Endnotes to Chapter Four
1 Although education spending is associated with improved health outcomes at the US$2/day
poverty level, it is not so associated at the US$1/day poverty level (Wagstaff, 2001). This is
probably because the burden of disease and malnutrition at deeper poverty levels precludes an
ability to learn effectively, or to act upon that knowledge. On the vicious circle linking illness
and impoverishment, see Narayan et al. (2000: 95-105).
2 This goal is almost identical to Target 3, Goal 2 of the MDGs, which states: 'Ensure that, by




3 This goal is almost identical to Target 4, Goal 3 of the MDGs, which states: 'Eliminate gender
disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education
no later than 2015.'
4 The United States had, as of May 2003, not rejoined UNESCO after leaving in 1984 to protest a
UNESCO project designed to reduce dependence on the 'Big Four' wire services for media




Most international trade in agricultural commodities is controlled by a
very few big transnational corporations, based in rich exporting
countries. If a low-income country attempts to promote greater self-
reliance in feeding its population and more remunerative employment
for its small producers, it will often have to selectively restrict agricultural
imports. [P]oor countries have few other effective policy instruments.
... Rich countries in contrast... have a wide range of policy instruments
at their disposal. ... The issue for developing countries should be seen
as ... the goal of sustainable agriculture, not as one of 'free markets'
versus regulated ones (Barraclough, 2000: xvii-xviii).
Introduction
According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO), 'in 1997-
99, there were 815 million undernourished people in the world: 777 million
in the developing countries, 27 million in transition countries and 11 million
in the industrialized countries' (UNFAO, 2001: 2). 'Undernourishment' in
this context means daily caloric intake 'that is continuously insufficient to
meet dietary energy requirements' (UNFAO, 2001: 50); it does not refer to
shortages of micronutrients such as iodine, vitamin A and iron that may be
critical for health, and which affect much larger numbers of people (UN
ACC/SCN, 2000: 23-32; WHO, 1997:13-14). Nutritional deficiencies represent
an adverse health outcome in themselves, and clearly increase vulnerability
to other stressors such as infectious disease (e.g. see Rice etal., 2000). Indeed,
the WHO describes malnutrition as the greatest single risk factor contributing
to the global burden of disease (WHO figures published in 1995, as cited in
World Bank, 2002d: 42), and more recently published figures suggest that
this may even be an underestimate.1 In developing countries, particularly
LDCs, adequate nutrition may figure more importantly as a determinant of
health, and therefore of economic growth and development, than even
education. We noted in Chapter 3 that education spending at the US$I/day
poverty level is not associated with improved health outcomes. This is
probably because malnutrition and other stressors inescapable at this level of
poverty affect people's abilities to learn or act upon new knowledge. At the
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same time, the higher a woman's education, the less likely her children are
to be stunted (Smith & Haddad, 2000): the relationship between education
and nutrition is dynamic. In this chapter, we provide a brief assessment of
G8 responses to the health-related challenges presented by inadequate
nutrition and food security. We have not attempted to place food crises in
their historical context, even though knowledge of that context is often
essential to understanding the continued coexistence within national and
regional economies of highly productive agriculture with large numbers of
people who are unable to get enough to eat (cf. Franke & Chasin, 1980;
Lawrence, 1986).
Nutrition and Food Security
The 1996 World Food Summit defined food security as a situation where
'[a] 11 people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe
and nutritional food to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an active
and healthy life' (quoted by Thomson, 2001: 24). In the intervening years,
progress in reducing the global prevalence of food insecurity has been at
best modest, perhaps reflecting what some observers see as the marginal
political status of food security issues and the associated international
institutions (Amalric, 2001). The 2001 State of Food Insecurity report from
UNFAO notes that
FAO's latest estimates indicate that, in 1997-99, there were 815 million
undernourished people in the world: 777 million in the developing
countries, 27 million in transition countries and 11 million in the
industrialized countries. For the developing countries, the latest figure
represents a decrease of 39 million since 1990-92 (the benchmark
period used at the World Food Summit), for which the revised figure
is 816 million undernourished.
This means that the average annual decrease [in undernourished
people] now stands at about 6 million people. Clearly, there has been
a slowdown in the reduction of undernourished in the world. As a
consequence, to achieve the World Food Summit goal of halving the
number of undernourished in developing countries by 2015, the average
annual decrease required is no longer 20 million but 22 million -well
above the current level of performance (UNFAO, 2001: 2).
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Figure 5.1: Regional Prevalence of Undernourishment, % of Total Population
Source: UNFAO (2001: 51, Table 1)
Indeed, 'continuing at the current rate, it would take more than 60 years to
reach the target' (UNFAO, 2001: iv).
These aggregate figures fail to shed light on widely varying country
performances. For example, the highest percentage reductions in the proportion
of undernourished people during the 1990s were found in Peru, Chad, Ghana
and Kuwait, and the highest increases were found in Tanzania, Burundi, North
Korea and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UNFAO warns, however,
that 'the majority of developing countries suffered significant increases in
their absolute number of undernourished. This is a worrying trend, masked
by the much better performances of a few' (UNFAO, 2001: 6; emphasis added).
Table 5.1, below, shows the ten 'best' and 'worst' performers, in terms of
the increase or decrease in the absolute number of undernourished people. It
should be read keeping in mind several things. Firstly, various factors -
including population growth, changes in agricultural productivity, and
changes in the level and distribution of income - can contribute to changes
in undernourishment. Secondly (population) size matters. In India, 'the
percentage of undernourished is estimated to have declined from 25 to 23
percent but the number of undernourished rose by 11 million, owing to
rapid population growth'; conversely, 'despite China's good performance,
the country is still home to the world's second largest number of
undernourished people after India' (UNFAO, 2001: 5).
At the 2001 summit, the G8 made a generic commitment to 'meet the
International Development Goals, by strengthening and enhancing the
effectiveness of our development assistance' (Genoa Communique, para.
14). As we point out in the next chapter, a commitment to increase the amounts
of aid at this summit was conspicuous by its absence. The IDGs include the
goal of poverty reduction, a key indicator for which is the proportion of
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children under five who are underweight. However, the lack of more explicit
commitments in the area of food security at the Cologne, Okinawa and Genoa
G8 summits represents an omission of considerable significance in terms of
human health. The G8 Africa Action Plan announced at the 2002 summit contains
a section on food security (para. 7.3), but within a context concerned primarily
with the economic development (including adoption of new biotechnologies)
of Africa's agricultural sector. We comment on the relationships between
agriculture, biotechnology and food security later in this chapter.
Table 5.1: Ten Countries with Largest Increases and Decreases in the Number of






























Democratic Republic of the Congo
India























Source: UNFAO (2001: 5)
Sub-Saharan African countries are indicated in italics.
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G7 ODA to Agriculture
The G8 further noted in 2001 that 'a central objective of our poverty reduction
strategy remains access to adequate food supplies and rural development.
Support to agriculture is a crucial instrument of ODA. We shall endeavour to
develop capacity in poor countries, integrating programmes into national
strategies and increasing training in agricultural science' (Genoa
Communique, para. 20).
They also committed to 'target the most food-insecure regions, particularly
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia' (Genoa Communique, para. 21) -
apparently, given the context, for development assistance including food aid.
The brief time that has elapsed since Genoa makes it impossible to assess the
contributions of specific G7 countries to reducing food insecurity. The decline
in such aid over the past 20 years, however, has been substantial (see Figure
5.2, below), except for those G7 countries that initially directed a low
percentage of their ODA to agriculture in the first place (the UK and France).
Trends in agriculture assistance in more recent years vary considerably
across G7 countries. Japan and France show sizeable increases in 2001, while
Germany, Italy and the US show modest growth. The UK and Canada both
register a drop, although not enough to prevent the G7 average from rising
in 2001. To put the dollar figures into some context, however, US agriculture
aid in 2000 was US$411 million, roughly 2.3 per cent of the US$18 billion
planned annual increase in US domestic agricultural subsidies over the next
ten years.
Food aid shows a different pattern, with Italy, Canada and the US (the
latter two being the two largest food exporters among the G7) contributing
sizable portions of their ODA in this fashion. US contributions, however, are
declining; while Canadian, Italian and, to a lesser degree, French, assistance
show increases in 2001. However, such aid is motivated at least partly by a
desire to absorb domestic production surpluses. Here, again, perspective is
valuable: combined US agricultural and food ODA in 2000 amounted to just
US$1.6 billion, or 11 per cent of the amount that will be spent on new
domestic agricultural subsidies (see Figure 5.4, below). The importance of
industrialized country agricultural subsidies as a barrier to improving
agricultural production, food security and export earnings is discussed in
more detail in Chapter 7.
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Figure 5.2: % of Total ODA to Agriculture, 1979-80, 1999-2001
Source: OECD (2001 c: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD
(2002b: Tables 13, 15, 18 & 19); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
Estimates of 1999, 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
The multilateral contributions for European G7 countries in 1999 were approximated
using EC sector commitments in 2000, as data on EC sector commitments for 1999 are
not available. 1979-80 is bilateral aid only.
These crude data do not permit an assessment of the usefulness of agricultural
aid: i.e. the purposes for which it is intended and whether the beneficiaries
are primarily recipient country producers and food security or donor country
producers and agro-technology companies. Non-emergency food aid, for
example, 'has damaged food production in a number of developing countries,
some of which had been carefully nurtured under assistance programs' (IMF,
2002: 2). Even emergency food aid had come under scrutiny by developing
101
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
nations. Some argue that bilateral food aid has often been used to 'dump' surpluses
outside of the purview of WTO anti-dumping rules. Others counter that individual
nations can be more responsive to emergencies than inter-governmental bodies
such as the UNFAO or the World Food Programme. Most developing countries
at the WTO, however, state that 'food aid should only be given in grant form,'
thus allowing recipient countries the ability to manage their relief requirements
more effectively (BRIDGES Trade News Weekly, 2002c: 4).
Figure 5.3: % of Total ODA to Food Aid, 1999-2001
Source: OECD (2001 c: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD
(2002b: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
In 1999, the multilateral contributions for European G7 countries were approximated using EC
sector commitments in 2000, as data on EC sector commitments for 1999 are not available.
Figure 5.4: US Agricultural and Food Aid, 2001, Compared to Annual Domestic
Agricultural Subsidies, 2002-12
Source: OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
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Child Malnutrition, Food Security and Africa
In absolute numbers, child malnutrition is highest in Asia (47 per cent of the
world's total) and second highest in sub-Saharan Africa (35 per cent) (World
Bank, 2002d: 47). The prevalence of child malnutrition has been steadily
declining in Asia over the past 20 years, but has been increasing steadily in
Africa, particularly over the past decade (World Bank, 2002d: 40). Of all
African countries, 18 showed some improvement in recent years, three showed
no change, and ten showed increased rates (Social Watch, 2002: 33). However,
the inferences that can be drawn from these data are limited, because data
are limited or unavailable for some countries and, for others, the 'trend' in
question has been observed over a very short time (one- or two-year periods).
Available food security data (Social Watch, 2002) provide trends between
1990 and 1999, although these data concern average daily caloric intake only.
Data are available for 52 African countries; trend data are available for 47 (see
Table 5.2).







































































Source: Social Watch (2002: 31 -2)
No data available for Equatorial Guinea.
Legend:
A: Countries that must achieve a minimum of 2 300 cat.
B: Countries that must grow one per cent per year.
C: Countries starting off with less than 2 300 cal. that can reach 2 700 cal.
D: Countries starting off with more than 2 300 cal. that can reach 2 700 cal.
E: Countries starting off with more than 2 700 cal. that can reach 3 000 cal.
F. Countries starting off with more than 2 950 cal. that can reach 3 200 cal.
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The World Food Summit goal of ensuring caloric supply according to UNFAO
levels should be seen in relation to undernutrition rates, which continue to
be high in many African countries, despite progress in food security: in 1990,
42 countries provided less than 2 300 calories per capita daily, and 24 countries
were still below the 2 300 level in 1999. This could possibly be explained by
increasing maldistribution of food supplies within countries, reflecting
increasing economic inequalities as an aspect of globalization.
It also has to be noted that seasonal fluctuations in food security are
important for large numbers of people who rely substantially on subsistence
farming. The importance of these seasonal fluctuations can be seen in
countries currently affected by drought in Southern Africa, which has resulted
in an estimated 13 million people facing starvation (IRIN, 2002c; Brough,
2002). Despite this, three of these countries showed progress in achieving
the UNFAO food security goal between 1990 and 1999. (See Chapter 9 for a
discussion of NEPAD's statements on food security.)
Again, we emphasize that responsibility for malnutrition in Africa, and in
other developing and least developed countries, does not rest solely with the
G8. The premise of NEPAD is that African countries shoulder their share of
responsibility for resolving entrenched, health-damaging practices and
conditions. Moreover, the G8 have taken steps to aid in many of these areas,
albeit usually inadequate ones. But there are also many instances in which
G8 practices contribute directly to the problems facing Africa's human and
economic development. One such practice, involving factory fishing off
Africa's coast, is described in Box 5.1.
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Box 5.1: African Fish on European Dinner Plates
Food security in African countries can be undermined by C7 behaviours that
have little to do with aid or trade. One recent example is provided by Mauritania,
one of the poorer sub-Saharan African countries. Mauritania managed to show
substantial improvements in its food security (using caloric supply as the
benchmark) between 1990 and 1996 (Social Watch, 2002: 31). More recently,
however, it has significantly regressed on infant mortality rates and become
stagnant in under-five mortality rates (Social Watch, 2002: 27, 29). Taken
together, this suggests a decline in nutritional levels since 1996.
Since 1996, according to UNEP, Mauritania became one of several countries
granting fishing licenses to factory-style fishing vessels of the EU, japan and
China that were 'causing alarming reductions in fish stocks off West Africa'
(Brown, 2002). (Senegal had such an agreement with the EU, but is
renegotiating it for better terms.) Some 60 per cent of global fisheries are
estimated to be in, or near, depletion crisis (UNEP, 1999), mostly due to
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Biotechnology and Food Security
While direct attention by the G8 to food security issues has been limited,
documents from the last three summits show what can almost be called an
obsession with the promotion of biotechnology and the removal of
impediments to its rapid diffusion that might be created by food safety
regulation. Thus, in 2001 the G8 stated the following:
Every effort should be undertaken to enhance agricultural productivity.
Among other things, the introduction of tried and tested new
technology, including biotechnology, in a safe manner and adapted
to local conditions has significant potential to substantially increase
crop yields in developing countries, while using fewer pesticides and
less water than conventional methods. We are committed to study,
share and facilitate the responsible use of biotechnology in addressing
development needs (Genoa Communique, para. 20).
The potential for agricultural biotechnology to make significant contributions
to both food security and environmental conservation was noted in a recent
article in Science by a team of scientists who emphasized the need for
productivity improvements to slow the rate of land use and land-cover change
as the demand for agricultural products increases (Tilman et al., 2001). On
the other hand, whether that potential can be realized given the current
incentive structure for agricultural research, which ensures that priority is
given to commercially attractive applications that may or may not have much
to do with food security, is open to serious question. In this area, as in
health research, 'money talks louder than need' in setting priorities for
scientific research (UNDP, 1999: 68-76), and productivity improvements in
the crops on which the world's poor depend seldom offer commercial returns
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industrial overfishing. Mauritania will receive US$426 million from the EU for
fishing rights from 2001 to 2006, but recent overfishing has already seriously
depleted fish stocks, and fish, 'the staple diet of coastal communities ... is no
longer available in some places' (Brown, 2002).
This behaviour by the EU and Japan also contradicts commitments made
by their environment ministers at the 1999 Schwerin meetings pfior to the
Cologne summit, which stated emphatically their 'grave concern at the
continuing threat to the oceans and seas and their biological diversity posed'
in part by 'unsustainable fishing practices' (Schwerin Communique", para. 23).
The hypocrisy of the EU is particularly glaring, given its moves to limit fishing
vessels within its own waters to protect stocks, and to commit almost US$600
million to compensate European fisherpeople affected by depleting fish stocks
and increased fishing restrictions (BRIDGES Trade News Weekly, 2002f: 12).
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sufficiently attractive to interest commercial investors. As the World Bank's
2003 World Development Report pointed out,
[gjenes are already available that could help food production in the
poorest countries if they were to be transferred into poor people's
crops. These include genes that improve tolerances to salt, aluminum
and manganese in soils; give plants greater resistance to insects, viruses,
bacteria, and fungi; enrich beta carotene to correct vitamin A
deficiency; create more nutritious oils, starches, and amino acids; and
improve fatty acid profiles and digestibility for animals.
Despite this promise for poor people, biotechnology in general and
transgenics research in particular have barely begun to be put to work
to address the problems of poor people.... This is partly because much
of the research supporting this technology is locked into patents held
by a small number of multinational, vertically integrated life-science
organizations, which have had little commercial interest in working
on crops with limited markets, or funding research for the needs of
poor producers (World Bank, 2003: 90-1).2
The World Bank, in turn, links this privatization of agricultural research
with the limited political support that can be mobilized for public sector
research in a time of low prices and - in the industrialized world - growing
agricultural surpluses.
A more fundamental question is that of whether food security should be
considered primarily an issue of resource scarcity (with the corollary being
that it can be 'solved' by improving agricultural productivity through, for
example, the diffusion of genetically modified crops) or resource distribution.
Amartya Sen's (1981,1982,1989) path-breaking work on the political economy
of famine showed that famines are not 'natural' phenomena, but rather that
access to nutrition and food security is directly related either to purchasing
power or to the availability of some other entitlement to food.3 On the one
hand, this may explain the absence of specific G8 commitments on the topic
- it could be argued that they are addressing the issues instead by way of
economic development and poverty reduction. On the other hand, both the
record of 'adjustment' policy as it has affected food security (e.g. see Walton
et al. 1994) and our own critical examination of recent G8 commitments in
the areas of macroeconomic growth and poverty reduction suggest that the
bleak prospect identified by the UNFAO earlier in this chapter may be the
best we can expect in the absence of fundamental policy shifts. One
participant in a recent effort to identify the 'top ten biotechnologies' in
terms of potential health benefits in developing countries commented that
'the basic problem of poverty-related diseases cannot be addressed by
providing supplements through genetically engineered food. The issue is
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how to have socio-economic equity and this cannot be solved through
biotechnology' (quoted in Daar etal., 2002:102). Ironically, issues of 'socio-
economic equity' were largely ignored in the report of this initiative.
The G8 in Genoa further claimed that they would
strive to provide consumers with relevant information on the safety
of food products, based on independent scientific advice, sound risk
analysis and the latest research developments. We believe an effective
framework for risk management, consistent with the science, is a key
component in maintaining consumer confidence and in fostering
public acceptance (Genoa Communique, para. 30).
In light of the cautions expressed by the UNDP and the World Bank, the
recurring emphasis on consumer information about food safety and on
'science-based, rules-based' regulatory approaches to food safety (Okinawa
Communique, para. 56) may be viewed less as an effort to improve food
security than as one to protect and increase market share for agricultural
producers and producers of agricultural inputs (such as genetically modified
crop varieties, and the herbicides they have been designed to resist) in some
industrialized countries (see Box 5.2, below). This impression is reinforced
by the notable absence of G8 commitments to strengthening public sector
agricultural research infrastructure or improving researchers' ability to address
the needs of the developing world.
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Box 5.2: The 'Beef-Hormone' Case
Consideration of a 'science-based, rules-based' system must begin from the
premise that no regulatory regime can be purely 'science-based': regulatory
regimes can be 'rules-based', but the rules must reflect the competing values
that can guide public policy under conditions of scientific uncertainty
(Schrecker, 2001; Walker, 1998). The contrasting interpretations of a
precautionary approach to food safety that emerged from the long-running
trade dispute between the EU and Canada and the United States over the issue
of hormone-treated beef (Walker, 1998; Skogstad, 2001; 304-6) are a case in
point. It is important, firstly, to recognize that the trade agreement in question
(on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, or SPS) is not a health agreement
(WTO, 1995). Its stated goal is to prevent the use of SPS as disguised barriers
to trade. Indeed, 'a government that abandoned all health regulations would
not be in violation of the SPS. Governments do not violate the SPS by permitting
exports unsafe for the foreign consumer' (Charnovitz, 2001: 2).
The SPS require that countries base their regulatory standards on a scientific
risk assessment. The WTO dispute panel rejected as inadequate the scientific
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arguments presented to them by the European Commission, specifically ruling
that the EC had failed to present an adequate risk assessment (Sullivan &
Shainblum, 2001; Charnovitz, 2001). Several aspects of both the SPS agreement
and the beef hormone case raised concerns within the health community.
Firstly, 'the SPS [agreement] subjects non-discriminatory domestic measures
to supervision whenever they affect trade' (Charnovitz, 2001: 1). It allows
exporting countries to challenge how national governments set their own
domestic standards.
Secondiy, these standards must be 'based on scientific principles' and cannot
be maintained 'without sufficient scientific evidence' (WTO, 1995: art. 2,2).
The EC bans the use of growth hormones in its domestic beef products, but
Canada and the US argued that this ban was not justified on scientific grounds.
The necessity test in the SPS is a 'risk assessment' (WTO, 1995, art. 5.1) and
challenges under the SPS have usually succeeded because the WTO dispute
panels and Appellate Body found that the challenged country had failed to
undertake an adequate risk assessment proving harm. But it is not clear how
the adequacy of such assessments should be adjudicated. For example, evidence
that hormones were 'safe' was based on the assumption that they would always
be used in accordance with 'good veterinary practice' (Charnovitz, 2001: 4);
did not include studies examining the synergistic effects of growth hormones
on naturally occurring hormones, or effects on infants or children more
susceptible to carcinogens (Caldwell, 1997); and apparently did not take into
account convincing conclusions by the International Agency for Research on
Cancer that exposure to several of the hormones at issue may cause human
cancer and/or have carcinogenic effects on laboratory animals (Charnovitz,
2001). Dispute panel and Appellate Body members are not scientists, yet are
in a position of making judgements on the adequacy of scientific study.
Thirdly, the burden of any error in an SPS dispute panel decision is borne
entirely by the affected importing country. The exporting country has nothing
to lose, if hormone-treated beef is found to harm human health, the affected
individuals and the EC bear the cost, not the producers or exporting country.
Fourthly, the Appellate Body in the beef-hormone dispute acknowledged
that the precautionary principle may be part of customary international law -
the position argued by the EC - but that the principle lacked authority in
health law (unlike environmental law) and that it 'had not been written into
the SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying a measure that otherwise violates
the SPS' (Charnovitz, 2001: 8), i.e. the precautionary principle may have no
bearing in an SPS dispute.
Article XX(b) of CATT permits exceptions to the general GATT rules 'necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health.'The question of when general
health exceptions (including the precautionary principle) are disguised forms
of protectionism lies at the heart of disputes under both CATT (art. XX(b))
and the SPS.
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Agricultural Exports and Food Security
As we have noted elsewhere, an underlying assumption in G8 development
policy is that open markets lead to the economic growth that, in turn, is a
means of reducing poverty and presumably enhancing food security. In
Genoa, the G8 affirmed its pledge about opening its own markets to products
from the LDCs, many of which are agricultural. These assumptions are even
more explicit in NEPAD, which envisions Africa as becoming 'a net exporter
of agricultural products' (para. 154). Trade and market access are taken up in
Chapter 7. Here we wish to raise a number of economic and distributional
concerns about agricultural export-led growth. We need also to underscore
that, insofar as environmental aspects of increased agricultural production
are concerned, the G8 have a longer history of deforestation, excess fertilizer
and pesticide use and water pollution than most developing nations (UNDP,
1999).
Such growth presumes, for example, that increased food or non-food (cash
crop) exports to developed countries will create sufficient income for
developing countries to pay for the increased food imports they will need to
offset any decline in domestic production. This is a classic liberalization
argument, but supported by little empirical evidence (Murphy, 1999); rather,
the costs of imported foods are often higher. Evidence also suggests that
agriculture-led growth performs poorly over the long term, when compared
to manufacturing-led growth, indicating that emphasis in poorer agricultural
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One important means of improving the odds that trade does not trump
public health in such cases is to reverse the burden of proof in all such disputes.
The onus should be on the disputing country to prove that the exception was
not intended to protect human or environmental health (GATT, art. XX(b)),
i.e. that its intent is protectionist; or, in the case of SPS, to provide risk
assessments indicating a product disallowed on health grounds in one country
is safe, or at least that reasonable study has been undertaken to show it does
not cause harm. This position was strongly cal led for by several hundred
representatives of NCOs invited by the Italian Prime Minister to a major
consultation prior to the 2001 Genoa summit-the first such major civil society
engagement by any G7 hosting count ry (see Final Report and
Recommendations from this consultation: http://www.gnginitiative.net/
gngreport.htm). Interestingly, this is also a position now supported by the
Government of Canada, which proposes guidelines for the precautionary
principle to include that, '[g]enerally, the responsibility for providing the
scientific information base (the burden of proof) should rest with the party
who is taking an action associated with potential orserious harm' (Government
of Canada, 2001). This was clearly not the case when Canada joined with the
US against the EU in the beef hormone dispute.
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countries should be placed on 'value-added' (food processing and packaging)
exports rather than raw food commodities (Gershman & Irwin, 2000). This
is recognized by NEPAD, which stresses the importance of 'value added in
agro-processing' (para. 153). This would require G8 countries to change their
current policies on tariff escalation, by which tariffs rise with the value added
to raw material imports (UNCTAD, 2002c: 37-8; IMF, 2002).
More generally, agricultural export-led development can have negative
effects on poverty and income distribution in poorer nations, including
reduced tax revenues for social development programs, such as health,
education and sanitation (Woodward, 1996). Relatively few agricultural
producers grow for the export market in developing countries, but these
producers often occupy a large portion of arable land. The majority are
subsistence producers or farmers who cultivate small land holdings and sell
on local markets. Price effects of agricultural liberalization, without 'special
and differential' treatment for domestic markets, can force many local
producers into poverty, and subsistence producers onto less desirable land
more readily degraded by farming.
A UNFAO study in 14 countries concluded that liberalization in the
agriculture sector has led, variously, to an increase in the food import bill, a
decline in local production of products facing competition from cheaper
imports, and a general trend towards consolidation of farms and displacement
of farm labour (Third World Network/UNDP, 2001: 8). Several developing
countries, even as they argue for a radical drop in agricultural subsidies and
tariffs in developed countries, are urging exemptions for themselves. This
apparent double standard is warranted on health, development and ecological
grounds. The economics of food production differ radically between rich
and poor nations, in terms of the number of citizens employed in food
production, the technological scale of such production, the size of the
production surplus or deficit for domestic consumption, and so on. Several
small exporter countries, for example, rely upon only one or two agricultural
products. Without phase-in protection, liberalized trade in agricultural prodcts
could seriously affect their domestic economies and food security.
This logic appears to have been accepted at the WTO, which, in the Doha
Declaration (WTO, 2001a) committed itself to 'reductions in, with a view to
phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support,'4 while at the same time recognizing the need
for 'special and differential treatment for developing countries ... including
food security.' Developing countries are urging creation of a 'development
box' under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in order to do so.
Negotiations on special and differential treatment for developing countries,
however, are proceeding very slowly at the WTO. The primary obstacle
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developing nations are facing is the reluctance by the US, Canada, Japan and
the EU members - the entire G7 membership - to regard these meetings of
the WTO Committee on Trade and Development as actual negotiating sessions,
which is how developing countries consider them and how the process was
laid out by the Doha Declaration and the WTO itself (BRIDGES Weekly Trade
News Digest, 2002a: 7). This negotiating stance on the part of the G7 calls into
question the seriousness of some of its more normative commitments on
globalization and, in the words of one LDC delegate, 'would contradict the
reasoning behind the whole special session exercise/ including their rhetoric
about this WTO Round comprising, in part, a 'development agenda.'
How will increased agricultural trade affect greenhouse gas emissions, water
shortage and contamination, or other global environmental issues; and how,
over time, might this affect domestic food security? This question is most
pressing for Africa, which has experienced serious soil erosion in the past
decade, with declining food security, and which is the only continent where
poverty rates are expected to rise over the next decade. Moreover, many of
the two-thirds of the global population projected to experience moderate to
high water stress by 2025 (UNEP, 1999), including many of the two billion
people projected to experience extreme water scarcity (Worldwatch Institute,
2001), will reside in the 25 African countries that are, or will be, experiencing
water scarcity (UNEP, 1999). Intensified agricultural production currently
intensifies water use, notwithstanding the potential for bioengineered crops
to be less thirsty. The potential negative water impact of intensified agricultural
production in Africa is heightened by the facts that irrigation for agriculture
currently accounts for 70 per cent of human water use, returning only 30-36
per cent for downstream use (UNDP et al., 2000: 54), and that sub-Saharan
Africa is presently the world's lowest regional user of irrigation, yet is still
projected to have serious water shortages in the next two decades. The
'environmental debts' of accumulated ecological degradation, which could
be enhanced by increased agriculture-led export growth, will soon outstrip
the costs of many African countries' already heavy financial debts (UNEP,
1999).5 Finally, we reiterate a caution raised in our Introduction that countries
with a high percentage of their GDP derived from only a few primary
commodities face a greater risk of conflict. As Chapter 9's discussion of NEPAD
notes in more detail, fully 20 of 50 African countries derive more than 30
per cent of their GDP from agricultural products.
None of this is either to argue against increased market access in G8
countries for agriculture products from LDCs, or to dismiss the potential
short-term gains these countries may enjoy through increased agricultural
exports. Our discussion does emphasize, however, the need for careful
planning of mitigating strategies for the negative externalities of increased
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exports on these countries; and for technical and development assistance
from the G8 towards that end.
Food Security: An Epilogue
The World Food Summit originally scheduled to take place in November
2001 was rescheduled for June 2002 following the terrorist attacks on the
United States. The declaration issued by the summit acknowledged that
progress toward the 2015 targets had been inadequate, and 'call[ed] upon the
concerned development partners to exert all necessary efforts to achieve the
international development goals of the Millennium Declaration, particularly,
those related to halving poverty and hunger by 2015' (UNFAO, 2002: Annex
I, para. 6). NGOs active on food security issues were strongly critical of the
lack of specific commitments to action (Mulvany, 2002; Rosset, 2002).
The United States came in for special criticism as the only country to
submit a 'reservation' with respect to the declaration's call for the UNFAO
Council to establish 'an Intergovernmental Working Group, with the
participation of stakeholders, in the context of the WFS follow-up, to elaborate,
in a period of two years, a set of voluntary guidelines to support Member
States' efforts to achieve the progressive realisation of the right to adequate
food in the context of national food security' (UNFAO, 2002: Annex I, para.
10). The basis of the US objection was that
the issue of adequate food can only be viewed in the context of the
right to a standard of living adequate for health and well-being, as set
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which includes
the opportunity to secure food, clothing, housing, medical care and
necessary social services. Further, the United States believes that the
attainment of the right to an adequate standard of living is a goal or
aspiration to be realized progressively that does not give rise to any
international obligation or any domestic legal entitlement, and does
not diminish the responsibilities of national governments towards their
citizens. Additionally, the United States understands the right of access
to food to mean the opportunity to secure food, and not guaranteed
entitlement (UNFAO, 2002: Annex II).
We are a long way from the situation in which any of the rights set out in the
Universal Declaration gives rise to a 'domestic legal entitlement.' Nevertheless,
US insistence on the language of 'opportunity' made one NGO commentator
wonder whether such an opportunity 'may be gained by purchasing lottery
tickets at the local convenience store' (Rosset, 2002).
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Summary: Chapter Five
The lack of explicit commitments, goals and strategies related to enhanced
food security, especially in the regions of the world where undernourishment
is most prevalent, is disturbing. And the fixation on biotechnology as a
panacea for food security issues neglects crucial issues of market power, the
direction of research priorities, and (potentially) environmental and consumer
safety. Parallels exist here with the G8 position on the role of information
and communications technology in development (see Box 4.2, Chapter 4).
Strategies of using agricultural exports as the driver of economic growth
similarly raise a number of complex (and unresolved) issues, requiring careful
research and policy monitoring, a point we take up in our concluding chapter.
Explicit or Specific Commitments: Nutrition, Food Security
and Biotechnology
• Strengthening and enhancing effectiveness of development assistance
to meet IDGs (Genoa).
• Support to agriculture as a "crucial instrument of ODA" (Genoa).
Accomplished: Uncertain - certainly not in a decisive fashion. Recent
national contributions to agriculture ODA have varied; there is a long-
term trend of decline.
Adequacy: The UNFAO estimates that at the current rate of progress it
will take 60 years to reach the goal of halving the number of under-
nourished people (not eliminating undernutrition).
Comments: The lack of more explicit commitments in the area of food
security is highly disturbing. The World Food Summit 2002 was
overshadowed by the attacks on the US. Food aid contributions may be
driven by domestic political considerations.
• Targeting of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia (Genoa).
Accomplished: This is difficult to assess; the continued high prevalence
of undernutrition suggests that the response has been inadequate to the
need.
Adequacy: Child malnutrition still highest in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Comments: It is unclear whether commitment refers to food aid or to
agricultural aid. Agricultural aid as a whole increased substantially for
the G7 as a group, although it declined in Canada and the UK and, for all
countries, is well below 1979/80 levels. Food aid increased only marginally
for the G7 as a group in 2001, but more substantially for Canada, Italy
and France.
113
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
Implicit or Generic Commitments: Nutrition, Food Security
and Biotechnology
• Promotion of agricultural biotechnology for increasing crop yields, food
security, public acceptance (Okinawa, Genoa).
Accomplished: Promotion is meeting with increased resistance within
the G7 countries, and in many developing countries.
Adequacy: There is a lack of clear measures to ensure that agricultural
biotechnology research is actually directed toward the needs of developing
countries.
Comments: There is controversy about the realism of anticipating a
biotechnology contribution to food security. The emphasis on public
acceptance seems to play down potential environmental and safety
hazards.
• Promoting agricultural (and other) exports as a route to poverty reduction,
increasing food security is part of the G8 development model, and explicit
in NEPAD (Okinawa, Cologne, NEPAD).
Accomplished: Historically, yes in some cases, but sometimes with
disastrous results (e.g. Box 5.1).
Adequacy: Questions arise in several areas: domestic income distribution
issues, diversion of resources, productive capacity to serve export markets,
and environmental impacts.
Comments: WTO negotiations are in progress on 'development box'
under Agreement on Agriculture.
Endnotes to Chapter Five
1 The WHO'S World Health Report 2002(WHO, 2002b: chap. 4) estimates that undernutrition
contributes 16.8 per cent to the total global burden of disease, as measured by DALYs (see
Chapter 3). However, this estimate includes only the effects of maternal and childhood
undernutrition, and of a limited number of specific nutrient deficiencies; it therefore may not
reflect the contribution of adult undernutrition to ill health throughout the life course.
2 At least one of the examples of potentially beneficial applications of biotechnology, beta-carotene-
enriched rice ('golden rice') as a remedy for vitamin A deficiency, has been harshly criticized by
some observers: e.g. see Crouch (2001). It seems likely that, even if it were widely and
inexpensively available, this crop would function as a complement to other interventions (Dawe
eta/., 2002).
3 This generic point, which has been made by a variety of other authors as well (e.g. George,
1984), must be distinguished from a more historically specific, and contentious, claim on Sen's
part about the role of 'democracy' in preventing famine.
4 This section of the Doha Declaration is undermined by the recently announced US$180 billion
in domestic agricultural subsidies. US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick subsequently proposed
global reductions of US$100 billion in such subsidies, including reducing US subsidies by 50 per
cent (BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 2002f: 2). This is a common ploy by wealthier countries
in the WTO. Before agreeing to reduce trade-distorting tariffs or subsidies in sectors important
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to their own economies, they first dramatically raise them. A group of Canadian NCOs working
on food security issues argue that the persistence of such subsidies should allow developing
countries to use strong countervailing measures (tariffs) 'on agricultural imports that are sold at
less than the cost of domestic production' (Clark & Fried, 2003: 2).
5 Another set of case studies projected the impacts of liberalization in the agriculture sector for
the Mediterranean basin (Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development, 2001). The
studies found that effects on traditional farming sectors (cereals and livestock) would be
substantial and largely negative, with increased poverty and rural depopulation, as well as loss
of biodiversity and landscape deterioration. Economic benefits would accrue to the export sector
(primarily fruit and vegetables), but not without incurring negative environmental externalities
such as increased pressure on water resources and increased pollution. The lower income from
agricultural products will be hardest for the majority of small producers, which could increase
pressure on marginal land to offset lower income with negative biodiversity and other
environmental results. Socially, there would be increased risk of loss of social cohesion in the
rural areas and of rural migration, which could worsen the environmental and social problems
in towns along the coastline.
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Official Development Assistance
[Development] cooperation is not a thing of the past, but it is not a
thing of the present either, because there exists neither unequivocal
development nor a strong desire for international cooperation (Pronk,
2000: 40).
Introduction
Official, or overseas, development assistance, often referred to as 'foreign
aid/ is one of the older and more evident forms of international cooperation
by which wealthier countries assist the development of poorer ones. ODA
consists of transfers from industrialized country governments to governments
and other institutions in the developing world. As the last three chapters
argued, this assistance can be very important for the development of health,
education, water, sanitation and other services and sectors essential to health.
Contemporary forms of ODA date from the 1950s, when they emerged as
part of the post-war economic reconstruction initiative that began with the
Marshall Plan. By 1969, a UN commission (the Pearson Commission)
recommended that industrialized countries acknowledge an obligation to
improve economic conditions elsewhere in the world by committing 0.7 per
cent of their GDP to ODA.1 As we shall see, few countries have achieved this
target, and ODA is sometimes provided with motivations that are far from
altruistic.
ODA can be provided either as a grant or as a loan, but in order to be
considered ODA in standard statistics, a loan must be 'concessional' - in
other words, it must involve lower interest rates or more flexible repayment
terms than would be available on the commercial market.2 The industrialized
countries provide aid both bilaterally and multilaterally. Bilateral aid involves
a direct transfer to governments or other institutions in the developing world,
through an agency like the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) or the UK
Department of Foreign and International Development (DFID). Multilateral
aid is provided by way of a country's contribution to such institutions as the
World Bank, the regional development banks and UN agencies. It should be
noted that the World Bank provides both 'soft' or concessional and 'hard' or non-




Various estimates of the cost of meeting key development objectives in
such areas as health and education have been cited in earlier chapters. A
more comprehensive estimate prepared for the World Bank puts the cost of
achieving the first seven Millennium Development Goals (see Table 2.1 in
Chapter 2) at approximately US$40-70 billion per year (Devarajan et al, 2002).
The authors arrived at these figures using two distinct methods. Firstly, they
estimated the additional amount of ODA that would be needed to raise growth
rates by enough to meet the target of a 50 per cent reduction in the number
of people living on US$1 a day or less by the year 2015. The presumption
behind this approach was that 'the additional amount of ODA needed to
achieve the poverty goal will finance, inter alia, the effort to achieve the
social and environmental goals,' although this would not in fact necessarily
or always be the case (Devarajan et al., 2002: 16). Secondly, they estimated
the direct costs that would be incurred to meet the targets in the areas of
education, health and environment, but not the poverty reduction goals.
The rationale was that progress in education, health and the environment
has substantial benefits in terms of economic growth, and therefore of poverty
reduction, although it is not possible to determine whether these benefits
would in fact be sufficient to meet the poverty reduction target. The authors
emphasized that 'these estimates are extremely crude, and based on a host of
heroic assumptions/ and further, that financial assistance amounting to
approximately a doubling of current ODA flows is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for meeting the goals (Devarajan et al., 2002: 30). The
scale of the new annual investments needed nevertheless provides a basis for
comparison with the anticipated annual increase in US military expenditures
of US$48 billion in 2002 (Borger, 2002). This comparison is not specious,
since disease and poverty are increasingly becoming global security threats.
Essential to any discussion of ODA is the realization that in most developing
countries, growth achieved through domestic macroeconomic policy change,
even on the most optimistic projections, will provide neither adequate
opportunities for poverty reduction nor a tax base sufficient to support
essential public sector investments in such areas as education, nutrition and
health systems from domestic sources. As Enge (2002: 13) writes of just one
country: 'Uganda ... has had a "model policy environment" for poverty
reduction in the eyes of many donors, but with only modest growth levels
and current rates of ODA receipts ... will face a poverty funding gap of
[US]$660 million after five years and [US]$190 million after ten years.'
This point is underscored in the NEPAD, which states that 'while growth
rates are important, they are not themselves sufficient to enable African
countries to achieve the goal of poverty reduction,' which requires, inter
alia, 'human capital ... health, and good stewardship of the environment'
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(NEPAD, para. 64). With respect to health, NEPAD notes that it is essential
that 'donors... ensure that support for the continent is increased by at least
[US] $10 billion per annum' (NEPAD, para. 124).3In other words, substantially
increased and sustained donor aid targeted to health, education and sanitation
will be required.
Trends in G8 Official Development Assistance
In Agenda 21, the document that emerged from the UN Conference on
Environment and Development in 1992, the developed countries -including,
of course, the G8 - 'reaffirmed] their commitments to reach the accepted
United Nations target of 0.7 percent of GDP for ODA/ first proposed in 1969,
and 'to augment their aid programmes in order to reach that target as soon
as possible and to ensure a prompt and effective implementation of Agenda
21' (UN, 1992, Ch. 33). Recent summits have been notably silent on the 0.7
per cent target: the Genoa and Okinawa summit communiques emphasized
improving the effectiveness of aid, rather than increasing the quantity:
We will work with developing countries to meet the International
Development Goals, by strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness
of our development assistance (Genoa Communique, para. 14;
emphasis added).
ODA is essential in the fight against poverty. We commit ourselves
to strengthening the effectiveness of our ODA in support of countries'
own efforts to tackle poverty, including through national strategies
for poverty reduction (Okinawa Communique, para. 20; emphasis
added).
This marks a retreat from the earlier Cologne summit, in which G8 countries
committed themselves to improving both quality and quantity of ODA: 'We
will strive gradually to increase the volume of official development assistance
(ODA), and to put special emphasis on countries best positioned to use it
effectively' (Cologne Communique, para. 29; emphasis added).
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Box 6.1: The G8 and the Multilateral Development Banks
An increasing portion of C8 development assistance is directed through World
Bank loans and grants - in some cases, in the form of debt relief under the
Enhanced HiPC Initiative discussed in Chapter 2. Summit communiques
periodically refer to the World Bank and IMF, generally following on decisions
made by C8 finance ministers in their meetings held prior to the summit itself.
In Okinawa, for example, the C8 declared that
Official Development Assistance
[t]he core role of the MDBs [multilateral development banks, i.e. the
World Bank and regional development banks] should be accelerating
poverty reduction in developing countries while improving the efficiency
of assistance and avoiding competition with private financial flows.
The MDBs should increase their resources devoted to core social
investments such as basic health and education, clean water and
sanitation (Okinawa Communique, paras. 9-10).
In 1999, regional development banks financed no expenditures on basic health;
in 2000, basic health accounted for 3.0 per cent of their budgets, but the figure
dropped again to zero in 2001. The figures for the World Bank are, respectively,
0.1 per cent, 1.9 per cent and 1.8 percent - hardly a massive infusion of new
investment. Basic education fared little better. Regional development banks,
from a base of 0.1 per cent in 1999, increased assistance slowly to 0.8 percent in
2000 and 1.4 per cent in 2001. World Bank figures for the same years were 1.3
per cent, 1.5 per cent and 1.3 per cent - not indicative of the new investments
called for by the Okinawa Communique", Water and sanitation, a higher aid
priority for both G7 and multilateral donors, actually declinedas a proportion
of regional development bank assistance, from 7,3 per cent (1999) to 7.0 per
cent (2000) and 3.8 percent (2001). The World Bank did slightly better, showing
a positive growth from 2.4 per cent (1999) to 4.0 per cent (2000) and 4.6 per
cent (2001) (all figures from OECD, 2001; 2002b; 2003: Table 19). In sum, there
is no compelling evidence that the MDSs heeded the advice of the G7, which,
given the dominance of the C7 in these banks' decision-making, gives cause to
question the seriousness of this commitment.
A year later, when the C8 called on MDBs 'to provide support for global
public goods' (see Chapter 3), they included amongst these 'fostering financial
stability' (Genoa Statement, para. 13). Yet, as Box 2.4 in Chapter 2 noted, such
stability is undermined by the very private financial flows the G8 is encouraging
the MDBs to promote. Moreover, the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
of the World Bank is actively promoting private investment in health services,
ignoring evidence that this erodes access by the poor.
TheGS in Genoa also committed themselves to'a meaningful replenishment
of IDA and, in that context, we will explore the increased use of grants for
priority social investments, such as education and health' (Genoa Statement,
para.13). (The IDA is the World Bank section that provides funding for
developing countries.) This repeats an even earlier pledge made in Cologne,
where the C8 agreed 'to increase the share of grant-based financing in the
ODA we provide to the least developed countries' (Cologne Communique,
para. 27). Both commitments were partly fulfilled during the G7 finance
ministers' meeting in Halifax, Canada, prior to the Kananaskis summit, which
led to replenishment of the IDA with US$22 billion, and an agreement to
'increase ... the use of grants, in the range of 18 per cent to 21 per cent ... to
enhance the effectiveness of IDA in helping the poorest and debt vulnerable
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In fact, none of the G7 countries approaches the 0.7 per cent target -and, in
contrast to the performance of some industrialized countries outside the G7,
the trend has been one of declining G7 commitments to ODA over the past
15 years, during the very period of globalization that has produced, for those
countries, unprecedented prosperity (see Figure 6.1, below). If we compress
our comparisons to just the last two years for which, at this time, there are
good data (2000 and 2001), two of the G7 actually saw their ODA drop (a
failing grade on the 1999 Cologne commitment), with Italian and US levels
of ODA showing small increases (from the lowest levels among the G7) and
France, Germany and the UK remaining unchanged (OECD, 2003: Table 6a).
Figure 6.1: Total ODA as % of GNI, 1984-85 (average), 2000-01
Source: OECD (2002b: Table 4); OECD (2003: Table 4)
Estimates of 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
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countries combat HIV/AIDS, support the social sectors, including education, and
overcome the effects of devastating conflict' (C7 Finance Ministers, 2002). The
grant portion, however, was a disappointment to many development NGOs.
The US had been urging a grants ratio of at least SO per cent, to prevent putting
developing nations further in debt. The European nations preferred retaining
loans (which, for most African countries, bear no interest) in order to keep trie
fund replenished (Foot, 2002), The United States' generosity may reflect its low
contribution to development assistance (both bilateral and multilateral), relative
to CN1, in comparison to European G7 members (particularly the UK, France
and Germany); in theory, at least, the US has more fiscal space to continue
replenishing the IDA.
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This trend is not simply a product of growth in national economies that
outstripped growing, or at least constant, contributions to ODA in real dollar
terms (i.e. in dollars adjusted for inflation). Figure 6.2, below, shows that for
five of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the US), ODA relative to
the size of the country's national economy declined in real dollar terms
between 1993 and 2001. Japan's 2001 contribution remained essentially
unchanged from its 1993 amount. Only the UK showed any signs of sharing
more of the enormous amount of wealth created during the 1990s. As a group,
the G7 improved over its 1997 average, but was still below its 1990 and 1994
averages.
If the G7 had met the target of spending 0.7 per cent of GNI on ODA - as
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway and Luxembourg have done, so
the target is not inherently implausible -the effect would have been to make
an additional US$109 billion per year available in 2001 for improving the
conditions of life outside the industrialized world. If this commitment were
sustained, it might then be possible, given appropriate policy commitments
and implementation capacity on the part of recipient countries, either to go
beyond or to accelerate progress toward the MDGs. Based on ODA expenditures
in the year 2001, the 0.7 per cent target would mean an annual increase in
ODA expenditures of US$215 per resident of the United States, or US$104
per resident of Canada. The per capita value of such an annual increase
corresponds to roughly a Big Mac per week in Canada, or just over 1.5 Big
Macs per week in the United States, whose ODA expenditures are smallest
among the G7 as a percentage of GNI (see Table 6.1).
Figure 6.2: Trends in Total ODA, 1993-2001, at 2000 Prices and Exchange Rates
(US$ millions)
Source: OECD (2003: Table 8)
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The trend to proportional declines in G7 ODA commitments becomes clearer
in Figure 6.3, which takes into account inflation and changes in exchange
rates.
Figure 6.3: % Change in Total ODA, 1993-2001, at 2000 Prices and Exchange
Rates
Source: OECD (2003: Table 8)
This level of added public expenditure is hardly an excessive expectation, in
view of the buoyant economies of those countries over the last several years.
As Sachs (2000: 1) has stated the issue in the US context, using figures from
a few years ago,
[i]n 1998, the United States foreign assistance totaled around [US]$8.8
billion, or 0.12 of one percent of the Gross National Product. And of
this derisory sum, only around one-sixth went to the least developed
countries. A sixth of twelve-hundredths of one-percent of GDP
amounted to the grand total of around [US]$4.95 per American in
1998 for the world's least developed countries. This is [US]$4.95 per
year in a country where the average income is more than [US] $30,000,
and where investors have enjoyed more than [US] $7 trillion in capital
gains since the start of 1996.
We make the Big Mac comparison with some hesitation, because it runs the
risk of trivializing the very real levels of relative poverty, and even hunger
(Schwartz-Nobel, 2002; Webber, 1992), that coexist with the myth of universal
affluence in those countries. Nevertheless, just as it is very much within the
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capacity of those countries to address this problem domestically, so it is
within their capacity to finance a commitment to improving human welfare
outside their borders that is very modest in the global frame of reference.
Since the 2001 G8 summit, some countries have announced significant
commitments to increasing their ODA budgets. In February 2002, the EU
member countries agreed to increase their ODA spending from an average of
0.33 per cent of GNP to 0.39 per cent by 2006, which will make an extra US$ 7
billion per year available by 2006, if the commitments are implemented. At the
International Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey,
Mexico, the following month, Finland, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway,
Switzerland, the Netherlands and Sweden all announced plans to increase their
ODA budgets. None of these, however, is a G7 country -and all these countries
now spend as much as or more than any of the G7 on ODA, relative to the size
of their economies (OECD, 2003: Table 4).
Only two G7 countries made commitments to increased aid at Monterrey. The US
commitment, although substantial (an increase from US$ 10 billion to US$ 15 billion
per year by 2006), must be weighed against the current US level of ODA (the lowest
in the G7), the uncertainty of implementation, and the worrisome proviso that
aid will be conditional on 'sound economic policies that foster enterprise and
entrepreneurship, including more open markets and sustainable budget policies.'
Canada announced that ODA budgets would increase by eight per cent a year in
the coming years, with half of that growth going to Africa. Included in the African
portion is a specific C$500 million fund in support of the Africa Action Plan
that was later announced at the 2002 G8 summit (UN, 2002b: paras. 5-14).
In addition to declining commitments to overall ODA on the part of the G7,
at least until 2002, four more specific trends are surprising and disappointing.
Firstly, the limited nature of debt relief has meant that much ODA in fact
flows to debt repayment. In 1995, 'around one quarter of bilateral aid was
being used to repay multilateral lenders. And for World Bank aid the position
was even worse. In 1993-94, out of every [US] $3 that the World Bank offered
as International Development Association (IDA) loans and grants, it reclaimed
[US] $2 as debt repayment. Of the remaining dollar, the IMF pocketed part'
(UNRISD, 2000: 27) (see Box 6.2, below). UNCTAD (2000:123-6) points out
that throughout the 1990s, the amount of ODA received by a developing
country was directly related to the country's level of external debt. To provide
one example of how this shell game works, the C$1.1 billion in debt owed by
HIPC countries to its Export Development Corporation and Wheat Board
that Canada has committed to cancelling (see Chapter 2) will, as countries
become eligible for its cancellation over the next two to three years, be
counted as part of its ODA contribution (CCIC Africa-Canada Forum, 2002).
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Source: OECD (2003: Tables 4, 19 & 37), except Big Macs/capita calculation,
based on national cost figures (for the Big Mac) from The Economist (2001)





Averaged over the next three years, this will raise Canada's ODA contribution
by over 20 per cent, without Canada's actually contributing any new money
to development assistance (based on calculations from OECD, 2002b: Table
14): Canada will simply be contributing to the repayment of debts owed to
Canadians. This problem is not, of course, restricted to ODA offered by Canada
or other G7 countries, but it will persist in future in the absence of more
comprehensive G8 leadership on the debt question.
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Box 6.2: Canada's 'Fund for Africa'
As host of the C8 Kananaskis summit, Canada was 'first out of the gate' with a
series of new initiatives for Africa's health and development. Indeed, its C$500
million 'Canada Fund for Africa' was the only substantial new commitment to
the continent made in connection with the summit. An important reversal of
the past decade, the fund nonetheless represents less than one-third of the
C$1.6 billion in aid that might have gone to sub-Saharan African countries
over the past decade, had Canada's ODA to this region remained at its 1990
level rather than experiencing its precipitous decline (CCIC, 2002). Moreover,
there are several concerns raised about how the fund will be expended. An
analysis of the fund undertaken by the Canadian Council for International
Cooperation (CCIC), the umbrella organization of Canadian-based development
NGOs, reports the following:
* C$100 million will go to private sector partnerships focusing on water,
transport, pipelines and energy infrastructure.
An additional C$50 million will go to water and sanitation projects through
the 'Global Water Partnership/ comprising the World Bank, bilateral donors,
private water companies and some NGOs which have a pro-privatization
orientation.
Serious questions have been raised by researchers and by civil society
organizations over the ability of such partnerships to provide such health
essentials as water and energy in ways that are affordable to the poor.
Although results are not always negative, policies aimed at encouraging
private investment in such services in Africa (Fiil-Flynn, 2001; McDonald,
2002; McDonald & Smith, 2002; Mngxitama & Eveleth, 2003; Tanoh &
Cusack, 2003) and elsewhere (Herrera, 2003; Kruse & Ramos, 2003; Loftus
& McDonald, 2001; Sangaralingam & Raman, 2003; Yep eta/., 2003) have
generally resulted in higher prices and reduced access for the poor.
Sometimes, as in the case of a cholera epidemic in South Africa (McDonald,
2002), the results have been immediately destructive for human health -
with over 250 000 people infected and 300 fatalities (Centre for Public
Integrity, 2003b: 1) - as well as adding to the general accumulation of
poverty-related stressors and vulnerabilities.
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Secondly, as previous chapters have shown, only a small proportion of G7
ODA is directed toward health or toward the crucial health-related areas of
basic education, water and sanitation. Table 6.1, above, summarizes G7 ODA
for these three purposes in 2001; these figures should be viewed with the
caveat that the proportion of an individual country's ODA spending on any
one of these areas can vary substantially from year to year. There are some
signs of increased emphasis on these crucial areas as a matter of national
policy. For example, Canada is planning to increase its aid to basic health,
education and nutrition, and to HIV/AIDS (Tomlinson, 2002), and the US is
making global health one of its four main foci for future development
assistance (Woods, 2002). There is considerable concern among development
NGOs, however, that increased aid for HIV/AIDS will represent displaced rather
than new assistance, coming at the expense of other programs (such as
education, health infrastructure and water/sanitation) that are also very
important.
Thirdly, a substantial proportion of bilateral aid continues to consist of
'tied aid' (OECD, 2002b: 245) (see Figure 6.4, below). Tying' of aid represents
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" C$20 million wilt go to build trade capacity for export-oriented growth.
This is consistent with the G8's and NEPAD's endorsements of neo-!iberal
economic theories of growth through increased trade liberalization. As our
next chapter on trade and market access discusses, there are many empirical
reservations about an export-oriented growth strategy, ranging from reliance
on primary commodities (rather than manufactured products) to the lack
of sufficiently strong 'special and differential' treatment (trade rule
exemptions) for poorer countries to protect their domestic markets from
foreign competition subsequent to liberalization. Many developed countries,
however, have been reluctant to proceed with WTO negotiations on this topic
(BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 2002e). Canada's draft 2003
negotiating strategy at the WTO explicitly states it will not support extending
special and differential treatment for developing countries in any legally
binding way, as this will allegedly create a 'two-tiered system [to which]
developed countries are strongly opposed' (Government of Canada, 2002,
para. 59). Vet there is growing consensus among development economists
that, without a two-tiered system, poorer nations will not be able to develop
internal economies in ways that will support the health of their populations,
be stable over the long term or ensure the environmentally sustainable use
of their natural resources (e.g. UNCTAD, 2002c).
" C$28 million will strengthen the African public sector, but in areas that
'support ... opening African economies to foreign direct investment and
trade liberalization' (CC1C, 2002: 3). Only C$18 million will be devoted to
strengthening governance and civil society engagement for participation in
development strategies.r
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a specific form of conditionality: the recipient country must agree to use the
aid for specified purposes, usually involving purchases of goods and services
from the donor country.
Italy has the highest tying rate and it increased in 2001. Canada offered 68
per cent of its ODA (excluding technical cooperation and administrative costs)
on a tied basis in 2001, although its record is improving marginally. Japan,
Germany and the UK have very low rates of tied aid, although Japan's tied
portion, like Italy's and Germany's, is going in the wrong direction.
A substantial proportion of ODA -more than 30 per cent of all Canada's
bilateral aid, 58 per cent of the United States' and 61 per cent of Germany's
(OECD, 2003: Table 13) -is provided in the form of technical cooperation
grants. These may involve payments to people from developing countries
receiving training at home or abroad, or payments to industrialized country
service providers, such as consulting and engineering firms. On a regional
basis, more than 50 per cent of UK aid to South Africa, Kenya, Nepal and
Pakistan (Vasquez, 2002) and more than 50 per cent of German aid to African
countries (Dederichs-Bain, 2002) is accounted for by technical cooperation.
Such aid is often tied, arguably with the effect of distorting recipient
country priorities, as illustrated in the following example:
The former Minister of Finance of Mozambique, Abdul Magid Osman,
for example, recalled at a recent UNDP roundtable that he had declined
[for budgetary reasons] a provincial governor's request for US$50,000
for 100 additional primary teachers, only to see an expatriate consultant
hired for US$150,000, paid out of a technical cooperation budget (Enge,
2002: 15; citation omitted).
However, we cannot assume for purposes of calculation that technical
cooperation grants are invariably tied, thus making precise calculation of
the percentage of formally tied aid impossible.
The relation between ODA and levels of external indebtedness suggests a
more subtle respect in which the proportion of aid that is tied may be
understated by the OECD figures. A quarter of developing countries' long-
term external debt is owed to export credit agencies (EGAs) in industrialized
countries (World Bank, 2002e: 107), which exist solely to promote their
countries' exports. It may be that a substantial proportion of ODA that is not
formally tied is nevertheless offered in order to facilitate repayment of these
debts, owed to agencies whose purpose and function are strictly commercial.
After protracted negotiation, in April 2001, the members of the OECD
Development Assistance Committee reached an agreement on untying aid
to the LDCs, as classified by UNCTAD. At the 2001 summit, the G8
'commitfed] [them]selves to implement the landmark OECD-DAC
Recommendation on Untying Aid to LDCs' (Genoa Communique, para. 14).
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Figure 6.4: % of Bilateral Aid by Tying Status, 1999-2001
Source: OECD (2001 c: Table 23); OECD (2002b: Table 23); OECD (2003: Table 23)
Data on US not provided.
However, at least two factors limit the significance of this achievement. Firstly
it applies only to the LDCs, which are not in fact the largest recipients of
ODA. Secondly not all forms of aid are untied under the terms of the
agreement: food aid and investment-related technical cooperation can remain
tied (OECD, 2002a: 42-3). Individual countries may take steps beyond those
called for by the DAC agreement: Canada, for example, is now 'untying' its
technical cooperation aid to all LDCs and sub-Saharan Africa countries,
allowing individuals or organizations from those countries to bid on technical
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cooperation proposals (CIDA, 2002a). Nevertheless, the DAC agreement on
untying aid, while a substantial accomplishment, remains only a start on the
much larger task of decoupling ODA from donor country economic interests
and adapting aid to the real requirements of recipient countries.
Finally, and including an imputed share of multilateral aid, G7 aid to those
countries in direst need - the LDCs - declined over the past decade for all
members, with the exception of the UK: Canada's drop was particularly steep
(see Figure 6.5, below). This decline contradicts the G8's Cologne
commitment 'to working with [developing countries], especially with the
poorest countries, to eradicate poverty, launch effective policies for sustainable
development and develop their capacity to integrate better into the global
economy' (Cologne Communique, para. 27), with its implied increase in
development assistance. The UK, and to a lesser extent France, however, helped
raise the group average in 2000 and 2001 slightly above its 1999 rates. It is
worth recalling that the 1990s were a decade of unprecedented wealth
accumulation in most G7 countries. Aid to LDCs as a percentage of GNI (see
Figure 6.6, below) portrays an even less generous spirit.
Figure 6.5: Aid from G7 Countries to LDCs as % of Total ODA
Source: OECD (2002b: Tables 4 & 31); OECD (2003: Tables 4 & 31)
Estimates of 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
Figure 6.6: Aid from G7 Countries to LDCs as % of GNI
Source: OECD (2002b: Table 31); OECD (2003: Table 31)
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Aid to LDCs has declined, with a corresponding increase in aid to low- and
lower-middle-income nations. Where this leaves Africa, and particularly sub-
Saharan Africa, is more obvious in Figure 6.7, below. While France, Italy and
the UK still give a large percentage of their total aid to sub-Saharan Africa,
only the US has increased targeting of sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade,
though it is still below 1994-95 levels. The US, like Japan, also starts from a
very low percentile. (Japan's low rate is partly explained by its geographic
emphasis on Asia, where South Asian needs are also very great.) The UK
marginally improved over the past five years. Italy's improvement was greater,
but from a much lower total ODA rate (only 0.13 per cent of GNI).
Individually, in terms of bilateral aid, the G7 countries show considerable
variance (see Figure 6.8, below).
Figure 6.7: Trends in G7 Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa as % of Total Aid
Source: OECD (2002b: Table 28); OECD (2003: Table 28)
Estimates of 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
Reported as fiscal years (e.g. 1989-90) rather than calendar years (e.g. 1990).
Canada shows a sharp decline. Of the top ten recipients of UK bilateral aid,
seven are from Africa and five of these are LDCs (German & Randel, 2002:
243). France does almost as well, with six of its top ten recipient counties in
sub-Saharan Africa. Germany, surprisingly, shows a rapid drop, while Japan,
despite its emphasis on LDCs in Asia, added one sub-Saharan African country
to its list of top ten recipients in 2000. The US gives little bilateral aid to sub-
Saharan African countries: most of its sub-Saharan African contributions
come through support to multilateral donors, i.e. the World Bank.
In the context of overall declining rates of ODA from the G7, and shifts
away from sub-Saharan Africa, it is not surprising that net aid receipts by
sub-Saharan Africa fell sharply over the last decade (see Figure 6.10, below).
Sub-Saharan Africa is still receiving the largest regional portion of aid (see
Figure 6.9, below), but the overall trend is for ODA to go increasingly to
other regions, especially Asia and Oceania (home of Asian Tigers'), Europe
(the Balkan republics) and Latin America and the Caribbean. (Data do not
permit calculation of regional ODA for G7 countries only.)
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Figure 6.8: Number of Sub-Saharan African Countries in Top 10 Recipients of
Bilateral Assistance
Source: OECD (2002b: Table 32); OECD (2003: Table 32)
Reported as fiscal years (e.g. 1989-90) rather than calendar years (e.g. 1990).
Figure 6.9: Trends in Regional Distribution of ODA from All Donors (%)
Source: OECD (2003: Table 27)
Reported as fiscal years (e.g. 1990-91) rather than calendar years (e.g. 1991).
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In constant 1998 dollars, total aid to sub-Saharan Africa from G7 countries
alone fell 18.8 per cent between 1988 and 1999 (CCIC Africa-Canada Forum,
2002: 3), and has only just begun to rise again. Had Canada maintained its
ODA to sub-Saharan Africa at its 1990 level, for example, it would have meant
C$1.6 billion more to the region over the decade -over three times its multi-
year C$500 'Plan for Africa' announced with much fanfare just prior to the
Kananaskis summit (CCIC Africa-Canada Forum, 2002).
Figure 6.10: Trends in G7 Total ODA Disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa
Source: OECD (2003: Table 30)
ODA in the Near Future
The near future of increased ODA from the G7 to LDCs, particularly in Africa,
appears almost as dismal as the recent past. True, there are hopeful signs.
Four of the G7 (France, Italy, the UK and the US) increased aid levels in 2001
over 2000 amounts, but contributions declined for the other three Qapan,
Canada and Germany) (see Table 6.2, below). More importantly, for the Group
of 7 (and summits are supposed to enhance group behaviour), aid levels
dropped by over five per cent, largely a result of the dramatic decline in
Japan's contribution. The Monterrey commitments will significantly boost
development assistance once fully implemented. ODA rates, however, will
still be below G7 averages from the late 1980s and well under the 0.7 per cent
of GNI benchmark urged, once again, by the UN report on high-level financing
for development that was prepared in advance of the Monterrey meeting in
the first place (UN, 2001: 8).
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Source: OECD (2003: Tables 4 & 6a)
* Includes bilateral and multilateral.
** In US$ at current prices and exchange rates.
The Politics of Aid
Despite the need for ODA, and its potential value, the development community
(NGOs, academics, civil society groups) in both donor and recipient countries
has sometimes questioned whether the various conditions associated with it
do more long-term harm than good to poor countries. During the 1960s and
1970s, many developing countries receiving ODA also showed positive changes
in key social indicators. It can be argued that these were also decades during
which some recipient countries were allowed relatively more autonomy in
how they chose to pursue development (Enge, 2002). With the collapse of the
real or imagined Soviet threat to market capitalism, globalization has supplanted
internationalism. The development discourse, first reflected in the structural
adjustment policies of the IFIs and more recently by the trade agreements of
the WTO, is now about adapting developing nations to the needs of the
integrated global marketplace (Dallaire, 2001). This shift in emphasis is
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increasingly evident in the policy commitments of the G8: less is going to
those in greatest need. A more general problem arises from the fact that ODA,
whether offered directly or as taxpayer-financed debt relief, is unlike almost
any other item of government expenditure in that it lacks a domestic political
clientele, apart from the politically favoured beneficiaries of tied aid. A report
prepared for the World Bank, with specific reference to Africa, observes that
'[d]onors have apparently not used recipient governments' revealed
commitment to tackling poverty as a basis for country aid allocations.
Econometric analysis of aid shows that "donor interest variables" capturing
commercial and political considerations are a major determining factor for
bilateral aid allocations' (White & Killick, 2001:118).
Box 6.3, below, briefly describes a case in which such variables arguably
outweighed the reasonable belief that recipient governments should give
priority to the basic needs of their citizens. Such examples, when repeated
over time, have the pernicious effect of creating 'donor fatigue' even among
people in the industrialized world who are inclined to favour increases in
development assistance. The World Bank has suggested that
some of the disaffection with the impact of aid on poverty reduction
does not reflect the intrinsic ineffectiveness of aid, but rather the large
share of aid that is allocated on the basis of 'strategic' criteria, instead
of on the basis of the quality of policies and the number of poor. In
this context, the end of the Cold War may have improved the
opportunities for allocating aid according to poverty alleviation rather
than to strategic criteria (World Bank, 2002e: 95).
If so, then the case described in Box 6.3 exemplifies a remarkable failure of
leadership on the part of the G8 as a whole with respect to this opportunity.
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Box 6.3: Aircraft, Air Traffic Control and Basic Needs
Early in 2002, a split within the British cabinet revealed some of the politics of
development assistance and donor country interests, especially when those
interests involve exporters of military hardware. Although a recipient of debt
relief under HIPC, the Tanzanian government had agreed to purchase a £28
million military air traffic control system from Britain's BAE Systems, one of
the world's largest defence contractors. BAE Systems actively lobbied for the
granting of an export licence for the system, citing the need to preserve 250
jobs in Britain, but International Development Secretary Clare Short publicly
opposed the deal. So did the World Bank, which argued that far less expensive
systems would be adequate for Tanzania's civilian needs. Further complicating
the matter, the purchase was financed by a low-interest loan from Barclays
Bank, after the bank had 'been granted a lucrative banking licence to operate
Official Development Assistance
Summary: Chapter Six
Despite the political problems with ODA, massive infusions of funds are
needed in developing, and especially least developed, countries. ODA, untied,
with few or appropriate conditions, targeted on the basis of social need and
capacity-building, is one vehicle for this infusion. Several G7 countries failed
completely in their commitment to increase development assistance (over
the years 1999-2001); and where increases have been forthcoming or have
been announced, they remain incommensurate with the need, perhaps
especially for sub-Saharan African countries.
It is important to recall that many of the LDCs, particularly in sub-Saharan
Africa, will be unable to meet IDG targets for universal primary education
without a seven-fold increase in their present level of aid receipts. Achieving
just three of the IDG targets of poverty reduction, universal primary education
and infant/maternal mortality reduction will require a trebling of ODA from
donor countries, but commitments made at the Monterrey conference will
represent just one-ninth of the amount required (Denny, 2002a: 24).
Explicit or Specific Commitments: Official Development
Assistance
• Increase the volume of ODA (Cologne).
Accomplished: No. As a group, G7 ODA as a percentage of GNI and in
real dollars declined post-Cologne.
Adequacy: Had the G7 provided ODA equivalent to 0.7% of the value of
their economic production -a target that was re-affirmed at the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit — an additional US $109 billion would have been available
in 2001.
Comments: The US, the UK and Italy showed marginal increases in ODA
spending in 2001 over 2000 levels; Japan showed a major decline.
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in Tanzania' (Hencke, 2002b), When the cabinet split was publicized, Short
temporarily froze £10 million of British aid to Tanzania, but was ultimately
overruled on the issue, and indeed announced a new aid package worth £270
million over six years as the sale went ahead. So did the Tanzanian government's
purchase of a £15 million personal jet for the country's president (Denny, 2002b;
Denny et at., 2002; Hencke, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e; MacAskill,
2002; Norton-Taylor etal, 2002). This case may have been unusual only because
such internal disagreements are usually kept out of the public eye, but it
illuminates the origins of much cynicism about ODA.
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Strengthen and enhance the effectiveness of ODA (Okinawa and Genoa).
Accomplished: Difficult to assess. However, the problem of 'recycling'
ODA for purposes of debt servicing remains, and debt relief from G7
countries is counted as ODA despite representing no new capital transfers.
Adequacy: 2002 commitments to raise ODA, even when fully
implemented, will represent just one-ninth of increase required to meet
just three of the IDGs: poverty reduction, universal primary education,
and maternal/child mortality reduction.
Comments: Note the retreat from the 1999 (Cologne) recognition of the
need to increase the value of ODA.
Implement OECD-DAC Recommendations on Untying Aid to Least
Developed Countries (Genoa).
Accomplished: Too soon to assess. Data on the tying status of aid is not
available separately for LDCs. Based on overall tying status, however,
Canada and Italy have much ground to make up; Japan, Italy and Germany
are increasing, rather than decreasing, their tied aid portions.
Adequacy: OECD recommendations exclude food aid and, crucially,
investment-related technical cooperation.
Comments: Individual countries may take steps beyond those called for
by the DAC agreement: Canada, for example, is now 'untying' its technical
cooperation aid to all LDCs and sub-Saharan African countries.
Replenish IDA (portion of World Bank providing funding to 79 poorest
countries) (Genoa Statement).
Accomplished: Yes: agreement to additional US $22 billion in funding.
Multilateral Development Banks to increase funding for basic health,
basic education and water and sanitation (Okinawa).
Accomplished: No: The World Bank and regional development banks
did not significantly increase such funding, and in some cases decreased
the amounts.
Comments: The G7 are not singularly responsible for the MDBs' decision-
making, but they do hold the most influence over these banks' decisions.
The World Bank's IFC, which lends to the private sector, is promoting
private investment in health and other services, which could have negative
impacts on access for the poor.
Increase portion of IDA funding going to grants (Okinawa, Genoa).
Accomplished: Yes and no. A compromise was reached in 2002 to allocate
18% to 21% of IDA financing for grants, but this does little to resolve the
debt problems of developing countries.
Comments: The US favoured a larger grant portion, EU countries favoured
loans only to maintain the solvency of the IDA.
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Implicit or Generic Commitments: Official Development Assistance
Target 'poorest countries' (Cologne).
Accomplished: Yes and no. The average percentage of G7 ODA going to
LDCs did increase post-Cologne, but ODA to LDCs as a percentage of G7
gross national income declined post-Cologne.
Adequacy: In the context of NEPAD, it is notable that G7 ODA to sub-
Saharan Africa, declined until two years ago. ODA often continues to
correspond more to the strategic and economic priorities of donor
countries than the development needs of poorest countries. Poverty, as
measured by living on US $l/day or less, continues to increase in the
least developed countries.
Comments: Recent UK increases in ODA spending, especially for LDCs
and sub-Saharan African countries, set it apart from the other G7 countries.
Endnotes to Chapter Six
1 The original plan called for 1.0 per cent of GDP, but was scaled back to the more modest 0.7
per cent. Recent comparative statistics use a slightly different figure, gross national income
(GNI), against which to measure national governments' ODA expenditures.
2 For purposes of the OECD statistics on aid flows cited in this report, a loan is only counted as
ODA if the 'grant element' - i.e. the value to the recipient of lower interest rates or flexible
repayment terms - is equivalent to at least 25 per cent of the nominal value of the loan.
3 Unfortunately, NEPAD does not specify what this sum is for (essentially health interventions
such as GFATM or GAVI, public health infrastructure development, some combination of both);
or how the sum was arrived at. This imprecision is taken up in more detail in Chapter 9.
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Trade and Market Access
Trade, along with migration, communication, and dissemination of
scientific and technical knowledge, has helped to break the dominance
of rampant poverty and the pervasiveness of 'nasty, brutish and short'
lives that characterised the world. And yet, despite all the progress, life
is still severely nasty, brutish, and short for a large part of the world
population. The great rewards of globalised trade have come to some,
but not to others (Amartya Sen, Honorary President of Oxfam, 2002; in
Watkins, 2002a: 3).
Introduction
Because of the links between poverty and ill health, opportunities for
increasing incomes in the developing world are critically important.
Development policy observers, who disagree on many other points, share the
view that meaningful improvements in market access for the products of the
world's poorest countries would result in dramatic increases in income.1 In
keeping with their general commitment to accelerating global economic
integration, the leaders of the G8 have consistently linked development
objectives to shared benefits from the liberalization of trade:
Open trade and investment drive global growth and poverty reduction.
That is why we have agreed today to support the launch of an ambitious
new Round of global trade negotiations with a balanced agenda (Genoa
Communique, para. 10).
We pledge to pursue policies that will contribute to global growth
by enhancing strong productivity growth in a sound macroeconomic
environment, through structural reform, free trade and strengthened
international economic co-operation (Genoa Statement, para. 2).
Sustained economic growth world-wide requires a renewed
commitment to free trade. Opening markets globally and strengthening
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as the bedrock of the multilateral
trading system is therefore an economic imperative. It is for this reason
that we pledge today to engage personally and jointly in the launch of
a new ambitious Round of global trade negotiations at the Fourth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar this November [i.e. November
2001] (Genoa Statement, para. 6).
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Trade and Market Access
Reduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade is one of the key institutional
contributors to globalization, as well as representing a core element of the
neo-liberal prescription for development policy. At the same time, trade
liberalization raises, with particular force, the question: Globalization on whose
terms, and for whose benefit? The LDCs, with ten per cent of the world's people,
accounted for just 0.42 per cent of the world's exports of goods and services in
1999 - a decline of 47 per cent since 1980 (UNCTAD, 2002b: 112). Even this
figure understates the degree to which the LDCs remain marginalized in the
global economy, since 'in 2000, about 52 percent of total merchandise exports
of the LDCs were accounted for by three countries -Angola and Yemen (both
oil exporters) and Bangladesh' (UNCTAD, 2002b: 112). For developing countries
as a whole, imports have tended to expand faster than exports, resulting in a
deterioration of their trade balances (UNCTAD, 2002c: 51) that exacerbates
their debt servicing problems. This is sometimes because import liberalization
has been a key condition for receiving financial assistance from the IMF
(Watkins, 2002a: 126-7).
Improving Market Access
A recent Oxfam report, which points out that the value of export earnings lost
to developing countries because of trade barriers erected by the rich countries
far exceeds the value of ODA, makes a compelling case for meaningful
improvements in market access. It notes, for example, that '[i]f developing
countries increased their share of world exports by just five per cent, this
would generate [US]$350bn -seven times as much as they receive in aid. The
[US]$70bn that Africa would generate through a one per cent increase in its
share of world exports is approximately five times the amount provided to
the region through aid and debt relief (Watkins, 2002a: 8; see also pp. 48-9).
However, G7 countries -and the industrialized world in general -have been
unwilling to match their rhetorical commitments to liberalized trade with
policy measures to level the playing field for developing country exporters.
Oxfam has developed a Double Standards Index (DSI) that compares the EU,
Canada, the United States and Japan on a number of dimensions of free trade
rhetoric versus protectionist practice (Watkins, 2002a: 97-121). It is worth
quoting at length from the conclusions of this exercise:
Among the most striking findings to emerge are the following:
• Thirty per cent of Canadian imports and 15 per cent of EU imports
from the least-developed countries face peak tariffs (in excess of
15 per cent).
• The average tariff on these 'tariff peak' items ranges from a low of
21 per cent for the USA to 40 per cent for the EU.
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• Agricultural subsidies account for one-quarter of farm output in
the USA, rising to 40 per cent in the EU and over 60 per cent in Japan.
• Average tariffs on processed agricultural products exported to Japan
and Canada are more than three times higher than those facing
unprocessed agricultural products.
• Average agricultural tariffs are close to 10 per cent in Canada and
the USA, rising to more than 20 per cent in the EU and Japan.3
• The EU and USA have eliminated only one-quarter of the textiles
and clothing import-quota restrictions that they are committed to
remove under the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.
• Between them, the USA and EU launched 234 anti-dumping cases
against developing countries in the five years following the end of
the Uruguay Round.4
Taken individually, each of the trade restrictions considered in the DSI
is deeply damaging to developing countries. Considered collectively,
they help to explain why developing countries have been unable to
increase their share of world trade, and why the links between
international trade and poverty reduction are so weak.
The costs of Northern protectionism can be illustrated through
economic models that predict the potential gains from import
liberalisation. One such model shows that moving to full import
liberalisation by the industrialised countries between 2000 and 2005
could generate gains of the following order:
• more than [US]$3bn each for India, China, and Brazil
• more than [US]$14bn for Latin America
• more than [US]$2bn for sub-Saharan Africa
• more than [US] $600m for Indonesia
Large as they are, even these figures understate the potential gains from
reduced trade barriers. This is because they do not take into account the
dynamic effects on investment and innovation that market opportunities
could generate (Watkins, 2002a: 100-1; citations omitted).
The World Bank has similarly noted that while agricultural exports can reduce
rural poverty and exports of textiles, clothing and other labor-intensive
manufactures can reduce urban poverty, 'the world's poor face tariffs that
are, on average, roughly twice as high as those imposed on the non-poor'
(World Bank, 2002a: 37). To put it mildly, it is unusual for organizations that
normally disagree as emphatically as the World Bank and Oxfam to agree on
a key policy issue. Even more remarkable is the fact that such agreement has
not been accompanied by meaningful policy change.
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At the very least, a tension would appear to exist between the G8
commitment to 'offering] people a fair chance to better their lives' (Okinawa
Communique, para. 15), on the one hand, and the actual behaviour of
member countries on the other. This tension has so far not been resolved by
such commitments as the agreement 'to work towards duty-free and quota-
free access for all products originating in the least developed countries' (Genoa
Communique, para. 11). Canada, for example, has removed only 29 of 295
import restrictions on textiles, the US only 13 of 750 (In Common, 2001: 6),
and collects five times more duty on textile imports from LDCs than it does
on textile imports from the US (Wiebe, 2002).5 The Canadian trade minister
notes that the government has removed 570 tariff lines for market access by
LDCs; according to Wiebe (2002), however, 'in 1999, Least Developed
Countries actually exported from only 67 of these tariff lines. The total of
these products was a mere [US]$543,000 - that is, less than 0.2 per cent of
LDC exports to Canada in that year. The hit on the Canadian taxpayer of this
largesse, as a result of foregone revenue, is a miniscule [US] $25,000' (Wiebe,
2002: A15).
Oxfam estimates that Canadian import restrictions on goods from LDCs
alone cost these countries a potential US$2 billion in earnings, five times the
Canadian aid to these countries (Oxfam Canada, 2002). Because of the role
of non-tariff barriers, it is not clear how Canada's commitment to remove
tariffs on all imports from LDCs except dairy products, poultry and eggs will
improve market access. The US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)
does propose access to the US market for African garments - but only if the
threads used originate in the US (Oxfam Canada, 2002). The much-vaunted
EU Everything But Arms initiative in 2001 provides tariff exemptions on all
non-military imports from LDCs, but with the rider that tariffs on some of
the most profitable developing country exports (e.g. rice, sugar and bananas)
will not be fully removed for eight years (Watkins, 2002a), leading some
pundits to call the initiative 'Everything But Farms.' Mozambique, for
example, loses an estimated US$100 million annually because of the EU's
retained tariffs on sugar (Watkins, 2002b).
Although developed countries have dropped their average tariffs on goods
from developing countries from ten per cent in the 1980s to five per cent in
1999, they maintain very high tariff peaks on products of particular economic
interest to developing countries. The EU, for example, imposes a tariff of 250
per cent on meat products; Canada and the US a tariff of 120 per cent (Watkins,
2002a: 102). Tariffs tend to increase with each value-added manufacturing or
processing step over the raw product (Watkins, 2002a: 99-103). Fully processed
food products face EU and Japanese tariffs twice as high as raw agricultural
products; in Canada, the rate can be as much as 13 times higher (Watkins,
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2002a: 103). This poses a significant barrier to agriculture-led export growth
for many developing countries, and although growth in agricultural exports
is far from a panacea, because of the dangers of the 'commodity trap'
(UNCTAD, 2002b: 137-50), it can be one important component of an overall
development strategy (see Box 7.1).
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Box 7.1: Whose Free Trade? Whose Development?
The WTO Banana Case
Market access for developing country agricultural products may make an
important contribution to economic growth, but the devil, as always, lies in
the details. In 1995, the US and several Central American countries challenged
the EU over its preferential treatment of bananas from some of its members'
former colonies. The WTO sided with the US, which brought the case forward
on behalf of the muttinational giant Chiquita corporation, a major contributor
to the Democratic Party, then in control of the White House; indeed the US,
after several earlier attempts by the smaller Central American countries had
failed, filed its complaint at the WTO less than a day after the chairman of
Chiquita donated US$500 000 to the Democratic Party (Read, 2001: 270). The
WTO ruling prohibited preferential treatment by the EU for banana imports
(rom the Caribbean, where production tends to be small and farmer-owned.
This treatment was part of the Lome Convention, under which the EU gives
financial aid and preferential market access to its former African, Caribbean
and Pacific colonies. While the convention may not always make economic
sense -Caribbean bananas have been ridiculed by liberalization economists
for their absurdly high costs -it does make development sense, at least insofar
as it represents a partial global redistribution of wealth. Without it, the
economies of small island nations in the Caribbean would collapse -and there
is evidence this is happening. Dominica's earnings from bananas dropped from
US$25 million in 1993, to only US$9 million in 2000 (Younge, 2003: 9); St.
Vincent and the Grenadines saw its banana income fall from US$120 million to
US$50 million, while two-thirds of the Windward Island banana growers have
gone out of business (Ryle, 2002:26). What was once a normative decision to
aid poorer countries in need became a market decision based solely on the
economic criterion of efficiency. Moreover, the EU believed the convention
had been successfully 'carved out' of CATT commitments.
The US and several Central American countries, however, did not dispute
the convention under GATT provisions, but argued that, since packing and
shipping bananas constituted services to which the EU had committed, the
convention violated GATS.
Trade and Market Access
Protected and Subsidized Agriculture
Because of the potential importance of agricultural exports to many
developing country economies, direct and indirect protection for agriculture
in the industrialized countries is a special problem. The effective tariff on
agricultural imports levied by Japan has been calculated at 29.1 per cent, by
the United States at 28.1 per cent, by the EU at 7.6 per cent, and by Canada at
just 3.4 per cent (World Bank/IMF, 2002a: 12). However, tariffs are only part
of the equation, and arguably a less important part than subsidies to producers
in the industrialized countries. The OECD estimates that total support to
agriculture in OECD countries in 2000 amounted to US$327 billion -roughly
seven times the total value of the industrial countries' annual ODA budgets
(World Bank, 2002a: 47). The producer support equivalent, or PSE - i.e. the
value of transfers from consumers and taxpayers to support agricultural
producers - has been estimated as equivalent to 35 per cent of total gross
farm receipts in the EU, 59 per cent in Japan, 21 per cent in the United States,
and 17 per cent in Canada (OECD estimates cited in World Bank/IMF, 2002a:
24.) Such subsidies not only limit market access, as industrialized country
producers can offer artificially low prices in their domestic markets, but also
lead to the production of surpluses that are then dumped on international
markets, as in the case of sugar and wheat from the US and the EU. The IMF
(2002) argues that world market prices depressed by US cotton subsidies
(valued at US$160 000 per producer) have resulted in a loss of three per cent
of GDP in Mali and Benin, and two per cent of GDP in Burkina Faso and
Chad - more than twice the value of debt relief received by those countries
in 2001. To state the problematique somewhat polemically, the industrialized
world can be seen as giving with one hand (in the form of debt relief) and
taking away much more aggressively (in the form of agricultural subsidies)
with the other. In some cases, subsidies depress prices on international markets
to the point where developing countries find their own producers competing
with subsidized imports.
Ironically, one of the reasons for this outcome is that developing countries
had to lower agricultural tariffs as the price of assistance from the IMF. When
the WTO Agreement on Agriculture came into force in 1995, their tariffs
were lower than those in developed countries. They also lacked the financial
resources to subsidize their farmers. Despite their 'competitive advantage' of
lower production costs, they could not compete domestically with foreign
imports, while foreign markets remained largely closed to their exports due
to much higher tariff rates (Third World Network/UNDP, 2001: 53-6). Mexico,
Uruguay, Zimbabwe, Kenya, India and the Philippines all experienced serious
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declines in income, and corresponding increases in poverty and poor health,
among their farming populations following liberalization (Hilary, 2001).
In Mexico, liberalization in trade and capital markets has allowed US-based
Wal-Mart (now the world's largest corporation) to become the largest retailer.
Although Mexico is a major corn producer, Wal-Mart sources all of its corn
products from the US (Watkins, 2002a: 41-2): an impending flood of heavily
subsidized imports from the US threatens Mexican corn producers.6 Among
other consequences, this is likely to result in intensified migration to the
cities, which will drive down labor costs and incomes still further. The
'efficiency' of Mexican agriculture may improve, but it is not clear whether
the overall economic and social (including health) impact will be positive, at
least over the short to medium term.
Figures from the period 1998-2000 show the EU to have spent more than US$ 100
billion on agricultural subsidies, with the US and Japan together accounting for a
similar amount. (Because the primary vehicle for EU agricultural subsidies is the
Common Agricultural Policy [CAP], it is not meaningful to estimate agricultural
subsidies for EU countries on a country-by-country basis.) However the US is the
biggest spender on a per-farmer basis, spending US$20 803 per farmer as against
US$ 16 028 in the EU (Watkins, 2002a: 112-13). The US government's recent US$ 180
billion farm subsidy legislation will satisfy key domestic political constituencies,
but is almost certain to exacerbate the problem of markets for developing country
agricultural products (Blustein, 2002). It also runs counter to the commitment
made in the Doha Declaration generated by the WTO ministerial meeting in
November, 2001 to 'reductions, with a view to phasing out, all forms of [agricultural]
export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support
(WTO, 2001 a: para. 13; emphasis added). This is one instance among several of a
disturbing recent US turn toward unilateralism and protectionism on trade matters.
'Since textile and clothing production often requires only simple
technology and is intensive in unskilled labour, many developing countries
have a strong comparative advantage in these sectors' (World Bank/IMF, 2002a:
35). In six developing countries, this sector accounts for more than half of
the value of all merchandise exports (54.4 per cent in Sri Lanka, rising to a
high of 88.7 per cent in Cambodia) (World Bank/IMF, 2002a: 39). However,
high tariffs and quantitative restrictions on textile imports to the
industrialized world create substantial impediments to such exports. When
textile tariffs and subsidies are added to agricultural tariffs and subsidies, the
annual cost to developing nations rises closer to US$700 billion (UNCTAD,
1999). This is more than the high-end debt cancellation cost calculated by
Hanlon (2000; see Chapter 2), and several times more than high-end estimated
costs of meeting the International or Millenium Development Goals.
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Market Access: Necessary but Not Sufficient
The specifics of the case for improving market access for developing country
agricultural and textile exports must not be taken as justifying the broader
development policy claim that export-led development is the only path to
economic growth and poverty reduction. Uncertainties remain about the
conditions under which improved export performance can be expected to result
in widely shared improvements in the social determinants of health. Still less
should these specifics be taken to susbstantiate the neo-classical economic
orthodoxy, part of the so-called 'Washington Consensus' in development policy
(Williamson, 1990), that trade liberalization is an indispensable element of any
sustainable pattern of economic growth and poverty reduction. Rodrik, writing
from within mainstream academic economics, has critiqued the conventional
wisdom and 'present [ed] an alternative account of economic development, one
that questions the centrality of trade and trade policy and emphasizes instead
the critical role of domestic institutional innovations that often depart from
prevailing orthodoxy.... Opening up the economy is hardly ever a key factor at
the outset' (Rodrik, 2001: 10). In Rodrik's view (see also Watkins, 2002a: 51-2,
127-33), access to industrialized country markets is a necessary condition for
development, but by no means a sufficient one. Similarly, UNCTAD (2002b:
101; emphasis added) warns, 'the current conventional wisdom that persistent
poverty in LDCs is due to their low level of trade integration and insufficient
trade liberalization is grossly simplistic. The persistence of generalized poverty
is less related to a low level of integration into the global economy, and to
insufficient trade liberalization, than to the form of trade integration.'
As we observed earlier, only a handful of countries (for example, some of
the Asian 'Tigers') have 'grown out of poverty.' Many analysts believe this is
due more to a development path that combined strategic tariff and non-tariff
barriers to imports with an export orientation, rigorous controls on foreign
capital flows, and various degrees of dirigisme in terms of industrial policy
(Amsden, 1994; Hertzman & Siddiqi, 2000; Rodrik, 2001; Watkins, 2002a: 146-
7). Furthermore, even the Tigers' faced dramatic increases in poverty when
their economies faltered and their currencies plunged during the financial crisis
of 1997-98 (Bello, 1998; Bello etal, 1998; Kristof, 1998a, 1998b; Sanger & Landler,
1999; World Bank, 1999: 51-62) The consequences of the crisis, in turn, illustrate
a point made by Cornia (2001) to the effect that financial liberalization may
be an even more important contributor to increased economic inequality than
trade liberalization, because it exposes national economies to the uncertainties
created by extremely large and volatile short-term capital flows.
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We return to these larger-scale issues of development policy in Chapter
10. However, none of them would need to be resolved in order to use improved
market access as the starting point for making the next round of multilateral
trade negotiations begun at Doha into a true 'development round/ organized
around what Rodrik (2001) calls an international trade regime that puts
development first (Audley & Florini, 2001; Third World Network/UNDP, 2001).
Critical observers of the Doha process (Kahn, 2001; Lucas, 2001; Third World
Network, 2001; Third World Network/UNDP, 2001: 97-100; Watkins, 2002b)
argue that little departure occurred from past patterns in which the
industrialized countries essentially strong-armed the developing world into
agreeing to major concessions in exchange for few or no substantive
improvements in market access.
WTO Participation
This is partly, albeit only partly, because of the dramatic disparity between
rich and poor countries in access to the specialized legal and economic
expertise that is a prerequisite for effective participation in the trade policy
arena. Even if they are reluctant, for domestic political reasons, to level the
playing field with respect to market access, the G8 have the opportunity -
and some would say the obligation - to make the negotiating and dispute
resolution processes as they unfold at the WTO less unbalanced. In 2001, the
G8 leaders stated that 'to help developing countries benefit from open markets,
we will better co-ordinate our trade related assistance to ... provide bilateral
assistance on technical standards, customs systems, legislation needed for
World Trade Organisation (WTO) membership, the protection of intellectual
property rights, and human resource development (Genoa Communique,
para. 12).
Table 7.1, below, shows how they have responded to one relevant initiative:
the Geneva-based Advisory Centre on WTO Law that was established based
on an agreement reached at the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference. The
agreement now has 32 signatories: nine developed countries, 22 developing
countries, and one economy in transition. Any WTO member or country in
the process of joining the WTO may join the center by acceding to the
agreement; however, the 49 countries designated by UNCTAD as LDCs are
entitled to the services of the center without membership. The European
Commission (EC), France, Germany, Japan and the US did not sign the
agreement, with the EC reportedly 'strongly opposed' to its establishment
(Blackhurst et al, 2001: 110).
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* Based on 1999 population figures from UNDP (2001 a: Table 5); dollar figures
unadjusted for purchasing power parity.
** Not currently a signatory to the agreement establishing the ACWL.
The Doha Declaration recognizes the need to negotiate improved special
and differential treatment for developing countries, to stem the erosion of
this treatment since the Uruguay Round (UNCTAD, 2002c: 42), although
discussion is bogged down by resistance from many of the developed
countries, including G8 members (see Box 7.2, below). Mandates regarding
'implementation issues' in the Doha Declaration also reflect developing
countries' concerns that the costs of implementing WTO agreements often
impairs their own development needs (UNCTAD, 2002c: 43). Small amounts
of funding assistance for developing country participation in the WTO exist
(see above), intended to assist delegations from these countries, which remain
very small compared to those from wealthier nations. A new Global Trust
Fund to assist developing countries in post-Doha negotiations has also been
established by the WTO, with about US$20 million in total funding (the
only specific G8 contribution to this fund that could be ascertained was a
147
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
US$560 000 sum from Germany) (WTO, 2001c, 2002b). But these rather
meagre levels of assistance do not deal with domestic costs associated with
trade agreement compliance, or with 'the challenges posed by proliferating
[technical] standards' (World Bank/IMF, 2002a: 17). One recent study (Finger
& Schuler, 2001) found that, to comply with WTO obligations on the SPS,
Argentina spent over US$80 million and Hungary over US$40 million. Mexico
spent over US$30 million to upgrade intellectual property laws and
enforcement.
The figures, for just three of the six Uruguay Round Agreements that
involve restructuring of domestic regulations, come to [US] $150
million ... [and could] be higher in the least developed countries ....
One hundred and fifty million dollars is more than the annual
development budget for eight of the twelve least developed countries
for which we could find a figure for that part of the budget (Finger &
Schuler, 2001: 129).
The current and future costs of WTO compliance seriously jeopardize the
already weakened health, education and human rights infrastructures in many
of these countries: 'for most of the developing and transition economies -
some 100 countries -money spent to implement the WTO rules... would be
money unproductively invested' (Finger & Schuler, 2001: 115).
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Box 7.2: Special and Differential Treatment at the WTO
The argument that there should be different standards for developed and
developing nations has precedent at the WTO, in the form of multiple 'special
and differential' provisions for developing and least developed countries written
into many of the trade agreements. Unfortunately, most of these exemptions
for poorer countries are scheduled to expire, in some instances as early as
2005, in others not until 2016. The EU, following the lead of many development
NCOs, is urging that these exemptions be based on the level of economic
development within a country, rather than on some arbitrary calendar date
(BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 2002g). This was also the small victory
earned by developing countries at the Doha Ministerial Round in 2001, which
declared that the WTO should review 'all Special and Differential provisions...
with a view to strengthening them' (WTO, 2001 a; emphasis added). Many
developed countries, however, have been reluctant to proceed with WTO
negotiations to do just that (BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, 2002e).The
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development made the same declaration,
as has the Director-General of UNCTAD in his 2002 report. The group of LDC
members of the WTO echoed the same claim in its Doha 'Development Round'
Trade and Market Access
Market Liberalization and Changes in Taxation
Tariffs still constitute a substantial portion of overall government revenue
in many developing countries, compared to an average of only four per cent
for high-income nations (World Bank, 2002d: 255). A neglected dimension
of the tariff reductions adopted by many developing countries as a condition
of SAPs has been the associated decline in government revenues. Between
1980 and 1997, as a percentage of total national taxes, tariff taxes fell from
48 per cent to 23 per cent in Jordan, 50 per cent to 16 per cent in Sri Lanka,
and 39 per cent to 12 per cent in Botswana (World Bank, 2000b). Few countries
experiencing these revenue declines have had the capacity to raise comparable
revenues from other sources, and most have not experienced sufficient growth
in trade to offset the drop (Hilary, 2001). In the past decade alone, for 18 of
the African countries for which comparative data are available, taxes on
international trade declined from 33 per cent of total tax revenue, to 30 per
cent (World Bank, 2002d: 252^1). The aggregate data mask some wide
variations. Cameroon increased its international trade share of tax revenue
from 14 per cent to 28 per cent between 1990 and 1999; even steeper increases
were posted by Cote d'lvoire and Guinea. The Republic of Congo, meanwhile,
saw its international trade share of tax drop from 21 per cent to six per cent,
and Mauritius from 46 per cent to 26 per cent. Tariff reductions resulting
from market liberalization have had, and will continue to have, a much
harsher revenue impact on poorer countries.
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negotiating paper, arguing that development must be seen as the primary
goal of the multilateral trading system (BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest,
2002 b).
There is one overarching exception for developing countries in GATT, Article
XVIII. This article allows developing countries to ignore all WTO agreements
that require them to lower import tariffs and to remove quantitative restrictions
on imports, both measures that reduce the level of imports allowed into the
country. They can do this to protect certain key domestic industries or other
economic sectors that are particularly fragile. But to do so, they must notify all
other countries. These countries, in turn, can then impose reciprocal trade
sanctions worth an amount equivalent to what they might lose by having their
exports shut out of the developing country's market. The cost is too high for
developing countries ever to use this exception (BRIDGES Trade News Weekly,
2002d). Removing this provision of Article XVII!, a point advocated by many
developing countries, would go a long way towards the goal of the multilateral
trading system being made to work for the world's poor.
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Partly as a result of tariff reductions, overall tax revenue as a percentage of
GDP is also much lower in most developing and least developed countries
than it is for G7 members (see Figure 7.1, below). Declining tax capacities
have been most dramatic for transition economies, but liberalization-related
currency crises in Asia led to reductions of ten per cent or more in public
spending for health, education and social/community services in Thailand,
the Philippines, Korea and, for a time, Malaysia (UNDP, 1999). A small and
declining tax base, together with tax competition and increasing difficulties
in taxing mobile capital - issues we have discussed in Chapter 2 - make
taxation for redistribution much harder than in previous decades (Von
Furstenberg & Kirton, 2001:248). This, in turn, increases developing countries'
need for ODA or -more destructively -encourages them to resort to continued
foreign borrowing.
Figure 7.1: Total Tax Revenues as % of GDP in Selected Countries, 2000
Source: World Bank (2002d: Table 5.5)
G7 average excludes France and Japan, for which data were not available.
Summary: Chapter Seven
The G8 deserve praise for launching a new round of trade negotiations in
Doha. However, it is not clear whether the anticipated 'development round'
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will actually materialize. The failure of the G8 to open their own markets
more rapidly to developing country products, despite much rhetoric about
the economic benefits of trade liberalization and despite the economic boost
this would provide for struggling economies, does not provide grounds for
optimism. Undoubtedly, domestic economic losses in G8 countries would
result, but - especially after the boom of the 1990s - the G8 are well able to
absorb the costs of mitigating these. Failure to open markets is arguably a
reflection of the same lack of genuine political commitment to development
that has resulted in declining ODA contributions (see Chapter 6).
It must further be emphasized that in the course of their own
industrialization, the G8 conspicuously failed to follow the import
liberalization prescriptions they - and the IFIs - are now urging on the
developing world. Recent US unilateralism on trade policy issues, exemplified
by the 2002 farm subsidy legislation, is cause for special concern.
Explicit or Specific Commitments: Trade and Market Access
• Launch of a new round of global trade negotiations in November 2001,
which will address developing country priorities (Genoa).
Accomplished: Yes, launched.
Adequacy: It remains to be seen whether the hoped-for 'development
round' will materialize.
Comments: Developing country positions on extending special and
differential treatment are being opposed by many G7 countries. Progress
on agricultural subsidies remains uncertain.
• Work towards duty- and quota-free market access for LDC exports (Genoa).
Accomplished: Partially and imperfectly.
Comments: Canadian, US and EU countries' records on this point are all
compromised by protectionism.
• Provide bilateral assistance on technical, legal and human resource aspects
of trade policy (Genoa).
Accomplished: Partially and unevenly (Advisory Centre on WTO Law).
Comments: Only Canada, Italy, and the UK among the G8 have signed
the agreement establishing the Center. The per capita contributions of
Sweden and Norway are more than three times Canada's, which is the
highest amongst the G8.
Implicit or Generic Commitments: Trade and Market Access
• Open markets as 'bedrock of multilateral trading system' (Genoa).
• Pursue policies to contribute to global growth through, inter alia, free
trade (Genoa).
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'Work with developing countries to put in place policies, programmes
and institutions that offer people a fair chance to better their lives'
(Okinawa).
Accomplished: Not in a way that is conducive to development. Developing
country markets have been opened up; the G7 have not reciprocated in a
meaningful way.
Comments: Conspicuous failure on the part of the G8 to open their
markets to developing country exports, especially agricultural products
and textiles, despite rare consensus on potential development benefits.
The escalation of agricultural subsidies by the US is a cause for special
concern.
Endnotes to Chapter Seven
1 This is true despite various caveats related to negative environmental and social (distributional)
externalities that might be associated with such trade, especially in raw agricultural products;
the potential for growth in agricultural exports to exclude smaller producers and thereby
exacerbate existing economic inequalities (UNCTAD, 2002b: 128-9); and the more general perils
of reliance on primary commodity exports as a development strategy (UNCTAD, 2002b: 137-
50).
2 Recall, however, that World Bank and other projections related to achievement of the IDGs
and MDGs -to say nothing of the problems of the HIPCs -still require huge increases in donor
aid as well as improved market access for goods from less and least developed countries.
3 EU tariffs on agricultural products from LDCs are actually higher than individual European
country tariffs had been (Enge, 2002: 25).
4 Under a WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, countries are not permitted
to 'dump' goods at below cost or substantially lower than market prices in other countries'
domestic markets. Developed countries have used this agreement to close their borders to products
from developing countries where they have a particularly cost-competitive advantage. It often
takes months or years for these cases to be resolved by the WTO. In the meanwhile, the developing
country has lost access to a developed country's market. In one case, an EU ban on bed linen
exports from India cut Indian production by 60 per cent, resulting in the loss of thousands of
jobs. Four years later, the WTO ruled that the anti-dumping measures had been unjustified, but
by then the damage had been done (Oxfam Canada, 2002: 4).
5 Indeed, Canada actually enjoys a trade surplus with sub-Saharan African countries (4.1 per
cent exports to 3.2 per cent imports in 2000), primarily exporting used clothing to these countries
- the very exports that helped undermine Zambia's 'inefficient' textile industries in the 1990s
described in Box 1.1, Chapter 1 (CCIC Africa-Canada Forum, 2002: 7).
6 The Econom/sthas been harshly critical of what it sees as Mexico's failure to lower the costs of
agricultural production, warning that 'the worst moment will come in 2008, when tariffs are
eliminated on American corn' (The Economist, 2002: 32). At the same time, it acknowledges
that the value of support for Mexican farmers is minuscule when compared with the value of




Poverty and environmental degradation are closely interrelated. While
poverty results in certain kinds of environmental stress, the major cause
of the continued deterioration of the global environment is the
unsustainable pattern of consumption and production, particularly in
industrialized countries, which is a matter of grave concern, aggravating
poverty and imbalances (UN, 1992: Ch. 4).
Introduction
The natural environment is related to human health in various ways, of which
direct exposure to hazards is only one. Fifteen years ago, the report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987) drew
attention to the multiple feedback loops that link poverty and economic
insecurity, environmental degradation, and international economic policy
environment. In the 1992 Agenda 21, the document that emerged from the
UN Conference on the Environment and Development (UN, 1992) elaborated
on these themes with a high degree of sophistication, noting inter alia that
'[a] first step towards the integration of sustainability into economic
management is the establishment of better measurement of the crucial role
of the environment as a source of natural capital and as a sink for the products
generated during the production of man-made capital' (UN, 1992: Ch. 8).
Subsequent analysis has strongly emphasized the importance for human
health of making these connections at the level of public policy and policy
implementation (see e.g. Butler et al, 2001; McMichael, 2000; UNCTAD,
2002b: 87-97; Waltner-Toews, 2001; Waltner-Toews & Lang, 2000). The past
decade has also provided numerous illustrations of how liberalization of
trade and financial flows can increase the pace of environmental destruction,
exacerbating inequalities in direct and indirect exposure to health hazards
associated with environmental change.
For example, the combined effects of deregulation, privatization and weak
governmental controls on the Indonesian logging industry have led to the
loss of more than one million hectares of forest per year through logging in
Indonesia. Health effects range from widespread, short-term respiratory
disorders associated with extensive burning to long-term ecosystem
disturbances and potential climatic change (Walt, 2000). In Uganda, trade
liberalization in the form of industrial privatization and tariff reduction on
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fishing technology contributed to overfishing of the Nile perch in Lake
Victoria, and a degradation of the lake ecosystem and water quality (UNEP,
2001). And in Argentina, trade liberalization and promotion of fisheries
exports led to a five-fold growth in fish catches in the decade 1985-95. Fishing
companies gained an estimated US$1.6 billion from this growth, but depletion
of fish stocks and environmental degradation has produced a net cost of
US$500 million (UNEP, 2001).
For purposes both of developing research strategies and of evaluating
existing policies, Labonte and Spiegel (2002) have proposed an analytical
framework for studying the relations between globalization (broadly defined)
and population health organized around 13 categories of inherently global
health issues (IGHIs). Of these categories, six (climate change, biodiversity
loss, water shortage, declining fish stocks, food [in] security and deforestation)
directly involve environmental policy and ecosystem change,1 and at least
two others (increasing poverty, and war and conflict) present the possibility
of 'downward spirals' in which ecosystem change reflects, transmits and
reinforces social conditions that are destructive of human health.
Commenting on the G8 record with respect to the environment, Bayne
(2001: 33) writes that '[protecting the environment becomes more effective
with the advance of globalisation, in principle, as world-wide agreements
become feasible. The recent record of the summits, however, has not been
very positive.' This may, indeed, be something of an understatement. Only
two of the IGHIs -climate change and food (in)security -are specifically and
substantively addressed in the documentation from the 1999-2001 summits,
and the documents reflect little awareness of the feedback loops linking
globalization, poverty, environmental change and human health.
This is a short chapter, not because these feedback loops are unimportant
-they are critically important, especially for the poor, who are first and worst
harmed by environmental hazards and resource degradation in rich and poor
countries alike -but because of the limited policy attention evident at the G8
summits we have studied. We examine four specific areas: G8 commitments
to improving drinking water quality and access to sanitation; environmental
assessments of export credit agencies; multilateral environmental agreements
(including the Kyoto Protocol on climate change); and energy conservation
and renewable energy. We conclude with a brief observation concerning the
retreat from past commitments on environment and sustainable development




Drinking Water and Sanitation
According to the WHO, inadequate access to sanitation and safe drinking
water is the second most important risk factor (after malnutrition)
contributing to the global burden of disease (as cited in World Bank, 2002d:
42). Earlier WHO figures indicated that 19 per cent of deaths among children
under five in the developing world in 1995 were attributable to diarrhoeal
disease (WHO, 1997: 21), which is closely associated with contaminated water.
Reflecting the importance of water and sanitation, the IDG include increased
access to potable water as one of their indicators, and the MDGs add to this
increased access to sanitation.
Provision of potable water has improved, particularly for rural families
(UNDP et al., 2000), with access in low-income countries rising from 70
per cent to 76 per cent between 1990 and 2000 (World Bank, 2002d: 28),
although some 300 million people in Africa (more than 35 per cent of the
total population) were estimated to lack access to safe water in 2000
(WorldWatch Institute, 2001: 95). Sanitation lags further behind. While the
portion of people with improved access in low-income countries also rose
between 1990 and 2000 from 40 per cent to 45 per cent (World Bank,
2002d: 28), the absolute numbers of people without access increased from
2.6 to 3.3 billion people from 1990 to 2000 (UNEP, 1999). Sub-Saharan
Africa fared slightly worse: access to safe water rose from 49 per cent to 55
per cent, while access to improved sanitation stagnated at 55 per cent (World
Bank, 2002d: 28). Thus, although progress has been widespread in Africa
(see Table 8.1, below) that progress is slow, and does not bode well for
achieving the 2015 target of halving the proportion of people without
sustainable access to safe water.
Perhaps recognizing the essential nature of safe drinking water and
sanitation to all other human needs (including health), G7 aid to water supply
and sanitation outstrips that for basic health and basic education combined
(see Figure 8.1, below). The UK, Canada and, until 2001, the US, are
particularly low donors for water and sanitation. More significantly, in light
of Africa's need, the 2001 decline in the G7 average commitment to ODA in
this crucial health-related area is disturbing.
In 1999, the multilateral contributions for European G7 countries were
approximated using EC sector commitments in 2000, as data on EC sector
commitments for 1999 are not available.
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Source: Social Watch (2002: 44-5)
* Some years approximate to base-line 1990, and range from 1988 to 1995.
Legend:
Significant progress. A Some progress.




Figure 8.1: % of Total Aid to Water and Sanitation, 1999-2001
Source: OECD (2001 c: Table 19); OECD (2002b: Table 19); OECD (2003: Table 19)
Privatization, Water and GATS
As disturbing as the decline in aid to water is the increasing trend to donor-
assisted privatization in water and sanitation, particularly private sector
management and provision. Water privatization in many poorer countries
arose as a condition of SALs, which promoted privatization even when the
costs would be beyond the reach of most families. Water privatization, full
cost recovery and an end to public subsidy programs for water persist as
conditions for IMF and World Bank loans. 'A review of IMF loan agreements
across 40 countries during 2000 found that privatization or full cost recovery
was a condition of 12 of them' (Hilary, 2001: 32, citation omitted). A third
(N = 84) of World Bank water supply loans during the 1990s require some
form of privatization, and the pace of such requirements is increasing. Fifty-
eight per cent of short-term SALs between 1996 and 1999 had privatization as
a condition; over 80 per cent of all World Bank-funded water projects in
2002 did the same (Centre for Public Integrity, 2003a). There is also evidence
of a close relationship between private water companies and the IFIs. Former
IMF Director, Michel Camdessus, on retirement in 2000, became chair of the
International Panel for New Investments in Water, a project of the world's
major private water companies; the World Bank owns a five per cent stake in
Agua Argentinas, controlled by the huge Suez water company, and provided
personnel assistance for negotiating water rate increases with the Argentine
government (Centre for Public Integrity, 2003b: 4, 6).2
Water privatization schemes in developing countries are often associated
with rapidly increased costs, which place access to water beyond the reach of
most poor households. Such programs in the capital of Mauritania led to
water costs consuming over one-fifth of total average household budgets for
low-income families (World Bank findings quoted in Hilary, 2001: 32). In
South Africa, large numbers of people have been cut off from privatized
157
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
water delivery systems for various periods since the mid-1990s (Bond, 2001:
64-7; Centre for Public Integrity, 2003b: 5; McDonald, 2002).
Water privatization schemes have been tried, and have failed, in Puerto
Rico (1995-99), Trinidad (1994-98), Argentina (1995-98) and several other
Latin American countries. In each case, rates skyrocketed, service was sporadic
or inefficient, huge deficits were created and, in most instances, the contracts
were not renewed or the providers simply walked away (Shaffer et al., 2002).
This did not prevent companies from earning high annual profits, executives
from earning high salaries or individual entrepreneurs from amassing small
fortunes - one Argentine businessman made US$100 million through the
sale of his shares in the private water company supplying Buenos Aires (Centre
for Public Integrity, 2003c: 3). Executives of some multinational water
companies, including Suez and Vivendi, or their subsidiaries, have been found
guilty of bribing local officials (Centre for Public Integrity, 2003d).
There is considerable concern that GATS could be used to open up
opportunities for private investment in water and sanitation services. Had this
occurred at the time of the reversal of the hugely unpopular water privatization
scheme in Cochabamba, Bolivia, foreign water supply companies might have
been able successfully to demand massive compensation. Even without GATS
protection, the companies involved -Bechtel and its consortium partner, Aguas
del Tunari - are involved in lawsuits against the Bolivian government seeking
compensation for lost investment (see Centre for Public Integrity, 2003b). To
date, 40 countries have committed themselves to liberalizing environmental
services under GATS, including 26 developing and least developed countries
(WTO Services Database Online, 2002). Such commitments could 'lock in'
existing policies and regulations that allow foreign private investors or companies
to provide water and sanitary or other environmental services.
It is difficult without very close scrutiny of the types of services that are
included in each sub-sector to determine which sets of commitments will
have most bearing on water. As with education, very few sub-Saharan African
countries have committed to liberalization in environmental services. Lesotho
and South Africa, however, stand out: Lesotho in particular has made the
most liberalization commitments in all three key sectors - health, education
and environmental services - followed by South Africa. Present-day negative
experiences with water privatization in South Africa do not bode well for the
future. By contrast, most of the G7 have made extensive commitments in
this sector, notably in mode 3, 'commercial presence' (foreign private
investment). These commitments have been the source of considerable civil
society critique and questioning within G7 countries.
We do not infer from this discussion that the private sector has no role to
play in water provision. Our concern is that, based on experience from
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developing countries so far, the commodification and commercialization of
water could severely limit access for the poor, with destructive consequences
for population health. Public regulation of, and increased access to, water
and sanitation is considered one of the main reasons for the decline in
infectious diseases in nineteenth-century Europe and North America,
especially among the poor (e.g. see Dubos, 1968; Szreter, 1988; Tesh, 1990).
In Chapter 3 we noted the need for further review and synthesis of the
literature on the effects of privatization in the context of health services and
systems. A similar need exists for research on direct and indirect health impacts
of privatizing water infrastructure, of a kind Canada's International
Development Research Centre is now supporting through the Municipal
Services Project (http://www.queensu.ca/msp) in Southern Africa.
Environmental Assessments of EGA Activities
Export credit agencies, such as Export Development Canada (EDC), the Export-
Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in the
United States, are agencies of industrialized country governments that provide
financial assistance to purchasers of exported goods and services. To
oversimplify somewhat, the assistance provided can be of several types: direct
loan financing (in which the EGA lends to a developing country purchaser),
guarantees of private loans (in which the EGA, on behalf of the government,
assumes a contingent liability in the event of purchaser default), and insurance
that protects exporters against non-payment. Even as ODA flows have been
decreasing, the value of financing provided by EGAs has increased
dramatically. Although precise estimates are difficult to obtain, it seems clear
that the annual value of long-term export financing provided by EGAs is
now considerably higher than the combined total of bilateral and multilateral
development assistance, and one estimate is that EGAs now finance eight per
cent of all global exports (Goldzimer, 2002; Rich et al., 2000). In the process,
EGAs have become very substantial creditors of the developing countries. As
Bruce Rich of the Environmental Defense Fund points out, EGAs 'are not
foreign assistance agencies. They are domestic assistance agencies. Their
mission is to boost the overseas sales of their countries' multinational
corporations' (Rich, 2000: 32).
For many years, NGOs have been critical of the lack of environmental
standards for EGAs, calling attention to their role in financing such
environmentally destructive activities as large-scale forest clearance in
Indonesia, extractive industries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the construction
of China's Three Gorges Dam (Fried & Soentoro, 2002; NGO Working Group,
2000, 2001; Norlen et al, 2002; Rich et al., 2000). To restate a point, the
159
Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
provision of such financing is primarily motivated not by benevolence, but
rather by a desire to create or expand markets for firms in the financing
country. A key element of the critique has involved lack of transparency:
historically, EGAs have functioned very much on the model of private
commercial corporations, without the degree of public disclosure,
consultation and assessment of environmental impacts that have come to be
expected from official aid agencies. The G8, reportedly with leadership from
the United States, and resistance from France and Germany (Rich, 2000),
have commendably recognized the importance of this issue, noting in 2001:
We are committed to ensuring that our Export Credit Agencies (EGAs)
adhere to high environmental standards. We therefore agreed in
Okinawa to develop common environmental guidelines for EGAs,
drawing on relevant MDB experience. Building on the progress made
since last year, we commit to reach agreement in the OECD by the end
of the year on a Recommendation that fulfils the Okinawa mandate
(Genoa Communique, para. 29).
In December 2001, the OECD failed to reach complete agreement on
environmental guidelines for EGAs. However, a February 2002 announcement
(OECD, 2002a) indicated that 'most Member countries have unilaterally agreed
to implement' a set of environmental guidelines developed by the OECD
Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees. Whether all the G8
countries have adopted the guidelines is not clear. Even if they have, ongoing
evaluations will be needed of whether and how the guidelines as interpreted
and implemented by individual countries conform to the principles of
sustainable development.
The Canadian situation illustrates this point. A recent review of new measures
taken by Export Development Canada, at least in part independently of the
OECD process, indicated that 'Canada retains plenty of room to avoid careful
environmental assessments and public scrutiny' (Reader, 2002; see also NGO
Working Group, 2003). In January 2003, a coalition of Canadian NGOs released
a report highly critical of Export Development Canada's disclosure policy and
lack of consistent standards for environmental review, pointing out that the
agency is not required even to disclose whether it is considering financing
seven large-scale industrial projects being undertaken by Canadian companies
in the developing world (NGO Working Group, 2003).
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Commitments on Multilateral Environmental
Agreements
G8 performance on environmental issues related to health can also be assessed
with respect to three major international agreements. When the Stockholm
Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs), adopted in 2001, comes
into force, it will begin the process of eliminating releases of 12 chemical
pollutants that are recognized as threats to human health and the
environment. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (to the UN Convention
on Biodiversity), adopted in 2000, will create a set of procedures for managing
trade in Living Modified Organisms (LMOs). Both agreements were
'welcomed' by the G8:
We welcome the recent adoption of the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) and will strongly promote its early
entry into force (Genoa Communique, para. 28).
We ... welcome the conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety, and encourage the parties concerned to work for its early
entry into force (Okinawa Communique, para. 64).
Although the language of these commitments is ambiguous, their supportive
intent seems clear. Nevertheless, at this writing, only Canada, Germany and
Japan among the G8 have ratified or acceded to the Stockholm Convention,
and none of the G8 countries has individually ratified the Cartagena Protocol,
although the EU has done so.3 The US is not even a party to the Biodiversity
Convention. In 1992, the first President Bush declined to sign the Convention
on Biodiversity, citing concerns including the lack of sufficient protection
for intellectual property. President Clinton subsequently signed the treaty
and submitted it to the Senate for ratification, but the Senate did not act on
this request (Segara & Fletcher, 2001: 2-3). Consequently, the US cannot be a
party to the Cartagena Protocol, although it attends meetings of the parties
to the Biodiversity Convention as an observer.
In terms of G8 performance as measured against specific summit
commitments, the dominant current issue is undoubtedly the contrasting
position of national governments with respect to the Kyoto Protocol for
limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The protocol (to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change) sets targets and timetables for
cutting each developed country's emissions of the greenhouse gases that
have been identified, by an overwhelming consensus among scientists (IPCC,
2001), as contributing to recent and future global climate change. It includes
provisions for an emissions trading regime among industrialized countries,
to accommodate situations in which it is less costly for countries to buy
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emissions credits than to reduce their own emissions, and also provides a
'Clean Development Mechanism' for financing emissions reductions in
developing countries.
A review conducted for the WHO in 2000 found that 'climate change is
likely to have wide-ranging and potentially serious health consequences' as
a result of impacts including increased frequency of extreme weather events,
broader distribution of vector-borne infectious diseases, localized reductions
in crop yields, changes in water quality and quantity, and increased urban
heat stress and air pollution (Kovats etal., 2000:16-23). This assessment was
corroborated by the contributors to the health component of the third report
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (McMichael &
Githeko, 2001), which is perhaps the largest-scale international collaboration
ever assembled around a specific scientific and policy challenge. Vulnerable,
low-income populations will be the first to experience adverse health effects
associated with climate change (Patz & Kovats, 2002); they are also likely to
have the fewest resources for effective adaptation. The rich can always turn
up the air conditioner, increase the food budget, or move to higher ground;
the poor have no such options. Poor countries are also less likely to have the
health infrastructure necessary to cope with (for instance) the expanded range
of infectious disease vectors (Githeko etal., 2000).
In 2001, the position of the G8 was as follows:
We recognise that climate change is a pressing issue that requires a
global solution. We are committed to providing strong leadership.
Prompt, effective and sustainable action is needed, consistent with
the ultimate objective of the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change of stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
(Genoa Communique, para. 23).
We all firmly agree on the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
While there is currently disagreement on the Kyoto Protocol and its
ratification, we are committed to working intensively together to meet
our common objective (Genoa Communique, para. 24).
These statements should be compared with the still guarded, but more
forceful, endorsements of the Kyoto Protocol at the Okinawa summit one
year earlier: 'We are strongly committed to ... early entry into force of the
Kyoto Protocol' (Okinawa Communique, para. 65; emphasis added); and at
the Cologne summit in 1999: '[we] resolve to make an urgent start on the
further work that is necessary to ratify and make Kyoto a reality (Cologne
Communique, para. 11; emphasis added).
G8 performance is a study in contrasts. With the exceptions of the United
States and Russia, all G8 countries have ratified or acceded to the Kyoto
162
Environment
Protocol,4 although substantial opposition was expressed in Canada. Canada
remains exposed to criticism for attempting to achieve Kyoto compliance
without reducing actual emission levels, through such mechanisms as export
credits for 'clean energy'-an approach that led one Canadian commentator
to describe Canada as a 'rogue state' in the environmental policy context
(Broadhead, 2001). Russia has delayed ratification, leading to concerns that
the protocol - which comes into force only when ratified by countries that
produce 55 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions - may become a
dead issue (MacKinnon, 2003). The United States, with the highest per capita
energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide among the G8 (see Table 8.1,
below), repudiated Kyoto after first signing the protocol. The positions of
Canada, Russia and the United States are all contrary to commitments made
by G8 environment ministers prior to the Cologne summit, to the effect that
'[w]e are determined to take the lead in combating climate change and to
make every effort to change our own emission trends by taking effective measure
domestically' (Schwerin G8 Environment Ministers Communique, para. 12;
emphasis added).
Energy Conservation and Renewable Energy
In addition to providing comparative information on the energy intensity of
the G8 economies, Table 8.1 also provides information on two reasonable, if
imperfect indicators of G7 countries' willingness to improve the efficiency
with which they use energy and to support a transition to renewable energy
sources: the tax they impose per litre of gasoline and their investment in
domestic research and development (R&D) on conservation and renewable
energy. Especially striking is the relation among carbon intensity, low levels
of gasoline tax and high levels of greenhouse gas emissions in Canada and
the United States, suggesting abundant opportunities for reducing
environmental impacts relative to comparably affluent economies and
societies elsewhere in the world.
A consensus is gradually emerging that, over the longer term, industrialized
economies in particular will need to reduce their current reliance on fossil
fuels. Although the consensus quickly dissolves once the talk turns to the
preferred replacements, in 2001 the G8 stated that '[w]e recognise the
importance of renewable energy for sustainable development, diversification
of energy supply, and preservation of the environment. We will ensure that
renewable energy sources are adequately considered in our national plans
and encourage others to do so as well' (Genoa Communique, para. 27).
It is too early to see how well this commitment will be honoured, but
recent trend data show a schism in G7 behaviour (Table 8.2, on page 165).
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Investments in renewable energy R&D over the past decade have been flat in
the US and Canada, in modest decline in Germany and Italy, and in rapid
and pronounced decline in the UK. Only France and Japan show increases,
with France's only more recently. Data on conservation R&D are a little more
encouraging for some G7 countries. Canada and the US show a rise in spending,
although the US level is still below its 1995 high mark; Japan has been
consistently increasing its expenditures, while Italy's performance remains flat.
Germany shows a slow decline, while UK spending has plunged dramatically.
R&D spending is, at best, an imperfect indicator of the extent to which
renewable energy is incorporated into 'national plans', since many more
factors affect the market penetration of renewable energy. Perhaps the most
important of these is the pricing structure for fossil fuels and the tax per litre
of gasoline (which is several times as high in the European G8 countries as
in Canada or the United States), which are perhaps the best bases for
comparing the seriousness of governmental commitments to a future of
reduced reliance on fossil fuels.
The G7 must also rate poorly on their ability to 'encourage others to do so
as well', at least as far as the World Bank is concerned. The ratio of fossil fuel
to renewable energy funding by the World Bank is 20:1, and it reportedly
rejects the establishment of targets for support for renewable energy (Halifax
Initiative, 2002).
The G8 in Genoa made a further commitment with respect to renewable
energy more generally:
We encourage continuing research and investment in renewable energy
technology, throughout the world. Renewable energy can contribute
to poverty reduction. We will help developing countries strengthen
institutional capacity and market-oriented national strategies that can
attract private sector investment in renewable energy and other clean
technologies (Genoa Communique, para. 27).
One indicator of G8 seriousness on this point will be an increase in ODA
commitments to renewable energy (see Table 8.3, below), which by 1999 had
declined by a remarkable 80 per cent from their peak in 1995.
Also in July 2001, the G8 Renewable Energy Task Force that was formed at the
Okinawa summit to examine renewable energy in developing countries (Okinawa
Communique, para. 66) issued its report. So far, there has not been a commitment
to implement the recommendations of that report (G8 Renewable Energy Task
Force, 2001 a), which focused on expanding the market for renewable energy
on both the demand and supply sides, 'ensuring that careful account is taken
of full societal costs and the broad range of benefits of alternative energy
supply options/ and mobilizing effective financing for renewables.
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* Excluding emissions from biomass-derived fuels, and from
n.a. = data not available.
Source: All figures from IEA (2001: Tables 9 & B14) except column 3
(tax per litre of gasoline), which is calculated from IEA (2003).
international marine and aviation bunkers.
fable 8.2: Trends in G7 Government Renewable Energy and Conservation R&D Budgets, 1989-2000 (US$ millions at 2000

































































































































































































































Source: IEA (2001: Tables B5 St B11)
n.a. = not available, or not available on a basis that permits meaningful comparison with previous or subsequent years.
* Calculated only for those years where figures are available for all seven countries.
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Source: G8 Renewable Energy Task Force (2001 b)
Johannesburg and the Retreat from Sustainable
Development
Many observers believed that the Stockholm Summit on the environment in
1972 signalled an overdue recognition on the part of the community of
nations that many environmental problems are both transnational and
interconnected. Twenty years later, the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro,
following as it did the Brundtland Commission's work on environment and
development (WCED, 1987), seemed to indicate a new receptiveness to
integrating environmental concerns with development strategy in a way that
prioritized the developing world's distinctive needs and aspirations. The
sustainable development imperative pervades Agenda 21, the action plan
developed for the summit, which, as we have noted, included such specific
commitments as the widely ignored pledge to increase ODA to the 0.7 per
cent figure.
Despite this lack of follow-through, expectations were high for the ten-
year follow-up to the Rio Summit (Rio +10), the World Summit on Sustainable
Development (WSSD) held in Johannesburg in 2002. In what seems in
retrospect to have been a warning sign, the only reference made to WSSD at
the 1999, 2000 and 2001 G8 summits was the commitment made in 2000
(Okinawa Communique, para. 65) that the G8 would 'endeavour with all
[their] partners to prepare a future-oriented agenda for Rio+10 in 2002.' A
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few weeks before the summit, a coalition of 32 countries, including all the
G8 except Russia, announced a US$2.92 billion replenishment of the Global
Environment Facility (GEF), which funds developing country projects in the
areas of biodiversity protection, climate change, protection of international
waters and ozone depletion. However, WSSD participants made few specific
commitments, primarily contenting themselves with restating the MDGs (UN,
2002c: paras. 7-S). Perhaps most notably, the commitment to establish a
'world solidarity fund to eradicate poverty' came with no dollar amounts
attached, and 'stress[ed] the voluntary nature of the contributions' (UN,
2002c: para. 7(b)).
The BBC's World Service quoted an Oxfam spokesperson describing the
WSSD as 'a triumph for greed and self-interest, a tragedy for poor people and
the environment' (http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/africa/2233969.stm,
accessed 18 January 2003) and a published NGO commentary captured a
widespread unease by concluding that '[t]he general sense is that but for
some small successes the Summit is one of great disappointments. It was the
largest and most expensive UN-sponsored Summit. But the Plan of
Implementation is toothless, lame even. It may as well be called the Plan for
Inaction' (Iyer, 2002). Although a detailed discussion of the WSSD is outside
the scope of this chapter, it appears clear that sustainable development,
especially the equity-driven version that featured prominently in Agenda 21,
has slid well down the industrialized world's list of priorities.
The actual site of the summit was described in the Guardian as 'a purpose-
built business centre ... surrounded by deep walls of police, electrified fences
and miles of concrete barriers', which 'only exists because the business
community has packed its bags and fled the terrible crime, impoverishment
and physical degradation of the old city centre' (Vidal, 2002). Indeed, the
juxtaposition of immense (and zealously guarded) wealth surrounded by
desperation arguably provides a metaphor for the world order that is emerging
as globalization proceeds apace. One is left to wonder whether G8
environmental policy in the future will be characterized by further retreats
from the idea that environmental protection represents a shared obligation,
in favour of a policy stance that regards environmental quality as just another
purchasable commodity, to which rich and poor alike are entitled only to
the extent that they can pay the price (on the domestic Canadian context, cf.
Schrecker, 2002).
Summary: Chapter 8
Environmental issues have generally been neglected by the G8. The G8, like
the other OECD countries, deserve praise for endorsing the principle of
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environmental review of EGA decisions. However, it is difficult to assess how
much difference this stance has made 'on the ground.' Canada, Germany
and Japan have ratified the Stockholm Convention on POPs, but no G8
country has individually ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
The United States deserves special criticism not only for failing to ratify
the Biodiversity Convention, but also for repudiating the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change, which has been ratified by all the other G7 countries. Russia
similarly merits criticism for its delay in ratification. G8 statements of support
for renewable energy sources have not been backed up either by increased
ODA for this purpose or, with a few exceptions, by increased R&D
commitments in their individual national budgets.
Explicit or Specific Commitments: Environment
• 'Prompt, effective and sustainable action is needed' on climate change
(Genoa).
• Firm agreement on the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but
'disagreement' on Kyoto protocol (Genoa, revisiting Cologne).
Accomplished: Too soon to tell. The Kyoto Protocol was ratified by all
G7 countries except the US, which repudiated after signing. Russia has
signed the protocol, but not ratified it.
Adequacy: It is too early to tell about the effectiveness of implementation.
The US repudiation, the Russian hesitation and the Canadian insistence
on flexibility all threaten to compromise the effectiveness of the protocol.
Comments: Canada and the US are the highest per capita greenhouse
gas emitters amongst the G7, with by far the lowest gasoline prices.
Gasoline tax increases would represent an important demonstration of
seriousness. However, US spending on conservation R&D more than
doubled between 1989 and 2000; the US and Japan are clear leaders here.
UK conservation R&D has plummeted.
• Commit to common environmental guidelines for EGAs (Genoa,
revisiting Okinawa).
Accomplished: OECD indicates that most member countries have adopted
its guidelines; G8 adoption is not clear.
Adequacy: Canadian NGOs suggest that Canada's EGA lacks transparency
and consistent standards for environmental review. Research on
implementation in other G7 countries is needed.
• Welcome and strongly promote early entry into force of Stockholm
Convention on POPs (Genoa).




Accomplished: Partially and unevenly. Only Canada, Germany and Japan
among the G8 have ratified or acceded to the Stockholm Convention.
None of the G8 countries has individually ratified the Cartagena Protocol,
although the EU has done so. The US has not even ratified the Biodiversity
Convention.
Implicit or Generic Commitments: Environment
• Ensure that renewable energy sources are adequately considered in G8
national energy plans; 'encourage others to do so as well' (Genoa).
Accomplished: Government renewable energy R&D spending 1989-2000
was stagnant in Canada, Italy and Japan; declined in Germany and the
UK; rose in the US and (from a very low level) France. In per capita terms
Japan is the clear leader.
Comments: R&D spending is an incomplete measure of commitment,
since market conditions, tax policy etc. are at least as important.
Encourage continuing research and investment in renewable energy
technology, throughout the world (Genoa).
Accomplished: No. G7 ODA commitments to renewable energy declined
by 80% between 1995 and 1999. World Bank support for fossil fuel
development was 20 times greater than its support for renewable energy.
Endnotes to Chapter Eight
1 These 'inherently global health issues' are located in various places in the analytical framework
presented in Chapter 1 (Figures 1.1 and 1.2).
2 In July 2002, Suez terminated its 30-year contract to provide water and sewage services to
Buenos Aires after the Argentine financial crisis led to an emergency decree overruling a contract
clause permitting Suez to link its water prices to the US dollar. Weak regulatory practices and
continuous renegotiation of the original 1993 contract allowed the Suez subsidiary Aguas
Argentines to earn a 19 per cent profit rate on its net worth, which turned into a US$500 million
loss with that country's 2002 financial crisis and the loss of the Buenos Aires concession. During
its nine years of water provision to the city, prices rose 20 per cent, compared to the company's
promise to lower them by 27 per cent (see Public Citizen, 2003).
3 This information is taken from the official web sites of the two agreements, http://www.pops/
int and http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety respectively (accessed 17 January 2003).
4 This information is taken from the official United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change web site, http://www.unfccc.int/resource/convkp.html (accessed 24 February 2003).
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CHAPTER NINE
Equity, Health and NEPAD:
A Case Study
Introduction
This book so far has examined some of the pathways through which the
health of individuals and populations is influenced by national and global
policy in domains ranging from macroeconomics to health-care financing
to protection of ecosystems. The relationships are complex, sometimes
converging and sometimes leading to opposing outcomes. Nevertheless, it is
clear that policies developed in relation to one context - the concerns of G8
leaders and countries, for example - influence both public policy and
population health in countries facing very different challenges and
opportunities. In this chapter, we focus on Africa and on NEPAD. The situation
of both health status and health systems in most of sub-Saharan Africa is
bleak. Reviewing and re-presenting some indicators of this reality reminds
us that the impacts of the complex threads we have been tracing throughout
this book are both concrete and severe.
NEPAD represents one element of the complex relationship between Africa
and the G8. While it is represented as a 'made in Africa' initiative, it was also
very much 'made in (and for) Genoa and Kananaskis.' Examining the document
and reflecting on the process of its development, as well as on the likelihood of
its success, this chapter offers a case study of the intersections of contexts and
approaches: what is at stake and what is decided globally and locally; how problems
are framed and how proposed solutions are developed and implemented; how
public policy addresses both the health sector and determinants of health. This
chapter, then, speaks to the reality of (ill) health in Africa, to NEPAD as a specific
response to this reality, and to the wider context of what is and is not on the
political agenda of both African and G8 leaders. While NEPAD is an initiative in
its own right, it can also be read as a chapter of the main narrative of this book,
namely, the G8 summit story.
NEPAD addresses many issues that relate to health and development. These
were identified during the development of the matrix (see Appendix 2). The
explicit health commitments are dealt with in the sections of this chapter
dealing with core health systems. Some of the key health-related commitments
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explicitly recognized, e.g. poverty, food and food security, GDP and GDP growth,
are either addressed here or throughout the book. In the latter case, these have
been reordered and grouped into G8 report sections that often cover several of
these topics, to facilitate integration within the G8 document.
Since the presentation of NEPAD at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, the
NEPAD program of action is being refined and a summary became available
in hard copy in July 2002. Within the NEPAD document, most of the content
relevant to health appears in the 'program of action' section, within the
'sectoral' sub-section on human resource development. Since the publication
of the NEPAD document, a draft health strategy has been developed, which
was made available to us only after the manuscript for this book was nearly
completed. We are pleased to note that many of our concerns raised below
have been largely addressed. However, this strategy document, although
finalized in August 2002, has yet to be made public and therefore its status is
still unclear. The chapter concludes with our reflections on both the potential
and likelihood of its successful implementation.
Global Policy, African Realities
Health and Development
Two potentially opposing views currently frame the debate concerning the
relationship between health and development. These diverging views are
visible throughout the policy responses discussed in this book.
Health as a Basic Human Right and Outcome of Development
'Health is a reflection of a society's commitment to equity and justice. Health
and human rights should prevail over economic and political concerns'
(People's Health Assembly, 2000b). Health is determined by myriad factors:
'Evidence from many countries shows that income is probably the most
important of the factors outside of the health sector, while others include social
inputs such as education, environmental inputs, access to clean water, and
general economic measures such as food rationing and subsidies, etc.' (Bijlmakers
etal., 1996: 18). This approach identifies economic and political factors as the
most significant determinants of health, as these factors determine who has
control over resources and decision-making and who has power over whom.
As Bijlmakers et al. put it,
[historical and contemporary experiences have shown that there is a
definite but complex relationship between economic growth on the
one hand and health status on the other. In general, sustained economic
growth ... does lead to improved health and nutritional status, but
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there is, however, no direct correlation between health and nutrition
indicators and GDP per capita because improved income distribution
can accelerate improvements in health (Bijlmakers et al., 1996: 17).
However, the last decades of the twentieth century have seen the increasing
dominance of neo-liberal economic policies and a weakening of the state.
This has been associated with increasingly unequal distribution of resources
that leads to unacceptable levels of hunger, poor health and impoverishment
(People's Health Assembly, 2000b: 11). Health care is being seen less as a
basic right than as a product that can be sold or exchanged for profit (People's
Health Assembly, 2000a).
Health as a Means to Achieve Economic Growth
The World Bank, in its 1993 Investing in Health report, emphasized health as
an input to rather than an outcome of economic growth and development.
Investing in Health proposed a three-pronged approach to government policies
in improving health, and emphasized that health services are only one factor
in explaining successes/gains made in health during the last decades. An
environment enabling households to improve health - focusing on economic
growth, education and gender equality -as well as diversity and competition
in the delivery of health services were presented as the other two approaches
(World Bank, 1993). A decade later, the Commission on Macroeconomics
and Health (CMH) called for a new strategy for investing in health for
economic growth, especially in the world's poorest countries (CMH, 2001).
We now turn to a recapitulation of progress and current realities in global
and African health. The choice, or mix, of views about the relation between
health and development significantly informs how the health situation is
interpreted, and what options for action are proposed.
Progress in Global and African Health
Globally, significant gains in health status were achieved during the last
decades of the twentieth century. Life expectancy increased from 46 years in
the 1950s to 65.6 years in 1999 (Social Watch, 2002). The number of child
deaths has been reduced from a projected 17.5 million to 12.5 million
annually. Substantial control of communicable diseases such as poliomyelitis,
diphtheria, measles, onchocerciasis and dracunculiasis through vaccination
and other disease control measures has been achieved. Industrialised countries
have seen a decline in male cardiovascular diseases.
Notwithstanding the above overall improvement in health, disaggregation
of infant, under-five mortality and life expectancy data reveals that the gap
in mortality rates between rich and poor countries has widened significantly.
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The relative probability of dying for under-five-year-olds in developing
countries compared to Western and Eastern European countries increased
from a ratio of 3.4 in 1950 to 8.8 in 1990 (Legge, 1993).





















* Relative probability of people in developing countries dying (across the ages
indicated) expressed as DDC/(FSE+EME) (the ratio of demographically developing
countries to the combined formerly socialist economies plus the established market
economies). Calculated by Legge from data in World Bank (1993).
Health Status in Africa
While in Africa, too, health status has improved over the last 50 years, the
current situation on the continent is of great concern, given the growing
disparities between Africa and the rest of the world, increasing inequalities
and even deteriorating indicators in many African countries.
Infant and Under-Five Mortality Rates
In 20 of the 53 African countries, an increase in infant mortality rate (IMR)
occurred between 1990 and 1999. In only seven of the 53 African countries is
the IMR equal to or below the world average of 45/1 000 live births; the 1999
IMR is equal to or higher than the average for developing countries (64/1 000
live births) in 37 African countries. The increases cannot be attributed to a
high HIV prevalence in all cases (Mauritius, Angola, Mauritania, Benin and
Niger). Eleven of the 20 countries that show an IMR increase have a per
capita GDP below US$1 per day.
Nor has the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) declined in all countries; in
ten countries, the U5MR showed an increase between 1990 and 2000. Only
nine African countries have a 2000 U5MR below the world average (78/1 000
live births), while the 2000 U5MR is higher than the average for developing
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countries (93/1 000 live births) in 39 African countries (of the 51 countries
for which data were available).
Life Expectancy
In 1999, 23 of 49 African countries for which trend data are available had a
lower life expectancy than in 1990. The decline in life expectancy is closely
linked to a high HIV prevalence rate: 21 of the 23 countries with a decline in
life expectancy have an HIV prevalence rate higher than the adult HIV
prevalence rate of 4.13 per cent, the average of all LDCs. The number of HIV-
infected people in Africa is estimated at 28 million, approximately 70 per
cent of the total of HIV-infected people globally (Collins & Rau, 2000).
Table 9.2: Adult HIV Prevalence Data in Africa
Adult HIV prevalence rate
Equal or below 0.99% (world average)
0.99%-1.18% (average for all developing countries)










Source: UNDP (2000: Table 10)
Non-Communicable Diseases
To aggravate matters, many developing countries are experiencing an
'epidemiological transition', with cardiovascular diseases, cancers, diabetes,
other chronic conditions and traumas replacing communicable diseases in
some social groups, but in others, coexisting with them. This constitutes an
epidemiological polarization, with poorer sectors of the population
experiencing high child mortality and morbidity as well as a high burden of
non-communicable disease (Frenk etal, 1989). In South Africa, for example,
children from poor families still suffer mainly from infectious diseases,
whereas increasing rates of hypertension, chronic lung diseases and diabetes
affect the urban, and especially poorer, adult population (South African
Demographic and Health Survey, 1998).
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Health Services in Africa
Public Expenditure on Health
Public expenditure on health has increased globally from 4.7 per cent to 5.6
per cent of GDP. This increase is most notable in high-income countries. A
smaller, but still significant, increase has been experienced in middle-income
countries. However, low-income countries, more than half of which are African
countries, have seen a reduction in public expenditure on health overall, as
shown in Table 9.3.
Table 9.3: Public Health Expenditure
46 high-income countries





$4 319 billion (22 African
countries included)
34 low-income countries



















Source: UNDP (2000: Table 16)
Trends in public expenditure on health, education and defence show positive
signs, as can be seen in Table 9.4.
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Source: UNDP (2000: Table 16)
Data on education expenditure are from 1990 and 1995-98, data on health
expenditure are from 1990 and 1996-98, and data on military expenditure are from
1990 and 1998.
However, actual expenditure on health in Africa falls far short of the costs of
a package of minimum necessary health services, as estimated by the former
Director-General of the WHO (US$60), the CMH (US$34) or the World Bank
(US$12) (see Table 9.5).
Only six African countries spend more than US$60 per capita per annum,
and only nine countries spend more than US$34 to cover essential health
services. Even using the US$12 per capita per annum package proposed by
the World Bank (1993), only 19 African countries of 46 countries for which
data are available spend this amount or more. These figures have profound
implications for health policy implementation in Africa.
Allocation of Financial Resources to Different Levels of the Health
System
Apart from a reduction in financial resources for public health expenditure,
many countries have also been unable to reallocate resources significantly
from tertiary and specialized services to basic health services or find increased
resources to moderate the imbalance, despite warnings given as early as the
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mid-1960s (King, 1966). In Ghana, for instance, only 42 per cent of the health
budget is allocated to district-level health service delivery, while the central
Ministry of Health's budget allocation amounts to 16 per cent, tertiary facilities
use almost 20 per cent and regional-level services use 23 per cent of the
national health budget (Addai & Caere, 2001).















Seychelles, South Africa, Mauritius, Botswana,
Tunisia, Namibia
Algeria, Swaziland, Cape Verde
Gabon, Morocco, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Sao
Tome & Principe, Senegal, Republic of Congo,
Cote d'lvoire, Comoros
Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania, Cameroon, Gambia,
Togo, Central African Republic, Uganda, Kenya,
Burkina Faso, Benin, Chad, Eritrea, DRC, Nigeria,
Mozambique, Madagascar, Niger, Zambia, Mali,
Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Burundi,
Malawi, Tanzania, Sierra Leone
Libya, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Djibouti,
Somalia, Liberia
Source: UNDP (2000)
Calculations based on 1998 GDP per capita (1995 US$) and 1998 public expenditure
on health as % of GDP.
Health Sector Access
Access to health services improved considerably during the period 1980-90,
but has worsened in many countries since health sector reforms, in particular
user charges and other cost recovery mechanisms, were introduced. The
introduction of user charges has been shown to be associated with a decline
in the number of obstetric admissions and deliveries in hospitals, with an
accompanying increase in perinatal mortality and maternal mortality amongst
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those delivering outside hospitals. Generally, utilization of health services by
households with low incomes has also declined (Simms etal, 2001). Health-
sector performance is reflected by Expanded Programme on Immunisation
(EPI) coverage data given below.
Health-Sector Performance
Vaccination coverage is considered a good indicator of health-service access
and performance. As the WHO state, 'the effectiveness of immunization
services is an excellent indicator of the effectiveness of the health systems'
and coverage rates are a good indicator of the 'degree of efficiency of a
particular reform process' (Simms etal., 2001). The different components of
an effective vaccination program - supervision, training, logistics - are also
required for the provision of other basic services (Simms et al, 2001).
Vaccination Coverage in Africa
Between 1990 and 1999, many African countries achieved an increase in
vaccination coverage for all six antigens. However, a significant number of
countries saw their vaccination coverage decrease and, more importantly,
few countries managed to achieve coverage rates that provide 'herd immunity.'
Only two countries have a measles vaccination coverage that protects the
population as a whole, i.e. a higher than 95 per cent measles vaccination coverage
(UNICEF, 1985: 67-8). Thirty-five countries have measles coverage below 75
per cent. A similar pattern can be seen for DPT coverage: pertussis herd
immunity is only achieved when the vaccination coverage is above 95 per cent
(UNICEF, 1985: 67-8). Only four African countries have achieved this coverage.
The Global Polio Eradication Initiative has organized intensive vaccination
campaigns outside of the routine vaccination activities and achieved a
significant reduction in the number of reported poliomyelitis cases. The
campaign has also resulted in an increase in coverage in 23 countries. However,
33 countries still have polio vaccination coverage below 75 per cent.
Human Resources for Health
Health personnel account for 60-80 per cent of recurrent expenditure and
are key to health systems (World Bank, 1994: 85-98). Physician and nurse to
population ratios are generally low in Africa and disguise the unequal
distribution of health personnel between rural and urban areas and, in some
African countries between private and public sectors.
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Source: Social Watch (2002: Table 10)


























































Source: Social Watch (2002: Table 10)
























































Source: Social Watch (2002: Table 10)
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Source: Social Watch (2002: Table 10)
Physician/1 000 people ratio (World Bank, ZOOlb):
High-income countries: 2.8/1 000
Middle-income countries: 1.8/1 000
Low-income countries: 0.5/1 000
Sub-Saharan Africa: 0.1/1000.
Morale of health personnel in Africa is increasingly undermined, because of:
• Low remuneration;
• Inadequate staff support and supervision;
• Inadequate working and living conditions;
• The impact of HIV/AIDS, which results in both increased demand for
health care as well as a high HIV prevalence amongst health workers; and
• Movement of health professionals from the public to the private sector
and from developing to developed countries without appropriate
replacement strategies (Dovlo, 2001; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001).
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Determinants of Health outside the Health Sector
Declines in per capita GDP occurred in 23 African countries between 1990
and 1998, while the number of countries with an average per capita GDP
below US$1 per day changed from 23 of 48 countries to 23 of 50 countries,
a slight improvement. However, the GDP data are aggregates that do not show
the increasing gap between the rich and the poor within countries, a process
that has occurred in parallel with globalization (UNDP, 2000).
Increased access to adequate housing, water and sanitation, education and
improved food security, as well as to improved health care, has contributed
to the gains in health status. However, much remains to be done in developing
countries to achieve sustainable gains, as:
• Nearly 1.1 billion people in the developing world, approximately 25 per
cent of whom lived in Africa, lacked access to a safe water supply in 2000;
• Approximately 2.4 billion people in developing countries, approximately
ten per cent of whom lived in Africa, still lacked access to proper sanitation
in 2000; and
• More than one billion people in developing countries lived without
adequate shelter or in unacceptable housing, while at least 600 million
people world-wide lived in dwellings that threaten their health and lives,
and 100 million people were homeless (UNDP, 1997: 29, 42,169, 218).
Twelve African countries have been or are still involved in conflict, while
neighbouring countries are affected by the conflicts because of population
movements across international borders. The breakdown in the delivery of
most social services, including health care, is a frequent accompaniment of
conflict.
Trends in Development of Public Health Services:
Globalisation, Health and Health Services in Africa
The increased mobility of capital and labour and cheaper costs of
communication have accelerated the pre-existing economic, political and
social interdependence that characterizes the modern phase of globalization.
Among the most important early interventions that have had the effect of
further integrating developing countries into the global economy, primarily
through the imposition of stringent debt repayments and the liberalization
of trade, have been SAPs promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. SAPs
have also resulted in significant macroeconomic policy changes, public sector
restructuring and reduced social provision, with negative effects on education,
health and social services for the poor: The majority of studies in Africa,
whether theoretical or empirical, are negative towards structural adjustment
and its effects on health outcomes' (Breman & Shelton, 2001).
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Health Sector Reform
Health sector reform was introduced in the late 1980s. It was a reflection in
the health sector of the dominant economic policies of the 'Washington
Consensus' era, including key features of globalization: the dominance of
market forces, the transformation of production systems and labour markets,
the integration of the global economy (including insurance), and pressure
on governments to reduce budgets and increase internal efficiency. In most
cases, health sector reform includes the following component areas (Cassels,
1995, 1997; fireman & Shelton, 2001):
• Actions to improve the performance of the civil service;
• Decentralization of management responsibility and/or provision of health
care to the local level;
• Actions to improve the efficiency of the national ministry of health;
• Universal delivery of a core set of essential services;
• Broadening health financing options - e.g. user fees, insurance schemes;
introduction of managed competition between providers of clinical and
support services;
• Working with the private sector through contracting, regulating and
franchising different service providers; and
• Adopting sector-wide approaches to aid rational planning.
Health sector reform was seen as an intervention that would increase the
efficiency and improve the functioning of health systems. At the start of the
twenty-first century, an assessment of progress is, however, sobering.
Questions have been raised about the sustainability of mass vaccination
campaigns (Hall & Cutts, 1993), the effectiveness of health-facility-based
growth monitoring (Chopra & Sanders, 1997), and the appropriateness of
oral rehydration therapy (ORT) when promoted as sachets or packets and
without a significant strengthening of health system infrastructure and
corresponding emphasis on nutrition, water and sanitation (Werner & Sanders,
1997). For example, although Ethiopia has managed to increase polio
vaccination coverage to approximately 80 per cent in 2001 from less than ten
per cent in 1992, largely as a result of vaccination campaigns, five suspected
cases of polio have been reported recently in a remote area (IRIN, 2001). A
systematic review has pointed out the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of
directly observed therapy for TB (DOTS) in the absence of well-functioning
health services and community engagement (Volmink & Garner, 1997). Only
when these core service activities are embedded in a more comprehensive
approach (which includes paying attention to social equity, health systems
and human capacity development), are real and sustainable improvements in
the health status of populations seen (Halstead et al., 1985; Fitzroy et al., 1990).
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Human Resources for Health: A Key Challenge
In many African countries, tertiary health facilities (teaching and specialist
hospitals) have continued to retain high proportions of the health budget
(Addai & Caere, 2001). These general trends in resource allocation reflect
and have contributed to a misdistribution of staff, many of whom prefer to
work in well-resourced tertiary care facilities and in urban areas. Eventually,
as these facilities have also deteriorated, they have joined the brain drain
into the private sector or to other countries (Dovlo, 1999).
The haemorrhage of health professionals from African countries is easily
the single most serious human resource problem facing health ministries
today. This drain occurs from developing countries to the developed world
but also to the relatively better-off developing countries. For example, South
Africa, despite its own emigration problems, is the recipient of large numbers
of doctors from other African countries. Some 20 per cent of doctors
(approximately 6 000) on the South African Medical Register in 1999 were
expatriates (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001). The population to physician
ratios in Africa are amongst the highest in the world: Uganda has one doctor
per 24 000 people (Bundred & Levitt, 2000), while vacancy rates for physicians
in Ghana, Lesotho, Namibia and Malawi were 42.6 per cent, 7.6 per cent, 26
per cent and 36.3 per cent respectively in 1998 (Dovlo, 2001; Dovlo &
Nyonator, 1999; Browne, 2000; WHO Lesotho Country Team, 1994).
The recipient countries of the 'brain drain' are few. Agreements to manage
the process and the numbers as well as the involvement of the 'exporting'
countries in the recruitment and selection process could ameliorate the
situation and ensure some remittance of earnings. For example, in 1996 and
1998, Ghana's Ministry of Health entered into agreements with the Ministry
of Health in Jamaica and with some recruitment agencies in the United
Kingdom, aimed mainly at restricting numbers recruited so as to avoid
collapse of services and to ensure health professionals' return after an agreed
period (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001).
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The NEPAD Report Card Project
Structure of NEPAD
The NEPAD document contains the following sections:
• Introduction;
• Africa in today's world;
• The new political will of African leaders;
• Appeal to the peoples of Africa;
• Programme of action;
• A new global partnership;
• Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development;
• Conclusion.
NEPAD's Programme of Action is divided into three sections, which deal with:
a) Conditions for sustainable development (including peace, security,
democracy, and political and economic governance);
b) Sectoral priorities (including infrastructure, human resource development
(which includes poverty reduction, education, the brain drain and health),
agriculture, environment, culture, science and technology); and
c) Mobilizing resources (including capital flows and market access).
Health is not NEPAD's primary focus; development is. The main goal is to
eradicate poverty by meeting the IDGs formulated in 1999 for the new
millennium. Nonetheless, NEPAD does contain health commitments that
are explicitly recognised, as well as non-health factors that are explicitly
acknowledged as having an impact on health.
These acknowledgements are important, because NEPAD is not being
assessed in terms of criteria that have been externally imposed on it. The
authors of NEPAD themselves recognize the interconnectedness of health
and development.
Basic Principles of NEPAD: Neo-liberal Macroeconomic
Policies
NEPAD in its overall thrust appears to accept uncritically a neo-liberal
economic paradigm. While we cannot engage in detail with all of the aspects
and implications of this, it is of concern that, for example in NEPAD, para.
24, SAPs are presented as having provided a 'partial solution' and that some
'countries achieved sustainable higher growth under [SAPs]' -whereas there
is much evidence that SAPs have had a negative impact on both the economies
of African countries and their health sectors, as described in earlier sections
of this report (Breman & Shelton, 2001; Bijlmakers etal., 1996).
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The NEPAD position on globalization is not always clear. Some paragraphs
clearly contradict each other:
para. 28: While globalization has increased the cost of Africa's ability
to compete, we hold that the advantages of an effectively managed
integration present the best prospects for future economic prosperity
and poverty reduction.
para. 40: Experience shows that, despite the unparalleled
opportunities that globalization has offered to some previously poor
countries, there is nothing inherent in the process that automatically
reduces poverty and inequality.
Conception, Design and Formulation, and Consultation Process
The NEPAD document is a merger of two separately conceived plans, the
Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) developed by South Africa, and the
OMEGA plan, developed by the Senegalese Head of State. The OMEGA plan
largely focused on infrastructural improvements, while MAP focused on
economic policies aimed at sustainable development through stimulating
economic growth on the continent. The formulation and subsequent merger
of the two plans into NEPAD were achieved without participation of ordinary
African citizens. Consultation with African civil society and think tanks only
started after NEPAD and its predecessors had been presented at the Genoa
G8 summit of 2001 and the World Economic Forum in New York in 2002
(Bond, 2002). Despite the fact that many Africans have yet to make their first
telephone call, the NEPAD document was, until recently, only accessible
through NEPAD's web site. Furthermore, NEPAD sectoral implementation
plans have not been made available to the public. Only in July 2002 were
hard copies of NEPAD's Initial Action Plan and the Summary of the NEPAD
Action Plan available. Detailed sectoral plans are currently being formulated,
but again, civil society is largely precluded from participating in this process.
Position of NEPAD on Health
The position taken throughout the NEPAD document is that health is a means
to achieve economic growth. It does not clearly recognize health as a basic
human right or as an outcome of equitable development. The following
paragraphs are indicative of this position:
para. 64: The challenge for Africa... is to develop the capacity to sustain
growth at levels required to achieve poverty reduction and sustainable
development. This, in turn, depends on other factors such as
infrastructure ... human capital... health, and good stewardship of the
environment.
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para. 128: Health ... contributes to increase in productivity and,
consequently, to economic growth. The most obvious effects of health
improvement... are the reduction in lost working days ... the increase
in productivity ... and the chance to secure better-paid jobs.
Living and working conditions, social service delivery and food security have
not improved for a large number of African people, and the majority live
below absolute poverty levels. 'Old' diseases, such as TB and malaria, and
'new' diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, affect large numbers of people, while
African countries' health systems have been undermined to the extent that
they are unable to provide even for the most basic health needs of their
populations (Simms etal., 2001; Sanders etal., 2002).
NEPAD does not pay sufficient attention to these issues. While NEPAD in
its health-sector objectives and actions 'encourages African countries to give
higher priority to health in their own budgets and to phase in such increases
in expenditure to be mutually determined/ it is difficult to see how this will
happen in the current economic climate on the continent. As Stephen Lewis,
UN special envoy for HIV/AIDS, recently said about NEPAD,
'[f]or all its talk of trade, and investment, and governance, and
corruption, and matters relating to financial architecture, there is only
pro forma sense of the social sectors, only modest reference to the
human side of the ledger. And in a fashion quite startling, in fact
disturbingly startling, NEPAD hardly mentions HIV/AIDS at all. ...
unless we deal with HIV/AIDS, all the proud declarations of NEPAD
are doomed (Lewis, 2002).
NEPAD Statements and Commitments Explicitly Relevant to
Health
This section considers the overarching goals of NEPAD's Programme of Action
(para. 68) that concern the IDGs directly related to health as well as para. 123
(objectives for the health sector) and para. 121 (reversing the brain drain).
The last has been included here because personnel are a vital component of
health systems.
International Development Goals (NEPAD, para. 68)
The NEPAD Programme of Action is the 'new and radical' approach for Africa
(NEPAD, para. 70). It aims to achieve a seven per cent annual GDP growth
rate, and the International Development Goals (IDGs) (NEPAD, para. 68).
The IDGs are considered a standard by which to measure progress (World
Bank, 2001b: 3). However, the World Bank, in the same document,
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acknowledges that sub-Saharan Africa is unlikely to achieve the poverty
reduction goal:
Even if we achieve the goal of cutting global poverty rates in half, the
number of people living in extreme poverty will fall by only one third.
China and India will see the largest improvements, but in Sub-Saharan
Africa the number will rise.... If they [China and India] do [maintain
average GDP per capita growth of 3.7 per cent per annum], the goal of
reducing poverty rates to half the 1990 level will be achieved in all
regions except sub-Saharan Africa.
As shown earlier in this chapter, the three IDGs that deal with health directly
• reduction in infant and under-five mortality rates, reduction in maternal
mortality ratios and universal access to reproductive health services - are
unlikely to be achieved. The necessary conditions for achieving a significant
reduction in infant and under-five mortality continue to involve not only
improved health services, but also provision of adequate water, sanitation
and housing; addressing food insecurity and consequent malnutrition;
education, in particular improving participation of girls in schooling; and,
last but not least, dealing with the HIV/AIDS pandemic and conflicts.
Public sector health spending has increased, but in most countries remains
far below minimum recommended levels. Governments have been unable
to provide adequate health services because of inadequate funding in the
face of an increased demand owing to HIV/AIDS, high attrition rates of health
personnel due to high HIV prevalence levels, and increasing migration of
health professionals to developed countries. Other communicable disease
control programs have not seen an increase in funding, be it from national
governments or from foreign donors, apart from the recently launched GFATM
and the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization.
Infant and Under-Five Mortality Rates
The World Bank states that the IDGs' target of a two-thirds reduction in
infant and under-five mortality rates will depend on:
• Halting the spread of HIV/AIDS;
• Increasing the capacity of developing countries' health systems to deliver
more health services; and
• Ensuring that technological progress in the medical field spills over to
benefit the developing world (World Bank, 2001 a).
Comparisons of declines in IMR and U5MR globally and in sub-Saharan Africa
is shown in Tables 9.10 and 9.11.
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Dramatic improvements occurred during the period between 1960 and 1999,
e.g. in medical technologies such as in diagnostic equipment, equipment
and drugs for treatment, vaccines, access to water and sanitation, and
education. However, the global gains in IMR and U5MR during these 40 years
are still below what the IDGs aim for during the 25-year period between
1990 and 2015. The gains on the African continent during this 40-year period
amounted to 33 per cent - significant progress, but still 50 per cent below
the IDG target set for the period between 1990 and 2015.
Maternal Mortality
The challenges of meeting the IDG target of a 75 per cent reduction in the
maternal mortality ratio (MMR = maternal deaths per 100 000 live births) are
similarly far removed from reality. Many women still lack access to health
services to monitor pregnancies and receive adequate obstetrical care. Accuracy
of reported information on maternal deaths continues to be a major cause
for concern. Testimony to this is that almost all African countries report
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MMR in units of hundreds. Maternal deaths and MMRs are not reported by all
countries and are generally based on reports from national authorities. Only
periodically do the WHO and UNICEF evaluate the situation on antenatal and
obstetrical care to make adjustments for acknowledged problems of under-
reporting (in particular in countries with inadequate access to health services)
and misclassification, i.e. deaths of women of reproductive age that are not
specifically related to pregnancy or delivery.
Data provided by the UNDP are incomplete, but show the following:
• In countries with high Human Development Index rank (46 countries,
no African country), MMR ranges between 0 and 150, with the majority
of countries reporting an MMR <10.
• In countries with medium Human Development Index rank (93 countries,
22 African countries), MMR ranges between 0 and 600.
• In countries with low Human Development Index rank (35 countries, 29
sub-Saharan African countries), MMR ranges between 350 and 1 100
(UNDP, 2000).
The World Development Indicators 2002 provides 1995 data which are 'modeled
estimates' (World Bank, 2002d), i.e. are estimated with a statistical method
using data on fertility, birth attendance and HIV prevalence. Using this method,
the MMRs range between two and 2 300. Unfortunately, trend data that would
allow measuring progress in reaching the IDGs target are not available. The
World Bank 1995 data show that in 39 of the 50 African countries with available
data, the MMR is higher than 500 maternal deaths per 100 000 live births.











Source: World Bank (2002d)
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Access to Reproductive Health Services for All Who Need Them by
2015
Reproductive health care includes a large number of services. The only
indicator introduced to measure progress towards achieving this target is
contraceptive prevalence. This indicator should be considered inadequate,
because it measures both 'modern' and 'traditional' contraceptive methods,
it often excludes unmarried women and it excludes men as users of
contraceptive methods. Apart from MMR and contraceptive prevalence, data
on the number of births attended by skilled health personnel are collected,
but are scant. No data are available for 13 of the 53 countries, while trend
data are only available for 19 of the 40 countries with data from either 1990
or 1999. The available data show that an increase in births attended by skilled
health personnel occurred in 11 countries, while eight countries showed a
reduction. However, the percentage of births attended by skilled health
workers is below 50 per cent in 13 of the 22 countries with 1999 data. In nine
countries, this percentage is above 50 per cent, with four countries having a
percentage higher than 80.
The above evidence raises questions about the wisdom/value of adopting
the IDGs in NEPAD's Programme of Action. The usefulness of setting goals is
not in dispute and it would be difficult for Africa not to endorse the IDGs, as
it would exclude Africa from the rest of the world. However, the goals of a
program of action need to be realistically achievable, and it is not clear that
NEPAD has recognized the seriousness of the constraints on achieving the
IDGs.
The Health Sector in NEPAD
NEPAD's Programme of Action deals with health and the health sector in its
paragraphs 123, 124, 125, 126 and 128. The objectives and plan of action for
the health sector can be found in paragraphs 123 and 124. However, the most
important articles that underpin NEPAD objectives for the health sector are
the following:
Health, defined by the WHO as a state of complete physical and mental
well-being, contributes to increase in productivity and, consequently,
to economic growth. The most obvious effects of health improvement
on the working population are the reduction in lost working days due
to sick leave, the increase in productivity and the chance to secure better-
paid jobs. Eventually, improvement in health and nutrition directly
contributes to improved well-being as the spread of diseases is controlled,
infant mortality rates are reduced and life-expectancy is higher. The
link with poverty reduction is clearly established (NEPAD, para. 128).
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In the health sector, Africa compares very poorly with the rest of
the world. In 1997, child and juvenile [sic] death rates were 105 and
169 per 1,000, as against 6 and 7 per 1,000 respectively in developed
countries. Life expectancy is 48.9 years, as against 77.7 years in
developed countries. Only 16 doctors are available per 100,000
inhabitants, as against 253 in industrialised countries. Poverty, reflected
in very low per capita incomes, is one of the major factors limiting the
population's capacity to address their health problems (NEPAD, para.
126).
Africa is home to major endemic diseases. Bacteria and parasites
carried by insects, the movement of people and other carriers thrive,
favoured as they are by weak environmental policies and poor living
conditions. One of the major impediments facing African development
efforts is the widespread incidence of communicable diseases, in
particular HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Unless these epidemics
are brought under control, real gains in human development will
remain an impossible hope (NEPAD, para. 125).
One of the most telling statements in these paragraphs is related to the direct
link NEPAD makes between the strength of the health sector and infant and
under-five mortality and life expectancy. It is clear that the health sector has
a role in and can contribute to the reduction of IMR and U5MR and in
increasing life expectancy. However, most determinants of health and ill-
health lie outside of the health sector, as we have pointed out above. There is
also a strong reliance on the GFATM to provide the necessary funds. The
GFATM is one of two recently established joint public and private initiatives
(JPPIs) that bring together public and corporate funding in the fight against
these diseases. Are these JPPIs an opportunity or a threat for Africa?
The Global Fund for the Fight against AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria
While the establishment of the GFATM is welcome, there is concern that
Africa's mixed experience of health policy implementation in the past 20
years should inform the utilization of these new resources. As a recent British
Medical Journal editorial stated, '[t]he dominant fear ... was that this new
public-private partnership fund would (yet again) be donor led. As a result
undue emphasis would be put on supplying drugs rather than building up
capacity to implement and sustain effective treatment and preventive
programmes' (Richards, 2001). What is as yet unclear is how the GFATM will
achieve its goals in the absence of strong health systems, resulting from
undermining by cuts in public expenditure under the SAPs, the health sector
reforms, and international policies and agreements that have led to increased
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migration of skilled health workers from the public to the private sector and
from developing to developed countries.
Many agree that prevention efforts have to be given emphasis in the absence
of cures and limited access to therapy. However, many also acknowledge that
HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria are 'straining an already frayed health
infrastructure' with 75 per cent of AIDS deaths, 22 per cent of TB deaths and
90 per cent of malaria deaths occurring in sub-Saharan Africa, where ten per
cent of the world's population lives (WHO, 2002d). The sustainability of the
GFATM's efforts is also questioned: 'Long-term sustainability can only be
achieved if the fund can be used to support system development and improve
the delivery of health services' (Ireland & Webb, 2001). This view was
supported by Stephen Lewis in a speech at the People's Summit in Calgary:
'The importance of health services is re-emerging as pivotal for their role in
dispensing commodities and care and ensuring therapy adherence by people
living with these infections. Health facilities must be re-vitalised' (Lewis,
2002).
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)
This initiative, supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, was
launched in January 2000. The first disbursements were made in 2000-01.
The reservations expressed in the context of GAVI were similar to those for
the GFATM: success will, to a large extent, depend on the strength of health
systems to deliver routine vaccination services (Starling et al., 2002).
Experience shows that those reservations were justified: 90 per cent of funds
were allocated to the introduction of new vaccines (DPT + Hep B or DPT +
Hep B + HIB) and single-use injection materials, while only ten per cent of
funds were allocated to strengthening vaccination services (Harden, 2001).
GAVI funds are disbursed through a separate fund, not via the sector-wide
approaches for health and development (SWAps) basket funding mechanisms,
because of possible delays in the implementation of the program. But more
importantly, countries only receive funding through GAVI if new vaccines
(either the quadravalent or pentavalent vaccine) and single-use syringe needles
+ disposal boxes are accepted. The support for health systems mainly concerns
training of staff involved in vaccination service delivery. As one bilateral
donor put it, '[although GAVI is integrated into routine immunization, it
comes with a vertical training programme .... Donors encourage global
initiatives that run counter to a systems approach and do not build capacity
in governments .... GAVI runs the risk of being too much about commodities
and supply, with insufficient emphasis on systems' (Starling et al., 2002).
Also in the context of GAVI, serious concerns have been raised about long-
term sustainability: the additional costs of the introduction of the new
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pentavalent vaccine for the national vaccination programme in Ghana are
estimated at US$7.1 million. In Tanzania, estimated Expanded Programme
on Immunization costs (for vaccine supply) would rise from US$2.2 million
to US$9.9 million with the inclusion of quadravalent vaccine (Starling et al,
2002).
One can conclude that the two funds have managed to garner much-needed
support for interventions to tackle an important group of communicable
diseases that mainly, although not exclusively, affect poor populations, many
of whom live on the African continent. However, the issue of long-term
sustainability has been studied inadequately, in particular given the current
weakness of health systems on the continent. The focus on 'Global Fund
diseases' could once again lead to vertical programs and a focus on
technologies in isolation from health systems.
Health Sector Objectives
The health-sector objectives read as follows (NEPAD, para. 123):
• To strengthen programmes for containing communicable diseases,
so that they do not fall short of the scale required in order to reduce
the burden of disease;
• To have a secure health system that meets needs and supports disease
control effectively;
• To ensure the necessary support capacity for the sustainable
development of an effective health care delivery system;
• To empower the people of Africa to act to improve their own health
and to achieve health literacy;
• To successfully reduce the burden of disease on the poorest people
of Africa;
• To encourage co-operation between medical doctors and
traditional healers.
The above six health sector objectives are not logically ordered, and unclear
formulations are introduced, such as 'secure' health systems and 'health literacy.'
It is proposed that NEPAD change the sequence of objectives to:
• To improve work and living conditions of Africa's population (this would
include objectives related to water and sanitation, housing, environment, etc.);
• To strengthen health systems so that these meet needs and support disease
control effectively;
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• To strengthen programs for containing communicable diseases, so that
they do not fall short of the scale required in order to reduce the burden
of disease;
• To ensure the necessary support capacity for the sustainable development
of an effective health-care delivery system;
• To empower the people of Africa to act to improve their own health and
to achieve health literacy; and
• To encourage cooperation between medical doctors and traditional
practitioners.
Proposed Health Sector Actions
The proposed health-sector actions (NEPAD, para. 124) read as follows:
• Strengthen Africa's participation in processes aimed at procuring
affordable drugs, including those involving the international
pharmaceutical companies and the international civil society, and
explore the use of alternative delivery systems for essential drugs
and supplies;
• Mobilize the resources required to build effective disease
interventions and secure health systems;
• Lead the campaign for increased international financial support
for the struggle against HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases;
• Join forces with other international agencies such as the World
Health Organisation (WHO) and donors to ensure that support for
the continent is increased by at least US $ 10 billion per annum;
• Encourage African countries to give higher priority to health in
their own budgets and phase in such increases in expenditure to a
level to be mutually determined;
• Jointly mobilize resources for capacity-building in order to enable
all African countries to improve their health infrastructures and
management.
It is proposed that the above actions be rearranged and modified to read as follows:
• Mobilize the resources required to strengthen (build effective disease
interventions and secure) health systems;
• Encourage African countries to give higher priority to health in their
own budgets and to phase in such increases in expenditure to a level to
be mutually determined;
• Strengthen Africa's participation in processes aimed at procuring
affordable drugs and explore the use of alternative delivery systems for
essential drugs and supplies; and
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• Jointly mobilize resources for capacity-building in order to enable all African
countries to improve their health infrastructures and management.
It is further proposed that the following two action points be combined:
• Lead the campaign for increased international financial support for the
struggle against HIV/AIDS and other communicable diseases;
• Join forces with other international agencies such as the WHO and donors
to ensure that support for the continent is increased by at least US$10
billion per annum.
For NEPAD to make a meaningful contribution towards the health of African
people, it is further proposed:
• That the IDGs be translated into realistic African Development Goals
that take into account the starting point and are measured against
compliance to pledges and commitments made by NEPAD and G8/OECD
member states;
• That the introduction of the JPPIs (GFATM and GAVI) be carried out with
a strong focus on the strengthening of health systems, as these are essential
and a prerequisite if these initiatives are to succeed;
• That research and development focuses on relevant health technologies
and health systems' performance; and
• That investment be mobilized for partnerships with NGOs and civil
society, and with training institutions.
The most important action of NEPAD should focus on strengthening health systems
so that health-care needs of the population can be met and underlying socio-economic
determinants of ill health are addressed. This implies health systems that are
inclusive of effective disease interventions, and are comprehensive in nature.
Reversing the Brain Drain
A critical component of health systems is human resources. As noted in Chapter
3, the growing loss of skilled health workers through international migration
has become a major policy issue for developing countries. NEPAD has made
the reversal of the brain drain one of its priorities (paras. 121-2) in its Human
Resource Development Initiative, which is welcomed. A variety of economic
and social factors affect the retention and equitable distribution of human
resources. In many African countries, health professionals are concentrated in
urban areas, while the majority of people live in rural areas. Migration of health
professionals, in particular physicians and nurses, from developing to developed
countries is a problem that is increasingly being recognized globally. According
to Pang et al. (2002), an estimated 23 000 qualified academic professionals
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(not only health professionals) emigrate from Africa annually, a figure
substantiated by research carried out on the African continent (IRIN, 2002b).
Factors that contribute to migration are many and are classified in two
groups: the 'push' and 'pull' factors. Push factors refer to the situation in the
exporting country and include remuneration, capacity to produce adequate
numbers of health professionals, support and supervision, work and living
conditions, social and political security, post-colonial and cultural links, and
a tradition of mobility (Dovlo, 2001; Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001). Pull
factors relate to conditions in importing countries and include the high
demand for health professionals, job and career opportunities, remuneration
differentials, training opportunities, and perceived freedom from undue
political and administrative influences on matters professional (Dovlo, 2001;
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001; IRIN, 2002b).
GATS, recently introduced by the WTO, sets out to liberalize trade in
services, including trade in health services (WTO, 1995; Hong, 2000). GATS
includes four different modes of supply of trade in services. Mode 4 concerns
migration directly, as it refers to the supply of a service 'by a service supplier
of one Member, through presence of natural persons of a Member in the
territory of any other Member' (WTO, 1995, emphasis in original; Bettcher et
al, 2000; WHO, 2001; Adlung & Carzaniga, 2001). GATS's mode 2 refers to
'consumption of services abroad' and includes under- and postgraduate
training at foreign educational institutions. Mode 2 is a contributor to
migration: some data indicate that as many as 50-70 per cent of persons who
received such training opportunities failed to return home after completion
(Dovlo, 2001; Hilary, 2001; Adlung & Carzaniga, 2001).
The costs for undergraduate training of health professionals are mainly
borne by governments. Data on actual costs of training of doctors available
for African countries show that these are considerable: in Ghana, tuition for
medical school attendance costs the government an estimated US$20 000
per student (Hundred & Levitt, 2000), Nigeria spends an estimated US$30
000 to train a physician, while South Africa's undergraduate medical training
costs approximately US$61 500 (Dovlo, 2001).
The NEPAD objectives to reverse the brain drain are (NEPAD, para. 121):
• To reverse the brain drain and turn it into a 'brain gain' for Africa;
• To build and retain within the continent critical human capacities
for Africa's development;
• To develop strategies for utilising the scientific and technological
know-how and skills of Africans in the diaspora for the development
of Africa.
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The first objective is not really an objective, but rather the desired outcome of
the initiative. The issues addressed in the third objective need clarification.
Different systems have different priorities, which influence the orientation
of the skills of professionals. How many Africans in the diaspora still possess
the appropriate skills to assist in the implementation of NEPAD's Programme
of Action? How will this be assessed? Will this really lead to reversing the
brain drain as currently experienced?
Actions related to above objectives are as follows (NEPAD, para. 122):
• Create the necessary political, social and economic conditions in
Africa that would serve as incentives to curb the brain drain and
attract much needed investment;
• Establish a reliable database on the brain drain, both to determine
the magnitude of the problem, and to promote networking and
collaboration between experts in the country of origin and those
in the diaspora;
• Develop scientific and technical networks to channel the
repatriation of scientific knowledge to the home country, and
establish cooperation between those abroad and at home;
• Ensure that the expertise of Africans living in the developed
countries is utilized in the execution of some of the projects
envisaged under NEPAD.
The proposed actions of NEPAD to address the brain drain are welcomed. However,
the focus is on Africans in the diaspora, technological and scientific skills, and
the push factors leading to migration. No mention is made of international
macroeconomic policies and trade agreements that perpetuate the current trend
of migration to developed countries, with little gain for the continent. No
attention is given to high attrition rates influenced by the high HIV/AIDS
infection rates amongst professionals in many sectors, leading to brain loss.
Yet, the high attrition rates in these sectors will affect NEPAD's ability to achieve
its 'health sector' objectives, in particular the strengthening of health systems.
We therefore propose that NEPAD strengthen its appeal to G8 and OECD
member states to assist in reversing the brain drain. In particular, we suggest:
• That G8/OECD member states are called upon to improve their health
human resource planning;
• That G8/OECD member states acknowledge the economic benefits they
reap from migration; and
• That G8/OECD member states establish mechanisms that ensure full
return of developing countries' investments in the production of [health]
professionals, in addition to ensuring that trade agreements truly benefit
developing countries.
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Health-Related, Explicitly Recognized Commitments
Poverty
While growth rates are important, they are not by themselves sufficient to
enable African countries to achieve the goal of poverty reduction (NEPAD,
para. 64). NEPAD's long-term objective is 'to eradicate poverty in Africa and
to place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of
sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalization of
Africa in the globalization process' (NEPAD, para. 67).
Africa is unlikely to achieve the IDG target that aims to reduce by 50 per cent
the proportion of people living in extreme poverty. The most likely scenario
under present macroeconomic arrangements is that the number of people living
in extreme poverty on the African continent will increase (World Bank, 2002a:
30-1). Although poverty rates declined during the 1990s, driven by high growth
rates in particular in China and, to a lesser extent, India, an estimated 1.2 billion of
the world's population live on less than US$ 1 per day. In 1999, an estimated 575
million Africans lived on less than US$2 daily, with the vast majority -
approximately 500 million, or 87.5 per cent -living on less than US$1 per day
(calculated using population figures and GDP data from UNDP, 2000).
GDP Growth Rate of Seven Per Cent and Income Inequality
Africa's GDP grew faster during 2001 than that of any other developing region,
at a rate of 4.3 per cent, as against 3.5 per cent in 2000. However, the aggregate
figure masks wide disparities among countries, and is still well below the
seven per cent that is proposed in NEPAD (IRIN, 2002c). Between 1990 and
1998, growth rates were as shown in Table 9.13.

















Fatal Indifference: The G8, Africa and Global Health
Given this trend during the 1990s, it is questionable how Africa can achieve
the NEPAD goal of seven per cent annual growth to be sustained over 15
years and the target of a 50 per cent reduction in extreme poverty, unless
massive investment occurs.
Food and Food Production
NEPAD acknowledges the poor state of Africa's agriculture systems (NEPAD,
para. 129), an important reason for the food insecurity experienced on the
continent. At the time of writing, an estimated 13 million people in Southern
Africa are facing serious food shortages because of prolonged drought, political
instability, corruption and market-based agricultural reforms (IRIN, 2002d).
Agriculture is an important contributor to Africa's GDP, as is shown in Table
9.14, below. The breakdown in the table reflects the fact that agriculture
contributes 4.8 per cent to world GDP, an average of 13.5 per cent in
developing countries, and an average of 32.7 per cent in all LDCs. In many
African countries, agriculture accounts for a greater proportion of GDP than
the LDC average.
Table 9.14: Agriculture as % of GDP
Agriculture as














Seychelles, South Africa, Botswana and
Djibouti
Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, Tunisia,
Algeria, Cape Verde, Republic of Congo,
Angola, Lesotho, Ghana, Eritrea
Swaziland, Morocco, Egypt, C6te d'lvoire,
Zimbabwe, Senegal, Guinea, Zambia,
Mauritania, Gambia, Sao Tome & Principe,
Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar,
Nigeria
Cameroon, Comoros, Togo, Central African
Republic, Benin, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Mali, DRC, Niger, Chad, Burkina
Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, Sudan,
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However, the current food crises on the continent are indicative of how fragile
the agricultural sector and production remain, exposed as they are to climate
change and seasonal influences.
Nutritional Status in Africa
'Nutrition is an important ingredient of good health. The average daily intake
of calories varies from 2384 in low-income countries to 2846 in middle-income
countries, to 3390 in countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD)' (NEPAD, para. 125). The target of achieving a 50
per cent reduction in global undernutrition by 2015, set at the World Food
Summit in 1996, will fail according to the latest report of the UNFAO, and
will not even be reached in 2030 (Brough, 2002). Available food security data
(Social Watch, 2002) provide trends between 1990 and 1999. These data show
that 42 countries start off with less than 2 300 calories per capita daily, with
24 countries still below the 2 300 calories per capita level in 1999.
As noted in Chapter 5, despite some progress in food security, sub-Saharan
Africa is the only region of the world in which child malnutrition is on the
increase. In terms of the population as a whole, 34 per cent of the people of
sub-Saharan Africa remain undernourished, and the absolute number grew
from 167.7 million to 194 million during the 1990s (UNFAO, 2001: 52). In a
few countries, increases in undernourishment were dramatic: e.g. during the
1990s, undernourishment increased from 36 per cent to 64 per cent in the
DRC, from 48 per cent to 66 per cent to 75 per cent in Somalia (UNFAO,
2001: 52-3).
The current food crises, exacerbated by conflict, HIV/AIDS, and political
and economic mismanagement (Brough, 2002) and aggravated by
protectionist measures in the industrialized countries (agricultural subsidies
in particular), do not bode well for NEPAD's aim to achieve food security, to
improve agricultural performance and achieve a 50 per cent reduction in
undernutrition.
Conclusion
Given the sobering reality on the African continent with regard to health
and development, NEPAD has set itself targets that are impossible to achieve
without a fundamental change in the current global and African economic
context. The unequivocal support the G8 extended to the NEPAD initiative
during the Kananaskis summit has not been translated into monetary support.
The G8 Plan of Action has promised aid and debt relief as well as support for
democracy, human rights and the promotion of the equality of women. This
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plan further proposes the supply of life-saving drugs and the eradication of
polio by 2005 to assist in achieving the health objectives. This falls far short
of the commitments required.
NEPAD has been presented as a plan 'by Africans for Africa.' It needs to
refocus on how it deals with the issues outlined earlier in this chapter. Where
it concerns health, we propose that the overall NEPAD goal be changed to
the following: To successfully reduce the burden of disease on the poorest
people of Africa.' We further recommend:
• That the IDGs be translated into realistic African Development Goals
that take into account the baseline indicators, and that progress towards
achievement is carefully monitored;
• That restoring and strengthening health systems to meet the health-care
needs of the population and addressing underlying socioeconomic
determinants of ill health become the focus of its health strategy;
• That a strong health system should utilize effective technologies, but be
comprehensive in nature, including preventive and promotive actions;
• That there be more investment in health and health-related sectors'
infrastructure and recurrent expenditure;
• That particular attention be paid to health and health-related personnel,
including retention strategies, training, support and supervision; and
• That commitments to NEPAD by G8 member states and NEPAD signatories
be monitored against commitments made by G8 and African Union
member states.
We conclude that, without challenging the causes of poverty and inequity
and without addressing the functioning of health systems, NEPAD's health
project as currently conceived is unlikely to achieve its goals.
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CHAPTER TEN
Promises Kept and Broken,
Right or Wrong
Drawing the poorest countries into the global economy is the surest
way to address their fundamental aspirations. ... The most effective
poverty reduction strategy is to maintain a strong, dynamic, open and
growing global economy (Genoa Communique, para. 3).
Experience shows that, despite the unparalleled opportunities that
globalisation has offered to some previously poor countries, there is
nothing inherent in the process that automatically reduces poverty and
inequality (NEPAD, para. 40).
It is becoming increasingly clear that globalization, as the US is
promoting it, is intensely unpopular. Why...? The answer is that
globalization, American-style, has left many of the poorest in the
developing world even poorer (Stiglitz, 2002b: 18-19).
We must question the prevailing logic of a system that essentially enables
the movement of capital, but not of people, across boundaries; a
financial system that essentially rewards unemployment and consolidates
a notion of jobless economic growth; a system that rewards rampant
over-consumption rather than grappling with the more complex
challenge of sustainable development. Instead, we continue to witness
the extension of market principles into more and more realms and a
stubborn reluctance to rethink the TINA (There Is No Alternative)
principle. In my part of the world, there is a Zulu name, THEMBA, which
means hope. We use this to remind ourselves that There Must Be An
Alternative' (Naidoo, 2003).
Introduction
In this, our concluding chapter, we summarize our responses to the two
questions that run through this book: Have the G8 countries kept their
promises? Are the prescriptions the G8 promotes for global integration the
right ones for health and development? (Or, returning to the synopsis on
this question presented in Chapter 1, for whose health and development are
they the right prescription?) We also identify some important issues to which
we have given only cursory attention -these present fertile ground for further
study. We conclude with some thoughts about the prospects for a global
order that places markets in the service of human development, rather than
the other way around.1
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Promises Kept, Promises Broken
Few international development observers believe the 2002 Kananaskis summit
delivered on any of the key health and human development goals its host
country, Canada, had intended and African countries, in particular, had hoped
for. The summit was preoccupied with a narrow, military definition of security,
committing its members to 'raise up to [US]$20 billion ... over the next 10
years' for 'the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of
decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and
the employment of former weapons scientists' (G8 Global Partnership Against
the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Fund). While ridding
the world of such weapons may be an important task, by contrast, and
including funds committed before the summit, Africa and NEPAD walked
away with a much smaller US$6 billion pledge.
But the Kananaskis summit is not the focus of this book; rather, it is the
three summits leading up to the 2002 G8 meeting. As our earlier chapters
recount, promises 'broken' outnumber those 'kept'; indeed, the final tally is
a failing ratio of 2:1. Table 10.1, below, is our 'report card' in its most distilled
form, including both explicit (specific) and implicit (generic) commitments,
with the chapters in which we made the assessment.





The PRSP process is now
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macroeconomic assump-
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Debt relief is freeing up
social spending space in
LDCs.
The GFATM was esta-
blished and 'primed' with
US$1.3 billion initial con-
tributions.
Agricultural biotechnology
for increasing crop yields
is being promoted
(although use of gene-
tically modified food crops
in agriculture or food aid
is opposed by many devel-
oping nations).
The IDA (part of the World
Bank lending to poorest
countries) was replenished
with US$22 billion.
The portion of IDA going
to grants increased - but







Flexibility in TRIPS agree-
ment, and eased access to
essential medicines in
poorest countries is not
being fully supported (US
refuses to accept compro-
mise in TRIPS Council
of WTO).
'Strong' national health
systems are not being
supported (G7 ODA to
health lower now than in
1996-98).
Multilateral banks have not
increased their support to
global public goods.
Universal primary educa-
tion and gender equality
education goals will not be
met (G7 ODA to education,
especially basic education,
very low; even with new
ODA pledges, the total is
less than 10% the estimate
of the required aid).
Support to UNESCO's basic
education efforts has not
occurred; the agency's fund-
ing, much of it supplied by
the G6 (the US still does not
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Poorest countries received
increased portion of ODA
budgets, 2000-01 .
A new round of global





the IDGs and MDGs are
unlikely to be met (partly
because of low level of ODA
for agriculture and food aid;
partly appropriation of food
sources in poor countries for
consumers in G8 countries,
notably the EU and japan).
Volume of ODA did not
increase from 2000 to 2001 .
Multilateral banks did not
increase their funding for
health, education and sani-
tation from 1999-2001 .
Poorest countries received
less ODA as a percentage of
G7 gross national income,
2000-01 .
Many G8 countries are
opposing developing coun-
try positions on new round
of global trade talks as a
'development round.'
Duty- and quota-free market
access for goods from LDCs




hurtful to developing coun-
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US, japan and EU; and in
the case of the US, drama-
tically increased after
committing in the WTO














in WTO negotiations is
supported by some, but
actively opposed by other,
G8 nations.
Kyoto Protocol on climate
change repudiated by the
US; Russia has signed the




and japan have ratified the
Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants.
Only EU G8 countries have
ratified the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety. The






Yet this simple list belies two more basic concerns. Firstly, even the promises
'kept' pale beside the nature of the problems to which they relate. Secondly,
and taking the argument one level deeper, are the G8 promises appropriate,
or are they rooted in a paradigmatic economic orthodoxy that is positively
destructive of human health and well-being?
Promises Right, Promises Wrong
The official statements from G8 summits presuppose that globalization, with
its neo-liberal underpinnings, is working for the world's poor. NEPAD, even
while adopting most of the premises of neo-liberal development strategy
(Bond, 2002), appears less sanguine about the beneficence of the market's
'invisible hand.' Joseph Stiglitz joins the ranks of an increasing number of
mainstream economists questioning whether the neo-liberal economic
prescription is the right one.
A recent 'scorecard' on the past 20 years of globalization compares
numerous health, economic and development indicators for the 'pre-
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globalization' period (1960-80) and the rapidly globalizing period (1980-
2000) (Weisbrot et al, 2001; for a similar analysis, see Milanovic, 2003).
During the latter period, GDP growth per capita declined in all countries,
but declined most rapidly for the poorest 20 per cent of nations. The rate of
improvement in life expectancy declined for all but the wealthiest 20 per
cent of nations, indicating increasing global disparity. Infant and child
mortality improvements slowed, particularly for the poorest 40 per cent of
nations. The rate of growth of public spending on education (as a share of
GDP) also slowed for all countries, and the rate of growth for school
enrolment, literacy rates and other educational attainment measures slowed
for most of the poorest 40 per cent of nations, with the sharpest drop in the
poorest 20 per cent.
This study's authors caution that this does not prove a causal link between
globalization, or liberalization, and a slowdown in development progress. As
most researchers now accept, and as we suggested in Chapter 1, only detailed,
multilevel national studies will begin to tease apart causal patterns or
relationships. But it certainly calls into question the orthodoxy that underpins
the 'global governance' economic platform of the G7. As Weisbrot (2002)
recently commented, '[t]he claim that "globalisation has caused extensive
poverty" is... quite reasonable, unless one can show that the structural and
policy changes associated with the globalisation of the last two decades have
had nothing to do with the economic slowdown of this era.' Milanovic (2003:
673), in his assessment, notes, 'in the first period [1960-78], two out of four
poorer regions grew faster than WENAO [Western Europe, North America,
Oceania countries], while in the second [1978-98], all of them grew slower
than WENAO.'
At the core of many of our critiques of G8 development policies is their
adherence to a set of propositions about development derived directly from
neo-classical economics, but supported, at best, by weak and highly contested
empirical evidence. Milanovic's (2003: 679) critique of these propositions is
especially blunt: 'Maintaining that globalization as we know it is the way to
go and that, if the Washington consensus policies have not borne fruit so far,
they will surely do so in the future, is to replace empiricism with ideology.'
Two such propositions deserve special attention because of their implications
for health and health policy.
The first, which is found in dogmatic form in the World Bank's 'Social
protection sector strategy' paper (Holzmann et al., 2000), holds that the
primary justification for social policy is correcting for market failure. In that
document, which is especially disturbing because of the World Bank's
financial leverage and ideological hegemony, the basic task of social policy is
(re)defined, without reference to redistribution, as 'social risk management'
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(p. 9). 'In an ideal world with perfectly symmetrical information and complete,
well-functioning markets, all risk management arrangements can and should
be market-based (except for the incapacitated)' (p. 16). Such market-based
arrangements can be either formal, as exemplified by the purchase of insurance
(p. 24) or informal, as exemplified by marriage (p. 13). If intervention to help
the non-incapacitated poor is justified, it is only because of the market failures
resulting from the fact that the poor 'are more vulnerable than other
population groups because they are typically more exposed to risk and have
little access to appropriate risk management instruments' (p. 10). Some public
health measures are justified, according to the World Bank, as is spending
on formal education ('the best risk reducer') and on early childhood
development services, which 'provide an exceptional opportunity to reduce
risks and improve human capital in general' (p. 26). However, within neo-
classical economics, such policies are justified not on the basis that they
increase human well-being or reduce human suffering, but rather because
they correct for market imperfections exemplified by the fact that parents
cannot borrow against a child's future earnings to finance his or her education
(Cigno et al., 2002: 1581), and will therefore underinvest in education.
The second is that the preferred, and possibly only, route to improved
health on a global basis lies through policies that will increase economic
growth in the developing world. It is important not to underestimate the
importance of growth; indeed, we have emphasized in this book the growth-
enhancing potential of a number of policies, notably increased investment
in basic health care and the reduction of trade barriers that protect
industrialized country markets in agricultural products and textiles. In fact,
however, the current development policy model appears to be one that
promotes growth only in ways that are (a) consistent with the financial
interests of the industrialized world, and (b) require minimal or no
redistribution of income and wealth from the rich world to the poor. Certainly,
that is the message conveyed by the long-term decline in ODA flows from the
G7 countries, even as their wealth has greatly increased.
A variant of this proposition that is seldom articulated, but is implicit in
the conditionalities imposed by IFIs, is that long-term gains (in health and
other areas) from the adoption of growth-enhancing policies justify the short-
term pain associated with structural adjustment and a variety of other policies
that undermine key social determinants of health. On a population basis,
the evidence is overwhelming that the surest way of improving the health of
a population, other things being equal, is to raise its level of income (Sieswerda
etal, 2001; World Bank, 1992: 10-12, 50-5; 1993: 7, 34, 39^2). Policies that
tolerate or even increase short-term inequalities, so the implicit argument
proceeds, are justified so long as they contribute to long-term economic
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growth at the national level. In a rare instance where this position has been
made explicit, World Bank researchers addressing the dramatic declines in
health status in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union argue that: '[i]n
the long run, the transition towards a market economy and adoption of
democratic forms of government should ultimately lead to improvements in
health status .... In the short run, however, one could expect that health
status would deteriorate' as incomes drop, inequalities widen, stress increases,
basic health services break down and already inadequate regulation of
environmental and workplace hazards deteriorates (Adeyi etal., 1997: 133).
Advocates of this position might cite Harrington Moore's bleak conclusion
that 'the poor bear the heaviest costs of modernization under both socialist
and capitalist auspices. The only justification for imposing the costs is that
they would become steadily worse without it' (Moore, 1966: 410). However,
there is, as we have pointed out, considerable uncertainty about the
effectiveness of free markets and open borders as a route to growth. Some of
the most conspicuous development success stories of the recent past opted
instead for a quite different approach, and no G8 country without a colonial
empire followed this path during the early stages of its own industrialization.
Even if we concede, for purposes of argument, the validity of the neo-liberal
prescription for growth, we must ask: How long is the long term? How long
may the pain last, and how severe may it be, before it ceases to be justified by
subsequent gains? And in view of such declarations of purpose on the part of
the international community as 'the attainment by all peoples of the world
by the year 2000 of a level of health that will permit them to lead a socially
and economically productive life' (WHO, 1978: para. 5), do the poor majority
of the world's people not have a claim to healthy lives that need not be
vindicated with reference to their future economic productivity? This is the
ethical dimension, the consideration of distributive justice that must be
incorporated into current and future critiques of development policy and its
relation to human health.
This critique is relevant even to 'progressive' approaches like that of the
CMH, which argued for major increases in health-related development
assistance, on the basis that investment in health is an investment in future
development: it can initiate virtuous cycles of human capital formation and
growth. The approach is empirically well grounded, yet without further
elaboration it invites a form of triage in which the countries and regions that
receive investments in health will primarily be those in which 'development'
offers the greatest promise of economic returns for the industrialized world,
e.g. because of the availability of expanding consumer markets or the
availability of healthy and relatively skilled, yet low-cost labor as an attraction
to foreign investors. Even within particular countries, the approach invites
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distinctions between those populations whose improved health is most likely
to yield attractive returns on investment and those people and territories that
simply cannot, for a variety of reasons, generate the returns that would justify
investing in their health on strictly economic grounds.
John Williamson, who coined the term 'Washington Consensus' to describe
official wisdom on development policy circa 1989, has noted that in codifying
the consensus he 'deliberately excluded from the list anything which was
primarily redistributive, as opposed to having equitable consequences as a
by-product of seeking efficiency objectives, because [he] felt the Washington
of the 1980s to be a city that was essentially contemptuous of equity concerns'
(Williamson, 1993: 1329). Our analysis suggests that with some exceptions,
the contemptuous attitude to which Williamson referred appears to have
diffused throughout the official levels of the G7, and is stronger than ever in
post-NAFTA, post-WTO Washington. But it is not universal, as shown by the
divergence among industrialized country ODA levels, by the fact that some
countries have met and surpassed the 0.7 per cent target while US ODA
languishes at about one-seventh that amount, and by the research of the
NGOs that have played such a prominent role in placing global health concerns
on the policy agenda. Future research must not only document the health
consequences of the rieo-liberal agenda's disdain for redistributive measures
that do not offer financial rewards, but challenge that agenda on a conceptual
level in terms of what it implies about human worth and worthlessness.
Areas for Further Research
This brings us to consider areas where further research or synthesis could be
useful. In addition to those areas identified in previous chapters (privatization
and cost recovery as they affect health systems and water infrastructure), we
were unable to devote the time and resources necessary to a thorough
investigation of labour market flexibility. We discuss each of these below.
1. Labour Market Flexibility, Economic Insecurity and
Human Health
Economic insecurity can affect human health in a variety of ways. Most
obviously, it can reduce access to prerequisites for health such as education,
nutrition and health care (see generally Narayan et al., 2000). Economic
insecurity can be associated with increased exposure to hazards on the job:
Quinlan et al. (2001) reviewed studies of occupational injury and illness in
industrialized countries, and found that in 76 of the 93 published studies
'precarious employment' (temporary or contract work, self-employment,
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telecommuting, part-time work etc.) was associated with an increase in work-
related illness or injury. More subtly, the stresses associated with economic
insecurity may have negative impacts on health that accumulate during the
life course (Carroll etal, 1994; Davey Smith etal, 1994).2
The 'flexibilization' of labour is arguably one of the major contributors to
economic insecurity, and to income and wealth inequality, especially in the
Anglo-American world. Communications from the last few summits are
ambivalent on the tension between flexibilization and social provision. On
the one hand, there is the view that 'economic performance and social
inclusion are mutually dependent' (Genoa Communique, para. 32), that
'social safety nets' (Cologne Communique, para. 14) are important, and that
'[i]t is therefore particularly important to maintain investment in basic social
services during times of crisis' (Cologne Communique, para. 21). On the
other hand, there is an insistence on the need for 'more adaptable labour
markets' (Okinawa Communique, para. 9) through 'elimination of structural
rigidities in labour, capital and product markets, the promotion of
entrepreneurship and innovation, investment in human capital, reform of
the tax/benefit systems to strengthen economic incentives and encourage
employment, and development of an innovative and knowledge-based society'
(Cologne Communique, paras. 12-13).
The tension between these two objectives is particularly clear in the
Cologne Communique's reference to the need 'to strike a sustainable balance
between social support programs and greater personal responsibility and
initiative' (para. 20).3
In their domestic social and economic policies, many industrialized
countries have resolved the tension firmly in favour of policies that increase
insecurity and inequality, whether or not that was the intention. A key text
here is US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan's March 1997
testimony to the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, in which
he commented as follows:
Atypical restraint on compensation increases has been evident for a
few years now. Almost certainly, it reflects a number of factors,
including the sharp deceleration in health care costs and the heightened
pressure on firms and workers in industries that compete
internationally. Domestic deregulation has also intensified the
competitive forces in some industries. But... I believe that job insecurity
has played the dominant role. For example, in 1991, at the bottom of
the recession, a survey of workers at large firms by International Survey
Research Corporation indicated that 25 percent feared being laid off.
In 1996, despite the sharply lower unemployment rate and the tighter
labor market, the same survey organization found that 46 percent were
fearful of a job layoff (Greenspan, 1997).
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In Canada, research conducted for the federal government shows that the
economic security of Canada's population as a whole, measured with
reference to the risks of unemployment, ill health, single parent poverty and
poverty in old age, has deteriorated almost continuously since 1973 (Osberg
& Sharpe, 1999: 40-52), even before taking into account the steady rise in
household debt levels.. A report prepared for the Vanier Institute of the Family,
based on Statistics Canada data, found that slight rises in average Canadian
family income recorded in the late 1990s, after a decade of steady decline,
were entirely the result of the fact that family members were working more
hours, and more family members were working (Sauve, 2001).
The same situation exists in the US, where average working hours per year
increased from 1 942 in 1990 to 1 978 per year in 2001 - equivalent to a full
extra week of work. This is the highest figure of all industrialized countries.
Of other G7 countries, Canadian and Japanese workers put in 100 fewer hours
per year, Britons 250 fewer hours, and Germans 500 fewer hours. Nor are
productivity and economic growth necessarily dependent on long working
hours. During the 1990s, Ireland, the 'Celtic Tiger,' saw its average number
of hours worked per year drop from 1 728 to 1 520 (ILO figures cited in
Ellison, 2001). Sklar et al. (2002) found that, as in Canada, longer working
hours in the US are partly a response to declining real wages, particularly for
those working near the bottom end of the job market. Inflation-adjusted
minimum wage rates in the US in 2001 were only 66 per cent of what they
had been in 1968.
Throughout the developing world, the literature similarly documents
increases in economic insecurity for large portions of the population as a
consequence both of SAPs and of financial crises precipitated by the
hypermobility of capital. We provided two examples of this (Zambia and the
Indian state of Kerala.) in Chapter 1. China offers another, where reportedly
over 200 million workers migrating from impoverished rural areas are
employed in privately-run factories, often backed by foreign investment, and
lacking access to many of the labour protections afforded the 80 million
workers still employed in China's shrinking state industries (Pan, 2002).
Among workers who may put in 16 hour days for months on end, a new
illness is being described: guolaosi or, literally, 'overwork death.' This is the
other face of precarious employment.
While we advise caution in simple cross-national comparisons, it is
nonetheless interesting that the ILO finds a gradient in the annual rate of
'inter-sectoral employment flows' (an indicator of job insecurity) and the
rapidity of trade liberalization. Countries liberalizing quickly experienced
twice the annual rate of such employment flows (Torres, 2001: 33). A recent
study of the effects of IMF programs on income distribution, which the author
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claims corrects for methodological weaknesses in earlier research, concludes
that such programs increase income inequality, primarily by redistributing
it from labor to capital (Vreeland, 2002). This effect arises partly from
liberalization's impact on previously protected but less efficient (or less heavily
subsidized) sectors, the contraction of employment in the public sector, and
the imposition of wage freezes and other policies to increase labor market
flexibility. These policies may not directly violate ILO core labor conventions,
but they do place labor at a disadvantage.
Vreeland further notes that a primary objective of the IMF is 'high quality
growth/ defined by former IMF Managing Director Michael Camdessus as
occurring when 'the benefits of positive economic growth are distributed
across all income groups' (Vreeland 2002: 133, original emphasis).
Previous research shows that IMF programs lower economic growth,
and this study demonstrates that the adverse effects are concentrated
on labor. Indeed, despite negative economic growth, the income of
'the privileged few' increases. Thus, according to the characterization
of Camdessus, the form of growth promoted by the IMF must be
considered of the 'lowest quality' (Vreeland, 2002: 133).
If Vreeland's findings stand up to further scrutiny, they should inform the
position the G8, with their majority of IMF votes, take in future lending
decisions.
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Box 10.1: Globalization, Labor Standards and the 08
The G8 leaders have made a limited number of commitments that directly
address labor standards. In 2000, they 'welcome[d] the increasing
cooperation between the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in promoting adequate social
protection and core labour standards. We urge the IFIs to incorporate these
standards into their policy dialogue with member countries' (Okinawa
Communique, para. 16).
The previous year, the C8 leaders stated;
We commit ourselves to promote effective implementation of the
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and its follow-up. We also welcome the
adoption of the ILO Convention on the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labor. We further intend to step up work with developing
countries to improve their capacity to meet their obligations. We support
the strengthening of the ILO's capacity to assist countries in
implementing core iabor standards (Cologne Communique, para, 25).
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The 2000 C8 labor ministers' meeting in Turin, Italy, part of the 'ramp up' to
the Genoa summit in 2001, went even further, committing members to'enhance
respect for core labor standards' (Chair's Conclusions, para. 16).
Labour standards are especially important as elements of a strategy for
poverty reduction and health improvement in an international economy
increasingly driven by mobile FD) (Watkins, 2002a: 189-96). This is why further
research is needed, on an ongoing basis. However, it is noteworthy that only
France and the United Kingdom among the G8 have ratified all seven core 1LO
conventions on labour rights (see Table 10.2, below), especially in light of the
earlier G7 commitment made at the Lyons Summit (1996) to 'respect
international labor standards' (Dallaire, 2001: 100).
Table 10.2: C8 Labor Relations and Status of Fundamental ILO Conventions
C 87 C 98 C 100 C 105 C 111 C 138 C 182
Canada x x x x x
France x x x x x x x
Germany x x x x x x
Itaiy x x x x x x
|apan x x x x x
Russian x x x x x x
Federation




Source: Ratification status (as of 18 December 2001):
Social Watch (2002: 59-60)
C 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize
Convention, 1948
C 98: Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
C 100: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
C 105: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
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C 111: Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958
C 138; Minimum Age Convention, 1973
C 182: Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, 1999
While there is little relationship between union density and ILO ratification -
except that the US is low in both - some research finds that it is associated
with improved income distribution, employment rates and social policy
outcomes under increased liberalization of global markets (Global Social Policy
Forum, 2001; Cough, 2001). Although systematic comparative research on
the policies of G8 governments towards organized labour is not easy to find,
recent work by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (1CFTU)
strongly suggests that several C8 countries have pursued anti-union policies
in the interests of containing public expenditure and/or enhancing private
sector competitiveness (ICFTU, 2001, 2002). A few findings from the most
recent iCFTU report follow; no data on France or Italy were provided,
Canada: Provinces can limit who has the right to join unions. Strikes are
often ended by legislation. Use of replacement workers during
strikes is permitted, except in the province of Quebec.
Germany. Civil servants do not have the right to strike. Teachers do not
have the right to collective bargaining.
japan: Public sector workers have very limited trade union rights; Japan
has continualfy ignored iLO recommendations to reform its
public sector trade union taws. Restrictions on labour rights
also apply to state-run companies.
Russia: Public sector workers have only a limited right to strike. The new
labour code favours short-term contracts over long-term
employment. Replacement labour during strikes is permitted.
Anti-union activity is high, particularly in foreign-owned
companies.
UK: The ILO continues to express concern over a continuing ban
on all solidarity actions by trade unions; restrictions on the right
of unions to enforce democratically decided rules; and use of
prison labour.
US: Forty per cent of public sector workers are denied collective
bargaining rights, and most public sector workers are denied
the right to strike. At least ten per cent of workers organizing
unions are illegally fired.
Finally, while welcoming dialogue between the ILO and the IFIs, the G8 have
been silent on what role the ILO might play at the WTO. Trade liberalization
can have an enormous impact on labour markets, for good or for bad. Informing
decisions about the pacing of liberalization, and what domestic regulatory
policies might aid in the transition to globally competitive markets, seems
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2. Arms Control, the G8 and Africa
The G8 have acknowledged that the international arms trade exacerbates
conflict in the developing world and poses an obvious threat to the health
and development of people living in, or fleeing, countries in conflict. At
Okinawa, the G8 expressed a commitment to reducing the flow of arms
exports, particularly to conflict-ridden regions:
The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects next year requires strong support to ensure
a successful outcome, including earliest possible agreement on the
Firearms Protocol. We invite the international community to exercise
restraint in conventional arms exports, and are committed to work
jointly to this end. We invite our Foreign Ministers to examine further
effective measures to prevent conflicts (Okinawa Communique, para. 73).
The same summit claimed in broadly normative terms that 'poverty can best
be overcome in resilient, peaceful, and democratic societies' (para. 14). No
similar commitment or comments were reiterated the next year in Genoa,
perhaps because, according to Amnesty International, the UN Programme
of Action 'was stripped of any meaningful human rights protection by
countries, including the USA, China and Russia' (Amnesty International,
2002). Not coincidentally, these three countries are the world's leading
exporters of arms to developing countries.
The majority of global arms transfers are from developed to developing
countries, accounting for 68.3 per cent of all arms sales agreements during
the period 1994-2001 (Grimmett, 2002). The US has been the main actor in
these arms agreements, receiving US$35.7 billion for arms transfers to the
developing world during the period 1998-2001. Russia, the second largest
arms supplier to developing nations, received US$19.8 billion over the same
period. The four major West European arms suppliers (France, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Italy) saw their collective share of arms transfer
agreements with developing countries drop precipitously from 11.5 per cent
of the world's total in 2000, to only 3.1 per cent in 2001, arguably in keeping
with the spirit of their Okinawa commitment (Grimmett, 2002).
Africa has been host to some of the most brutal and bloody wars in the
past few decades. African states receive the majority of their arms from Russia
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inherently logical. Yet the ILO, despite several efforts, has so far been unable
to obtain even official observer status at WTO meetings. The economic weight
the G8 countries bring to the nominally democratic WTO has not been used to
change this situation.
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(31.5 per cent during 1998-2001) and China (14.3 per cent during the same
period). The four European G8 countries were responsible for 2.9 per cent of
these arm transfers to Africa, and the US for 2.6 per cent. Total transfers were
valued at US$3.5 billion for 1998-2001, an increase from US$2.7 billion during
the period 1994-97 (Grimmett, 2002). Once these arms reach Africa, they are
often traded among African nations, including those with poor human rights
records or perpetrating war crimes. Arms shipments - official or otherwise -
facilitate the persistence of civil wars or allow certain governments, such as
the Sudanese government, to abuse and attack their own citizenry (Amnesty
International, 2002). Amnesty International has repeatedly voiced concern
about European nations, particularly Germany and Italy, supplying small
arms to African nations guilty of human rights violations. The Horn and
Central Africa, areas of high domestic conflict, continue to be armed with
weapons supplied by EU member states, although the value has been
significantly reduced, from US$ 700 million in 1985 to less than US$50 million
in 1995 (Benson, n.d.).
Canada also has substantially reduced its supply of arms to developing
countries, according to official Canadian government figures (Nolen, 2002a).
These figures, however, do not include Canada's sales to the United States,
the world's largest military exporter, or to the sub-systems that Canada
supplies. There are no restrictions on Canadian military sales to the US and
neither country is obligated to report any of its cross-border arms trade.
Official arms trade figures also only include finished systems, leaving Canada's
supply of sub-systems and unfinished parts to developing countries
unrecorded (Nolen, 2002a). Another point of concern is Canada's continued
arms exports to countries such as Zimbabwe and Indonesia, both of which
have very poor human rights records and tenuous political situations (Hurst,
2003). Finally, arms trade figures do not include the military training provided
to developing countries by members of the G8. For example, from 1995-98,
the US provided military personnel training for at least 34 of Africa's 53
nations, largely under the Pentagon's Joint Combined Exchange Training
(JCET) program. This training has been fairly indiscriminate. Many of the
African participants in the JCET program have been or are currently engaged
in brutal wars. Interestingly, the US has provided military training to opposing
factions in the on-going war in the DRC (Hartung & Moix, 2000).
We admit to skimming only the surface of this issue. It is an issue
complicated by the frequent use of 'third country' transfers, by which arms
sold to a questionable country or regime that, if reported publicly, would be
politically embarrassing, are sold to a more 'respectable' country acting as a
conduit. One could adopt the stance of the US National Rifle Association -
that guns do not kill people, people kill people - which has some merit
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considering the brutality associated with attacks using simple knives, clubs
or machetes in many countries in conflict. Small arms and 'conventional
weapons,' however, though only weapons of 'immediate' rather than 'mass'
destruction, have the capacity to increase greatly the number of victims per
incident. (Think about the shooting incidents at Austin's University of Texas,
Montreal's Ecole Polytechnique and Colorado's Columbine High School for
a simple demonstration of this point.) The role of the G8 in supplying such
weapons to countries in conflict -officially, illicitly or simply indirectly -is,
as we have indicated, an important matter for future study.
3. Other Key Research Questions
Besides these two underdeveloped themes, other connections between
contemporary globalization, health and development, and G8 commitments
and behaviours require more detailed and sustained scrutiny. We have cited,
for example, a number of studies that suggest or document the adverse effects
of privatization, cost recovery and user fees in developing country health
systems (Arhin-Tenkorang, 2000; Collins & Lear, 1995; Leon, 2002; Melgar,
1999; Schoepf et al, 2000; WHO, 2001: 121; Wasserman & Cornejo, 2002;
Whitehead et al., 2001; Yong Kim, Shakow et al, 2000; Zarrilli, 2002a).
However, time and resource limitations prevented us from carrying out a
systematic, authoritative and genuinely multidisciplinary literature review
on this topic, nor were we able to locate one in the published literature. Such
a review would represent an important contribution to public discussion of
development policy and health. It would also need to look beyond health
systems per se to consider the political economy of social provision as a
whole, and the extent to which other economic factors may either mitigate
or magnify the effects being observed; i.e. assess its findings against integrating
frameworks such as Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1. This is an important part of the
broader project of interrogating neo-liberalism.
Labonte and Spiegel (2002), in their discussion of 'inherently global health
issues' associated with contemporary globalization, identified several
questions in need of more nuanced examination and routine monitoring.
Many of these were intimated in several of this book's chapters; we consolidate
them in Table 10.3. We also emphasize that this is a very partial and incomplete
list. It serves more as notice of the types of questions that have been given
too little attention in many of the debates surrounding globalization, and
certainly within the communiques emanating from the G8.
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Table 10.3: Priority Burden of Disease Research Questions Associated with














Priority burden of disease research questions
1 . What impact will increasing trade in goods have on fossil fuel
consumption and climate change, and related infectious
disease rates (e.g. malaria)?
2. What effect is increased fossil fuel consumption having on
ground-level ozone production, respiratory illness and motor
vehicle accident rates, particularly for poorer and more
vulnerable populations?
1 . How are indigenous peoples who are more reliant on
biodiversity for food, economy and health affected by
increased economic harvesting of single foods and forestry
crops or species?
2. What are the health effects of genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) based on GMO impacts on biodiversity protection
and food security?
1 . How will the trajectories of the future economic growth of
poorer nations affect the safety and sustainable supply of
water, and subsequent water-related illnesses?
2. How will water supply and pricing policies reflecting market-
based costs affect water access and the burden of disease
associated with 'hydrological poverty' for poorer groups,
particularly within poorer nations?
1. What are the environmentally mediated human health effects
of increased fish farming?
2. How is liberalization in fish products affecting food security
for indigenous peoples, or poorer populations partly or wholly
reliant on non-commercial fishing, and with what burden of
disease outcomes?
1. How is deforestation affecting human health in the short term
via changes in disease vectors (e.g. pooling water and
malaria), burning (respiratory illness), accidents (particularly
in under-regulated nations) and use of herbicides and other
chemicals in reforestation?
222











2. What are the distributional (poverty, inequality) effects of
economic gains associated with deforestation, and how is this
affecting health?
1. What a priori conditions allow trade liberalization to promote
economic growth in poverty-reducing, disparity-reducing
ways?
2. What compensatory public policies (ranging from retraining,
to improved social safety nets, to longer phased-in tariff
removals) for 'liberalization shocks' would best maintain
health-enhancing social and environmental conditions,
including poverty reduction?
3. What are the long-term implications of increasing inequalities
on ethnic conflict or regional warfare, and how is this abetted
or constrained by trade liberalization or other macroeconomic
interventions?
1 . What are the impacts of financial instability on the abilities of
governments to provide essential health, education and other
health-enhancing services, particularly to the poorest
population?
1. What are the occupational and environmental hazards
associated with increased production of digital technologies,
where are they occurring and who is at greatest risk of
exposure?
1. What impact is liberalization having on national tax
capacities, especially for poorer nations, with what effects on
the abilities of governments to provide essential health,
education and other health-enhancing services, particularly to
the poorest population?
2. What are the distributional (poverty, inequality) effects of
changes in national tax capacities?
1 . What effects will agricultural export-led development have on
poverty and income distribution profiles in poorer nations,
public tax regimes and associated social development
programs, such as health care and education?
2. What are the probable environmental effects of increased
crop production, particularly for African countries where soil
degradation, depletion of nitrogen cycles and water shortages
are already severe, and how will this affect medium and
longer-term food security and health?
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1 . What is the impact of the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control on reducing trade in and use of tobacco products,
tobacco use rates and tobacco-related diseases?
2. What are the health impacts of the increased movement of
toxic/hazardous waste between countries, particularly in
poorer countries lacking the technology and regulatory
capacity to ensure safer disposal?
1. How are liberalization and macroeconomic adjustment
programs affecting governments' abilities to provide health,
educational and welfare services or programs to the poorer
members of their citizenry?
2. What impact is this having on measures on health status
(both absolute and distributional), and the rates of change in
these measures?
3. How are trade agreements affecting governments' regulatory
abilities to create healthier social and environmental
conditions, especially those influencing the burden of disease?
1. How can health-related interventions contribute to primary
prevention (averting conflict) and secondary prevention
(alleviating the impact of health effects) of war and conflict?
2. What is the relationship between disease rates/pandemics and
risk of conflict, and what interventions best mitigate that risk?
Conclusion: The G8 and the Question of Global
Governance
We began this book by citing the claim that the G8 is emerging as the centre of
effective global governance (Kirton, 1999). This observation was made before
the Republicans gained the US Presidency and Congress in 2000, and began to
move away from the cautious multilateralism that characterized the previous
administration. It nonetheless returns us to a theme we foreshadowed in Chapter
1: the major governance crisis we currently face is one in which there is an
increasing dissociation between economic power organized on a world
basis by global networks of industrial, financial and service enterprises,
and political power that remains organized at the national and regional
levels only. This dichotomy is rapidly leading to a situation where the
world is governed, not only in the economic sphere but in other spheres
as well, by groups of private networks of stateless and unaccountable
firms (Emmerij, 2000: 61).
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Governance, as distinct from government, presupposes some form of
partnership between elected government representatives or their appointees
and individuals representing different stakeholder constituencies. These
partnerships can range from being merely consultative and token, to more
formal structures, such as the accreditation process used for NGOs by UN
agencies such as ECOSOC (the Covenant Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights), to near or full joint decision-making, as in joint ventures
or 'private-public partnerships', national or international roundtables or
standards-setting bodies such as Codex Alimentarius. What constitutes 'good
governance' is a matter of much debate; what should be the final architecture
of the emerging shapes of global governance even more so. We do not purport
to engage in this debate in any detail or with any systematic rigour, assigning
that task to the 'further study' category of follow-up. We do offer some initial
comments, however, on a few of the key challenges posed by global
governance, and the G8's performance to date.
The G8 have commented on at least two different facets of governance. In
Genoa, for example, they advocated the idea of 'public-private partnerships'
(Genoa Communique, para. 13). The '3-Ps', as earlier chapters noted, remains
a controversial proposition amongst health scholars, particularly when applied
to health and social service delivery (Ollila, 2003; Pollock et al, 2002; for
contrasting opinions see Buse & Waxman, 2001; Buse & Walt, 2000). The G8
also concluded their Okinawa summit in 2000 by noting that 'we must engage
in a new partnership with ... non-governmental organisations' (Okinawa
Communique, para. 4). They delivered on this observation the following
year, when the Italian government, host of the 2001 summit, funded a two-
day meeting with almost 200 representatives from NGOs, the academic
community and multilateral organizations. What impact this had on the
decision-making during the Genoa summit is not known. This formal
consultation process was not, however, adopted by the Canadian government
the following year, which, dissuaded by street demonstrators in Genoa and
elsewhere, convened the summit in a remote national park with limited access,
declared the previously public site off-limits to the public during the summit,
and employed a large constabulary to enforce its decision.
The G8 have also weighed in on the 'good governance' debate itself, first
in Cologne, where the HIPC debt relief initiative is couched in terms of support
for 'good governance (Cologne Communique, para. 29), but most clearly,
and emulating similar pronouncements from the IFIs, at the Genoa 2002
summit:
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[W]e shall help developing countries promote:
• accountability and transparency in the public sector
• legal frameworks and corporate governance regimes to fight
corruption
• safeguards against the misappropriation of public funds and their
diversion into non-productive uses
• access to legal systems for all citizens, independence of the judiciary,
and legal provisions enabling private sector activity
• active involvement of civil society and Non Governmental
Organisations (NGOs)
• freedom of economic activities (Genoa Communique, para. 6).
These comments, in contrast to the caution expressed by Emmerij (2000),
largely exclude reference to the corporate sector, focusing almost exclusively
on the public sector. While few would take exception to these components
of good governance, it is revealing that 'freedom of economic activities'
warrants special mention, but guarantees of core human or labor rights, or
of other existing international conventions with important health and
development impacts, inter alia, do not.5 The emphasis on the economic
over the social, cultural and environmental reflects the neo-liberal
assumptions on which the G8 continue to base much of their deliberations
and global prescriptions.
Setting aside our earlier critical comments on these assumptions, the G8's
statements on governance are directed either to national levels or, when more
global in scope, primarily to the IFIs (but only to encourage them to promote
certain qualities of national governance as loan or grant requirements), to
the WTO (but only to encourage it to continue the project of global economic
liberalization) or to certain other multilateral organizations, such as the ILO
or UNESCO (but only to encourage them to 'keep up the good work'). The
larger question of what new forms of global governance should be created, or
how global governance might be improved, particularly with respect to
management of Table 10.3's 'inherently global health issues' - i.e. global
governance for health and development rather than for economic liberalization
- is notable by its absence.
The need for a new framework for global governance is increasingly recognized,
perhaps more so since two wars involving Iraq have revealed the difficulty of
negotiating multilateral solutions when one actor is sufficiently powerful to
quite literally 'call the shots.' One of the axioms of effective inter-sectoral
collaboration gleaned from years of inter-organizational research is that it is
virtually impossible when one of the 'stakeholders' has the capacity to act
unilaterally in 'the problem domain' (Gray, 1989). How this problematic will
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eventually resolve at a global level is unknown. Emmerij (2000: 58), however,
maintains that:
We urgently need the equivalent of the (welfare) state at the global
level. At the end of the nineteenth century, capitalism had become an
economic opportunity and a social problem at the national level.
Extreme riches sided with appalling poverty. It took strong and
imaginative people like Otto von Bismarck (hardly a radical) to start
the building of a national welfare state to balance the raw power of the
marketplace, to construct an income floor below which nobody could
fall, and hence to ensure a more equitable distribution of income.
Nation-states were strong and national decisions mattered in a world
economy that was largely organized along national lines. The private
sector became less free and more civilized.
Now, a century later, globalizing markets are gradually giving global
private enterprises the freedom that their national predecessors had at
the end of the nineteenth century. ... [A] paradoxical situation again
exists, but this time at a global level. We have a booming economy
propelled by energetic and dynamic global enterprises coexisting with
nation-states that are growing poorer and have to downsize the welfare
fabric patiently constructed over the decades .... What is now needed
is a new Bismarck to redefine the economic responsibility of the state
and the social responsibility of the business community.
This is, we acknowledge, a truncated account of a complex political era, one
that is also very Eurocentric and lacking in acknowledgement of the role of
social movement groups (unions, women's organizations and other
progressive reformers of various persuasions) in bending the hand of the
likes of Bismarck in certain welfare directions. Western democracies'
twentieth-century welfare states were as much a product of social mobilization
and political struggle, from the shop floor to the legislature, with the streets
in between, as they were of reasoned or enlightened policy-making. But
Emmerij's plea, while not particularly novel, is gaining in volume.
The heart of this plea is distributive justice, a consideration that has not
been central to the recent commitments of the G8. We can see this from
their parsimonious support of health and education; from the inadequacy of
their debt relief initiative; from their failures to support developing country
concerns and proposals in world trade talks; from their reluctance to give
poor countries market access in areas that might work to the advantage of
the poor, if at a slight cost to sectors within the industrialized countries; and
in their generally inadequate response to fundamental health- and life-
threatening challenges to the environmental commons. We also see this in
areas where the G8 are silent - on tobacco, as we have noted already, but
perhaps most strikingly on the number of proposals that have been advanced
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for some form of global taxation and wealth redistribution. The so-called Tobin'
or financial transactions tax, for example, would, at one per cent, raise over
US$ 720 billion annually 'with minimal impact on capital markets, low distortion
effects and ease of administration' (Wachtel, 2000: 88), as well as having the
potentially positive effect of slowing harmful speculative capital flows. UNCTAD
recommends that such a tax be divided, with half going to countries whose
currencies are being traded and half into a fund for redistribution from rich to
poor countries (cited in Wachtel, 2000: 88).6
The G8 have been extremely vocal on the need for a global system of
continuous wealth creation. They have been remarkably mute on the necessity
for a global system of wealth redistribution. The G8, in sum, appear to be
exercising their nascent role in global governance to the advantage of the
members of their exclusive club, and for certain groups of citizens within
their member countries. Tom Barry (2001: 2), of the Foreign Policy In Focus
group, and another observer of the G8's claim to global governance, expressed
it rather pithily: 'How can such an elite club fairly shape an agenda that will
affect all peoples and nations?' With respect to such an agenda that begins
seriously to redress the human health and development catastrophes arising
in the wake of contemporary globalization, the G8's response can best, if
disturbingly, be described as 'fatal indifference.'
Endnotes to Chapter Ten
1 Cf. Falk (1996: 13) on the need for a 'regulatory framework for global market forces that is
people-centred rather than capital-driven.'
2 A rapidly expanding body of evidence indicates the biological plausibility of such cumulative
impacts (e.g. Evans St English, 2002; Lupie eta/., 2000; McEwen, 2000a, 2001; McEwen &
Magarinos, 2001; Steptoe etal., 2002).
3 Words matter, and the invocation of 'personal responsibility and initiative' recalls the US
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which ended the
guarantee of at least minimal support to US families with dependent children without any
commensurate action to ensure that the 'work opportunities' available would actually provide a
living wage. They didn't (Blank, 1997: 52-79).
4 We recognize that ratification of these conventions does not necessarily mean full compliance
with them; it is an imprecise indicator at best.
5 Elliott (2001) identifies at least three such conventions: The Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), in which parties undertake to guarantee everyone's
'right to public health, medical care, social security and social services'; the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), in which parties agree to
'take all appropriate measures' to ensure, on a basis of equality, men and women 'access to
health care services, including those related to family planning'; and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC), which includes a series of items related to children with disabilities,
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special needs, the matter of an adequate standard of living, access to facilities to treatment
and rehabilitation, and so on.
6 Examples of other proposals include: a small tax on FDI, levied in proportion to the receiving
country's lack of compliance with core labour standards (the right to form a union and
proscriptions against child, bonded or prison labor), with the proceeds used to enact such
standards within the receiving country; a global unitary tax (to avoid the problems of tax havens
and transfer pricing schemes); and a carbon tax (based on per capita consumption of fossil fuels
and biomass).
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The attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001 meant that the
security of the G8 countries against terrorist threats dominated the 2002 and
2003 summits. In this brief epilogue, we first deal with more specifically
health-related areas and then comment briefly on the limits of the definition
of security that the G8 have adopted.
At the 2002 Kananaskis summit, G8 leaders 'welcomed and endorsed' the
conclusions of the G8 Education Task Force, which reaffirmed the importance
of the Dakar goals, while noting that their achievement currently seems
unlikely and that special attention should be paid to gender equity and to
the situation of disadvantaged children, i.e. working children, those affected
by AIDS and violent conflict, and those in rural areas. Although developing
countries were exhorted to demonstrate their own commitment to education
and to pay more attention to issues of quality, no specific commitments of
additional financial resources were made. Instead, the Monterrey
commitments were simply reiterated. Given the history of declining levels
of ODA that we have documented, and the far more impressive performance
in this respect by industrialized countries outside the G8, this admonition is
curious, to say the least. The ability of developing countries to finance
expenditures on education and on other basic social services, including health
care, is also constrained by the continued burden of debt repayment. Here,
the G8 made no commitments beyond those associated with the Enhanced
HIPC Initiative, although they did emphasize the importance of full financing
for the initiative and of securing the agreement of all relevant official and
commercial creditors to providing debt relief. However, the passive tone of
the G8 recommendations, which assign a leadership role to the World Bank
and IMF, is not in keeping with the dominant role played by the G8, perhaps
most especially the United States, in those institutions.
Potentially, the most significant health-related element of Kananaskis was
the unveiling of the G8 Africa Action Plan, which sets out the anticipated G8
role with respect to the implementation of NEPAD. A detailed critique of this
document, which contains a number of positive measures - notably a
commitment to fund the G8 share of the shortfall in financing for the
Enhanced HIPC Initiative and a tentative commitment to allocate half or
more of the new development assistance promised at Monterrey to Africa -
cannot be undertaken here. The conditionality attached to this latter
commitment should be noted: it refers to 'African nations that govern justly,




the possibility that 'economic freedom', as defined by the G8, may actually
entail disinvestment in people. More fundamentally, the Action Plan, by its
very nature, cannot overcome what some critics see as the basic flaws and
internal contradictions of NEPAD (see Chapter 9 and Bond, 2002). And it
remains difficult to understand why many African countries facing disease
pandemics and collapsed health systems on such a scale that the future of
any form of governance is moot should be denied assistance unless they
measure up to conditions increasingly beyond their reach.
The 2003 summit at Evian, overshadowed by divisions concerning the US
invasion of Iraq, continued the previous year's preoccupation with security.
At the same time, it produced 'a cornucopia of specific commitments ... in 14
separate communiques' (Kirton & Kokotsis, 2003), including action plans
on the marine environment, water supplies, famine and health. Notably, the
G8 committed finance ministers to report in September on a proposal by
Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer to create a new International Finance
Facility that would double the overall value of ODA provided by the
industrialized world (Brown, 2003; Elliott, 2003; H.M. Treasury, 2003).
Although an Oxfam spokesperson identified this as 'one of the few positive
outcomes of Evian' (Elliott, 2003), no specific financial commitment was
mentioned - an instance of the general pattern in which
the Evian G8 leaders added little [money] to ensure that their many
promises would actually be kept. Whereas Kananaskis in 2002 had been
one of the greatest G8 global fundraisers ever, mobilizing US$27 billion
[albeit with US$20 billion of this amount earmarked for 'security,'] Evian
ended with only one tenth of that amount near at hand. Even the US$3
billion Evian tried to lock in for the global health fund had to await a
subsequent European summit and donations from the Japanese, Russians
and others, before the pledged and hoped-for money would become
real. In many other areas, the communiques frankly noted the need for
major new moneys, but failed to identify how, when or from where
they would be obtained (Kirton & Kokotsis, 2003).
This failure on the part of the G8 underscores the need for continued in-
depth, critical monitoring of the health implications of G8 (in)actions - an
activity for which we will be seeking partners and collaborators in the months
and years ahead. Such monitoring is particularly important because the
'security' with which the G8 are now concerned is primarily that of their
own populations -a small and disproportionately rich minority of the world's
people - and their own commercial interests, whether those involve France's
transnational water utilities or the United States' pharmaceutical firms. Neither
before nor after Evian was there evidence of significant commitment to expand
the importance attached to issues of greatest concern to the developing world
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in the next round of trade negotiations, now scheduled to begin in September
2003 (Monbiot, 2003; Watkins, 2003). We have noted in Chapter 3 the
continued intransigence of the United States with respect to the Doha
commitments on TRIPs and pharmaceuticals.
Ironically, the results of a poll of 'opinion leaders' in rich and poor
countries, commissioned by the World Bank and released in June 2003, suggest
that elites believe broad and narrow conceptions of security to be connected.
Even while being generally positive about the effects of globalization, the
individuals polled expressed concern about the growing gap between rich
and poor, both within and among countries (Princeton Survey Research
Associates, 2003: 12). More strikingly:
Confronted with the reality that nearly half the world's population
subsists on less than [US]$2 a day, opinion leaders from around the
world are in very strong agreement that poverty reduction is key to
achieving global peace and stability. Overwhelming majorities in
developing and industrial countries alike believe that a major effort to
decrease poverty around the world is essential for reducing global
tensions (Princeton Survey Research Associates, 2003: 17).
Redefining 'security' in this way would not neglect the prospect of future
terrorist acts, which remains real. At the same time, equal emphasis would
be placed on policies to enhance the life chances of (for example) millions of
children in sub-Saharan Africa left orphaned by AIDS, of the Argentine woman
whom the recent economic collapse had left with nothing to feed her children
but soup made with the dried bones of a dead cow (Faiola, 2002), and of the
Mexican woman who now owes US$638 300 on a house worth US$45 000,
because of the dramatic rise in interest rates following the collapse of the
peso in 1994 (Moreno, 2002). In different ways, globalization has threatened
the health and future of these people and countless others, and it is safe to
say that terrorism - at least the kind of terrorism the leaders of the G8 have in
mind - is well down the list of threats to their security.
Clearly, there is potential to use security as the starting point for defining an
international order that is, in Richard Falk's words, 'people-centred rather than
capital driven.' For the moment, however, 'fatal indifference' remains accurate
as a description of the G8 leaders' attitudes toward achieving health for all.
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G7 and G8 Health-Related
Commitments Matrix, 1999-2001
Introductory Comments
The matrix includes only the initial statements and final communiques from
the 1999, 2000 and 2001 summits. However, endnotes are included, providing
the URLs for numerous documents and policy efforts that are referred to in
the documents that have been analysed. The content of these documents,
some of which were generated as part of the summit process and others of
which were produced in other contexts, has been incorporated into our analysis.
Two exclusions from our coverage of the summit documents need to be
explained.
We have not included commitments related to arms control and
disarmament. Although these have obvious and crucial effects on human
health that are perhaps especially obvious with respect to the G8 countries'
role in the highly lucrative global trade in small arms, we concluded that
they required sufficient specialized expertise to be the topic of a separate
research project.
We have also not included commitments related to the so-called war on
(illicit) drugs. Once again, there are important effects on human health.
However, we view as far more important the total silence at the last three
summits on the issue of tobacco control, and would like to draw readers' attention
to the unquestioned lethality of the global tobacco trade and its anticipated
contribution to the burden of disease outside the industrialized world, where
tobacco control has achieved limited legitimacy as a policy objective.1
One inclusion similarly demands explanation.
The connection between human health and international financial policy,
including tax competition and offshore financial centres, is not initially
obvious. However, economic dislocations at the national level that result
from international financial crises (e.g. in the course of the so-called Asian
meltdown in the late 1990s) can plunge millions of people into poverty, with
attendant effects on the social determinants of health. Further, capital flight
has the potential seriously to erode the fiscal capacity even of wealthy countries,
and to debilitate poor ones to the extent that they are unable to provide even
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the most basic forms of security for their citizens. Stated another way, in
conjunction with high levels of foreign debt, international institutions and
financial networks that facilitate capital flight enable elites to socialize the
costs of private capital accumulation, while the most basic determinants of
health are allowed to deteriorate for the majority of the population.
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A. Commitments that can
be assessed in quantitative
or dichotomous terms (e.g.
expenditure figures, agree-
ment reached or not reached) *
B. Commitments about
which adequate data exist
for assessment but which
can be assessed only in
qualitative narrative or terms
C. Commitments that
reflect a basic, but contested,
normative vision of the rela-
tions among markets, develop-
ment and health
* Note that commitments may be evaluated quantitatively even if they do not specify numerical
targets: e.g. a commitment to the importance of renewable energy for sustainable development
can be evaluated quantitatively if figures for domestic R&D spending and ODA on renewables
are available.
Note: Some commitments span columns because they fall into two, or even all three, of the above categories
General commitments
As democratic leaders, accountable to our citizens, we believe in the
fundamental importance of open public debate on the key challen-
ges facing our societies. We will promote innovative solutions based
on a broad partnership with civil society and the private sector. We
will also seek enhanced co-operation and solidarity with developing
countries, based on a mutual responsibility for combating poverty
and promoting sustainable development. We are determined to
make globalisation work for all our citizens and especially the
world's poor. Drawing the poorest countries into the global economy










We must engage in a new partner-
ship with non-G8 countries,
particularly developing countries,
international organisations and
civil society, including the private
sector and non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) (para. 4).
The challenge is to seize the opportunities globalization affords
while addressing its risks to respond to concerns about a lack of
control over its effects. We must work to sustain and increase the
benefits of globalization and ensure that its positive effects are
widely shared by people all over the world. We therefore call on
governments and international institutions, business and labor, civil
society and the individual to work together to meet this challenge
and realize the full potential of globalization for raising prosperity
and promoting social progress while preserving the environment
(para. 2).
Debt relief
Debt relief - particularly the
Enhanced Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative -
is a valuable contribution to the
fight against poverty, but it is
only one of the steps needed to
stimulate faster growth in very








qualified for an overall amount of
debt relief of over US$53 billion,
out of an initial stock of debt of
US$74 billion. We must continue
this progress (para. 7).
In addition to the policies we are
pursuing in our own economies,
we agreed today that co-opera-
tion on three further elements is
important to a strengthened
global economy: ... •
• actions to ensure that the
poorest countries are not left
behind, including the imple-
mentation of the Heavily
Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPC) Initiative (para. 4).
The Enhanced HIPC Initiative we launched in Cologne aims to increase
growth, reduce poverty and provide a lasting exit from unsustainable
debt, by reducing debt on the basis of strengthened policy reforms. ...
This will significantly reduce their debt service, thus freeing resources
for social sector expenditure, in particular education and health. We
have all agreed as a minimum to provide 100% debt reduction of
official development assistance (ODA) and eligible commercial claims
for qualifying HIPC countries. We urge those countries that have not
already done so to take similar steps, and we underline the need for
the active and full participation of all bilateral creditors in providing







We welcome the efforts being made by HIPCs to develop comprehensive and country-owned poverty
reduction strategies through a participatory process involving civil society. IFIs should, along with other
donors, help HIPCs prepare PRSPs and assist their financial resource management by providing technical
assistance. We are concerned by the fact that a number of HIPCs are currently affected by military
conflicts which prevent poverty reduction and delay debt relief. We call upon these countries to end
their involvement in conflicts and to embark quickly upon the HIPC process. We agree to strengthen our
efforts to help them prepare and come forward for debt relief, by asking our Ministers to make early
contact with the countries in conflict to encourage them to create the right conditions to participate in
the HIPC Initiative. We will work together to ensure that as many countries as possible reach their
Decision Points, in line with the targets set in Cologne, giving due consideration to the progress of
economic reforms and the need to ensure that the benefits of debt relief are targeted to assist the poor
and most vulnerable. We will work expeditiously together with HIPCs and the IFIs to realise the
expectation that 20 countries will reach the Decision Point within the framework of the Enhanced HIPC
Initiative by the end of this year. In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the Joint Implemen-
tation Committee by the World Bank and the IMF. We for our part will promote more responsible len-
ding and borrowing practices to ensure that HIPCs will not again be burdened by unsupportable debt.
We note the progress made in securing the required financing of the IFIs for effective implementation of
the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, and welcome pledges including those to the HIPC Trust Fund. We reaffirm
our commitment to make available as quickly as possible the resources we have pledged in the spirit of
fair burden sharing (paras. 24-5).
We welcome the efforts being made by HIPCs to develop compre-
hensive and country-owned poverty reduction strategies through
a participatory process involving civil society. We encourage those
HIPCs that have not yet done so to embark quickly on the process
and thus fully benefit from the debt reduction. We are concerned by
the fact that a number of HIPCs are currently affected by military
conflicts which prevent poverty reduction and delay debt relief. We
call upon these countries to end their involvement in conflicts and to
embark quickly upon the HIPC process. We agree to strengthen our
efforts to help them prepare and come forward for debt relief, by
asking our Ministers to make early contact with the countries in
conflict to encourage them to create the right conditions to participate
in the HIPC Initiative. We will work together to ensure that as many
countries as possible reach their Decision Points, in line with the
targets set in Cologne, giving due consideration to the progress of
economic reforms and the need to ensure that the benefits of debt
relief are targeted to assist the poor and most vulnerable.
In this regard, we welcome the establishment of the Joint Implemen-
tation Committee (JIC) by the World Bank and the IMF, and strongly
urge both HIPCs and IFIs to accelerate their work toward the imple-
mentation of the Initiative. IFIs should, along with other donors,
help HIPCs prepare PRSPs and assist their financial resource manage-
ment by providing technical assistance.
We reaffirmed our commitment to provide 100% debt reduction
of ODA claims, and newly commit to 100% debt reduction of eligible
commercial claims. We welcome the announcement made by some
non-G7 countries that they too will provide 100% debt relief, and we
urge other donors to follow suit.
We note the progress made in securing the required financing of the
IFIs for effective implementation of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative,
and welcome pledges and the initial contributions, including those to
the HIPC Trust Fund. We reaffirm our commitment to make available
as quickly as possible the resources we have pledged. In this context,





We have decided to give a fresh
boost to debt relief to developing
countries. In recent years the
international creditor community
has introduced a number of debt
relief measures for the poorest
countries. The Heavily Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPC) framework
has made an important contri-
bution in this respect. Recent
experience suggests that further
efforts are needed to achieve a
more enduring solution to the
problem of unsustainable debt
burdens. To this end we welcome
the 1999 Koln Debt Initiative,3
which is designed to provide
deeper, broader and faster debt
relief through major changes to
the HIPC framework. The central
objective of this initiative is to
provide a greater focus on
poverty reduction by releasing
resources for investment in health,
education and social needs. In this








We welcome and endorse the Report of our Finance Ministers on the Koln Debt Initiative. The proposals
contained in this report will lead to a deeper debt reduction through more ambitious targets, faster debt
relief through greater flexibility in the timing of delivery of agreed debt relief packages, and a stronger
focus on early cash flow relief by the International Financial Institutions. We also ask the Paris Club and
other bilateral creditors to forgive commercial debt up to 90 % and more in individual cases if needed to
achieve debt sustainability, in particular for the very poorest among these countries. In addition to these
amounts, we call for full cancellation on a bilateral basis, through various options, of Official Develop-
ment Assistance (ODA) debt. For poor countries not qualifying under the HIPC Initiative, the Paris Club
could consider a unified 67 per cent reduction under Naples terms and, for other debtor countries, an
increase of the existing limit on debt swap operations.
... We recognize that these changes will entail significant costs, in particular arising from debt owed to
the IFIs. We are prepared to support a number of mechanisms to meet these costs, recognizing the
importance of maintaining an adequate concessional lending capacity by the IFIs:
• To meet the IMF's costs, the Fund should mobilize its resources, while maintaining an appropriate
level of reserves, through the use of premium interest income, the possible use of reflows from the
special contingency account or equivalent financing, and the use of interest on the proceeds of a
limited and cautiously phased sale of up to 10 million ounces of the IMF's gold reserves.
• The Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) should build on the work they have begun to identify
and exploit innovative approaches which maximize the use of their own resources.
• The costs to the IFIs will also require bilateral contributions. We have pledged substantial contribu-
tions to the existing HIPC Trust Fund. We will consider in good faith contributions to an expanded
HIPC Trust Fund.
• In meeting the costs, we call for appropriate burden sharing among donors, taking into account all
relevant aspects, including the magnitude and quality of ODA already extended and past ODA
forgiveness, and recognizing the contributions of countries with high ODA loans outstanding relative
to GDP (paras. 11-13).
On the basis of this framework,







Club to provide faster, deeper and
broader debt relief, to work with
the HI PC countries to ensure that
three quarters of eligible countries
have reached their decision point
by the year 2000, and to assist
the very poorest countries to
embark on the HIPC process as
soon as possible. Concrete pro-
posals should be agreed by the
time of the next Annual Meetings
of the IMF and the World Bank
(para. 15).
Development assistance
We will ... continue to provide
effective development assistance
to help developing countries' own
efforts to build long-term pros-
perity. Consistent with the con-
clusions of the LDC III Conference
and the Millennium Declaration,
we support a strategic approach
centred on the principles of
ownership and partnership
(para. 5).
We will work with developing










We commit ourselves to imple-
ment the landmark OECD-DAC
Recommendation on Untying
Aid to LDCs ... (para. 14).
national Development Goals, by
strengthening and enhancing the
effectiveness of our development
assistance (para. 14).
We call on MDBs to provide
support for global public goods,
such as fighting infectious
diseases, facilitating trade, fos-
tering financial stability and
protecting the environment. We
support a meaningful replenish-
ment of IDA and, in that context,
we will explore the increased use
of grants for priority social invest-
ments, such as education and
health (para. 13).
ODA is essential in the fight against poverty. We commit ourselves to
strengthening the effectiveness of our ODA in support of countries'
own efforts to tackle poverty, including through national strategies
for poverty reduction. We will take a long-term approach favouring
those countries where governments have demonstrated a commit-
ment to improve the well-being of their people through accountable









To achieve increased effectiveness of ODA, we resolve to untie our aid
to the Least Developed Countries on the basis of progress made in
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) to date and a fair burden-sharing mechanism that we will
agree with our OECD partners. We believe that this agreement should
come into effect on 1 January 2002. In the meantime, we urge those
countries which maintain low levels of untying of ODA to improve
their performance. We will also seek to demonstrate to the public that
well-targeted ODA gets results, and on that basis will strive to give
increased priority to such assistance (para. 20).
To ease future debt burdens and
facilitate sustainable development,
The core role of the MDBs should be accelerating poverty reduction
in developing countries while improving the efficiency of assistance
and avoiding competition with private financial flows. The MDBs
should increase their resources devoted to core social investments
such as basic health and education, clean water and sanitation. The
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF) and the Poverty
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) should become the basis for
programmes that have strong ownership by the recipient countries.
All the MDBs should allocate their support increasingly on the basis
of borrower performance (paras. 9-10).
We will strive gradually to
increase the volume of official
development assistance (ODA),
and to put special emphasis on
countries best positioned to use











we agree to increase the share of
grant-based financing in the ODA
we provide to the least developed
countries (para. 27).
We reaffirm our support for the
OECD mandate to finalize a
recommendation on untying aid
to the least developed countries.
We call on OECD members to
bring this effort to a successful
conclusion as soon as possible
(para. 27).
Domestic political reforms
[W]e shall help developing countries promote:
• accountability and transparency in the public sector
• legal frameworks and corporate governance regimes to fight
corruption
• safeguards against the misappropriation of public funds and
their diversion into non-productive uses
• access to legal systems for all citizens, independence of the
judiciary, and legal provisions enabling private sector activity
• active involvement of civil society and Non-Governmental
Organisations (NGOs)
• freedom of economic activities (para. 6).
We will continue to provide substantial support and assistance to
developing and transition economies in support of their own efforts
to open and diversify their economies, to democratize and improve








Education is a central building block for growth and employment. We
reaffirm our commitment to help countries meet the Dakar Framework
for Action8 goal of universal primary education by 2015. We agree on
the need to improve the effectiveness of our development assistance
in support of locally-owned strategies. Education - in particular,
universal primary education and equal access to education at all levels
for girls - must be given high priority both in national poverty
reduction strategies and in our development programmes. Resources
made available through the HIPC Initiative can contribute to these
objectives. We will help foster assessment systems to measure
progress, identify best practices and ensure accountability for results.
We will also focus on teacher training. Building on the work of the
G8 Digital Opportunities Task Force (dot.force),9 we will work to
expand the use of information and communications technology (ICT)
to train teachers in best practices and strengthen education strategies.
... We encourage MDBs to sharpen their focus on education and con-
centrate their future work on countries with sound strategies but
lacking sufficient resources and to report next year to the G8. We
support UNESCO in its key role for universal education. We will also
work with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to support
efforts to fight child labour and we will develop incentives to increase
school enrolment (para. 18).
We will establish a task force of
senior G8 officials to advise us on
how best to pursue the Dakar









other stakeholders. The task force
will provide us with recommen-
dations in time for our next
meeting (para. 19).
Building on the Cologne Education Charter,16 we therefore support the
Dakar Framework for Action11 as well as the recommendations of the
recently concluded follow-up to the Fourth World Conference on
Women,12 and welcome the efforts of developing countries to imple-
ment strong national action plans. We reaffirm our commitment that
no government seriously committed to achieving education for all
will be thwarted in this achievement by lack of resources.
We therefore commit ourselves to strengthen efforts bilaterally and
together with international organisations and private sector donors
to achieve the goals of universal primary education by 2015 and
gender equality in schooling by 2005. We call on IFIs, in partnership
with developing countries, to focus on education in their poverty
reduction strategies and provide greater assistance for countries with
sound education strategies. These strategies should maximise the
potential benefits of IT in this area through distance learning
wherever possible and other effective means (paras. 33-4).
Basic education, vocational
training, academic qualifications,
lifelong upgrading of skills and
knowledge for the labor market,
and support for the development










In support of these goals, we
agree to pursue the aims and
ambitions set out in the Koln
Charter (para. 16). 13
We commit ourselves to explore
jointly ways to work together and
through international institutions
to help our own countries as well
as developing nations use tech-
nology to address learning and
development needs, for example,
through distance learning
(para. 18).
essential to shape economic and
technical progress as we move
towards a knowledge-based
society. They also enrich
individuals and foster civic
responsibility and social
inclusion (para. 15).
Environment, energy and sustainable development
We confirm our determination to
find global solutions to threats
endangering the planet. We
recognise that climate change is a




global solution. We are commit-
ted to providing strong leader-
ship. Prompt, effective and
sustainable action is needed,
consistent with the ultimate
objective of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change
of stabilising greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere.
We are determined to meet our
national commitments and our
obligations under the Convention
through a variety of flexible
means, drawing on the power of
markets and technology. In this
context, we agree on the impor-
tance of intensifying co-operation
on climate-related science and
research. We shall promote co-
operation between our countries
and developing countries on
technology transfer and capacity
building (para. 23).
We all firmly agree on the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
While there is currently disagreement on the Kyoto Protocol and its
ratification, we are committed to working intensively together to










We recognise the importance of renewable energy for sustainable
development, diversification of energy supply, and preservation of the
environment. We will ensure that renewable energy sources are
adequately considered in our national plans and encourage others to
do so as well. We encourage continuing research and investment in
renewable energy technology, throughout the world. Renewable
energy can contribute to poverty reduction. We will help developing
countries strengthen institutional capacity and market-oriented
national strategies that can attract private sector investment in renew-
able energy and other clean technologies (para. 27).
We welcome the recent adoption
of the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants
(POPs) and will strongly promote
its early entry into force
(para. 28).
We are committed to ensuring
that our Export Credit Agencies
(ECAs) adhere to high environ-
mental standards. We therefore
agreed in Okinawa to develop
common environmental guide-
lines for ECAs, drawing on
relevant MDB experience.
Building on the progress made
since last year, we commit to













the end of the year on a
Recommendation that fulfils the
Okinawa mandate (para. 29).
We ... welcome the conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety,
and encourage the parties concerned to work for its early entry into
force (para. 64).
We will endeavour with all our partners to prepare a future-oriented
agenda for Rio+10 in 2002. We are strongly committed to close co-
operation among ourselves and with developing countries to resolve
as soon as possible all major outstanding issues, with a view to early
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. To that end, we are determined
to achieve a successful outcome at the Sixth Conference of the Parties
to the Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP6), in order to
achieve the goals of the Kyoto Protocol through undertaking strong
domestic actions and supplemental flexibility mechanisms (para. 65).
We invite stakeholders to join in
a Task Force to prepare concrete
recommendations for considera-
tion at our next Summit14 regarding
sound ways to better encourage
the use of renewables in deve-
loping countries (para. 66).
Export credit policies may have
very significant environmental
impacts. We welcome the adop-







be completed by 2001 . We
reaffirm our commitment to
develop common environmental
guidelines, drawing on relevant
MDB experience, for export credit
agencies by the 2001 G8 Summit.
We will co-operate to reinvigorate
and intensify our work to fulfil
the Cologne mandate (para. 68).
We look to the MDBs to play a
leadership role in increasing the
provision of global public goods,
particularly for urgently needed
measures against infectious and
parasitic diseases including HIV/
AIDS, as well as environmental
degradation (para. 11).
To underscore our commitment to
sustainable development we will
step up our efforts to build a
coherent global and environ-
mentally responsive framework of
multilateral agreements and
institutions. We support the
outcome of the G8 Environment
Ministers' meeting in Schwerin15
and will expedite international










general recognition and continual
improvement of environmental
standards and norms (para. 31).
We agree that environmental considerations should be taken fully into
account in the upcoming round of WTO negotiations. This should
include a clarification of the relationship between both multilateral
environmental agreements and key environmental principles, and
WTO rules (para. 31).
We agree to continue to support the Multilateral Development Banks
in making environmental considerations an integral part of their
activities and we will do likewise when providing our own support.
We will work within the OECD towards common environmental
guidelines for export finance agencies. We aim to complete this work
by the 2001 G8 Summit (para. 32).
We reaffirm that we consider climate change an extremely serious
threat to sustainable development. We will therefore work towards
timely progress in implementing the Buenos Aires Plan of Action with
a view to early entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. In particular,
we encourage decisions on the operation of the Kyoto mechanisms
and on a strong and effective compliance regime. We underline the
importance of taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
through rational and efficient use of energy and through other cost-
effective means. To this end, we commit ourselves to develop and
implement domestic measures including under the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change. We also agreed to exchange
experience on best practices. We will also promote increasing global














Food, food security and biotechnology
[A] central objective of our poverty reduction strategy remains access
to adequate food supplies and rural development. Support to agri-
culture is a crucial instrument of ODA. We shall endeavour to develop
capacity in poor countries, integrating programmes into national
strategies and increasing training in agricultural science (para. 20).
We shall target the most food-
insecure regions, particularly
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia,
and continue to encourage
South-South co-operation.
We will support the crucial role
international organisations and
NGOs play in relief operations
(para. 21).
Every effort should be undertaken to enhance agricultural
productivity. Among other things, the introduction of tried and
tested new technology, including biotechnology, in a safe manner
and adapted to local conditions has significant potential to
substantially increase crop yields in developing countries, while
using fewer pesticides and less water than conventional methods.
We are committed to study, share and facilitate the responsible use
of biotechnology in addressing development needs (para. 20).
We recognise our responsibility to promote a clear understanding by
the public of food safety benefits and risks. We shall strive to provide







based on independent scientific advice, sound risk analysis and the
latest research developments. We believe an effective framework for
risk management, consistent with the science, is a key component in
maintaining consumer confidence and in fostering public
acceptance (para. 30).
Maintenance of effective national food safety systems and public
confidence in them assumes critical importance in public policy. We
are committed to continued efforts to make systems responsive to
the growing public awareness of food safety issues, the potential
risks associated with food, the accelerating pace of developments in
biotechnology, and the increasing cross-border movement of food
and agricultural products
The commitment to a science-based, rule-based approach remains a
key principle underlying these endeavours We also support the
efforts of the CAC's Committee on General Principles to achieve
greater global consensus on how precaution should be applied to
food safety in circumstances where available scientific information is
incomplete or contradictory.
Policy dialogue, engaging all stakeholders and including both
developed and developing countries, must be intensified to advance
health protection, facilitate trade, ensure the sound development of
biotechnology, and foster consumer confidence and public
acceptance (paras. 55-7).
In pursuing this dialogue we will pay particular attention to the
needs, opportunities and constraints in developing countries. We will
work to strengthen our support for their capacity building to harness
the potentials of biotechnology, and encourage research and







In light of the increasing impor-
tance of issues concerning food
safety we invite the OECD Wor-
king Group on Harmonization of
Regulatory Oversight of Biotech-
nology16 and the OECD Task Force
for the Safety of Novel Foods and
logics, including those that address global food security, health,
nutritional and environmental challenges and are adapted to
specific conditions in these countries.
Open and transparent consultation with and involvement of all
stakeholders, including representatives of civil society, supported by
shared scientific understanding, is a key component of a credible
food and crop safety system. We ... will explore, in consultation with
international organisations and interested bodies including scientific
academies, the way to integrate the best scientific knowledge
available into the global process of consensus building on
biotechnology and other aspects of food and crop safety
(paras. 58-9).
Because trade is increasingly
global, the consequences of
developments in biotechnology
must be dealt with at the
national and international levels
in all the appropriate fora. We
are committed to a science-
based, rules-based approach to




Feeds17 to undertake a study of the
implications of biotechnology and
other aspects of food safety. We
invite OECD experts to discuss
their findings with our personal
representatives. We ask the latter
to report to us by the next
Summit on possible ways to
improve our approach to these
issues through international and
other institutions, taking into
account the reflections underway
in other fora (para. 43).
Health and health systems
At Okinawa last year, we pledged
to make a quantum leap in the
fight against infectious diseases
and to break the vicious cycle
between disease and poverty.
To meet that commitment and to
respond to the appeal of the UN
General Assembly, we have
launched with the UN Secretary-
General a new Global Fund to
fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and
tuberculosis. We are determined
to make the Fund operational










have committed $1 .3 billion. ...
We welcome the further commit-
ments already made amounting
to some $500 million (para. 15).
The Fund will promote an integrated approach emphasising preven-
tion in a continuum of treatment and care. It will operate according
to principles of proven scientific and medical effectiveness, rapid
resource transfer, low transaction costs, and light governance with a
strong focus on outcomes (para. 16).
Strong national health systems will continue to play a key role in the delivery of effective prevention,
treatment and care and in improving access to essential health services and commodities without
discrimination. ... In the context of the new Global Fund, we will work with the pharmaceutical industry
and with affected countries to facilitate the broadest possible provision of drugs in an affordable and
medically effective manner. We welcome ongoing discussion in the WTO on the use of relevant
provisions in the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. We recognise the
appropriateness of affected countries using the flexibility afforded by that agreement to ensure that
drugs are available to their citizens who need them, particularly those who are unable to afford basic
medical care. At the same time, we reaffirm our commitment to strong and effective intellectual
property rights protection as a necessary incentive for research on and development of life-saving drugs
(para. 17).
Only through sustained action and coherent international co-operation
to fully mobilise new and existing medical, technical and financial
resources, can we strengthen health delivery systems and reach
beyond traditional approaches to break the vicious cycle of disease
and poverty. ...
We therefore commit ourselves to working in strengthened partnership
with governments, the World Health Organisation (WHO) and other
international organisations, industry (notably pharmaceutical
companies), academic institutions, NGOs and other relevant actors in
civil society to deliver three critical UN targets:
• Reduce the number of HIV/AIDS-infected young people by 25% by
2010 (UN Secretary-General Report to the General Assembly on
27/3/2000);
• Reduce TB deaths and prevalence of the disease by 50% by 2010
(WHO Stop TB Initiative);
• Reduce the burden of disease associated with malaria by 50%
by 2010 (WHO Roll Back Malaria).
In order to achieve this ambitious agenda our partnership must
aim to cover:
• Mobilising additional resources ourselves, and calling on the
MDBs to expand their own assistance to the maximum extent
possible;
• Giving priority to the development of equitable and effective
health systems, expanded immunisation, nutrition and micro-
nutrients and the prevention and treatment of infectious diseases;
• Promoting political leadership through enhanced high-level
dialogue designed to raise public awareness in the affected
countries;
• Committing to support innovative partnerships, including with
the NGOs, the private sector and multilateral organisations;
• Working to make existing cost-effective interventions, including
key drugs, vaccines, treatments and preventive measures more
universally available and affordable in developing countries;
• Addressing the complex issue of access to medicines in developing
countries, and assessing obstacles being faced by developing







• Strengthening co-operation in the area of basic research and
development on new drugs, vaccines and other international
public health goods (paras. 26, 29-30).
In addition, we will convene a
conference in the autumn this
year in Japan to deliver agree-
ment on a new strategy to
harness our commitments. The
conference should look to define
the operations of this new part-
nership, the areas of priority and
the timetable for action. Partici-
pation of developing country
partners and other stakeholders
will be essential. We will take
stock of progress at the Genoa
Summit next year and will also
work with the UN to organise a
conference in 2001 focusing on
strategies to facilitate access to
AIDS treatment and care
(para. 32).
We look to the MDBs to play a
leadership role in increasing the
provision of global public goods,
particularly for urgently needed
measures against infectious and













AIDS, as well as environmental
degradation (para. 11).
We are concerned at the conti-
nuing global spread of AIDS. We
reaffirm the need to continue
efforts to combat AIDS at the
national and international level
through a combined strategy of
prevention, vaccine development
and appropriate therapy (para. 41).
We also pledge to continue our national and international efforts in
the fight against infectious and parasitic diseases, such as malaria,
polio and tuberculosis, and their drug-resistant forms. In particular
we will continue to support the endeavors of the World Health
Organization and its initiatives 'Roll Back Malaria' and 'Stop TB'. We
call on governments to adopt these recommended strategies (para. 42).
International finance, tax competition and offshore financial centres
We ... will:
• implement fully the OECD Bribery Convention
• support efforts in the UN to pursue an effective instrument
against corruption
• Encourage Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to help
recipient countries strengthen public expenditure and budget
management (para. 6).
We reaffirm our support for the multilateral effort against abuses of
the global financial system and endorse our Finance Ministers' recom-













We hereby declare our commit-
ment to take all necessary
national and international action
to effectively combat financial
crime, in line with international
standards (para. 46).
We renew our commitment to combat corruption. We stress the need
for transparency in government in this regard, and call for the ratifi-
cation and effective implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention by all signatory parties. Working with other countries, we will
prepare for the launch of negotiations in the United Nations on a new
instrument against corruption, and instruct the Lyon Croup to pursue
work on this issue (para. 47).
We will continue to work together
with other members of the
international community to
further strengthen the interna-
tional financial architecture
(para. 7).
As a universal institution, the IMF must work in partnership with all
its members, including the poorest, based on shared interests. In this
regard, we attach particular importance to the following measures:
Strengthening IMF surveillance to prevent crises: A substantial
qualitative shift in the nature and scope of the surveillance is needed







We urge the IMF to conduct
quickly assessments of offshore
financial centres identified by the
FSF [Financial Stability Forum] as
a priority (para. 14).
We welcome and strongly endorse our G7 Finance Ministers' report,
published today, on 'Actions Against Abuse of the Global Financial
System/'19 and attach particular importance to the following develop-
ments:
• Money laundering: We welcome the initial work of the Financial
Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)20 .... We are ready
to give our advice and provide, where appropriate, our technical
assistance to jurisdictions that commit to making improvements
to their regimes. We are prepared to act together, when required
and appropriate, to implement co-ordinated counter-measures
against those NCCTs that do not take steps to reform their
systems appropriately, including the possibility to condition or
restrict financial transactions with those jurisdictions and to
condition or restrict support from IFIs to them.
• Tax havens and other harmful tax practices: We welcome the
OECD Report on Progress on Identifying and Eliminating Harmful
Tax Practices,21 which includes two lists: certain jurisdictions meeting
tax haven criteria; and potentially harmful regimes within the
OECD member countries. We also welcome the public commit-
ments already made by jurisdictions to eliminate harmful tax
practices and we urge all jurisdictions to make such commitments.
We encourage the OECD to continue its efforts to counter harmful
tax practices and to extend its dialogue with non-member
countries. We also reaffirm our support for the OECD's report on
improving access to bank information for tax purposes and call on
all countries to work rapidly towards a position where they can
permit access to, and exchange, bank information for all tax
purposes.
Offshore financial centres: Regarding offshore financial centres
(OFCs) that do not meet international financial standards, we
welcome the identification by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
of priority jurisdictions for assessment. We consider it essential for
OFCs to implement all measures recommended by the FSF with a
view to improving weak regulatory and supervisory systems, as
well as to eliminate harmful tax competition and to adopt anti-
money laundering measures. In this regard, we attach priority to
the eight areas identified by our Finance Ministers: international
co-operation, exchange of information, customer identification,
abolition of excessive secrecy, effective vetting of financial institu-
tions, enhanced resources for financial supervision and anti-money
laundering compliance, improved legislation on money laundering
and elimination of harmful tax practices. We will take steps to
encourage jurisdictions to make the necessary changes and
provide technical assistance where appropriate. Where jurisdictions
fail to meet certain standards and are not committed to enhancing
their level of compliance with international standards, we will also
take measures to protect the international financial system from
the effects of these failures.
Role of international financial institutions (IFIs): We urge IFIs,
including the IMF and World Bank, to help countries implement
relevant international standards, in the context of financial sector











We agreed to intensify our
dialogue within the G8 structures
on the longer term social,
structural and economic reform
in Russia. ... We agreed to deepen
our cooperation on law enforce-
ment, fighting organized crime
and money laundering, including
as they relate to capital flight
(para. 7).
We call upon our Ministers of Finance, in coordination with other
Ministers, in particular with Ministers of Justice and the Interior, to
coordinate the development and implementation of complementary
positions regarding offshore financial centers and the FATF's
[Financial Action Task Force's] work on non-cooperative jurisdictions
in the various fora where these issues are being addressed (para. 21).
We welcome the establishment of the OECD's Forum on harmful tax
competition and the actual start of implementing the guidelines and
recommendations adopted by the OECD with respect to the harmful
effects of unfair tax practices. We strongly endorse the current work
program of the Forum, in particular the efforts to identify tax havens.
We also support the Forum's intention to engage in a dialogue with
jurisdictions identified through this process. We urge that this work
be given a high priority. We also note the ongoing work to implement










Labour, employment and social policy
In the firm belief that economic performance and social inclusion are
mutually dependent, we commit to implement policies in line with
the recommendations of the G8 Labour Ministers Conference held in
Torino last year22 (para. 32).
We ... welcome the increasing co-
operation between the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation (ILO)
and the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs) in promoting
adequate social protection and
core labour standards. We urge
the IFIs to incorporate these
standards into their policy dia-
logue with member countries. In
addition, we stress the impor-
tance of effective co-operation
between the World Trade Organi-
sation (WTO) and the ILO on the
social dimensions of globalisation
and trade liberalisation (para. 16).
To strengthen the foundations for sustainable growth and job
creation, we strongly emphasize a two-tiered approach:
1. promoting structural reforms to enhance the adaptability and
competitiveness of our economies and to help the long-term







2. pursuing macroeconomic policies for stability and growth and to
ensure that monetary and fiscal policies are well balanced.
The greater the adaptability of our economies, the greater the
likelihood that economic growth will result in more employment.
We therefore strongly support the elimination of structural rigidities
in labor, capital and product markets, the promotion of entrepre-
neurship and innovation, investment in human capital, reform of the
tax/benefit systems to strengthen economic incentives and encou-
rage employment, and development of an innovative and
knowledge-based society (paras. 12-13).
We also endorse the G8 Labor Ministers' conclusions at their confe-
rence in Washington last February,23 namely to provide social safety
nets that support employment, to prevent long-term unemployment
by early action, to facilitate job search by offering labor market infor-
mation and employment services, to promote lifelong learning and
new forms of work organization, to ensure equal access to the labor
market for all workers, including job entrants and older workers, and
to take forward the social dialogue (para. 14).
As the process of globalization has gained momentum, it has
brought with it important social and economic progress. At the same
time, rapid change and integration has left some individuals and
groups feeling unable to keep up and has resulted in some
dislocation, particularly in developing countries. We therefore need
to take steps to strengthen the institutional and social infrastructure
that can give globalization a 'human face' and ensure increasing,
widely shared prosperity.
Social security policies, including social safety nets, must be strong










change and liberalization and to improve their chances on the labor
market, while enhancing social cohesion. We recognize that, faced
with financial constraints, it is vital to strike a sustainable balance
between social support programs and greater personal responsibility
and initiative (paras. 19-20).
We are convinced that the countries most seriously affected by the
recent economic and financial crises will sustain a speedier recovery
if they create and improve the necessary social infrastructure. It is
therefore particularly important to maintain investment in basic social
services during times of crisis. Budgetary priorities and flexibility
should enhance the quality of social infrastructure and investment
(para. 21).
We call on the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to support and
monitor the development of sound social policy and infrastructure in
developing countries. ... We urge the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to give more attention to this issue in designing its economic
programs and to give particular priority to core budgets such as basic
health, education and training to the extent possible, even during
periods of fiscal consolidation (para. 23).
We commit ourselves to promote effective implementation of the
International Labor Organization's (ILO) Declaration On Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-up. We also welcome the
adoption of the ILO Convention on the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labor. We further intend to step up work with developing
countries to improve their capacity to meet their obligations. We
support the strengthening of the ILO's capacity to assist countries in










Macroeconomic policy and poverty reduction
Drawing the poorest countries
into the global economy is the
surest way to address their
fundamental aspirations. ... The
situation in many developing
countries -especially in Africa -
calls for decisive global action.
The most effective poverty
reduction strategy is to maintain
a strong, dynamic, open and
growing global economy
(paras. 3-4).
To help developing countries improve the climate for private
investment, we urge MDBs and other relevant international bodies
to support domestic reform efforts, including the establishment of
public-private partnerships and investment-related best practices, as
well as codes and standards in the field of corporate governance,
accounting standards, enhanced competition and transparent tax
regimes. We call on the World Bank to provide additional support
for programmes that promote private sector development in the
poorest countries (para. 13).
To promote further investments in the knowledge-based economy,
we call on the WTO and the World Intellectual Property Rights
Organisation, in collaboration with the World Bank, to help the
poorest countries comply with international rules on intellectual













We pledge to pursue policies that will contribute to global growth
by enhancing strong productivity growth in a sound macroeconomic
environment, through structural reform, free trade and strengthened
international economic co-operation (para. 2).
To capitalise on the opportunities before us, we must renew our
unwavering commitment to structural change in our own economies,
including greater competition and more adaptable labour markets,
underpinned by appropriate macro-economic policies (para. 9).
[W]e commit ourselves to the agreed international development goals,
including the overarching objective of reducing the share of the
world's population living in extreme poverty to half its 1990 level by
2015. We welcome the Report on Poverty Reduction by Multilateral
Development Banks (MDBs) and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF)24 which we requested in Cologne, and we look forward to recei-
ving an annual poverty report as we review progress each year in
reducing poverty across the globe (para. 13).
[M]any countries have made
significant progress in over-
coming poverty in the past
quarter century, and their
example is a beacon of hope for
others. From their success, we
have learned that poverty can
best be overcome in resilient,
peaceful, and democratic
societies with freedom and










open economies and dynamic
private sectors, and strong and
accountable leaders and
institutions (para. 14).
Robust, broad-based and equitable economic growth is needed to
fight poverty and rests on expanding people's capabilities and
choices. Government must, in co-operation with the private sector
and broader civil society, establish economic and social foundations
for broad-based, private sector growth. ... We will work with
developing countries to put in place policies, programmes and
institutions that offer people a fair chance to better their lives. We
therefore welcome the constructive discussions of the Tenth Meeting
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD X) in Bangkok, and will work in the United Nations and
other fora to further reduce poverty, especially in the Least Devel-
oped Countries (LDCs) (para. 15).
Trade and investment are critical to promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty. We
commit ourselves to put a higher priority on trade-related capacity-building activities. We are also
concerned that certain regions remain marginalised as regards foreign direct investment, and that the
48 LDCs attract less than 1% of total foreign direct investment flows to the developing countries. We
urge multilateral development organisations and financial institutions to support developing countries'
efforts to create a favourable trade and investment climate, including through the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Integrated Framework (IF) (para. 17).
We welcome the outline agree-
ments recently reached by Russia
with the IMF and the World Bank







implementation as a further
important step in Russia's reform
program. Once an IMF agreement
is in place, we encourage the
Paris Club to act expeditiously to
negotiate a debt rescheduling
agreement with Russia (para. 6).
We agreed to intensify our dia-
logue within the G8 structures on
the longer term social, structural
and economic reform in Russia.
To this end, we have instructed
our personal representatives to
ensure the overall continuity and
cohesion of the work among the
G8 on this subject. Particular
emphasis should be given to
concrete areas of cooperation
such as small business develop-
ment, strengthened cooperation
with regions, health, [and] the
social impact of economic transfor-
mation (para. 7).
Technology for development
We endorse the report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force (dot.force)
and its Genoa Plan of Action25 that successfully fulfilled the Okinawa










all stakeholders to demonstrate ownership, to mobilise expertise and
resources and to build on this successful co-operation (para. 22).
We will set up a Digital
Opportunities Task Force (dot.
force), which will be asked to
report to our next meeting its
findings and recommendations
on global action to bridge the
international information and
knowledge divide (para. 12).
IT empowers, benefits and links people the world over, allows global
citizens to express themselves and know and respect one another. It
also has immense potential for enabling economies to expand
further, countries to enhance public welfare and promote stronger
social cohesion and thus democracy to flourish. Access to the digital
opportunities must, therefore, be open to all.
In support of these goals, we commit ourselves to pursuing the aims
and ambitions set out in the Okinawa Charter on the Global
Information Society26 (paras. 10-12).
Trade and market access
Open trade and investment drive global growth and poverty reduction. That is why we have agreed











We confirm our pledge made at the UN LDC III Conference to work
towards duty-free and quota-free access for all products originating
in the least developed countries. We support efforts made by LDCs to
enter the global trading system and to take advantage of opportu-
nities for trade-based growth (para. 11).
[T]o help developing countries benefit from open markets, we will
better co-ordinate our trade-related assistance to:
• provide bilateral assistance on technical standards, customs sys-
tems, legislation needed for World Trade Organisation (WTO)
membership, the protection of intellectual property rights,
and human resource development
• support the work of the Integrated Framework for Trade-Related
Technical Assistance
• encourage the international financial institutions to help remove
obstacles to trade and investment, and establish the institutions
and policies essential for trade to flourish
• urge countries to mainstream trade expansion by including it in
their poverty reduction strategies (para. 12).
In addition to the policies we
are pursuing in our own
economies, we agreed today
that co-operation on three
further elements is important to
a strengthened global economy
[including] ... the launch of a










Sustained economic growth world-wide requires a renewed commitment to free trade. Opening markets
globally and strengthening the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as the bedrock of the multilateral
trading system is therefore an economic imperative. It is for this reason that we pledge today to engage
personally and jointly in the launch of a new ambitious Round of global trade negotiations at the Fourth
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar this November. We are committed to working with
developing countries, including the least developed, to ensure that the new Round addresses their
priorities through improved market access and sounder, more transparent trade rules. We recognise that
there are legitimate concerns in implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements. We welcome the steady
progress made so far on implementation issues and are ready to examine ways to make further progress
in connection with the launch of a new Round. Capacity building is essential to integrate developing
countries into the trading system, and we are intensifying our efforts to assist in this area, including with
international institutions. In the interests of all, the new Round should be based on a balanced agenda,
while clarifying, strengthening and extending multilateral rules. An improved dispute settlement
mechanism is central to this effort. Increased transparency in the WTO itself is also important to
strengthen confidence in the global trading system. The WTO should continue to respond to the
legitimate expectations of civil society, and ensure that the new Round supports sustainable develop-
ment (paras. 6-8).
Trade and investment are critical to promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty. We
commit ourselves to put a higher priority on trade-related capacity-building activities. We are also
concerned that certain regions remain marginalised as regards foreign direct investment, and that the
48 LDCs attract less than 1% of total foreign direct investment flows to the developing countries. We
urge multilateral development organisations and financial institutions to support developing countries'
efforts to create a favourable trade and investment climate, including through the Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Integrated Framework (IF) (para. 17).
We must ensure that the multilateral trading system is strengthened and continues to play its vital role in
the world economy. Recognising this responsibility, we are firmly committed to a new round of WTO







members. We agree that the objective of such negotiations should be to enhance market access, develop
and strengthen WTO rules and disciplines, support developing countries in achieving economic growth
and integration into the global trading system, and ensure that trade and social policies, and trade and
environmental policies are compatible and mutually supportive. We agree to intensify our close and
fruitful co-operation in order to try together with other WTO members to launch such a round during
the course of this year. We recognise that more comprehensive partnership must be developed to help
address the challenges of globalisation. In this regard, international and domestic policy coherence
should be enhanced, and co-operation between the international institutions should be improved. We
also underline the importance of our engagement with our publics to establish a constructive dialogue
on the benefits and challenges of trade liberalisation (paras. 36-7).
We therefore call on all nations to
launch at the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Seattle in
December 1999 a new round of
broad-based and ambitious
negotiations with the aim of
achieving substantial and
manageable results (para. 10).
We pledge to work for a successful
ministerial meeting in Seattle in
order to launch the new round
[of trade negotiations]. We will
also seek a more effective way
within the WTO for addressing
the trade and environment rela-
tionship and promoting sustaina-









We encourage all members to make proposals for progress in areas
where developing countries and in particular least developed coun-
tries can make solid and substantial gains; all countries should
contribute to and benefit from the new round. An effective new round
of trade negotiations should help pave the way for the further inte-
gration of the developing countries into the world economy. In this
context we reaffirm our commitment made in Birmingham last year
to the least developed countries on improved market access (para. 10).
We intend to step up work with developing countries and multilateral institutions to improve developing
countries' capacity to exercise their rights and meet their obligations in the global trading system so as to
ensure that they derive the full benefits of liberalized trade and thus contribute to global economic
growth (para. 27).
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21 http://www1.oecd.org/daf/fa/harm_tax/Report_En.pdf; for a report on










Several of the figures in this book were calculated and plotted using data from
multiple sources. Appendix 2 provides the raw numbers for these figures, their
sources and some of the calculations we performed to estimate new numbers.
Figure 3.1: Average Annual Key Health Indicators and Health Expenditures in G7,


















































































Source: World Bank (2002d: Tables 2.15 & 2.20)























































Source: OECD (2001 c: Table 2 [1990-92 and 1996-98 data]); OECD (2002b:
Tables 14 & 19 [2000 data]); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19 [2001 data])
Estimates of 1999, 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
*Total Official Development Assistance includes bilateral aid (country to country) and
multilateral aid (contributions made by donor countries to the European Commission,
the World Bank and regional development banks).
Note: Averages for 1990-92 and 1996-98 are for bilateral aid only. Data on country-
specific contributions to multilateral health aid could not be obtained or calculated
(imputed).





















































Source: OECD (2002b: Tables 14 & 19); German and Randel (2002); OECD (2003:
Tables 13, 15 & 19)
* Estimates of multilateral contributions made by authors.
**Basic health spending is part of total health spending.





































































Sources: OECD (2002b: Tables 14 & 19); Germany and Randel (2002); OECD (2003:
Tables 13, 15 & 19)
* Estimates of multilateral contributions made by authors.
**Basic health spending is part of total health spending. Population health is a separate
category.
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Sources: OECD (2002b: Tables 14 & 19); German and Randel (2002); OECD (2003:
Tables 13, 15 & 19)
*lncludes both bilateral and multilateral contributions. Estimates of multilateral
contributions made by authors.





















































Source: UNESCO (2002b: Table 5.2); OECD (2001 c: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD
(2002b: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
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Estimates of 1999, 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
Total ODA includes bilateral aid (country to country) and multilateral aid
(contributions made by donor countries to the European Commission, the World
Bank and Regional Development Banks). In 1999, the multilateral contributions for
European G7 countries were approximated using EC sector commitments in 2000, as
data on EC sector commitments for 1999 are not available.
Note: Averages for 1990-92 and 1993-96 for bilateral aid only.



















































Source: OECD (2002b: Table 19); OECD (2003: Table 19)
'Estimates of multilateral contributions made by authors.
r*Basic education spending is part of total education spending.
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Source: UNFAO (2001: Table 1)











































Source: OECD (2001 c: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD (2002b: Tables 13, 15, 18 & 19);
OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
Estimates of 1999, 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
The multilateral contributions for European G7 countries in 1999 were approximated
using EC sector commitments in 2000, as data on EC sector commitments for 1999 are
not available. 1979-80 is bilateral aid only.
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Source: OECD (2001 c: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD (2002b: Tables 13, 15 & 19); OECD
(2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
The multilateral contributions for European G7 countries in 1999 were approximated
using EC sector commitments in 2000, as data on EC sector commitments for 1999 is
not available.
Figure 5.4: US Agricultural and Food Aid, 2001, Compared to Increased Annual










Source: OECD (2003: Tables 13, 15 & 19)
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Source: OECD (2002b: Table 4); OECD (2003, Table 4)
Estimates of 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.























































Source: OECD (2003: Table 8)
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Source: OECD (2003: Table 8)


































































Source: OECD (2001 c, 2002b, 2003: Table 23; data on US not provided)














































Source: OECD (2002b, Tables 4 & 31); OECD (2003, Tables 4 & 31)
Estimates of 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
















































Source: OECD (2002b, Table 31); OECD (2003, Table 31)








































Source: OECD (2002b: Table 28); OECD (2003: Table 28)
Estimates of 2000 and 2001 multilateral contributions made by authors.
Reported as fiscal years (e.g. 1989-90) rather than calendar years (e.g. 1990).

































Source: OECD (2002b: Table 32); OECD (2003: Table 32)
Reported as fiscal years (e.g. 1989-90) rather than calendar years (e.g. 1990).
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Source: OECD (2003: Table 27)
Reported as fiscal years (e.g. 1990-91) rather than calendar years (e.g. 1991).
Figure 6.10: Trends in C7 Total ODA Disbursements to Sub-Saharan Africa

















Source: OECD (2003: Table 30)






























Source: World Bank (2002d: Table 5.5)
G7 average excludes France and Japan, for which data were not available.



































Source: OECD (2001 c: Table 19; 2002b: Table 19; 2003: Table 19)
The multilateral contributions for European G7 countries in 1999 were approximated
using EC sector commitments in 2000, as data on EC sector commitments for 1999 are
not available.
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Multilateral ODA Calculations
The OECD Development Assistance Committee report (OECD, 2002b) provides
country-specific data for bilateral aid, by key sectors. It does not, however, provide
multilateral aid by country for these same key sectors. Comparing sector-specific
aid trends without estimating countries' portions of 2000 aid contributed through
multilateral agencies would be egregious, to say the least. Instead, we estimate
total 2000 ODA (bilateral and multilateral) based on the following calculation:
country-specific percentage of total aid contributed through each of the three
multilateral agencies (Regional Development Banks, World Bank, European
Commission) x the percentage of aid provided to the specific sector by each of
the multilateral agencies. The sum of these calculations is added to that country's
sector-specific bilateral contribution. While reasonably accurate, there may be
small margins of error: the OECD report (2002b) itself cautions that figures for
the European Commission are 'approximate.' Total 2001 ODA contributions
are based on the same calculations, using provisional data from the OECD
(2003). An even greater note of caution is expressed for 1999 multilateral
estimates. We applied the same formula as for 2000 and 2001, but the percentage
of EC aid contributions by sector is not available for 1999. We used the percentages
for 2000 as a rough approximation. For this reason, we do not include 1999 in
calculating G7 averages, but rely on years for which data are more reliable
(2000,2001).


































































































Source: OECD (2001 c: Tables 13, 14 & 19); OECD (2002b: Table 19)
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% of Total Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Contributions to Specific












































































































Disease control/AIDS, malaria and other communicable diseases
Financial support/affordable drugs
Medical doctors and traditional practitioners
Capacity-building
Sustainable health-care systems
Health as a means to growth and development
The poor as a priority health target
II Health-Related Commitments Explicitly Recognised
Poverty
Food and food production
The Environmental and Energy Initiative
HI Health-Related Commitments not Explicitly Recognised
Safe water and sanitation
People-centered development
Global partnership: Elimination of unequal relations and marginalization
African autonomy and African Renaissance
GDP target for sustainable development
Debt reduction





Appendix 3: NEPAD's Health Commitments
Introduction
Whilst anyone can produce a valid assessment of anyone else, the exercise
carries extra weight to the extent that the subject of the assessment agrees with
the criteria being used. Health is not NEPAD's primary focus. Development is.
Nonetheless, NEPAD does contain health commitments that are explicitly
recognized. NEPAD also includes non-health factors that it explicitly
acknowledges as having an impact on health.
These acknowledgements are important because they mean that, given the
reality of everything being interconnected with everything else, NEPAD is not
being assessed in terms of criteria that have been externally imposed on it.
The structure of this Report Card mirrors NEPAD'S own position. This is to
say, the Report Card begins with NEPAD's own explicitly acknowledged direct
health commitments, which, accordingly, carry the greatest weight. The Report
Card follows these commitments with those that NEPAD recognizes as being
health-related, even though not in themselves self-evidently health factors.
The Report Card ends with NEPAD commitments that are not explicitly
recognized as being health related, but which plainly have a right to be included
as part of an evaluation of NEPAD's health commitments. These last
commitments are not unimportant, even though they might be said to carry
less weight than those openly acknowledged by NEPAD as being health-related.
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NEPAD's Health Commitments
In the following table, all paragraph references are to the NEPAD document, unless otherwise stated.
DRB = Debt Relief and Beyond
#
1.
A. Commitments that can be
assessed in quantitative or
dichotomous terms (e.g. expen-
diture figures, agreement
reached or not reached)
B. Commitments about which
adequate data exist for assess-
ment, but can be assessed only
in qualitative or narrative terms
C. Commitments that reflect a
basic, but contested, normative
vision of the relations among
markets, development and
health
Note: Some commitments span columns because they fall into two, or even all three, of the above categories.
(i) EXPLICIT HEALTH COMMITMENTS
(Health [is] defined by the WHO as a state of complete physical and mental well-being.)
GENERAL STATISTICS
In the health sector, Africa compares
very poorly with the rest of the world.
In 1997, child and juvenile death rates
were 105 and 169 per 1 000, as
against 6 and 7 per 1 000 respectively
in developed countries. Life
expectancy is 48.9 years, as against
77.7 years in developed countries. Only
16 doctors are available per 100 000
inhabitants, as against 253 in






To reduce infant and child mortality
rates by two-thirds between 1990
and 2015 (para. 68).
MATERNAL MORTALITY
To reduce maternal mortality ratios
by three-quarters between 1990
and 2015 (para. 68).
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERVICES
To provide access for all who need
reproductive health services by
2015 (para. 68).
DISEASE CONTROL/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER COMMUNICABLE DISEASES
One of the major impediments facing African development efforts is the
widespread incidence of communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. African leaders will therefore take joint responsibility
for revitalizing and extending programmes for containing these and other
communicable diseases, so that they do not fall short of the scale required in
order to reduce the burden of disease. Recognizing the need to sequence and
prioritize, the initiating Presidents propose that these programmes be fast-




The Declaration emphasizes ... the
establishment of conditions for the key
challenges of eradicating (or
controlling) disease (paras. 46, 92, 123).
FINANCIAL SUPPORT/AFFORDABLE DRUGS
In order to mobilize the resources required to build effective disease inter-
ventions and a secure health system, Nepad will join forces with other inter-
national agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and
donors to ensure that support for the continent is increased by at least
US $10 billion per annum. Nepad will also encourage African countries to
give higher priority to health in their own budgets and to phase in such
increases in expenditure to a level to be mutually determined (para. 124).
To strengthen Africa's participation
in processes aimed at procuring
affordable drugs, African leaders
envisage facilitating the development
of a partnership between countries,
international pharmaceutical corpo-
rations and civil society organisations
to urgently secure access to existing
drugs for Africans suffering from
infectious diseases. Such a partner-
ship would be in keeping with the







MEDICAL DOCTORS AND TRADITIONAL PRACTITIONERS
Encourage cooperation between
medical doctors and traditional
practitioners (para. 123).
CAPACITY BUILDING
The African leaders envisage the translation into concrete commitments of
the international strategies adopted in the fields of education and health,
as part of the responsibilities and obligations of the developed countries
and multilateral institutions (para. 185).
To empower the people of Africa to act
to improve their own health and to
achieve health literacy, Nepad
requires the joint mobilization of
resources for capacity-building in order
to enable all African countries to
improve their health infrastructures
and management (paras. 123, 124)
SUSTAINABLE HEALTH-CARE SYSTEMS
To ensure the necessary support capacity for the sustainable development




HEALTH AS A MEANS TO GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
The challenge for Africa is to develop
the capacity to sustain growth and
development at levels required to
achieve poverty reduction and
sustainable development. This, in
turn, depends on other factors such
as infrastructure, capital accumulation,
human capital, institutions, structural
diversification, competitiveness,
health, and good stewardship of the
environment (paras. 64, 94).
THE POOR AS A PRIORITY HEALTH TARGET
Nepad is committed to the successful reduction of the burden of disease
on the poorest people in Africa (paras. 123, 126).
(ii) HEALTH-RELATED COMMITMENTS EXPLICITLY RECOGNIZED
POVERTY
Th is New Partnership for Africa 's
Development's a pledge by African
leaders, based on a common vision
and a firm and shared conviction, that




What is required ... is bold and
imaginative leadership that is
genuinely committed to ... the
eradication of poverty (para. 6).
Poverty, reflected in very low per
capita incomes, is one of the major
factors limiting the populations'
capacity to address their health
problems (para. 126).
While globalization has increased the
cost of Africa's ability to compete,
we hold that the advantages of an
effectively managed integration
present the best prospects for future
economic prosperity and poverty
reduction (para. 28).
Experience shows that, despite the
unparalleled opportunities that
globalization has offered to some
previously poor countries, there is
nothing inherent in the process that
automatically reduces poverty and
inequality (para. 40).
The new phase of globalization
coincided with the reshaping of
international relations in the aftermath




The Declaration emphasizes ... the establishment of conditions ... for the
key challenges of eradicating poverty and disease (para. 46).
Although long-term funding is envi-
saged under this initiative, the
projects can be expedited to help
eradicate poverty in Africa and place
African countries ... on a path of
sustainable growth and development
and thus halt the marginalization of
Africa in the globalization process
(para. 62).
This is associated with the emergence
of new concepts of security and self-
interest, which encompass the right to
development and the eradication of
poverty (para. 43).
While growth rates are important, they
are not by themselves sufficient to
enable African countries to achieve the
goal of poverty reduction. The
challenge for Africa, therefore, is to
develop the capacity to sustain growth









To eradicate poverty in Africa and to place African countries ... on a path
of sustainable growth and development .... (para. 67).
To ensure that the continent achieves the agreed International Develop-
ment Goals (IDGs) .... To reduce the proportion of people living in extreme
poverty by half between 1990 and 2015 (para. 68).
The strategy has the following
expected outcomes:
.... - Reduction in poverty and
inequality (para. 69).
• To provide focused leadership by
prioritising poverty reduction in all
the programmes and priorities of
the New Partnership for Africa's
Development, as well as national
macroeconomicand sectoral policies;
The state has a major role to play in
promoting economic growth and
development and in implementing
poverty reduction programmes
(para. 86).
The structural gap in infrastructure
constitutes a very serious handicap to
economic growth and poverty
reduction (para. 98).
26.
• To give special attention to the
reduction of poverty among women;
• To ensure empowerment of the poor
in poverty reduction strategies;
• To support existing poverty reduction
initiatives at the multilateral level,
such as the Comprehensive Develop-
ment Framework of the World Bank
and the Poverty Reduction Strategy
approach linked to the debt relief
initiative for Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPCs) (para. 115).
• Require that country plans prepared
for initiatives in this programme of
action assess their poverty reduction
impact, both before and after imple-
mentation;
• Work with the World Bank, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), the
African Development Bank, and the
United Nations (UN) agencies to
accelerate the implementation and
adoption of the Comprehensive
Development Framework, the Poverty
Reduction Strategy and related
approaches;
• Establish a gender task team to
ensure that the specific issues faced
27.
28.
by poor women are addressed in the
poverty reduction strategies of the
New Partnership for Africa's
Development (para. 116).
Improvement in health and nutrition
directly contributes to improved well-
being as the spread of diseases is
controlled, infant mortality rates are
reduced and life expectancy is higher.
The link with poverty reduction is
clearly established (para. 128).
It has been demonstrated in other
parts of the world that measures
taken to achieve a healthy
environmental base can contribute
greatly to ... reduction of poverty
(para. 136).
FOOD AND FOOD PRODUCTION
Nutrition is an important ingredient
of good health. The average daily
intake of calories varies from 2384 in
low-income countries to 2846 in
middle-income countries, to 3390 in
countries of the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and




Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversifi-
cation into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and
export markets (para. 49).
The urgent need to achieve food
security in African countries requires
that the problem of inadequate agri-
cultural systems be addressed, so that




agriculture rests on the removal of a
number of structural constraints
affecting the sector.
A key constraint is climatic
uncertainty, which raises the risk
factor facing intensive agriculture
based on the significant inflow of
private investment (para. 132).
There is an urgent need to diversify
production and the logical starting
point is to harness Africa's natural
resource base. Value added in agro-




• To ensure food security for all people and increase the access of the
poor to adequate food and nutrition;
• To integrate the rural poor into the market economy and provide them
with better access to export markets;
• To develop Africa into a net exporter of agricultural products (para. 154).
• Foster regional, subregional,
national and household food
security through the development
and management of increased
production, transport, storage
and marketing of food crops,
livestock and fisheries. Particular
attention must also be given to
the needs of the poor, as well as
the establishment of early
warning systems to monitor
droughts and crop production.
• Promote access to international
markets by improving the quality
of African produce and agricultural
products, particularly processed
products, to meet the standards
required by those markets.
• Develop new partnership schemes







• To plan and manage water resources to become a basis for national
and regional cooperation and development
• To systematically address and sustain ecosystems, biodiversity and
wildlife
• To cooperate on shared rivers among member states
• To effectively address the threat of climate change
• To ensure enhanced irrigation and rain-fed agriculture to improve
agricultural production and food security (para. 113).
Establish a task team to make plans
for mitigating the negative impact
of climate change in Africa
(para. 114).
Accelerate work on multipurpose
water resource projects, e.g. the
SADC Water Secretariat's investiga-
tion of the utilisation of the Congo
River, and the Nile Basin Initiative
(para. 114).
• Increase the security of water supply for agriculture by establishing small-
scale irrigation facilities, improving local water management, and increasing
the exchange of information and technical know-how with the international
community;
• Improve land tenure security under traditional and modern forms of tenure,
and promote the necessary land reform;
• Enhance agricultural credit and financing schemes, and improve access to
credit by small-scale and women farmers (para. 155).
38.
39.
Expand the ambit and operation of the integrated action plan for land and water
management for Africa. The project addresses the maintenance and upgrading
of Africa's fragile agricultural natural resources base. Many African governments
are already implementing these initiatives as part of this programme. Partners
include the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the World Bank, the African
Development Bank, the FAO and other bilateral donor agencies (para. 190).
Strengthen and refocus the capacity of Africa's agricultural research and
extension systems. The project addresses the issue of upgrading the physical
and institutional infrastructure that supports Africa's agriculture. Technological
innovation and technology diffusion hold enormous potential for accelerating
agricultural output and productivity, but the continent lacks the research
capacity necessary for major breakthroughs. Major players include the Forum
for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA), the World Bank, the FAO and the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
(para. 191).
THE ENVIRONMENTAL & ENERGY INITIATIVE
It has been recognized that a healthy
and productive environment is a
prerequisite for the New Partnership
for Africa's Development. It is further
recognized that the range of issues
necessary to nurture this
environmental base is vast and
complex, and that a systematic
combination of initiatives is necessary
to develop a coherent environ mental
programme (para. 135).
40.
41. The Environment Initiative has targeted eight sub-themes for priority
interventions:
Combating Desertification. Initial interventions are envisaged to
rehabilitate degraded land and to address the factors that led to such
degradation. Many of these steps will need to be labour-intensive, along
the lines of "public works programmes", thereby contributing to the
It is also recognised that a core
objective of the Environment Initiative
must be to combat poverty and
contribute to socio-economic
development in Africa. It has been
demonstrated in other parts of the
world that measures taken to achieve
a healthy environmental base can
contribute greatly to employment,
social and economic empowerment,
and reduction of poverty (para. 136).
It should be mentioned here that
Africa will host the World Summit on
Sustainable Development in
September 2002, and that
environmental management forms the
basis of the Summit. In this regard, we
propose that the event put particular
emphasis on the deliberations on this
theme in the New Partnership for
Africa's Development (para. 137).
42.
social development needs of the continent. The initial interventions will
serve as best practices or prototypes for future interventions in this area;
Wetland Conservation. This involves the implementation of African best
practices on wetland conservation, where social and ecological benefits
are derived from private sector investment in this area;
Invasive Alien Species. Partnerships are sought to prevent and control
invasive alien species. These partnerships are critical for both the preser-
vation of the ecosystems and for economic well-being;
Coastal Management. In protecting and utilizing coastal resources to
optimal effect, best practices are again suggested from which a broader
programme can be drawn up;
Global Warming. The initial focus will be on monitoring and regulating
the impact of climate change. Labour-intensive work is essential and
critical to integrated fire management projects; ...
Environmental Governance. This relates to securing institutional, legal,
planning, training and capacity-building requirements that underpin all
the above ... (para. 141).
The Environment Initiative has a
distinct advantage in that many of the
projects can start within relatively
short timeframes, and they also offer
exceptionally good returns on
investment in terms of creating the
social and ecological base on which
the New Partnership for Africa's





• To increase Africans' access to
reliable and affordable commercial
energy supply from 10 to 35 per
cent or more within 20 years;
• To reverse environmental degra-
dation that is associated with the
use of traditional fuels in rural
areas (para. 109).
To implement national strategies for
sustainable development by 2005,
so as to reverse the loss of environ-
mental resources by 2015 (para. 68).
The New Partnership for Africa's
Development focuses on the
provision of essential regional
public goods (such as transport,
energy, water, ICT, disease eradica-
tion, environmental preservation
and provision of regional research
capacity, as well as the promotion of
intra-African trade and investments)
(para. 92).
Establish a task team to accelerate






Broaden the scope of the programme
for biomass energy conservation from
the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) to the rest of the
continent (para. 110).
Productivity improvement in
agriculture rests on the removal of a
number of structural constraints
affecting the sector ....
The improvement of other rural
infrastructure (roads, rural
electrification, etc.) is also essential
(para. 132).
(iii) HEALTH-RELATED COMMITMENTS NOT EXPLICITY RECOGNIZED
SAFE WATER & SANITATION
"In Africa ... only 58% of the population have access to safe water" (para. 4).
• To ensure sustainable access to safe and adequate clean water supply
and sanitation, especially for the poor;
• To plan and manage water resources to become a basis for national
anrl ronirtnal f-/~>r»r>arat-ir»n anrl Hcn/olor>mont ^r»ara 11̂
The New Partnership for Africa's
Development focuses on the provision
of essential regional public goods





• Collaborate with the Global Environmental Sanitation Initiative
(GESI) in promoting sanitary waste disposal methods and projects
(para. 114).
To improve access to, and affordability and reliability of, infrastructure
services for both firms and households (para. 102).
PEOPLE-CENTERED DEVELOPMENT
What is required ... is bold and
imaginative leadership that is
genuinely committed to a sustained
human development ... (para. 6).
Across the continent, Africans declare
that we will no longer allow ourselves
to be conditioned by circumstance. ...
There are already signs of progress and
hope. Democratic regimes that are
committed to ... people-centred
development ... are on the increase
(para. 7).
GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP: ELIMINATION OF UNEQUAL RELATIONS AND MARGINALIZATION
The New Partnership for Africa 's
Development calls for the reversal of
this abnormal situation by changing
the relationship that underpins it.
55.
Africans are appealing neither for the
further entrenchment of dependency
through aid, nor for marginal
concessions (para. 5).
The New Partnership for Africa 's
developments ... [a] call for a new
relationship of partnership between
Africa and the international
community, especially the highly
industrialized countries, to overcome
the development chasm that has
widened over centuries of unequal
relations (para. 8).
For centuries, Africa has been
integrated into the world economy
mainly as a supplier of cheap labour
and raw materials. Of necessity, this
has meant the draining of Africa's
resources rather than their use for the
continent's development. The drive in
that period to use the minerals and
raw materials to develop
manufacturing industries and a highly
skilled labour force to sustain growth
and development was lost. Thus,
Africa remains the poorest continent
despite being one of the most richly




Africans must not be wards of
benevolent guardians; rather they
must be the architects of their own
sustained upliftment (para. 27).
Greater integration has also led to the
further marginalisation of those
countries that are unable to compete
effectively. In the absence of fair and
just global rules, globalization has
increased the ability of the strong to
advance their interests to the
detriment of the weak, especially in
the areas of trade, finance and
technology. It has limited the space
for developing countries to control
their own development, as the system
makes no provision for compensating
the weak. The conditions of those
marginalized in this process have
worsened in real terms. A fissure
between inclusion and exclusion has
emerged within and among nations
(para. 33).
In part, Africa's inability to harness
the process of globalization is a result




Global governance ... recognises
partnership among all peoples. We
hold that it is within the capacity of
the international community to create
fair and just conditions in which Africa
can participate effectively in the
global economy and body politic
(para. 41).
The United Nations Millennium
Declaration, adopted in September
2000, confirms the global community's




AFRICAN AUTONOMY & AFRICAN RENAISSANCE
The programme is a new framework of
interaction with the rest of the world,
including the industrialized countries
and multilateral organisations.
It is based on the agenda set by
African peoples through their own
initiatives and of their own volition, to
shape their own destiny (para. 48).
The New Partnership for Africa's
Developmentvi\\\ be successful only if
it is owned by the African peoples
united in their diversity (para. 51 ).
60.
61.
This is why our peoples, in spite of
the present difficulties, must regain
confidence in their genius and their
capacity to face obstacles and be
involved in the building of the new
Africa. The present initiative is an
expression of the commitment of
Africa's leaders to translate the deep
popular will into action (para. 53).
However, the struggle they would
be waging will be successful only if
our peoples are the masters of their
own destiny (para. 54).
The New Partnership for Africa's
Developments envisaged as a long-
term vision of an African-owned and
African-led development programme
(para. 60).
GDP TARGET FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
To achieve and sustain an average
gross domestic product (GDP)
growth rate of over 7 per cent per
annum for the next 15 years





Realising that unless something new and radical is done, Africa will not
achieve ... the 7 per cent annual GDP growth rate, the African heads of state
propose the programme described below (i.e. sustainable development)
(para. 70).
To achieve the estimated 7 per cent
annual growth rate needed to meet ...
the goal of reducing by half the
proportion of Africans living in
poverty by the year 2015 -Africa
needs to fill an annual resource gap of
12 per cent of its GDP, or US $64
billion (para. 144).
DEBT REDUCTION
Credit has led to the debt deadlock
which, from instalments to
rescheduling, still exists and hinders
the growth of African countries. The
limits of this option have been
reached (para. 3).
The Declaration further points to the
global community's commitment to
enhance resource flows to Africa, by
improving ... debt relationships
between Africa and the rest of the
world .... It is now important to





We also recognize that, if
infrastructure is to improve in Africa,
private foreign finance is essential to
complement the two major funding
methods, namely credit and aid
(para. 100).
To support existing poverty reduction
initiatives at the multilateral level,
such as the Comprehensive
Development Framework of the World
Bank and the Poverty Reduction
Strategy approach linked to the debt
relief initiative for Highly Indebted
Poor Countries (HIPCs) (para. 115).
The New Partnership for Africa's
Development focuses on debt
reduction ... as ... external resources
required in the short to medium term
(para. 144).
The New Partnership for Africa's Development seeks the extension of debt relief
beyond its current levels (based on debt "sustainability"), which still require
debt service payments amounting to a significant portion of the resource gap.
The long-term objective of the New Partnership for Africa's Development's to
66.
a
link debt relief with costed poverty reduction outcomes. In the interim, debt
service ceilings should be fixed as a proportion of fiscal revenue, with different
ceilings for international development assistance (IDA) and non-IDA countries.
To secure the full commitment of concessional resources - debt relief plus ODA
-that Africa requires, the leadership of the New Partnership for Africa's
Development will negotiate these arrangements with creditor governments.
Countries would engage with existing debt relief mechanisms -the HIPC and
the Paris Club - before seeking recourse through the New Partnership for
Africa's Development. The Debt initiative will require agreed poverty reduction
strategies, debt strategies and participation in the Economic Governance
Initiative to ensure that countries are able to absorb the extra resources. In
addition to seeking further debt relief through the interim debt strategy set
out above, the leadership of the New Partnership for Africa's Development will
establish a forum in which African countries will share experience and mobilise
for the improvement of debt relief strategies (para. 146).
The heads of state of the New Partnership for Africa's Development will
secure an agreement, negotiated with the international community, to
provide further debt relief for countries participating in the New
Partnership for Africa's Development, based on the principles outlined
above. The leadership of the New Partnership for Africa's Development
will establish a forum in which African countries may share experiences
and mobilise for the improvement of debt relief strategies. They will
exchange ideas that may end the process of reform and qualification in
the HIPC process (para. 147).
The New Partnership for Africa's Development \N\\\ support a PRSP
Learning Group to engage in the PRSP process, together with the IMF
and the World Bank (para. 148).
Support efforts of the Economic Commission for Africa (EGA) to establish




The African leaders envisage the following responsibilities and obligations
of the developed countries and multilateral institutions:
• To accelerate debt reduction for heavily indebted African countries, in
conjunction with more effective poverty reduction programmes, of which
the Strategic Partnership with Africa and the PRSP initiatives are an
important starting point;
• To improve debt relief strategies for middle-income countries (para. 185).
Equally important, however, especially
in the short to medium term, is the
need for additional ... debt reduction.
Further debt reduction is also crucial.
The enhanced HIPC debt relief
initiative still leaves many countries
within its scope with very high debt
burdens; hence the need to direct
more resources towards poverty
reduction. In addition, some countries
not included in the HIPC initiative
also require debt relief to release
resources for poverty reduction
(para. 152).
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, CONCESSIONAL FINANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Historically accession to the
institutions of the international
community, the credit and aid
binomial has underlined the logic of
74.
African development. ... Concerning
the other element of the binomial -
aid -we can also note the reduction of
private aid and the upper limit of
public aid, which is below the target
set in the 1970s (para. 3).
The Declaration further points to the
global community's commitment to
enhance resource flows to Africa, by
improving aid .... It is now important
to translate these commitments into
reality (para. 46).
The new long-term vision will
require massive, heavy investment to
bridge existing gaps. The challenge
ahead for Africa is to be able to raise
the required funding under the best
conditions possible.
We therefore call on our development
partners to assist us in this endeavour
(para. 66).
We also recognize that, if
infrastructure is to improve in Africa,
private foreign finance is essential to
complement the two major funding




Work with the African Development Bank and other development finance
institutions on the continent to mobilize sustainable financing, especially
through multilateral processes, institutions and donor governments, with
a view to securing grant and concessional finance to mitigate medium-
term risks (para. 103).
To achieve the estimated 7 per cent
annual growth rate needed to meet
the IDGs - particularly, the goal of
reducing by half the proportion of
Africans living in poverty by the year
2015 -Africa needs to fill an annual
resource gap of 12 per cent of its GDP,
or US $64 billion.
This will require increased domestic
savings, as well as improvements in
the public revenue collection systems.
However, the bulk of the needed
resources will have to be obtained
from outside the continent. The New
Partnership for Africa's Development
focuses on debt reduction and
overseas development assistance
(ODA) as complementary external
resources required in the short to
medium term, and addresses private




... requesting the developed
countries to pledge their Treasury
Bills to finance the Plan. In so doing,
they would not directly commit their
liquid assets. ... We suggest the
establishment of Special Drawing
Rights for Africa (para. 145).
The New Partnership for Africa's
Development seeks increased ODA
flows in the medium term, as well as
reform of the ODA delivery system,
to ensure that flows are more
effectively utilised by recipient
African countries (para. 148).
The New Partnership for Africa's
Development will establish a forum
of African countries so as to develop
a common African position on ODA
reform, and to engage with the
Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) of the OECD and other
donors in developing a charter
underpinning the development
partnership. This charter will:
• Identify the Economic Governance
Initiative as a prerequisite for
enhancing the capacity of African
countries to utilize increased ODA
79.
80.
flows, and will propose a comple-
mentary, independent assessment
mechanism for monitoring donor
performance (para. 148);
• Constitute an ODA forum for
developing a common African
position on ODA reform, as a
counterpart to the OECD/DAC
structure;
• Engage, through the ODA forum,
with donor agencies to establish a
charter for the development
partnership, which would embody
the principles outlined above;
Establish an independent
mechanism for assessing donor
and recipient country
performance (para. 149).
Equally important, however, especially in the short to medium term, is the need for additional ODA .... Additional ODA is
required to enable least developed countries to achieve the IDGs, especially in the areas of primary education, health,
and poverty eradication (para. 152).
A critical dimension of Africans taking
responsibility for the continent's
destiny is the need to negotiate a new
relationship with their development
partners. The manner in which
development assistance is delivered in
81. To reverse the decline in ODA flows
to Africa and to meet the target
level of ODA flows equivalent to 0.7
per cent of each developed
country's gross national product
(GNP) within an agreed period
(para. 185).
itself creates serious problems for
developing countries. The need to
negotiate with, and account
separately to, donors supporting the
same sector of programme is both
cumbersome and inefficient.
Also, the tying of development
assistance generates further
inefficiencies. The appeal is for a new
relationship that takes the country
programmes as a point of departure.
The new relationship should set out
mutually agreed performance targets
and standards for both donor and
recipient. Many cases clearly show
that the failure of projects is not
caused only by poor performance of
recipients, but also by bad advice




Increased aid flows will be used to
complement funds released by debt
reduction for accelerating the fight
against poverty (para. 185).
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
The structural adjustment
programmes of the 1980s provided
only a partial solution. They
promoted reforms that tended to
remove serious price distortions, but
gave inadequate attention to the
provision of social services.
Consequently, only a few countries
managed to achieve sustainable
higher growth under these
programmes (para. 24).
POLITICAL DOMESTIC REFORMS
Democracy and state legitimacy have
been redefined to include accountable
government, a culture of human rights
and popular participation as central
elements (para. 43).
85. Across the continent, democracy is spreading, backed by the African Union
(AU), which has shown a new resolve to deal with conflicts and censure
deviation from the norm (para. 45).
86. To achieve these objectives, African leaders will take joint responsibility
for the following:
• Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and
resolution at the subregiona! and continental levels, and to ensure
that these mechanisms are used to restore and maintain peace;
• Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights in their
respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of
accountability, transparency and participatory governance at the
national and subnational levels (para. 49).
87. Efforts to build Africa's capacity to
manage all aspects of conflict must
focus on the means necessary to
strengthen existing regional and sub-
regional institutions, especially in four
key areas: Prevention, management




reconstruction; [and] Combating the
illicit proliferation of small arms, light




The leadership of the New
Partnership for Africa's
Development w\\\ consider, within
six months of its establishment,
setting out detailed and costed
measures required in each of the
four areas above (para. 74).
The exercise will also include the
actions required of partners, and
the nature and sources of financing
such activities (para. 75).
It is generally acknowledged that
development is impossible in the
absence of true democracy, respect
for human rights, peace and good
governance. With the New
Partnership for Africa 's
Development, Africa undertakes to
respect the global standards of
democracy, the core components
of which include political pluralism,
allowing for the existence of several
political parties and workers'
At the Lusaka Summit, the AU decided
to take drastic measures in reviving
the organs responsible for conflict
prevention and resolution (para. 78).
91.
unions, and fair, open and
democratic elections periodically
organized to enable people to
choose their leaders freely
(para. 79).
Within six months of its institution-




diagnostic and assessment tools, in
support of compliance with the
shared goals of good governance,
as well as identify institutional
weaknesses and seek resources
and expertise for addressing these
weaknesses (para. 82).
The Heads of State Forum on the
New Partnership for Africa's
Development will serve as a
mechanism through which the
leadership of the New Partnership
for Africa 's De velopmentw \ 1 1
periodically monitor and assess
the progress made by African
countries in meeting their
commitment towards achieving
good governance and social
reforms.
The Forum will also provide a
platform for countries to share
experiences with a view to
fostering good governance and
democratic practices (para. 85).
92. A basic principle of the Capital Flows
Initiative is that improved governance
is a necessary requirement for
increased capital flows, so that
participation in the Economic and
Political Governance Initiatives is a
prerequisite for participation in the
Capital Flows Initiative (para. 144).
93. To counter Africa's negative image
through conflict resolution and
marketing [and thus promote African
exports] (para. 165).
94. The African leaders envisage the
... responsibility] and obligation] of
the developed countries and
multilateral institutions ... to
materially support mechanisms for
and processes of conflict prevention,
management and resolution in Africa,
as well as peacekeeping initiatives
(para. 185).
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